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THE MAGHREB STATES, REGIONAL AND FOREIGN POLICIES 1973-1987

BY

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To My Father Mohand Tahar-Ameziane

And to My Mother Thassadhith

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ABSTRACT

By 1973, the period of uncertainty that followed independence in the Maghreb was over, and the regimes in place - whether civilian or military were there to remain. Legitimising formulas were no longer rested on the ideological rhetoric that had been derived from the euphoria of independence, and by now the Maghrebi elites had to seek other legitimising sources. Thus they embarked on consolidating the state through institutionalisation and through new policies that sought to associate key constituencies with the conduct of the government. The intense social transformation over the last two decades, with greater access to education, has been coupled with the new emphasis on the state. Ideology has retreated before the advance of pragmatism and a greater awareness of the developments both at home and abroad. Accordingly, our work suggests that foreign policies of the Maghreb States, in the period under study have been executed in accordance with, and in response to, the exigencies of 'national interest'.

The thesis is divided into five parts:

The First Part, discusses different theories of foreign policy-making and sets out our suggested framework for analysis;

The Second Part, deals with the conflicting and competitive nature that commands Inter-Maghrebin relations. The strife and rivalry for leadership and supremacy in North Africa has been a crucial factor dictating Maghrebi policies in Africa, the Middle East, Europe and beyond;

The Third Part, treats Maghrebi relations with the Arab World and their attitudes with regard to issues ranging from the Arab Israeli conflict to the Iran-Iraq War, while competing for support and allies in their inter-Maghrebin altercations;

Part Four, is concerned with the Maghrebi African policies. While the continent became a battle ground for the struggle against Isreal, it has also become a forum that for long has been dominated by inter-Maghrebin rivalries;

Finally, the Fifth Part, deals with the Maghrebi foreign policies with regard to Europe and the super powers. As in the case of their relations with the Middle East and Africa, relations with Europe and the super powers have also been conflicting and competitive as far as the Maghreb states are concerned. Here, however, Maghrebi pragmatic approach has prevailed through the divorce of the foreign policy utterances from economic practices.

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION

Theories of foreign policy are usually oriented towards the study of well established, highly structured political entities and are concerned mainly with the industrialised and developed world. The foreign policies of the "developing" states, which are assumed to reflect rather different problems and aspirations, have not yet received the same degree of attention from specialists in international politics. Because the developing states are mostly "new" it is more difficult to identify any tradition or well established patterns in their foreign policies. Their lack of "power" and inability to influence major events outside their frontiers, together with the difficulty in acquiring credible information and reliable data about these states, has also served to discourage more detailed examination of their policies. Some scholars have gone so far as to question the utility of studying their foreign policy at all - suggesting that attention might be more profitably focussed on their domestic problems or on the "linkage" between the domestic situation and the international arenas. Presumably to attempt a comparative study of foreign policy-making in a number of such states is only to compound the error.

Foreign Policy in the Developed States

Approaches to foreign policy-making in the more developed states include the theories of "power" politics associated with the "realist" school and with Hans Morgenthau in particular.¹ He identified "power" as the distinguishing element in international politics, whether that "power" was intended to serve aggressive or defensive ends. Whether or not such a view is still appropriate and relevant in this nuclear age is a matter for debate. What is obvious, however, is that most states of the Third World lack not only the elements of national power but also the capacity to create those elements, at least in the short run. They are characterised more by dependence, or at best interdependence. The decision-making approach associated with Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, directs attention more to the motivations of the decision-makers, themselves, the flow of information among them and the way they interpret and respond to the many signals that they receive.² Here the "human" dimension is of particular interest : i.e., the perceptions and subsequent behaviour of those directly responsible for making and implementing government policy.

The "bureaucratic" model,³ on the other hand, emphasises the role played in the foreign policy process by administrators and officials of all grades and at all levels, instead of focussing solely on the top decision-makers. Because of the considerable

turnover in government and among party leaders, in many states, and because politicians often lack expertise in foreign policy, they must of necessity rely on career public servants for information and advice. Hence the importance of bureaucrats in the shaping of foreign policy.⁴ Both the decision-making approach and the bureaucratic model suggest an open system with a well structured and well organised decisional unit, possessing a high level of political institutionalisation, ready access to information, together with a sophisticated and highly routinised bureaucracy. This last then plays a significant role in shaping foreign policy decisions in a manner that is both rational and cautious.

This scenario seems far removed from that to be encountered in most developing countries where the level of institutionalisation is low, and the indices of instability and insecurity remain high. Such states are seldom characterised by bureaucratic rationality. The dominant influence is usually the personality and character of a political leader unconstrained by an opposition or by a free press. Public opinion and pressure groups count for little while the role and influence of the bureaucracy - such as it is - depends for its effectiveness on the support and confidence of the political leadership.

The communication or "steering" model, presented by John Burton, seems even less relevant to the analysis of policy making in developing states.⁵ It assumes that the state has ready access

to large quantities of information and the capacity to collect, classify, store, retrieve and process such information. It is claimed that modern states, thanks to the efficiency of their communication systems, now have the ability to adjust and adapt to new external pressures without provoking a crisis. They are well placed to take whatever action may be necessary to meet and contain all threats, real or potential, to themselves and their immediate environment. But the new states, already lacking the power to impose themselves on their environment, are even more deficient in the sophisticated techniques of data collection and processing that are central to the notion of "steering". Information is scarce, genuine choices are few, and the capacity to adjust to new circumstances is necessarily limited.

Similar problems also arise in the case of the "adaptive" model of foreign policy, which focusses on the way states respond to the constraints and the opportunities presented by their different external environments.⁶ The fact remains that most new states lack the resources and the institutional means to adapt to an environment where the constraints are many and the opportunities are few and infrequent.

Foreign Policy in a Third World Context

In the literature on Third World states and their foreign policies the main emphasis has been on the character and quality of the leadership. It is assumed that, where structures are

weak, leadership and personality will be a significant, if often unpredictable variable in the decision-making process. While the observation has considerable merit, and one cannot rule out the idiosyncratic nature of much decision-making in many Third World states, the invocation of leadership (and sometimes charisma) does entail a risk of "reductionism" and over-simplification. Foreign policy-making can easily be made to appear an irrational activity that does not warrant systematic, detailed analysis but dependent rather on the psychology and even the whims of an individual. However prominent the individual he is more or less constrained by the context in which he has to operate, whether domestic, regional or global. The approach also tends to underestimate the role that personalities can and do play in policy-making in the most developed states.

Theories of global or structural dependence often go to the other extreme, seeking to explain the weakness and vulnerability of Third World states by reference to their peripheral role within the capitalist system. While emphasising external rather than domestic factors, and seeking to de-personalise policy-making, the approach usually involves an element of determinism, emphasising economic factors while appearing to exclude any prospect of "independent" foreign policy initiatives on the part of individual Third World governments.

Others again have pointed to the role of foreign policy in seeking to reduce dependence. Thus Franklin Weinstein insists

that the role of foreign policy making in the new states is closely bound up with the pursuit of domestic goals.⁷ In support of that view he identifies three main foreign policy objectives : (1) defence of the nation's independence against perceived external threats; (2) the mobilisation of external resources for the country's development; and (3) the achievement of objectives related to domestic politics, including "nation" or "state" building. In hostile, competitive situations, independence is likely to be the main priority; in a more relaxed environment the emphasis may be on the search for aid and the consolidation of domestic support. One problem with this approach is that foreign policy everywhere has always served a variety of purposes. The manipulation of foreign policy to build a domestic constituency is hardly confined to Third World states.

In his introduction to *Foreign Policy Making in Developing States*,⁸ Christopher Hill argues, as we have done, that much of the theory derived from studies of foreign policy-making in more developed states is likely to be unhelpful if and when it is applied to less developed states.⁹ At the same time he is critical of those who seek to draw a "sharp contrast between decision-making in complex industrial societies, and in elitist developing countries". In discussing the latter he concedes that "no doubt foreign policy in these states is a different matter altogether" : there is the "lack of power experienced by many developing countries" and "decisions will always be subject to the ambitions of individual leaders to make their mark in world

politics".¹⁰ Moreover, it requires little sophistication to be able to see that bureaucracy, and related factors, will be less in evidence in the new states than in countries like Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

But there are interesting exceptions. There are new states where the administration has been especially influential in policy-making, whether negatively by reason of their shortcomings and failures, or more positively, reflecting their (relatively) greater professionalism, experience and intellectual formation.¹¹ Hill turns, however, to other arguments, "structural" this time, to justify the separate treatment that developing states receive in the book, at the same time rejecting any deterministic bias implicit in the notion that "the foreign policies of the developing countries are ultimately shaped by the external environment".

Where the introduction is content to outline the problems posed by any comparative study of foreign policy making within the Third World, the conclusion, by Christopher Clapham, points to regional studies, not unlike our own, as the most promising area for comparative treatment.¹² The existence of a shared culture and history limits significantly the number of variables that have to be considered. It is in the regional context, too, that the definition of goals or the articulation of a "national interest" assumes some importance. While there are obvious problems with the use of the term national interest - this "hoary

phrase" - Clapham does maintain - quite reasonably in our view - that "eventually, some elements of national - or at any rate of state - interest do generally emerge" in the case of the new states, at least in the sense of acquiring a certain perspective and arranging or re-ordering priorities and goals accordingly.¹³

Foreign Policy-Making in the African Context

In an article in the early 1970s, Dennis Austin has provided us with a succinct account of the (then) relatively small but growing corpus of African political studies in the 1960s.¹⁴ Of particular interest to us is his survey of relations between and among the new African states. Being on the periphery such states have had to meet and overcome considerable problems first in formulating and then in implementing their foreign policies. Where the more developed states have been assisted in that area by a long history and a sense of continuity, the recent experience of most African states has been one of colonialism and dependency, accompanied by rapid social and political change, superimposed on traditions and values of a very different kind. The effect has been to delay the emergence of a consensus about national interest and therefore to postpone the adoption of credible foreign policies.¹⁵

Because of their colonial history, African states had to give first priority at independence to domestic problems, which were largely inherited, over inter-state relations. Moreover, in the

absence of any "large body of shared opinion" policy has, by default, been left to individual leaders who have often projected a very singular and strongly personal view of the national interest. Austin does not suggest, however, that this state of affairs need continue indefinitely. There is the possibility in future of a more structured network of relations, thanks to the emergence of regional powers with a larger population base and greater resource potential. For the present, however, and notwithstanding the fact of independence, it is best to approach African governments and the study of their policies in terms of their colonial past and their ties with the former metropole.¹⁶

Here Austin appears to attach more significance to colonial influence in Africa and its persistence long after independence than does I.W. Zartman, in a contemporaneous article.¹⁷ Zartman suggests that dependency is clearly being overcome after only a decade of independence, deriving that conclusion from a rather summary account of Euro-African relations within the evolving context of the Yaoundé and Lomé Agreements.¹⁸ Despite his emphasis on the colonial relationship and its "interest to the African governments concerned", Austin does not, however, see this "as crippling their freedom of action in other directions" - if only because economic and political relationships are constantly evolving along with the patterns of trade and investment. The principal concern in African capitals in the

1970s was not "dependency" but the "indifference" of the European states to the plight of their former territories.

In a discussion of "the determinants" of foreign policy in the African states Olajide Aluko identifies a number of key problem areas.¹⁹ There is the "newness" of the states and the absence as yet of any "tradition" or "firmly established pattern of interests" behind their foreign policies. He nevertheless regards as possibly "an extreme view" Austin's contention that the study of African foreign policies was "a doubtful exercise".²⁰ Like Austin, however, he recognises the inconsistency of much that passes for foreign policy in Africa, as well as the prominence and unpredictability of those engaged in policy-making. Finally, there is "the problem of generalisation" : a problem of comparison, i.e., trying to come to terms with so many sovereign and independent states.

Aluko nevertheless attempts to isolate and identify those situations and concerns that appear to be of particular relevance to a majority of African states. In the domestic sphere there is concern "with unity, stability, independence and economic development"; while abroad there is the pursuit of liberation particularly in Southern Africa; and beyond that there is the search for international peace and security - which can best be achieved through non-alignment.²¹ In Aluko's view the principal variables influencing African foreign policies are the weakness of the domestic economies on the one hand, and the efforts to

raise living standards and reduce external dependence on the other. He seems, on the whole, to agree with Austin that the colonial heritage has been the main influences in African states south of the Sahara. And even if that "is certainly not true in all cases", Aluko nevertheless cites Vernon McKay to the effect that "anti-colonialism is the most obvious and consistent, and all embracing common denominator of African foreign policies".²²

Like Austin, Aluko stresses the importance of leadership in the formulation of foreign policies and "the enormous influence of the African heads of state". Unlike Austin, however, he does recognise the existence of domestic opinion in Africa, in the shape of interest and pressure groups, which "are a continuing factor" in foreign-policy making. Such opinion has in "several instances" prompted changes in foreign policy on the part of African governments, although its importance should not be exaggerated.²³ Again Aluko follows Austin in recognising the weakness of African states and their reluctance to employ force to resolve their disputes. This, in turn, is a consequence of the extent to which power is widely diffused in Africa, only a handful of states - Egypt, Algeria, Zaire, Nigeria - having any clearly discernible advantage over the rest.

In the end Aluko returns to the concerns that are distinctive and, in his view, central to the foreign policies of the African states : on the one hand de-colonisation and liberation, and on the other rejection of the cold war in favour of non-alignment.

It is true that on both issues their achievements have been limited, a reflection of their undoubted weakness together with their continuing differences of viewpoint and interpretation. For some states the French connection retains a certain attraction while for the countries of North Africa it is the Middle East rather than Africa that is the principal focus of attention. In other words, the history that has helped shape the objectives of the new African states has also set the conditions of (and the limits to) their external involvement.

It is interesting to compare two accounts of Africa's external relations which appeared in the same year, 1977.²⁴ Both writers, Olajide Aluko and Ali Mazrui, are African and their interests were then focussed on two contemporary issues : the prospects for liberation in Southern Africa and the idea of a new international economic order. Again each emphasises the salient role of leaders. According to Mazrui, "one important dimension in politics is the interaction between politically significant persons". They are agreed, too, that the history that has shaped both the past and the present will continue to shape the future of the African states. Mazrui goes further than Aluko, however, in stressing that economic dependence is but one aspect of the much wider question of cultural dependency. In the last resort it is the penetration of Africa by Arab/Moslem and European/Christian influences, and their interaction with more "traditional" African ideas and cultures, that has given the

African state its present character and African politics their sense of movement and direction.

For Mazrui, therefore, the search for independence is not just political or economic but is, above all, the quest for cultural identity and racial dignity. This indeed suggests a limited resemblance to the earlier doctrine of *négritude* : but *négritude* was primarily concerned with the upwards mobility of black African and Caribbean elites, and the obstacles they had first to overcome. Mazrui, on the other hand, seeks to overturn what he regards as the "caste" system entrenched in the international division of labour. For him it is race not class that is at the heart of the international system and it is race that is reflected in the global hierarchy of states.²⁵

Aluko sees the main contest, globally, as one between rich and poor with its familiar class overtones. The principal objectives of the new African states are political independence and a fairer economic order. With Mazrui, however, it is race that is the decisive factor at the international level while class, so important in European society, has to compete in Africa with ethnic and other more "traditional" identities. Liberation is a re-assertion of African culture and African values in the face of the challenge from other cultures.²⁶ Aluko and Mazrui are both convinced that, for the African states, the liberation of Southern Africa is (or should be) the main focus of their foreign policies. For Mazrui at least revolution in South Africa

in the 1980s would be an important contribution to the racial and cultural emancipation of black peoples worldwide.²⁷

That emancipation will, however, entail a measure of racial collaboration. For Mazrui the oil crisis of 1973 marked the first successful challenge by Third World states to the international economic (and political) order. A future alliance of Arab oil and Black gold, following the overthrow of white rule in Southern Africa, would mark a critical success for the strategy of "counter-penetration" - i.e., "establishing a Third World presence in the developed world" - which would help to balance the Western cultural and economic presence in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Mazrui concludes that the best and "only hope lies in the capacity of the Third World to use their natural resources more effectively as leverage for reform".²⁸

Austin's broadly historical approach, which emphasises the significance of Euro-African ties can be distinguished both from the "developmental" focus of many writers of the 1960s, and from the "dependency" viewpoint that was more salient a decade later. Writing in the early 1970s Austin shares some of the preoccupations of both intellectual schools. There is his recognition of the continuing and close ties between Europe and Africa and their relevance to "national life" in the African states. There is the realisation, too, that the under-developed African states lacked the power to influence and coerce others and had not yet had the opportunity to develop a clear and

consistent view of their national interest. Indeed, the African states were (and still are) forced to devote much attention to their domestic problems - usually subsumed under the heading of "development".

There is no doubt that, today, domestic issues remain the first priority for most African governments, while inter-African relations are relegated to third place - after relations with the developed world. However, the scope for foreign policy has been greatly enlarged as African states have come to perceive the relevance of wider, often global issues involving debt and economic re-structuring. In any case, the interests of the major African states - as defined by domestic circumstances as well as by the external situation - are by no means as volatile as some have suggested. And with the rupture of the Libyan/Moroccan accord, in 1986, even the Libyan government would appear, at last, to be following a more predictable if not more stable course of action. Even the pronounced changes of generation and leadership, that have been a feature of Africa in the past ten years, have brought only shifts of emphasis in foreign policy - and not the dramatic upheavals that had earlier been feared.

If one no longer has to explain and justify the study of African foreign policy there still remains the problem of interpretation - and perspective. The emphasis by Aluko and Mazrui on "structural" factors, which help to shape economic and cultural "dependency", suggests that African foreign policies

either share (or should share) a range of common concerns which themselves reflect certain common values or orientations; i.e., they are not so much national as African concerns. But on apparently crucial issues such as "dialogue" with South Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, or trade with Israel in the 1970s and 1980s, the African states were far from united.

There were many and varied interpretations of non-alignment while questions of liberation and self-determination, as in the Western Sahara, served to divide rather than unite the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The movements in the 1970s towards regional cooperation, cited by Aluko, proved short-lived or unprofitable, while Mazrui's notion of an Afro-Arab alliance was already being contested in Africa at the very time his book was being published. That idea now looks increasingly fanciful whatever the outcome of the present struggle in South Africa and the longer-term prospects for an alliance of Arab oil and Black gold.

Foreign Policy in a Middle Eastern Context

Similar criticisms can be advanced in the case of another fairly recent and influential study that focusses on the foreign policies of the Arab states.²⁹ Bahgat Korany and Ali Hillal Dessouki begin their study by expressing dismay at the dearth of literature on Arab foreign policies³⁰ and rejecting what they describe as the "contemporary political history approach", with

its inadequate conceptualisation, over-emphasis on historicism, and its neglect of a truly comparative outlook.³¹ In trying to isolate elements they believe are unique to the foreign policies of the Arab states they advance four general propositions. These are that the Arab states share a number of norms and concerns; that their foreign policies are primarily regional in orientation; that domestic and foreign policy are closely inter-related; and that there exists a latent tension in Arab foreign policies between the regional or Arab commitment and the narrow, secular interests of each state.³²

In their search for specifically Arab characteristics Korany and Dessouki lay particular emphasis on cultural homogeneity as a factor shaping policy, and on the centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, the pan-Arab movement of the 1950s and 1960s, culminating in the creation of the United Arab Republic (UAR), features prominently in their account of Arab foreign policies. What is less clear, however, is its relevance to present day policy-making. The authors seem to be indulging in the kind of historicism they were at such pains to reject. Moreover, the establishment of the UAR is seen as confirmation of their view that Arab foreign policies are subject to "intense involvement by the masses".³³ But they fail to draw the distinction between involvement on the one hand and influence on the other. It is questionable whether Arab elites are particularly responsive to pressures from below.

In any long term view of the evolution of Arab foreign policies, the disintegration of the UAR and the factors contributing thereto were probably more significant than its formation. Fouad Ajami, for example, sees it as marking the beginning of the end of pan-Arabism.³⁴ When Korany and Dessouki describe Arab opposition to the Camp David Agreements they choose to ignore the support for Sadat's initiative, not only in Egypt itself but also from the Arab governments of Morocco, Sudan and Oman. The gradual reintegration of Egypt into the Arab fold, which was already well advanced in 1984 when the book in question was published, is likewise overlooked. It does not bear out their claim that the Israeli presence in the region has contributed to the sentiment of Arab unity.

The other writers in the book for the most part subscribe to the conclusion already reached by Ajami : namely, the primacy since 1967 of state interests and state loyalties over earlier pan-Arab sentiment. Paul Noble, for example, in his chapter on "The Arab System : Opportunities, Constraints and Pressures", records the decline in the significance of ideology and of pan-Arabism for Arab political elites during the 1970s.³⁵ He finds confirmation of this thesis in the recent trend within the region away from outright mergers and towards functional bilateral agreements between states. At the same time he insists that, as the Arab world becomes less revolutionary, it also becomes more fragmented while a more prominent role is assigned to *raison d'état* in the formulation of foreign policy.³⁶ That was

certainly the case with Sadat's Egypt and it is also a prominent feature of Syrian foreign policy in its continuing conflict with Israel.

In the Maghreb, too, with which we are primarily concerned, *raison d'état* has long been an essential element in foreign policy-making. In this regard it is interesting that in his contribution on Algeria - "Third Worldism and Pragmatic Radicalism : The Foreign Policy of Algeria" - Bahgat Korany identifies broad Third World concerns rather than pan-Arabism as the dominant ideological strand in the country's foreign policy.³⁷ This is certainly true in the sense that Algeria's anti-colonial strategy and progressive political views have pushed it towards assuming a leadership role in Africa and the Third World, rather than in the more divided and more generally conservative Arab world. Algeria, for its part, tends to look somewhat askance at the other Arab states which it sees as being jealous of its achievements and resentful of its legitimate ambitions.

The other case studies bring further modifications of the editors' thesis about the distinctive character of Arab foreign policies. Thus I.W. Zartman and A.G. Kluge, in their examination of Libyan foreign policy - "Heroic Politics : The Foreign Policy of Libya" - present Muammar Kadhafi as a maverick leader, seeking unity in the Arab world through disunity.³⁸ In his determined bid for Arab leadership he has spared no one, least of all the

Arab Heads of State. His support, until recently, for Iran in its confrontation with Arab-led Iraq, is but one, albeit extreme example of his rather singular approach to the question of Arab unity.

His critics and opponents, not excluding Yasser Arafat, the popular leader of the *Palestine Liberation Organisation* (PLO) , have often been the target of campaigns to remove them. In fact the notion that conflict with Israel promotes Arab unity - as advanced by the editors of the book - is difficult to reconcile with the statement attributed to an Israeli general who maintained that "for Israel, Kadhafi can be a kind of an asset. Who else, in all his frantic attempts to unify the Arabs, is keeping them divided to the extent Kadhafi is?" ³⁹

Many of the case studies seem to suggest that there is little that is particularly Arab about the foreign policies of most Arab states. Which may be why the editors are prepared to concede at the end that the propositions advanced at the outset are only partly confirmed by the studies themselves. This attempt to find a unifying framework for the analysis of Arab foreign policies has, therefore, fallen short of its objective. It was a bold and courageous first step towards a more systematic and comparative analysis of policies that were both complex and difficult. But in the end it has to be admitted that the one feature that today is common to the foreign policies of the Arab states is the

saliency of state loyalties and state interests, contributing to the general picture of disunity.

Foreign Policy in a North African Context

I.W. Zartman is an outstanding scholar whose work has focussed on the study of politics in West and North Africa, more particularly in Algeria. In his earliest writings, dating from the 1960s, Zartman identified the features characteristic of the new African states whose polities were as underdeveloped as their economies. They suffered from low levels of institutionalisation, weak and unstable political structures, chronic insecurity and a general lack of power and effectiveness. Decision-making was highly personalised and, at the same time, largely reactive in nature.⁴⁰ Under-development was also a characteristic of their foreign policies which, for the most part, failed to come to terms with - let alone secure - their immediate environment. Lacking power themselves and finding it difficult, therefore, to relate to the international system, the new states took refuge in ideology - if only to mask their incomplete sense of national interest.

In a further contribution, entitled "National Interest and Ideology", Zartman argues that the preoccupation with ideology shown by many African policy-makers is not so much incompatible with national interest but rather that ideology and national interest constitute "two extremes of a range of foreign policy

criteria".⁴¹ In the end, however, ideology bows before reality; the state acts in its own and/or the national interest or it runs the risk of being overwhelmed and disappearing altogether, or of being captured by a rival technocratic elite "that places problem-solving before ideology".⁴² In terms of foreign policy-making, therefore, development to Zartman means a situation where "aspiration and reality at least come in sight of each other", and when "means become commensurate with state ends". It is when African decision-makers can think more in terms of their interests and less in terms of idealist, revisionist ideologies" - but "obviously, Africa is not yet at this point".

Zartman's early writings on African states and their foreign policies all betray the strong influence of the "developmental" school. This is clear from the (mainly negative) criteria he uses to characterise policy-making in West and North Africa. There he maintains that the state is only partially a "sovereign territorial group"; the nation is not yet "an organised aggregate"; the transition "from party to state to nation is not complete"; the elements of state power on which capability is based "are underdeveloped"; the instruments of national policy, with which this capability is exercised are limited; "sanctions and force are either disallowed or impractical"; domestic public opinion and pressure groups "have little weight in decision-making process"; informational output is "small" and "there are few clear goals, flexible policies, and nation-interest criteria" to support a rational, negotiating process.

As a result foreign policy-making in Africa, and possibly elsewhere in the Third World, was ad hoc and improvised. "Too often it is made on the basis of incomplete evidence, chance meetings, and accidental stimuli, and without much awareness of state interests." In such circumstances and in the absence of stable commitments and firm alliances the prospects for on-going cooperation were poor. There was an absence of "clear interests involved to hold them together", leaving their relations "at the mercy of changing situations and events". To summarise : "the final characteristic of Western Africa's developing international relations is their instability", i.e., "the lack of permanence in affinities and commitments, and the lack of control over events".

But it is not only in their approach to policy-making that African states are said to differ from their more developed counterparts. Africa also boasts a "system of limited, mobile relations". The alliances that were created in the early 1960s, in response to the pressures of rapid de-colonisation, were dissolved either before or shortly after the creation of the OAU in 1963. According to Zartman, the continent subsequently reverted to "the more basic characteristics of international relations", namely, "temporary coincidence of policy on the issue of the moment". Elsewhere Zartman again singles out "the kaleidoscopic nature of African relations where a slight turn of events brings dramatic new patterns ; until firmer patterns of friendship and rivalry are established, yesterday's friends can become today's enemies".⁴³

Moreover, "few friendships and enmities are of such serious nature that they involve the entire continent". Despite the continental perspective, the orientation of individual states is essentially local or, at best, regional. The priorities of the new states are directed toward nation-building and to securing their immediate environment (i.e., boundaries), carefully avoiding wider involvement and open-ended commitments that might have a de-stabilising effect.

North Africa and the "Checkerboard" Model

On these grounds Zartman has described the dominant pattern of relations in Western Africa - West and North Africa - as that of the "checkerboard", which is a multilateral extension of "bad neighbour" relations, predicated on the view that "my enemies' enemies are my friends".⁴⁴ Zartman would appear to have adapted this checkerboard model from the European experience of inter-state relations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when nation-state formation was already well under way. If the pattern seems to have been most visible in West Africa during the early 1960s it is also said to have been "characteristic of North Africa" where "the states of the region have continually acted as if my neighbour is my enemy and my neighbour's neighbour is my friend". In both cases the explanation given is the same : having so much in common culturally, such states are compelled to exaggerate their few differences and to accord these a high priority in foreign policy-making.

They feel the need for self-identification, to help distinguish one state from the next; and the need for reassurance or secure frontiers against predatory neighbours. Zartman sees these preoccupations as the main obstacles to any permanent move away from the "primitive checkerboard of West Africa" and towards "a more sophisticated pattern of relations", e.g., the balance of power model, or a genuine concert of states "as practised in other parts of the world". Meanwhile circumstances - since 1975 the dispute over Western Sahara - have been more conducive to conflict and competition within the region rather than to cooperation and the pursuit of trade and mutual advantage.

In his more recent writings Zartman has returned to the question of inter-Maghrebin relations and the theme of conflict versus cooperation. Once more he reviews the sources of the continuing tension and conflict within the region.⁴⁵ While there has been substantial growth in the economic and military capabilities of the individual states he considers that power here, as elsewhere in Africa, remains diffused. There is no question of one state imposing union on another. Any cooperation within the Maghreb would therefore have to be voluntary. But the will to cooperate has been absent since the Moroccan decision to occupy and partition the Spanish Sahara in 1975.

The late 1970s saw the escalation of the Western Sahara conflict with growing African and external intervention in the

dispute in the early 1980s. Moroccan claims to the former Spanish Sahara had their counterpart in Algerian support for the nationalist movement, Polisario, and for an independent Saharawi Democratic Republic. Libyan involvement was a complicating factor both here, where it backed Polisario, and in the long-standing civil war in Chad where Libyan forces intervened directly. The two overlapping conflicts in the Sahel region of West Africa threatened for a time to overwhelm existing political mechanisms for dealing with such disputes.

There was a revival of ideological groupings in Africa with the emergence of a radical/conservative cleavage - linking these and other issues. A large and impressive, but heterogeneous coalition of "radical" states emerged in the early 1980s, which brought together Algeria and Libya and various "Front-Line" states, who were looking for allies in their confrontation with South Africa. The accommodation of interests was only temporary, however, and the grouping soon dissolved without effecting any real transformation of existing African political structures in Africa. The re-alignments of the 1980s, like those of the 1960s, proved to be temporary, essentially parochial, and for the most part opportunistic.

Nor did mounting external involvement in the Maghreb bring any dramatic change in existing patterns of inter-state relations. American and Soviet involvement has been low key as the Soviet Union does not appear eager to confront the United

States and its European allies in North Africa and the Mediterranean. Moreover, each of the super-powers has important interests, political and economic, on both sides of the Algerian-Moroccan frontier. They are likely, therefore, to favour the present military "stalemate" which avoids any direct challenge to those interests, while reducing the risks of armed confrontation.

But if the balance in the Maghreb is unlikely to be transformed by external political or military intervention that, in Zartman's view, leaves the Maghreb states with a choice between regional cooperation, or, failing that "a conflictual future" and "an overriding checkerboard pattern".⁴⁶ The first option would be more compelling were the Maghrebin economies truly complementary, which they are not. Moreover, cooperation can only succeed with Algerian support whereas, at present, Algeria is no more disposed to join with Morocco than Morocco is to unite with Algeria. Much would depend on a settlement of the dispute in Western Sahara. Meanwhile, "the tendency to return to a checkerboard pattern of relations has proved irresistible".

Within the Maghreb the advent of new issues and the appearance of new actors have served only to entrench an already established pattern of inter-state relations. Whether as enemies, rivals or allies, the Maghrebin states have behaved "as a checkerboard set of neighbours/non-neighbours should".⁴⁷ In a revealing comment Zartman admits that the pattern, itself, may be "more a reflection of relations than their cause, but [it is]

nonetheless a pattern that seems to reassert itself despite some efforts to the contrary". We must therefore be prepared for "a continuation of the past pattern of relations", for "a future of attenuated conflict and interrupted cooperation", punctuated by unstable alliances and occasional experiments in "balance of power" or "concert" politics.

"Checkerboard" Model Reviewed

Most striking in Zartman's writings over a period of two decades are the continuities of theme and emphasis. The role of foreign policy is to help define and protect the new community as well as mobilising domestic support for the new state. Foreign policy-making in Africa was "underdeveloped" because of the weakness of the state and its organisational deficiencies. As a result the leadership became personally involved in policy-making without the constraint of an informed and relatively stable public opinion. There was thus a certain ambivalence about national interests and a preference for confrontation and ideological posturing at the expense of a more "mature", pragmatic bargaining style. But at the heart of the problem there lies the post-colonial "checkerboard" and the resulting pressures for identity and differentiation at the expense of cooperation and accommodation.

It is to the theme of the checkerboard that Zartman continually returns. What began as an evolutionary model, focussing on change and the "development" of foreign policy in the new states, has since become a largely static model. Its theme is the persistence of a single pattern of inter-state relations : the checkerboard.⁴⁸ The model borrows from European experience and the implication is that, across the Mediterranean at least, the checkerboard has been largely superseded - replaced by more stable forms of alliance based on inter-dependence and cooperation.

Alternatively, one could argue that inter-state relations in Europe were "static" for a good part of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries while, even today, "bad neighbour" relations are by no means exceptional among the more developed states. All policy-making is subject to constraints, environmental and otherwise. The basic ingredients of foreign policy-making - population, resource base, and geographical situation - are all fairly fixed and immutable. Which may explain why foreign policy tends to be more flexible and imaginative when it is concerned with issues far removed from its domestic base. Washington can show greater flexibility in dealing with Western Europe or even the Soviet Union than in its relations with Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico.

Whatever its derivation, Zartman's model does serve to direct our attention to what he sees as the most salient and

enduring aspects of inter-state relations in Africa in general and North Africa in particular. He does, however, acknowledge limitations in the model. It does not purport to explain everything about inter-state relations. Even in the 1960s when the checkerboard pattern was becoming established in Africa it was more useful in explaining inter-state relations in West and North Africa than in other regions. And in West Africa the model was much less relevant after 1963 and the creation of the OAU. There it could even be said to have lost most of its point following the disappearance of the Ghanaian leader, Kwame Nkrumah, overthrown by a military *coup* in 1966.

In North Africa, on the other hand, Zartman originally had reservations about the model and its relevance although he tells us that it was the French who helped establish the pattern inside the region by according independence to Tunisia and Morocco in 1956, in an attempt to forestall (and pre-empt) independence for Algeria. By the 1970s, however, the model has become central to Zartman's interpretation of inter-state relations in the Maghreb and is even described as being "characteristic of North Africa".⁴⁹ In fact the checkerboard model does help us to "make sense" of relations both within the Maghreb and between Maghrebin states and the outside world. It does not, however, provide a comprehensive picture of those relations and their evolution over time; nor does it do justice to their variety and complexity; and, like all models, it necessarily leaves a good many questions unanswered.

The key to North African politics and the foreign policies of its states is the persistent hostility and suspicion between rulers and administrations in Algiers and Rabat. Algeria, by reason of its geographical situation, its population and resource base, and its revolutionary origins, alone has the potential to play a dominant role within the region. Morocco, on the other hand, claiming a long and continuous history, and with a largely agrarian base and an independent military capability has been mainly concerned to resist Algeria's pretensions. Concerned for its own industrial development, Algeria has in political terms favoured the status quo within the Maghreb - while pursuing the theme of de-colonisation elsewhere in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s, hoping eventually to replace the French in the markets of Black Africa. By way of contrast Morocco has over three decades pursued a policy of territorial expansion, favouring the incorporation first of Mauritania, and more recently of the Spanish Sahara, and persisting in a long-standing border quarrel with Algeria - hoping, it would appear, to correct what it rightly perceives as an unfavourable balance of power within the Maghreb.

The situation in the Maghreb is in fact both more complex and also more straightforward than Zartman's model suggests. No state has managed to maintain cordial relations with all its neighbours over any period of time. Conversely, no state can afford to antagonise all its neighbours at one and the same time.

Bad relations with one neighbour are likely to dictate a policy of friendship towards the others. Having failed in its campaign to annex Mauritania in the 1960s, Morocco tried in the 1970s to persuade that now independent state to join her in the subsequent partition of the Spanish Sahara, thereby pre-empting the Polisario's claim to independence - which was supported by Algeria and Libya.

Tunisia, being territorially the smallest state in the region, has directed its efforts to surviving as an independent political and economic unit. Tunisian policy is essentially reactive, based more on prudence than on calculation, and involves remaining on reasonably friendly terms with at least one of her two more powerful neighbours. As Tunisia poses no direct threat and certainly no challenge to Algeria, their relationship has been more relaxed than that between Algeria and Morocco. And, notwithstanding the checkerboard, Tunisia and Morocco have only very occasionally made common cause against Algeria. At present Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania are members of a Maghreb alliance that does not include Morocco or, as yet, Libya.

Libya has pursued a "policy" of union with all her neighbours and with states that were not even contiguous. Kadhafi's growing involvement with the states of sub-Saharan Africa as well as with those of the Maghreb was the result of frustrated ambitions elsewhere in the Arab East. The accession of Anwar Sadat in Egypt in 1970, following the death of Gamal Nasser, effectively

blocked his designs for Arab unity under his own charismatic leadership. The growing influence of Saudi Arabia inside both the Arab League and the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting States (OPEC) also contributed to the Libyan failure. Which left Kadhafi little choice but to turn his attention - southwards and westwards - to the Maghreb and the neighbouring states of the Sahel.

The result was a series of abortive proposals for union with Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Chad, Morocco, and most recently, Algeria - a policy of "voluntary" union with neighbours and near neighbours which then contributed to Libya's subsequent isolation. If a kind of checkerboard pattern did subsequently emerge it was certainly not in any sense inherent in the situation of the states themselves, but was rather the product of Kadhafi's style and policies.

Apart from these matters of detail there are problems, too, with the actual status of the checkerboard model. Originally it seemed to offer a plausible, even convincing explanation for the otherwise rather chaotic pattern of alliances and counter-alliances that linked the new African states in the 1960s. By focussing on the twin concerns of identity and security it also provided a credible motive for actions that otherwise might have seemed to defy logic. The persistence of the checkerboard through the 1960s and into the next decade could be seen as a consequence of, - if it did not serve as an explanation for - the

failure of African states to support an effective balance of power system or even to sustain a loose concert pattern.

There was the impression of a structural "grid" or, to change metaphors, of a kind of strait-jacket that would allow no escape and permit no deviation.

However, Zartman has since insisted that the checkerboard pattern is more a reflection of existing relations rather than their cause. Which suggests he does not view it as an independent causal factor, still less as a strait-jacket or structural grid. It could be meant simply as a point of reference, suggesting and even anticipating certain kinds of partnership/alliance and so directing our attention to exceptions and apparent anomalies. But Zartman's preoccupation with the model over three decades does suggest something more is involved.

Zartman's argument may require further clarification, but this should not be allowed to detract from the strength of his thesis which is that the foreign policies of the North African states are primarily a response to the situation within the Maghreb. It is circumstances in the Maghreb that have usually dictated forays abroad into the Middle East, Black Africa and Western Europe; events close to home are also largely responsible for the assumption by the North African states of global as well as continental and regional responsibilities.

The real problem with Zartman, and with other writers who seek to look at the African states and their political behaviour in "structural" terms, is the essentially static picture they manage to convey even when incorporating a "developmental" perspective. Change comes to depend largely on external events or pressures. Interestingly, Aluko, Mazrui and, more recently, Zartman,⁵⁰ have been looking to the troubled situation in South Africa to provide possible scenarios for more "radical" changes elsewhere in the continent. The danger is that in their efforts to isolate and describe the more enduring (and perhaps less endearing) features of the African landscape, they may have neglected or dismissed other important developments in African inter-state relations, particularly since 1973.

It is our contention that after 1973 there did emerge in the Maghrebin states, beginning with Algeria, a sense of national interest which was reflected in the foreign policies of those states and which has since provided a measure of continuity and predictability in their policy. In the Maghreb this change seemed to coincide with the emergence, in the late 1960s, of a new, more technocratic generation of leaders, sometimes of military background, and favouring pragmatic rather than ideological solutions. The switch was most marked in Algeria following the removal of Ben Bella in 1965 and the arrival in power of Colonel Houari Boumedienne.

With the new leader and his "team" there eventually came a change of emphasis from "nation" to "state" building, or what Zartman has described as "national consolidation processes". This coincided with the attempt to create a centralised governmental structure. There was "the need to build a centre", and "to define, attract, and hold its periphery" often in competition with neighbours : the state and its concerns were increasingly central to foreign policy and a source of potential conflict with other states. Ideology remained important but was now harnessed to the state, serving its need for "self-perception and identification".

This new, more pragmatic emphasis on the state and its interests was reinforced by events elsewhere. In the Middle East, there was the 1967 Arab defeat followed by the defeat and eviction of the PLO from Jordan in 1970, and later that year the death of Nasser and his replacement by Sadat. All heralded the decline of pan-Arabism as a factor in Arab foreign policies and its substitution by narrower, state-based interests.

The partial military success by the Arab forces, in 1973, not only strengthened Sadat's position in the Arab world, but also gave a much-needed boost to the "peace process" in the Middle East as dialogue and bargaining came to succeed the politics of confrontation. As Ajami has argued the power of revolution (*thawra*) was replaced by that of wealth (*tharwa*).⁵¹ The striking success of OPEC in boosting oil prices in 1973 reinforced the

state in the Middle East, as well as helping to promote more technocratic elements within the administration.

The revival of cold war tensions after 1978 and the continuing economic crisis of the 1980s all served to underline the essential inter-dependence of political and economic structures on both the global and the regional/local levels. In North Africa there emerged new and, hopefully, more discerning patterns of alliance as Algeria, linked militarily with the Soviet Union, sought closer economic ties with the United States, while Morocco, allied with the United States and the West, expanded its own trade with the Soviet Union.

Even Libyan policy had at last to come to terms with falling oil prices and the almost complete isolation of the regime following the American attack on Tripoli and Benghazi, in April 1986, and the humiliating defeat in Chad at the end of 1987. The treaty with Morocco (1984-86) - a union of incompatibles - was an indication both of the extent of Kadhafi's isolation and of the contradictions in his foreign policy. It is true that in some quarters the treaty was seen as further evidence of African unpredictability and the intrusion of personalities into the domain of foreign policy-making. But there was never much chance of the union surviving - or being consummated. Ideology played no role whatever in the 'union' which was, on the contrary, an extreme example of the principle of *raison d'état*.

The Thesis

Our thesis is concerned with the evolution of Maghrebin foreign policy during the years 1973-1987. Despite the fact that dependence and instability have imposed serious constraints on the political leadership, these have not prevented the North African states pursuing quite original and often imaginative and forward-looking policies in the Middle East, in Africa and the Third World - even if there has been little change in the pattern of inter-state relations in the Maghreb itself. Although the balance of power in North Africa is central to the preoccupations and therefore the policies of all four states, that is no reason for neglecting their contribution in other regions and other spheres. Nor can we "explain" each and every foreign policy initiative by reference to local, Maghrebin factors, without laying ourselves open to charges of "reductionism".

Foreign policy usually begins (but seldom ends) with the immediate environment. As a process, however, it has a life and style of its own, generating a complex set of responses to apparently discreet problems. Certain preoccupations recur over time while responses become more structured and priorities are established. There is a growing sense of continuity and consistency as the interests of the state come to be defined by the elites - political, economic and military - and by the rapidly proliferating administrative agencies. These interests then provide a sense of direction for foreign policy and

criteria with which to judge its success or failure. They will also suggest a preference for certain approved options in each area of foreign policy.

The prominence of leaders in African policy-making is perhaps exceptional, as are the political and other constraints under which the bureaucratic agencies must function - but in no sense is this unique to Africa or the Middle East. Public interest in foreign policy fluctuates, even within developed Western states, while its presence or absence can hardly be said to characterise foreign policy-making in Africa or in the Third World. Likewise a supposed preference for ideological rather than pragmatic solutions hardly matches the recent and widespread rejection of socialism by African leaders in favour of "free enterprise" solutions and programmes of "structural adjustment". And while the notion of "national interest" may have been poorly defined before 1973 that is no longer the case today. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the changes of leadership that have so far taken place in North Africa - and those yet to come - will greatly alter the parameters of foreign policy in the individual Maghrebin states.

Economic constraints will probably continue and even grow, along with urban unrest, ethnic and religious tensions, and military frustration - and they may, of course precipitate sudden changes of leadership. However, the persistence of North African regimes to date does argue for a certain identification

between the leadership on the one hand and strategically placed elites on the other. In any case it is the role of foreign policy to help define and elaborate the national interest in such a way as to enlist popular support for the regime and for its objectives. King Hassan II was highly successful in associating a large part of the opposition and the country as a whole with the Green March of 1975 and the "peaceful" occupation of the Spanish Sahara. The result was a policy and a situation that future leaders will find it difficult to reverse.

The parameters of Algerian policy were set by a number of confrontations : with France in the war of independence, 1954-62, and again in 1971 over nationalisation of the Algerian oil industry; and with Morocco in 1963, over boundary demarcation, and again in 1975 over the Western Sahara. In Tunisia the identification between the regime and the strategic elites was forged at a much earlier stage, with the consolidation of the Neo-Destour Party and the triumph of Bourguiba's militant and secular nationalism against the opposition of the French and the resistance of the Bey.

The options of the North African leaders have been under challenge in the 1980s, particularly their failure to alleviate economic hardship and distress. In every case, however, the opposition has focussed on economic discontent and the criticisms have been directed more at domestic rather than foreign policies. It would be difficult, therefore, to envisage an abrupt change in

any key area of foreign policy simply as the result of a change of leadership. In Libya, however, where it is still difficult to identify any clear sense of national interest, it is conceivable that *realpolitik* or a change of leadership could dictate sharp changes in international as well as Middle Eastern and Maghreb policies. Kadhafi has certainly moved a little closer to "moderate" Arab opinion, on oil pricing as on the Iran-Iraq war. Relations with the Soviet Union have been strained since the American raid in April 1986.

Even there, however, it seems unlikely that a new Libyan regime would depart so far from existing foreign policy options as to approach, say, the Tunisian position. Nor would Bourguiba's successor find much support in Tunis and other African and European capitals were he to revise his country's foreign policy in conformity with the prescriptions set out in Kadhafi's *Green Book*. And one can no longer argue, as Zartman did in the 1960s, that the rationale for such policies in North Africa was simply the concern with identity and the pressure for differentiation. While national interest and identity are clearly related the second now seems firmly established - in the Maghreb if not in the adjoining Sahel. The role of foreign policy therefore is to perpetuate the state and the national interest as it is perceived by the state.

It is our thesis that the evolution of the North African states since independence, and more particularly since 1973, has

been accompanied by substantial bureaucratic growth and an intensification of economic activity, to say nothing of much higher levels of education and social formation and greatly increased expectations throughout the society. Such changes have for the most part been more pronounced in the Maghreb than in other African states. Where the leaders of the 1960s had subscribed to the idea of nation-building, with its emphasis on identity and differentiation, their successors in the seventies were more likely to emphasise state-building with a new emphasis on economic priorities and encouragement for limited inter-state cooperation at regional and other levels. Indeed, there was a relaxation of tension within the Maghreb in the early seventies, with confirmation of existing frontiers and a discussion of economic integration - until the revival of Moroccan territorial claims in the Sahara, in 1975, ended any realistic prospect of a Maghrebin Union.

With the 1980s the emphasis switched again as state-building became associated with the poor performance of the public sector in previous decades. The goals of "liberalisation" and the "free market" economy did not sit easily with the historical, dynastic and cultural traditions of the Maghreb. They did, however, shift the responsibility for relieving the acute economic situation, particularly in the large conurbations, onto other shoulders, namely the so-called "middle sectors". At the same time they sought to re-direct state activity to the "approved" tasks of structural adjustment - with new opportunities for patronage, for

a much-needed shake-up of the bureaucracy, and with a renewed search for popular support in the countryside.

Socialism was finally dropped from the agenda in the 1980s - Libya being the exception - while new priorities also emerged in foreign policy. Mazrui's proposed coalition of Arab oil and Black gold appeared even more fanciful as North African states counted the costs of their African involvement at a time of sharply falling oil prices. Their initial successes had to be set against more recent failures, notably those African states which had severed ties with Israel in 1973 only to resume their former relations after 1979. Meanwhile hard-pressed African governments were again looking to the West and to France for economic relief while criticising the Arab states for their want of solidarity. The Middle East, too, receded in importance for the Maghreb states, Libya included, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and the subsequent failures of Arab diplomacy leading to the near collapse of the Arab League.

By contrast the connection between domestic unrest and the global economic crisis has served to push the Maghreb states, again with the exception of Libya, closer to the western powers and America. Where regional competition had previously dictated contrasting foreign policies and rival alignments, there has been considerable convergence in the 1980s in the policies of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. The emphasis is no longer on Afro-Arab Dialogue, or Euro-African Dialogue, or the North-South Debate.

The rivalry now centres on efforts to secure trade and credits, preferential access to markets and the transfer of advanced technology, interest relief and multi-year repayments. And the West, America in particular, is the most obvious source of all such goods and "concessions" - to say nothing of sophisticated military hardware.

To that extent it might appear that in North Africa foreign policies are being traded in the market-place. But the functions and uses of foreign policy have always been many and complex. From Zartman's point of view relations within the Maghreb seem to have changed but little since independence and these, in turn, have largely determined the pattern of North Africa's external relations. By comparison with the West and other more advanced states their foreign policies presumably remain "underdeveloped". Others again maintain that the present predicament of the Maghrebin states is the direct and necessary consequence of "dependency" on the West : a dependency that foreign policy, even in Algeria, has done little to relieve.

Neither interpretation seems to us to provide a sufficiently fair or full account of the evolution of foreign policy in the Maghrebin states over the last fifteen years. While colonial influence remains, is likely to persist for some time to come , and is more pronounced in some states than in others, there is now a greater appreciation elsewhere of the determination of the North African states to maintain their independence, and to

continue to formulate their own policies and press for more investment and better terms of trade. Nor can we accept the view that a continuation of Algerian-Moroccan rivalry inside the Maghreb means that little has changed in terms of foreign policy-making.

In our view the last two decades have seen considerable change and ferment, both in North Africa and in the international sphere. Policy-makers in the Maghreb have had to respond to new problems and pressures, and from many and varied quarters. The administration of the state has grown in complexity and also in its capacity to define and defend national interests. Military capabilities have likewise increased considerably - although admittedly an increase in the "power" of one state tends to be balanced by corresponding increments on the part of its neighbours. If the checkerboard is still with us it is not for want of change in other areas of North African society.

Structure of the Thesis

In our dissertation we wish to examine the impact since 1973 of some of these changes, not on the states themselves or on North African society as such, but with reference to foreign policy and inter-state relations. It is not our intention to discuss the way foreign policy is made in North Africa or elsewhere. Nor will we be looking, in any detail, at the interaction between domestic and external policies except where

this relates directly to our subject. Instead we propose to analyse North African foreign policies in so far as they affect the Maghrebin states (1) in their relations with one another and (2) in their relations with states in other, adjacent regional sub-systems, namely the Middle East, Africa and Europe. This then provides the subject matter of our dissertation, while suggesting its main themes and the comparative framework within which we have tried to work.

PART TWO

I N T E R - M A G H R E B I N R E L A T I O N S

CHAPTER TWO : THE MAGHREB. AN OVERVIEW

Four Regimes Under Pressure

The prospects for continued stability and renewed growth in the Maghreb states appear rather bleak. The 'feudal' character of the Moroccan regime and the strong social tensions that underpin it could one day lead to a violent explosion - although not of the Iranian type as the King, who is Commander of the Faithful, serves as a deterrent against religious fanaticism. He also functions as an effective obstacle to military intervention. For the present the large and well equipped army is fully occupied defending Moroccan positions in the Western Sahara, but it has threatened the regime before, in the early 1970s, and could well do so again. An interventionist military would be a de-stabilising factor elsewhere in the region as it would be under strong domestic pressure to adopt a foreign policy even more expansionist than the present one. To that extent the monarchy is a force for stability in the region as a whole.

In Tunisia the most immediate and persistent threat comes from its neighbour, Libya. But other factors also threaten the country's enviable reputation for stability. There was the chronic succession crisis after 1973; aggravated by earlier failures to broaden the base of the regime by co-opting the secular opposition. Here as in Morocco, stagnation of the

economy in the 1980s and a mounting debt problem, has occasioned considerable economic hardship. There has been widespread unrest and violence, particularly in the towns and cities, following cuts in government subsidies that were dictated by pressure mainly from the International Monetary Fund and from the major Western creditor-nations. One consequence has been the recent challenge from extreme Islamic elements which had not previously attracted much support inside Tunisia. The growing uncertainty about the choice of a constitutional successor to Bourguiba has also contributed to the recent turbulence. A quick succession of prime ministers and the inability of President Bourguiba, in power since 1956, to organise a voluntary retirement finally led to his enforced removal in November 1987. He was finally displaced by the last of his prime ministers, not a civilian this time but the former director of military security, General Ben Ali.

Unlike its two North African neighbours, Algeria has the advantage of a legitimising formula - the revolutionary struggle against French rule - that does not depend to any extent either on personalities or on the survival of a dynasty. The succession 'crisis' in 1979 was resolved peacefully, albeit by the elites themselves and without popular involvement. Dissidence has so far been contained by a mixture of exhortation, concessions and coercion while the military has little reason to overturn existing structures in which it occupies a privileged place. The deteriorating economic situation of 1980s seemed to call for new

policies and a new style of government. Where Tunisia vacillated between liberalisation and repression, and the Moroccan regime drew still further on its reserves of patriotism and popular enthusiasm, there was a natural change of leadership in Algeria following the death in 1978 of President Houari Boumedienne and the accession, in 1979, of Chadli Benjedid. There was scope therefore for new initiatives and policies and an enforced turnover among the ruling elites. One should not, however, underestimate the extent and importance of the social pressures that have long been building up inside Algeria. They are likely to be exacerbated as population continues to grow rapidly, accompanied by large-scale migration to the towns, while the economic base of the country contracts, if only temporarily, with the global recession of the 1980s and the sudden fall in oil and gas revenues.

Aware of the problems confronting its neighbours, the new Algerian leadership is concerned about stability both at home and within the region. At the regional level Algeria has traditionally favoured closer political and economic cooperation, particularly the latter, stopping well short of "integration". That was certainly the view of President Houari Boumedienne until the emergence of the conflict in Western Sahara in 1975. As relations between Algeria and Morocco deteriorated, however, in the late 1970s, Boumedienne adopted a more strident, populist note, threatening the Moroccan regime with a "Maghreb of the Peoples". Under Chadli, however, the emphasis was once again on

reconciliation with his neighbours, while his approach to regional cooperation has been functional and technocratic rather than political and ideological. Nevertheless, the new government continues, like its predecessor, to emphasise Algeria's strategic position at the centre of the region and her privileged role within the Maghreb. But it also acknowledges that little can be achieved by way of economic cooperation without political good-will on all sides.

Although the general framework of Algeria's foreign policy remains basically the same, each president appears to stamp the country's diplomacy with his own personality and preoccupations. The emergence of the Western Sahara issue prompted Boumedienne's speech on June 19, 1975, the tenth anniversary of his accession, marking a shift in his position. Instead of cooperating with its neighbours in the construction of a "Maghreb of States" Algeria would lead the struggle for a "Maghreb of the Peoples".¹

Chadli's more conciliatory approach was set out in a speech of December 20, 1981, that turned away from Boumedienne's earlier diplomatic offensive and looked forward instead to a resumption of dialogue and cooperation with the rest of the Maghreb. The aim was to enter on a period of "positive good neighbourliness" within the region as a whole - *<le bon voisinage positif>*.² As the conflict in the Sahara continued, however, despite Chadli's efforts, the prospects for economic cooperation and a new political relationship between Morocco and Algeria remained, at

best, uncertain. Hopes for détente within the Maghreb improved, however, following Chadli's meeting with King Hassan in 1987, which took place on the border of the two states, after the intervention of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. It was seen by most observers as a conciliatory gesture on the part of the Algerians. Subsequently the Moroccans reciprocated by releasing a number of Algerian soldiers who had been captured at the height of the confrontation between the two states.

The conflict in the Western Sahara has yet to be resolved, however. Meanwhile Algeria has continued its earlier and quite successful diplomatic efforts to isolate the Moroccan regime, both in North Africa itself and in the wider international community. Less successful have been the Algerian government's efforts to persuade King Hassan's Western allies to desist from providing economic and military support for Rabat. The key to the new diplomatic offensive was the Algerian-Tunisian Friendship Treaty concluded in March 1983, to which Mauritania later acceded. This provided Bourguiba with guarantees against possible Libyan aggression following his earlier rejection of the proposed Libyan-Tunisian merger. Meanwhile Morocco found itself excluded from an alliance that threatened it on both flanks, southern and eastern, and served to distance it even further from its former partner, Tunisia.

Morocco reacted by signing the 1984 agreement on 'union' with Libya - provoked by the growing diplomatic isolation of both

regimes that was itself the result of their expansionist policies in the south, aimed respectively at the Western Sahara and Chad. The sudden rapprochement between the two former antagonists was the more unexpected as their ideologies had seemed incompatible. There was, however, a temporary convergence of interests as each sought to 'squeeze' Algeria so as to effect a quick and mutually advantageous change in the regional balance. By 1986, however, the union appeared to have outlived its usefulness - certainly from the Moroccan point of view. There was a marked deterioration in the Libyan position, in Chad and elsewhere, following the armed intervention against Tripoli by the Americans. Which coincided with the strengthening of Morocco's defensive frontier around much of Western Sahara, where American support seems again to have played a major role.

As the disadvantages of the agreement with Libya came increasingly to outweigh any possible advantages, King Hassan broke with Libya, returning to more orthodox policies and the quest for more conventional and less controversial allies. It was left to Chadli to try to accommodate a shaken but apparently unrepentant Colonel Muammar Khadafi who at the end of 1987 sued to join the tri-partite alliance between Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania. As the alliance was directed as much against Libya as against Morocco Chadli has to balance Tunisian fears of Libya off against the obvious advantage of maintaining diplomatic pressure on Morocco to reach an accommodation with the Polisario guerrillas, who are receiving Algerian as well as Libyan support.

It seems clear that where Boumedienne and Chadli both started out with the aim of securing a political settlement in the Western Sahara and improving relations within the Maghreb, neither was able or willing to accept major territorial changes that would threaten the existing power balance which is favourable to Algeria. Meanwhile Algerian support for the Polisario guerrillas and the widespread recognition accorded to the Democratic Arab Republic of the Sahara (SADR) are additional complicating factors. Given the Algerian commitment to self-determination, with its roots in the long war against the French, and the problems in the way of an agreement between Polisario and Morocco, both Boumedienne and Chadli came reluctantly to accept the need for diplomatic sanctions against Morocco in place of their earlier goal of closer economic cooperation. In North Africa as elsewhere Algeria remains committed to self-determination but within established colonial frontiers. Acceptance of the territorial status quo and non-intervention in the affairs of neighbouring states, is perceived as the minimum condition for future economic cooperation within the Maghreb. Meanwhile national economic development remains the first priority of all Algerian governments and leaders : here, after all, they do still have a clear advantage over Morocco.

Obstacles to Maghrebin cooperation

Chadli outlined his policy of "good neighbourliness" to the Algerian National Assembly, in the traditional "state of the

nation" message, in 1981. It was based on adherence to the principles of non-aggression and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states - already embodied in the charter of the Organisation of African Unity. Chadli also proposed to develop cooperation at the regional level with a view to coordinating policies where it was a question of "common problems" and "complementary interests". To achieve this objective it was first necessary to liquidate "all causes of tension" and for the governments concerned to uphold the decision of the OAU in favour of retaining the borders inherited at independence - any change requiring the voluntary agreement of the states affected.

The border issue has rightly been seen by successive Algerian governments - and by outside observers - as a fundamental, even primordial source of tension. Its solution, therefore, is a prerequisite for genuine rapprochement and cooperation within the region. Shortly before Tunisia and Morocco acquired first self-government then, in 1956, independence, the French finally agreed to define the border separating French Algeria from the former protectorates. Tunisia and Morocco have always claimed that the result favoured Algeria at their expense. As a gesture of Maghrebin solidarity - and because they were unlikely to secure better terms from the French - they did, however, agree to postpone further discussion of the issue until Algeria became independent. It was the refusal of the new Algerian leadership to consider territorial revision that helped prompt the short border war with Morocco in October 1963, which focussed on

ownership of mineral deposits in the frontier zone between the two states, near the town of Tindouf, in South-Western Algeria.

The contentious border question between Algeria and Morocco is the most serious of all because of the size and military resources of the two states involved and because of the sheer extent of Moroccan 'historic' claims, not only on a part of the Algerian desert, but also over the whole of Mauritania, Western (former Spanish) Sahara, as well as parts of Mali and Senegal. Such claims were based on the 'Greater Morocco' thesis, initiated in the mid 1950s by the then leader of the Istiqlal Party, Allal Al Fassi and his brother Abdelkbir Al Fassi. The independence of Mauritania in the 1960s and the rejection of Moroccan claims not only by the colonial power but also by the OAU led to more conciliatory policies by the Moroccan regime in the early 1970s. At the OAU summit in Rabat - the "summit of reconciliation" - in June 1972, agreement was reached between Algeria and Morocco concerning their own disputed frontier, with provision for Algerian sovereignty and joint exploitation by the two states of the mineral wealth. However, the Moroccan parliament failed to ratify the agreement. This enabled Morocco to revive her territorial claims on Algeria in the mid 1970s in an attempt to persuade Algeria to concede Morocco's right to the former Spanish Sahara, the phosphate-rich territory adjacent to Morocco's southern frontier.

Algeria's border dispute with Tunisia arose largely from Tunisia's decision, during the Algerian war, to allow the French to run an oil pipeline from Ejele, in Algeria, to the Tunisian city of Skirra - before the question of sovereignty over the Sahara had been finally resolved. Here, however, there was no deep-seated rivalry or clash of national interests or territorial ambitions. Economic cooperation along the Algerian-Tunisian frontier had long been a reality. The dispute was satisfactorily resolved as early as 1970, and the agreement confirmed much later by the Algerian-Tunisian Friendship Treaty of March 1983. Algeria was also able by 1983 to settle outstanding border problems with all her southern neighbours, Mali, Niger, and Mauritania. Besides the continuing dispute with Morocco only the frontier with Libya remains unsettled. The government in Tripoli has claims on Algerian territory but has chosen not to press them - partly because of Libya's extensive commitments elsewhere in Africa, and partly on account of Algeria's military strength and the extent of her diplomatic support. Libyan acceptance of existing boundaries in North Africa is, however, a condition for joining Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania as co-signatories of the Friendship Treaty.

Algeria has been understandably sensitive about border issues, in North Africa as elsewhere, because of her central location within the Maghreb, her extended frontiers, the proximity of expansionist states like Morocco and Libya, and the nomadic character of much of the population in the Sahara region.

Whereas we can speak of the Maghreb as a cultural and historical unit, political union, while perhaps "inevitable" necessarily involves cooperation among existing states which can only be achieved on the basis of sovereignty and mutual respect for existing boundaries. After the long and bitter war of independence against the French the Algerian leadership will not accept subordinate status inside a Maghrebin super-state. Nor is there any question of union being imposed on the North African states, whether from outside or from within.

Contrasting perspectives on Maghrebin unity

While the commitment to unity may be deep-felt, Algeria is not alone in viewing Maghrebin unity largely from the vantage point of 'national interest'. Thus President Bourguiba of Tunisia continued, to the end of his rule, to work for the realisation of the Maghrebin ideal, despite his reservations about the prospects for and the wisdom of pan-Arab political union. Circumstances seem to have conspired to push Tunisia in that direction including the country's small size, limited resources and military weakness compared with its larger neighbours. There is also the relatively developed economic base and the surplus of educated and skilled personnel forced to seek employment abroad. Trade, commerce and movement across the Tunisian-Algerian frontier is far from negligible while a pipeline carries Algerian gas across the border to an outlet on the Tunisian coast. It is not surprising then that the Tunisian constitution

of 1959 underlined the will of the people to obey the teachings of Islam, to respect the unity of the 'Greater Maghreb' and to remain loyal to the wider Arab community.³

In Morocco, too, the constitution of December 1962 emphasised not only the sovereignty and the Islamic character of the kingdom, but also its membership of the 'Greater Maghreb'. The same formula was repeated in the July 1970 constitution.⁴ However, King Hassan II prefers, like his father before him, to base his legitimacy on the Sharifian dynasty which claims descent from the Prophet himself. As Commander of the Faithful, the king continues to rely on historical continuity and religious sanction in his attempts to re-constitute a national territorial state out of the remnants of a colonial empire. Maghrebin and Arab unity are, in any case, not without problems for a ruler whose territorial ambitions are blocked by Algeria in the east, and whose legitimacy has been contested by 'progressive' Arab states, including Algeria and Libya, as well as by 'progressive' political forces at home.

The constitution of the United Kingdom of Libya of October 1951 made no reference to Arab unity. On the other hand, the first article of the constitutional proclamations of December 1969, affirmed that "Libya is a free Arab Democratic Republic and sovereignty therein is vested in the people who are part of the Arab nation and whose aim is full Arab unity."⁵ In those terms, the young Libyan revolution proclaims its firm commitment

to the cause of Arab unity. In contrast to the Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian constitutions, there is no reference here to an intermediate stage of regional or Maghrebin unity, no mention of the creation of a Greater Maghreb. The object of Kadhafi's Libya was Arab unity and the importance of that unity was such that the first foreign minister after the revolution was designated the Minister of Unity.

The Algerian elite approaches Maghrebin unity from a viewpoint that reflects both ideology and pragmatism. Before his removal by the military in 1965 President Ben Bella showed considerable interest in and enthusiasm for an Arab unity inspired by revolutionary ideals. Hence his close and conspicuous friendship with President Nasser of Egypt and his attacks on conservative Arab regimes in general and the monarchies in particular. Boumedienne, on the other hand, appealed after 1965 for a united Maghreb that would constitute a 'first step' towards a wider and more comprehensive Arab and African unity. Later this would receive a more ideological and even subversive emphasis, in his demand for the creation of a "Maghreb of the Peoples". As the National Charter of 1976 emphasised :

Because there can be no objective for Maghrebin unity other than the well-being of its peoples, it must aim first and foremost for the liberation of the exploited

and deprived masses...the result would be a strong, united, prosperous and progressive Arab Maghreb.^e

It is unlikely that Morocco or Tunisia would accept unity on that basis, seeing it as a threat to the privileged classes of both countries. It might even appear as a not too subtle attempt to export the Algerian revolution to its more conservative neighbours, an appeal to the masses over the heads of their leaders. Equally, the statement could signify that social emancipation must begin at home and that domestic preoccupations would receive priority over less pressing regional concerns. But the language of the Charter abounds in ambiguities of that kind as the ruling elites have tried to match revolutionary rhetoric and populist themes to an administrative style that is essentially paternalistic and conservative. Whatever the "Maghreb of the Peoples" was meant to convey, the kind of regional unity envisaged by Algeria corresponds more closely to the "Maghreb of the States". Since 1965 the pragmatic element has taken precedence over the doctrinal. Boumedienne and now Chadli have favoured an incremental, functional approach to unity, based on existing states and their economic interests. They have shown no enthusiasm about creating a new supra-national entity.

According to the National Charter (1976) the Greater Maghreb would be built in stages with the first stage involving the

"strengthening of economic, trade and cultural links". Cooperation among member states would develop on the basis of their "common interests", "respecting at the same time the specific circumstances of each and every country." Algeria views the Greater Maghreb first and foremost in terms of her preoccupation with ending foreign domination or exploitation. It would strengthen the region both economically and politically, helping to guarantee both its independence and its autonomous development. In his report to the Fifth Congress of the National Liberation Front (19-22 Dec.1983) Chadli reminded delegates that :

The building of the 'Greater Maghreb' requires respect for the underlying principles that relate to the right of peoples to equality, and their right to self-determination; also respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as support for the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs.⁷

The object of the Greater Maghreb is to reinforce the independence of existing states rather than reduce or undermine it. In so far as it leads to greater interdependence this would be to the advantage of Algeria both by reason of its central location within North Africa and because it would help confirm the status quo in a region where Algeria, unlike Morocco or

Libya, has no expansionist ambitions. For Algerian leaders, then, the Western Sahara conflict remains an insurmountable obstacle to Maghrebin union. There is much, however, to recommend the idea of a loose Maghrebin arrangement between the various North African states. By its geographical location Algeria would occupy a privileged position. An economic union with benefits widely shared would reduce pressures for a possible alliance between Algeria's 'moderate' neighbours, Morocco and Tunisia, perhaps even in conjunction with France, in a move to contain Algerian influence. Maghrebin cooperation was also preferable to more comprehensive schemes for Arab unity that would focus on the Middle East and the 'core' Arab states, with Algeria relegated to the periphery.

That was, indeed, one of the principal concerns of the Tangiers meeting, in April 1958, between representatives of the three main political parties of the Maghreb : the *Neo-Destour* of Tunisia, *Istiqlal* of Morocco, and the FLN, representing the struggling Algeria. Bourguiba's aim in summoning the meeting was to try to put an end to Nasser's revolutionary influence over the FLN, and to bring the Maghreb states to the position where they could assert their identity and withstand Nasser's drive for domination. Twenty-five years later, in April 1983, the three Maghrebin parties met again at the same venue, this time to revive the spirit of unity and bring together the leadership of the region. But by then the parties were so clearly subordinate to their respective states, and their powers

so limited, that no genuine rapprochement was possible. A regional summit meeting, scheduled for the following month, failed to convene at the agreed rendez-vous, Algiers. King Hassan II and President Kadhafi both declined to join Presidents Chadli, Bourguiba and Mohammed Ould Haidallah of Mauritania, in this mini-summit, emphasising once again the marginality of the Maghrebin parties - even as an arena for diplomacy - at a time when inter-state rivalry was pronounced within the region.

Centrifugal pressures and decline of the Maghrebin idea

It is an undisputable fact that the Maghrebin states share a common history, geography and culture. But the "Maghreb of the States", with its fusion of inherited colonial frontiers and narrow, state-based nationalism, is an effective barrier to the rival notion of a "Maghreb of the Peoples". The most striking and recent example of Maghrebin unity was probably the generous support that Tunisia and Morocco both provided to the FLN during the war of Algerian independence. This included the use of much of their territory for military bases when the Army of Liberation (ALN) could no longer operate from Algerian soil. Since Algerian independence in 1962, however, strong centrifugal pressures have overcome what little remained of Maghrebin sentiment. There was Morocco's coolness towards Tunisia, after Tunisia recognised the independence of Mauritania, thereby rejecting Moroccan claims to that territory. There were the frontier disputes between Tunisia and Algeria, on the one hand, and between Algeria and Morocco on

the other. The Algerian-Moroccan dispute escalated into a short armed confrontation in 1963. And more recently there has been the continuing dispute over the Western Sahara.

A Permanent Consultative Committee of the Maghreb (CPCM) was set up in 1964, in an effort to carry on the earlier work of the secretariat created at the Tangiers conference of 1958. The four member states included Libya. There was a first conference of Maghrebin economic ministers in Tunis in October 1964 and the CPCM was scheduled to meet every two years. Its aims included the encouragement of preferential trade within the Maghreb, as well as the harmonisation of customs tariffs and procedures, the coordination of industrial policies and joint action to expand infrastructure and improve communications. The coordination of policy towards the EEC was also among the objectives. At this and later meetings various Maghrebin agencies were created to plan, coordinate and supervise the above activities. There was provision for a Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs; a Permanent Consultative Committee (CPCM) assisted by a Secretariat; a Centre for Industrial Studies (CEIM) as well as a number of special commissions and sub-commissions covering trade, industry, transportation, postal and telegraph services, and tourism.⁸

From October 1964 until 1970 Libya was an active member of the Maghreb organisation, but the *coup* of September 1969 brought to power a new leadership group whose values and objectives

differed markedly from those of the other Maghreb states. The immediate result was that Libya under Kadhafi drifted eastwards, away from the *Maghreb* and in the direction of the *Machrek*. Because of political conflicts and repeated disagreements the movement towards Maghrebin economic cooperation yielded little if anything in the way of tangible results. With the emergence of the Western Saharan issue in the mid 1970s its institutions ceased to function while meetings and consultation lapsed. The prospects for Maghrebin cooperation were never strong in any case despite the common history and culture and some experience of collaboration during the Algerian war. The Maghrebin economies have never achieved any great degree of complementarity and the undoubted development that took place in the 1960s and 1970s was coordinated on a state rather than a regional basis. At the end of the 1970s inter-Maghrebin trade still comprised only three per cent. of their total external trade and does not begin to compare with the figures for trade between the Maghrebin states and France. Within the Maghreb the pattern is one of intensified competition for external markets like the European Community where the North African states, being "associate" members, are increasingly at a disadvantage compared with full member states.

Conclusion

These then are the Maghrebin states whose interactions are the subject of our dissertation. In the remaining chapters of Part II we will be examining the relations between individual

pairs of Maghrebin states in an attempt to trace the evolution of their foreign policies from 1973 to the present. We are particularly interested in Zartman's preoccupation with Algerian-Moroccan rivalry and its persistence over time. Here the conflict that has emerged since 1975 in the Western Sahara is clearly the most important development of our period. We propose to analyse first the response of the two leading protagonists in the dispute and then to consider the role and relevance of the other states and their relationship with Algeria and/or Morocco.

CHAPTER THREE : ALGERIA VERSUS MOROCCO

Western Sahara : a race for leadership

Algeria and Morocco are the main antagonists in the Maghreb, and the principal contenders for dominance and supremacy within the region. Morocco's claim is based on historical continuity and traditional legitimacy and its long-standing role as intermediary between Western and Arab cultures. Algeria, on the other hand, claims to derive its legitimacy from its recent revolutionary experience, which it offers as a model not only for the peoples of the region but also for the entire Third World. Algeria's wider perspectives, far-ranging pretensions and more ambitious economic policy would seem to have given it a clear advantage in any contest for leadership, whether at the regional or continental levels, or in the Third World as a whole.

Such competitive perceptions have given rise to the conflicting attitudes and policies of the two states, both within the region and also outside it. Morocco's pursuit of irredentist claims on the territory of its southern and eastern neighbours had economic as well as political objectives : the significant iron ore deposits at Tindouf, just inside the Algerian border, were the focus of the brief war between the two states in 1963. Mauritania's reserves of iron ore and the rich phosphate deposits of the Spanish Sahara also influenced Moroccan policy in an expansionist direction. Algeria, on the other hand, possessed

extensive deposits of iron ore, as well as large reserves of oil and natural gas. Her policy was directed more towards securing her long pipelines and, where necessary, negotiating storage terminals, port facilities and access to the European natural gas network. Hence the concern to maintain close political and economic ties with Tunisia and to reach an early settlement of outstanding border issues. Algeria's ambitions south of the Sahara stopped far short of territorial aggrandisement. Black Africa presented itself as an obvious future market for Algeria's industrial production. Hence the idea of building the Trans-Saharan Highway to link the proposed industrial centres with the countries of the Sahel. There is also the idea of Algeria as a kind of 'bridge' across the Mediterranean, linking the two continents : although Morocco is perhaps rather better situated for that purpose.

Algerian-Moroccan relations appeared to have reached a critical stage by 1973. The meeting of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, held in Rabat, Morocco, in 1972 had been hailed as the "summit of reconciliation", not least between the former Maghrebini rivals. Where Morocco had earlier dropped her claims on Mauritania and now seemed ready to ratify her disputed border with Algeria, Algeria was ready to support the candidacy of Hassan II for the chairmanship of the OAU in 1972-3. Hassan's domestic difficulties prevented him, however, from playing a more active role in the African context, while the same internal problems may

once again have suggested a more aggressive external policy - if only to outflank the opposition parties and deflect mounting criticism within the military. The illness of General Franco and uncertainty about the future of the Spanish Sahara must have prompted a review of Moroccan foreign policy. A continuation of the recent policy of cooperation with Algeria could only mean self-determination for the small Saharawi population, whose leaders were already close to Algeria. This would eventually strengthen Algeria's position to the south of Morocco, thereby tilting the balance of power within the region further in Algeria's favour.

Such an outcome had few if any attractions for the Moroccan state and had little appeal either for Tunisia or Libya. However, the incorporation of the Spanish Sahara into Morocco was likely to provoke intense Algerian opposition as it, too, threatened the existing balance of power. Libya, although not so directly involved at this time, had no interest in a diplomatic or military success for either of its principal rivals in the region. A continuing state of tension or stalemate offered greater scope for Libya's own wider ambitions both in the Maghreb and the neighbouring Sahel zone. Tunisia, for its part, was intent on placating its powerful neighbours. While recalling its former support for Mauritanian independence, when it had aligned with France and the black francophone states, Tunisia may this time have hoped to benefit from a territorial arrangement that

would secure an even closer balance between the rival regional powers.

Thus, at the end of 1974, President Bourguiba moved sufficiently in the direction of Morocco to envisage and even recommend to his Maghrebin neighbours a division of the former Spanish territory between Morocco and Mauritania. At the time this appeared to be a judgement of Solomon - which nevertheless won French and (later) Spanish support, and for which President Bourguiba even claimed some measure of Algerian approval. President Boumedienne's reaction was, however, predictably hostile. Algerian-Moroccan tension mounted during 1975 as King Hassan prepared for the 'Green March' southwards into the territory that the Spanish would relinquish without firing a shot - despite earlier warnings to the contrary. The success of the Moroccan move, at least in the short term, provoked the Algerian authorities into a hostile reaction as they reaffirmed their support for self-determination. At the same time they channelled additional assistance to the Saharawis in the form of re-settlement camps, for those who did not wish to remain under Moroccan or Mauritanian rule, and training and armaments for the military arm of Polisario.

At the end of February 1976 Algeria went further and recognised the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as an independent state whereupon Rabat severed diplomatic relations with Algiers threatening an open confrontation. Relations

between Algiers and Tunis likewise deteriorated for a time because of the role played by President Bourguiba in engineering the rapprochement between Mauritania and Morocco - at the expense of Algeria who had long cultivated a very close and cordial relationship with Mauritania. Before long, however, Bourguiba had distanced himself from the Moroccan position, offering instead to mediate between the parties to the conflict. He was doubtless influenced by the hostile position adopted by President Boumedienne, the military support accorded Polisario by both Algeria and Libya, and Tunisia's rather exposed position between the two. The decision by a new regime in Mauritania to quit the Western Sahara and withdraw to its own frontiers, in 1979, was confirmation of the extent of Algerian pressure on Nouakchott.

At issue in the dispute over the Spanish Sahara was not so much the assertion of national identity and its preoccupation with frontiers and differentiation of policy. That had dominated the earlier confrontations between Algeria and Morocco in the 1960s, notably the 1963 war and the conflicting positions over Mauretania. The refusal of the Moroccan regime to ratify the border agreement with Algeria, after 1973, signified not a return to the politics of identity and differentiation, but rather a new

concern with the state, its domestic consolidation, its resource base, and the balance of forces within the region. From Zartman's perspective, it signified a return to the checkerboard pattern. We would maintain, instead, that it marked a new phase in the evolution of Maghrebin foreign policies. Not only were the relevant national interests more clearly defined than a decade before but, with the possible exception of Mauritania, they corresponded more closely to perceptions of economic as well as political advantage and reflected assessments of the relevant costs and benefits rather than an unreflecting response to ill-defined 'ideological' positions.

The stakes were much higher than in the 1960s, the African alliances and international linkages were likewise based less on ideology than on more immediate and pragmatic considerations. Opportunism was certainly a factor but a sense of *raison d'état* was even more pronounced. Thus the 'radical' bloc that emerged within the OAU in the early 1980s, with the Western Sahara as one of the main issues, included very 'moderate' southern African states. Libya, which had the highest profile among the 'radical' states - although it was far from being their leader - was prepared to distance itself from the Polisario movement if that was the price for African consensus about the selection of Tripoli, its capital, as the venue for the nineteenth OAU summit and the selection of Kadhafi, its leader, as the next OAU chairman. By the 1980s questions of cost and benefit, real or potential, had moved close to the top of the Maghrebin agenda.

The economic crisis, too, imposed new constraints on foreign policy while falling commodity and energy prices threatened the economic strategy as well as the political ambitions of the two contending Maghrebin states.

Algeria's hopes to become a newly industrialising country (NIC) with access to black African and Maghrebin markets were shelved as the new administration of Benjedid Chadli sought instead, after 1979, to revive agricultural production with the emphasis on incentives for the individual producers, and worked to break up the large, costly and inefficient state industrial corporations. In Morocco, the collapse of the phosphates market, the cost of erecting and securing the defensive perimeter that was constructed around the Spanish Sahara, and a mounting debt burden that came to exceed the Gross Domestic Product, all suggested a too familiar pattern. France, after all, had effectively occupied Algerian territory and secured the eastern and western perimeters in the course of the war of independence. But the cost in terms of money and morale soon proved excessive. It remains to be seen whether Morocco will prove as vulnerable to domestic and international pressures. Western Sahara is far smaller and more easily defended than Algeria; the population in question is small and probably little more than 100-150,000; it is close to Morocco in terms of culture; and Moroccan opinion, as expressed through the parties, still seems to be supportive of the military campaign.

In any case new socio-economic pressures, arising from the economic downturn of the 1980s, would seem to act as a constraint on the leading parties to the dispute. Morocco and Algeria cannot afford a re-run of the Iran-Iraq war in the context of North Africa. Only Libya and its leader, Kadhafi, could conceivably benefit from a damaging war of attrition fought from behind prepared defences. It is doubtful, moreover, whether either regime would survive prolonged exposure to military confrontation. In the present economic climate it is therefore likely that the contest for regional leadership will remain relatively subdued. There are, of course, similarities with the earlier contest of 1963. There is still the element of confrontation between neighbouring states, and the territorial dimension which focusses on the inherited frontiers and which is now being challenged by Morocco in the context of Western Sahara. But to interpret the conflict largely as a return to the checkerboard pattern of the 1960s is, in our view, unduly to neglect the many and important developments that have taken place in North African society and politics and in policy-making since that time.

Morocco is, like Tunisia, a 'conservative' force in the Maghreb, but one whose major foreign policy objective is to secure the stability of the monarchy. The Alawite dynasty in Rabat rejects the Algerian version of Maghrebin unity together with the revolutionary rhetoric emanating from Tripoli. From the viewpoint of Algeria and Libya a monarchical regime appears as an

anomaly and as an obstacle to Maghrebin unity. Hence the Moroccan perception that any increase in the strength of its larger, 'revolutionary' neighbour, would represent a conspicuous threat to the security of its regime. Meanwhile, aware of the danger of intervention by disgruntled elements of the military, the Moroccan leadership has consistently sought to distract the attention of the army away from internal and towards external issues. One result has been to keep the area in a state of permanent tension.

For its part the Algerian leadership, aware of Morocco's expansionist designs, has repeatedly signalled its determination to retain intact the territory that was finally liberated in 1962 at the cost of so many lives. In a variety of contexts Algeria has affirmed its support for the frontiers inherited from colonialism and the principle, recognised by the OAU in 1963 and confirmed again in 1964, that the frontiers of African states can only be modified by mutual agreement. Algeria is, therefore, committed to the territorial status quo : its pretensions to leadership of the Maghreb (and of the Third World) are largely ideological and economic. Its large army has, since 1965, been closely associated with the administration of the country : with the removal of President Ben Bella the military has provided the top political leadership while participating actively in the economic development of the country and in the socialisation of its youth. The last attempted *coup* was in 1967 and the regime is

under no great pressure to re-direct the energies of the military outside the country.

These then are the factors that have inspired the contest between the two countries for leadership of the region : a contest that has helped promote the growth of nationalistic fervour, underlined by latent hostility and military tensions, beginning with the 'war of the sands', in October 1963, and culminating, after 1975, in the threatened (and sometimes actual) confrontation between the two states over the Western Sahara.

Failure of détente

Before 1973 there were, however, clear signs of detente and rapprochement, beginning with the removal of Ben Bella by the military in 1965. Following the settlement of Algeria's border problem with Tunisia, in 1970, there was a move by President Houari Boumedienne and King Hassan to resolve their own disputed frontier. To that end Algeria refused to be associated with the efforts of Colonel Muammar Khadafi, after 1969, to de-stabilise the Moroccan monarchy by offering support to the domestic opponents of the regime. Instead Algeria sought an accommodation with King Hassan, even at the expense of his left-wing critics. The main priority of Algiers was to resolve, once and for all, the contentious border issue. To that end President Boumedienne gave assurances that his government would not intervene in Morocco's domestic affairs while at the same time emphasising the

benefits to be derived from economic cooperation with Algeria - notably through joint exploitation of the iron ore deposits at Gara Jebilet, in Tindouf, south-western Algeria.

There followed a meeting between the King and Boumedienne at Ifran, Morocco, early in 1969, and much later there came the signature, at the Rabat summit of the OAU in June 1972, of an agreement establishing Algeria's control and sovereignty over the Gara Jebilet, but conceding joint exploitation of the mineral reserves. Boumedienne then gave his support to the campaign by Hassan to hasten the Spanish departure from the Western Sahara and complete the de-colonisation of North Africa. Boumedienne, indeed, confirmed his good intentions when, after the abortive military coup against Hassan, in August 1972, he was among the first to greet the King after he had escaped the assassination plot. Boumedienne presumably realised that a change of regime in Morocco was likely to bring to power a nationalistic regime that would be more intransigent over the border issue.

In fact Boumedienne's optimism was short-lived. Perhaps as a result of mounting pressure from the military establishment in Morocco, as well as from opposition parties that were generally hostile to Algeria, the Moroccan parliament delayed ratification of the border agreement *sine die*. There was no doubt, however, that despite their mounting suspicions, the Algerian and Moroccan leaders wished to see an end to the Spanish presence in Western Sahara. Thus, on 23 July 1973, Hassan II of Morocco met in

Agadir with Presidents Boumedienne of Algeria and Mokhtar Ould Daddah of Mauritania to consider Western Sahara and re-affirmed their attachment to the principle of self-determination and their desire to ensure the implementation of this principle in a framework that would guarantee the inhabitants a genuine opportunity freely to express their will in conformity with the decisions of the United Nations.'

It was at that meeting that Ould Daddah asked that his country should be integrated with the 'Arab' Maghreb. Four months later, at the Arab Summit in Algiers in November, Mauritania was, with Algerian help, admitted to membership of the Arab League. Other factors were, however, working against détente within the Maghreb. The prospects for an orderly, negotiated de-colonisation in the Spanish Sahara had begun to recede as early as 1963 with the discovery by the Spanish of rich phosphate deposits. Already in 1966 the Algerian foreign minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, had declared Algeria to be a "concerned and interested" party. A little earlier the Mauritanian representative at the United Nations, Ahmed Baba Niske, had publicised his country's claims to the territory, based on tribal affinities.²

In 1974, as Spanish rule in the Sahara moved to an end, the Moroccan leadership sought to link the question of detente and a final resolution of the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute with the wider issue of sovereignty over the Western Sahara. In a speech

on 20 August 1974 Hassan II warned the Algerians that the continued improvement in relations between their two states was dependent on Algerian support for Moroccan claims over the territory.³ Two months later, at the Arab Summit in Rabat, in October, Boumedienne was reported to have expressed his readiness to "give his political, military and diplomatic support to a division of the Spanish Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania",⁴ presumably in the context of multi-lateral negotiations that would involve the Polisario movement and would entail certain concessions for Algeria, possibly in the transit of Algerian iron ore to the Atlantic coast. Equally, it is possible that Boumedienne was convinced that Mauritania was firmly on Algeria's side and would never conclude an agreement with Morocco. If that was the case it soon proved to be an illusion.

As the Spanish role in the territory came to a close Spain, Morocco and Mauritania started negotiations. Suspecting a sell-out shortly before the vital Madrid Tripartite Agreement of November 1975, Boumedienne met President Ould Daddah at Colomb Béchar, in South-West Algeria. There he seems to have urged him to part company with Morocco warning of grave consequences should he proceed with partition. Ould Daddah stood his ground, incorporated the southern portion of the Spanish territory into Mauritania in 1975, and, under pressure from Polisario guerrillas, hastened in 1977 to sign a defence pact with Morocco. Meanwhile France and Tunisia were recommending the division of the Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania. In the end the

occupation of Western Sahara was accomplished by Morocco in November 1975, as masses of 'volunteers' crossed the southern border into the Sahara in what was described as the 'Green March'.

There followed the Tripartite Agreement between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania, which transferred responsibility for the administration of the territory from Spain to the other two states. While the phosphate deposits in the north were secured by Morocco, the southernmost part of the territory was awarded to Mauritania. Excluded from the final settlement the Algerian government complained that the pledge of self-determination for the Saharawi peoples had not been honoured. Algeria was not prepared to abandon its life-long commitment to the principle long since accepted by member-states of the OAU including Morocco. Since 1975 the renewed conflict between Algeria and Morocco has been a focal point of the diplomatic efforts of the two countries.

Towards a military solution?

Political leaders generally manipulate national symbols for their own purposes and the Maghreb states are no exception. Thus Hassan was able to use the Green March once again to link his dynasty with a popular nationalist cause. Popular support for Moroccan claims on the Western Sahara was clearly expressed in the enthusiasm generated by the Green March, with its

traditional and religious character. Hassan had taken the opportunity of the march to affirm an oath to abandon no part of the newly acquired territory. It was a massive demonstration of popular fervour that could not be ignored either by the Moroccan military, whose loyalty to the dynasty had so recently been questioned, or by the opposition parties whether of the nationalist right or the socialist left. Indeed the parties adopted a line even more strident than that of the King himself. There were accusations of "collusion" directed at Algiers and Madrid from *Istiqlal* on the right as well as from the USFP on the left. The Algerian foreign minister, Bouteflika, was nicknamed Boutefrica, or divider of Africa, and portrayed by the *Istiqlal* press with a colonial helmet accompanied by a dog labelled Polisario.⁵ But perhaps the most fervent defenders of Moroccan claims to the Sahara have been the Moroccan Communists (*Parti de Progrès et de Socialisme*), whose general secretary had published a book as early as 1972 entitled *Le Sahara Occidental Marocain*

1976 saw the beginning of extensive military operations by Polisario guerrillas, in particular the Angala I and II offensives, in January and early February, which witnessed direct military confrontation between Algerian and Moroccan troops. That, and the creation of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) on February 28, and its recognition by Algeria a week later, led Hassan to announce that the confrontation was not between Moroccans and Saharawis, but rather between Morocco and Algeria, with Algeria fully engaged behind Polisario. After

Amgala II Hassan offered the Algerians a choice between all-out war or a negotiated peace. In November 1977 Morocco accused Algeria of supplying troops as well as arms and vehicles to the Polisario forces, and warned of 'hot pursuit' and retaliation by Moroccan troops against bases in Algeria should the attacks continue against "Moroccan borders".⁶ The Algerian media responded in much the same tone.

Moroccan foreign policy has criticised the 'intransigence' of the Algerian leadership that has so far prevented a negotiated settlement. The Polisario guerrillas are presented as 'mercenaries', camped in Algeria and dependent on the Algerian authorities for their very existence. Behind the threats of 'hot pursuit' is a clear preference for a political solution rather than a military confrontation which would be disastrous for both sides. The desire to renew negotiations with Algeria over the issue is reflected in the willingness of Morocco to play down, if not renounce any further claims over Algerian territory in return for Algerian recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara. In this context the Moroccan foreign minister, Mohammed Boucetta, who is also the leader of the Istiqlal nationalist party, declared in October 1977 that :

for me there is only one problem in the Maghreb, that of the Sahara...I do not make a point of the border controversy with Algeria; the only problem is Algeria's attitude towards Moroccan and Mauritanian Sahara. For

us, as for our Mauritanian brothers, the recovery of these territories is definitive and irreversible.⁷

Algeria, on the other hand, does not admit to being directly concerned in the conflict and rejects the view that it is one between the two leading Maghrebin powers. Given her own long struggle for independence and self-determination Algeria cannot deny material and diplomatic support for Polisario in its present campaign on behalf of the Saharawi people. But Algeria insists her government cannot speak for Polisario or represent it in negotiations. It maintains it has no independent territorial claims over the Western Sahara but that its case is based on UN Resolution 1514 (xv) concerning the "offering of independence to colonised peoples". And in various international and African forums the Algerian government has argued further that the problem in the Western Sahara is one of de-colonisation, involving both Morocco and Mauritania as the new occupying powers.

This view has won increasing support, particularly within the OAU whose members are particularly sensitive to questions of de-colonisation and receptive to the principle of self-determination. On the other hand it has made little headway with the conservative majority of the Arab League who reject the parallel with the Palestine Liberation Organisation. They have to confront demands for autonomy on the part of ethnic minorities

and continue therefore to affirm the essential unity of the Arab nation. Where Algeria has preferred to take the issue to the OAU, with its more sympathetic audience of African Heads of State, Morocco has been able to count on the support of the other Arab monarchies as well as the more conservative Arab regimes.

The period of most acute tension between Algeria and Morocco coincided with a marked deterioration in Franco-Algerian relations following the racist and anti-Algerian campaign which developed in France in the mid 1970s. The new French President, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, elected in 1974, had initially hoped for better relations with Algeria, with its large surplus of cheap energy. Relations quickly deteriorated, however, after the French intervened militarily in North West Africa, ostensibly to protect their expatriates working in Mauritania and exposed to Polisario raids. In reality the French seem to have been supporting Morocco as part of a concerted effort to isolate and de-stabilise 'revolutionary' Algeria. This became more obvious in 1977 when the French deployed Jaguar aircraft, stationed in Senegal, to attack Polisario bases close to if not inside Algerian territory. The French raid coincided with joint military efforts by France and Morocco to suppress rebellion in Shaba province of Zaire in 1977 and again in 1978, and to safeguard the conservative regime of Mobutu Sese Seko against forces attacking from across the Angolan frontier. For three years (1975-78) Algeria was indeed isolated and threatened by a Paris-Rabat-Dakar-Nouakchott axis. The isolation was only

relieved in July 1978 when a *coup* in Mauritania removed the pro-French government of Mokhtar Ould Daddah and substituted a regime that was anxious to end the conflict with Polisario, restore security within the troubled Mauritanian state, and arrest the country's economic collapse.

Because of Mauritania's economic and military weakness it had been the prime target for Polisario raids that soon demoralised the administration and severely disrupted the economy, dependent as it is on the extraction and export of iron ore. The racial and other tensions within Mauritania also meant that a section of the population, the young in particular, not only opposed the continuing war in Western Sahara, but openly expressed their sympathy with Polisario. They perceived the war as a 'fratricidal' one and insisted that Moroccan aims in the 1970s were the same as in the 1960s : then they were against Mauritania, now it was Western Sahara. Mauritania should therefore be supporting Polisario and Algeria. It was the bait of partition, the promise of French protection and the veiled threat of Moroccan intervention that had ensured the 'voluntary' collaboration of Ould Daddah.

Immediately following the *coup* in Nouakchott, Polisario was able to announce a unilateral cease-fire on the front with Mauritania, while the new regime sought a rapprochement with Algeria - recalling the good relations that had persisted between the two countries prior to the Tripartite Agreement of 1975. In

August 1979 Mauritania concluded a peace treaty with Polisario in Algiers. At the same time Mauritania renounced all claims on the Western Sahara and recognised Polisario as the "representative of the Saharawi people". It subsequently 'restored' to Polisario the southern part of the Sahara (*Tiris Al Gharbiya*) which it had occupied in 1975, although Moroccan troops pre-empted the move by occupying the territory first. Where the Algerian media welcomed the Mauritanian action as a "victory for reason", the Moroccan press denounced it as "unconditional surrender".

The Mauritanian *coup* marked the lowest point in Moroccan fortunes, before the construction of the sand walls which would effectively secure the perimeter of Western Sahara from outside penetration. Moroccan troops occupying the territory, who now numbered upwards of 150,000, had suffered several important reverses and morale was reported to be dangerously low. The Algiers Agreement effectively isolated Morocco which had already been put into a minority position at the previous OUA summit in Monrovia. Even the French, confronted by austerity and rising unemployment at home, had hastened to lower their military profile in Africa, shifting their attention to the resource-rich states of Central Africa which made a positive contribution to the French balance of payments.

Towards a diplomatic solution?

At the start of the 1980s Morocco felt vulnerable and isolated. Despite the deployment of large military forces the country's perimeter was now more extensive and more difficult to secure. The initiative remained with Algeria and the small Polisario forces whose successful attacks inside Moroccan territory, in 1979 and again in 1980, were aimed not at inflicting military defeat but at weakening Morocco diplomatically. They were scheduled for the eve of the OAU summits at Monrovia and Freetown, in 1979 and 1980 respectively, before the Non-Aligned summit held at Havana in 1979, and prior to the debate on the Western Sahara at the UN General Assembly in October 1980. Meanwhile the death of Boumedienne at the end of 1978 and the appointment of Benjedid Chadli as Algerian President, early in 1979, held out some prospect of diplomatic contact between the two Maghrebin powers - some four years after relations had been severed.

The nationalist *Istiqlal* press in Morocco continued to single out Algeria rather than Libya or the Soviet Union as "the major threat to our territorial integrity"^a As Libya could not intervene directly in the Western Sahara dispute, notwithstanding its support for Polisario, it was clear that without Algeria there would be no war. Algerian backing for Polisario was also apparent in other diplomatic quarters. The same newspaper insisted that Algeria was supporting Iran in the Gulf war "solely

because Iraq had refused to recognise Polisario".⁹ Government moves for a rapprochement with Algeria were criticised by *Istiqlal* as a sign of weakness. Another political movement, the Moroccan Socialist Party (USFP), had earlier criticised Moroccan overtures to the new Algerian government, arguing that the move would be misinterpreted and would lose Morocco the support of its traditional allies "first in Black Africa, then in Europe, and after that at the United Nations".¹⁰

There were nevertheless signs of rapprochement between Rabat and Algiers in October 1980. An attack on the border town of M'Hamid was attributed by King Hassan not to Algerian provocation but to an outside conspiracy directed against both states. Using the occasion of the state opening of parliament, Hassan suggested that others (perhaps Libya?) were seeking to de-stabilise the region by engineering a war between Algeria and Morocco. Meanwhile the tragic earthquake at Al Asnam, in October 1980, enabled the King to express his condolences to President Chadli. The Moroccan people were invited to assist the victims of the earthquake by donating the skins of the three million sheep ritually slaughtered during the religious festival of sacrifice (*Aid Al Adha*). Such gestures of good will failed, however, to persuade Algeria to abandon the cause of the Saharawi. The Algerian economy had benefited from the oil price rise of 1979 and there was still considerable diplomatic capital to be made from the government's support for Polisario and for the principle of self-determination.

The question of the Western Sahara was finally included on the agenda of the OAU summit scheduled for June 1981. This was a victory for Algeria as previously Hassan had been able to circumvent discussion of the issue by threatening to quit the OAU along with a number of other conservative, francophone states. In 1981 Hassan had to agree to the holding of a referendum on self-determination for the Western Sahara although the terms of the consultation were not specified. Where Algeria and Polisario wanted it held under UN auspices and only after the withdrawal of Moroccan administration, Rabat wished to supervise and administer the consultation. In any case the issue for Morocco was one not of self-determination but the re-affirmation of the ethnic, cultural and historical ties between the disputed territory and the Moroccan throne. It was a question of national reunification, following colonial intervention and misrule. For Algeria the issue was national independence for the people of the Western Sahara from colonial rule first under the Spanish and now under Morocco and Mauritania. Even more basic was the question of the electorate : who was entitled to vote? Here Morocco insisted on the results of the Spanish census held in the mid 1970s, which recorded some 60-70,000 Saharawi inhabitants. At the same time Morocco saw Polisario as unrepresentative of those inhabitants and as mercenaries in the pay of Algeria and, more recently, Libya. Algeria estimated that Saharawi population more generously at 100-300,000 and insisted on the representative nature of Polisario.

Time, however, was on the side of the Moroccans who began in the 1980s to receive substantial financial assistance from Saudi Arabia as well as large supplies of military equipment from the United States - mainly with a view to containing the Libyan 'threat' in the Sahel and strengthening the conservative Arab and African regimes. Morocco was thus able to embark on the construction of the multiple and extended sand walls, heavily mined and containing sophisticated electronic sensors capable of detecting movement in the surrounding desert. This substantially limited the effectiveness of the small Polisario forces while it also served to reduce Moroccan casualties and to relieve some of the pressures building up around the throne, most notably from the army. And while phosphate prices remained low, the sudden and steep drop in oil and gas prices, beginning in 1981 and continuing through the mid 1980s, combined with the inefficiency of Algerian industry and agriculture to cause considerable financial embarrassment to the new Algerian administration.

The result was a hardening of the Moroccan attitude as the administration temporised about the promised referendum on the Western Sahara - finally opting to withdraw from the OAU in 1984. Hassan nevertheless claimed that :

With or without a referendum the western Sahara is and will continue to be Moroccan territory...Even if the result of the referendum were to be negative, incredible

as that may seem, nothing will force us to hand over the Sahara on a silver plate to a bunch of mercenaries.''

However, Hassan never lost hope of extracting concessions from Algeria, particularly after the reconciliation summit between Chadli and Hassan, held in February 1983. Chadli himself wanted to improve economic ties between Algeria and its Maghrebin neighbours and to expand regional trade. While Algeria was particularly anxious to secure new markets for its surplus oil and gas production, Morocco continued to import most of its oil from Iraq. After the summit there seemed to be steady progress towards a full normalisation of relations. In April 1983 the border between the two states was re-opened to allow Moroccans in Algeria and Algerians in Morocco to return to their homes.

Algeria now held that a solution to the Western Sahara problem lay in improved economic cooperation between the Maghrebin states. There were projects for the joint exploitation of the Gara Jebilet iron ore deposits, situated on the Algerian-Moroccan border, as well as proposals for a gas pipeline through Morocco and under the Mediterranean to Spain - the counterpart of the pipeline that now supplies Algerian gas to Italy. The Moroccans, who import their energy requirements from abroad, might be allowed access to this gas at concessionary prices. There was even talk of reviving the idea of a Maghreb Common Market - first launched in the mid 1960s when it had quickly lapsed for want of trade as much as for lack of political will.

In some very limited respects the Algerian and Moroccan economies are, indeed, 'complementary' with Algeria's concentration on heavy industry and energy-related sectors, and Morocco's emphasis on import substitution and the production of consumer goods. But the fact remains that trade within the Maghreb is but a minute fraction of the trade that each year crosses the Mediterranean. Any expansion of intra-Maghrebin trade would be dependent on heavy investment from overseas that is unlikely to be forthcoming in the present global economic context. In any case serious doubts will remain about the political will for cooperation within the Maghreb as long as the conflict in Western Sahara continues.

Algeria has continued to insist that there can be no military solution in Western Sahara and that any negotiated settlement must be between Morocco and Polisario. However, to consider these and other obstacles to Maghrebin cooperation, King Hassan was invited to participate in a Maghrebin summit, to be held in May 1983 in Algeria. The summit was planned in advance by Algeria and Tunisia, the two states drawing closer together as the nucleus of a wider North African grouping. President Bourguiba was anxious to improve relations with Algeria in view of the constant threats from neighbouring Libya : he also hoped to create a climate conducive to closer Maghrebin relations that would also ease the pressures on his own small state. His earlier diplomatic intervention, at the end of 1974, to effect a diplomatic rapprochement between Mauritania and Morocco, had not

been well received in Algiers by President Boumedienne. But there was a new leadership in Algeria and Bourguiba wished to take advantage of the situation to cement his own relations with Algeria and to seek a reconciliation between Algiers and Rabat. Hassan, however, was unhappy about the new Algerian-Tunisian accord, which appeared to be directed as much against Morocco as against Libya. As a result the meeting was boycotted by Morocco and Libya and the immediate, if unexpected consequence, was the Moroccan-Libyan 'union' concluded after Kadhafi's visit to Oujda, in August 1984.

Far from creating a climate of detente, the 1983 meeting in Algiers between Chadli and Bourguiba served only to deepen the divisions within the Maghreb and to confirm the Libyan presence within the Maghreb system. Meanwhile the issue of the Western Sahara remains unresolved despite the growing entrenchment of the Moroccan forces. Not only does Morocco refuse to negotiate with Polisario but as recently as 1984 Hassan was threatening to revive the old border issue with Algeria, and his country's claims to the area of the Sahara around the Algerian town of Tindouf - should Chadli continue his support for Polisario. "When I went into exile with my father, in 1953, the stamp used in Tindouf was that of the Sharifian Kingdom."¹² This veiled threat followed a series of diplomatic reverses for Morocco. These began in November 1983 when Mauritania announced that it would recognise the SADR should Morocco fail to comply before the end of the year with the OAU resolution demanding a referendum on

self-determination. Like Tunisia, Mauritania was clearly anxious to renew its former good relations with Algeria and, on February 27, 1984, Mauritania gave official recognition to the SADR.

Morocco's diplomatic isolation within Africa was now complete. The admission of the SADR as a full member was on the agenda of the OAU at its 20th summit in Addis Ababa, in November 1984. The conference followed several earlier (and abortive) attempts to convene in Tripoli when Kadhafi had been ready to exclude the Polisario delegation to ensure the success of the summit and his own election as chairman of the OAU. At Addis Ababa the African states, led by Nigeria, were looking for consensus on the issues that had earlier divided them, including Chad and the Western Sahara as well as the leadership of the OAU for the next year. In Africa Nigerian support for the SADR proved critical in winning over other 'moderate' states and providing a majority for recognition of the proposed new state. Once the OAU had agreed to full membership for the SADR, Morocco had little option but to walk out of the summit. However, thanks to the Nigerian stand and the ensuing divisions among the francophone states, Morocco was joined only by Zaire - recalling Morocco's earlier military support for Zaire at the time of the Shaba invasions in 1977/1978.

Already, in June 1984, President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire had called on black African states to break away from the then paralysed and largely ineffectual OAU and to form a new regional

organisation - without the participation of the North African states. In his view the conflicts in Chad and Western Sahara, which had been largely responsible for the deadlock within the OAU, were essentially Arab and not African problems and were therefore the responsibility of the Arab League. In place of the OAU he now called for the creation of a "League of the States of Black Africa".¹³ This was not the first time that a French-speaking state had advanced such a proposal but it now coincided with diplomatic efforts by Zaire and some other francophone states to improve relations with Israel while distancing themselves from their former Arab partners.¹⁴ The Arab League was, in any case, favourable to the Moroccan position on the Western Sahara and Morocco had long argued that the Arab League and not the OAU was the appropriate forum for any debate on the Sahara.

After leaving the OAU Morocco would ask for full membership of the European Community (EC) - a request that was later repeated by King Hassan on the occasion of his visit to the United Kingdom, in July 1987, but was rejected as incompatible with the statutes of the EC. Morocco had also tried, through the 1980s, to implement a kind of Hallstein doctrine, severing relations with states that recognised the SADR. But that policy met with no greater success and, indeed, proved counter-productive. Having severed ties with Cuba in April 1980, Morocco then broke with Yugoslavia in 1984. As these were leading members of the Non-Aligned Movement the effect was only to

underline the extent of Morocco's isolation - to the benefit of Polisario and Algeria. In a message to the new Chairman of the OAU, Julius Nyerere, King Hassan dated his country's withdrawal from the twentieth summit which had seen the admission of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic as the fifty-first member. He complained that Article 4 of the OAU Charter had not been respected by the majority at the summit and insisted that Morocco did not, therefore, regard itself as being bound in any way by Article 32 under which her withdrawal would only become effective after an interval of a year.¹⁵

The Arab states of the Middle East have been concerned lest the Western Sahara conflict divert attention away from the more important Palestinian issue and the continuing war between Iran and Iraq. Most Arab states, being conservative and pro-western, have nevertheless supported Morocco, and they include Saudi Arabia and the conservative Gulf states as well as Jordan. There was also Hassan's long and close relationship with the former Shah of Iran and their joint identification with American policy and western security. He was thus singled out for particular criticism from the new revolutionary regime in Teheran. This and his public stand against the Ayatollahs won him considerable sympathy and support from the Arab side of the Gulf. Conversely, many Arab states were uneasy about Algeria's friendly relations with Iran after 1979, although it could largely be explained by Algeria's former opposition to the Shah. Even the alliance in the 1980s between socialist Iraq and conservative Morocco was not

that strange. Being opposed to Khomeini Hassan found himself, after 1980, supporting Iraq in its confrontation with Iran, while Iraq reciprocated, supplying Morocco with most of its oil. The Iraqi leadership also resented the role Boumedienne and Algiers had played in 1975 in hosting the conference called to consider the dispute over the Iran-Iraq border. The agreement reached at that conference was later held by President Saddam Hussein of Iraq to have been unduly favourable to Iranian interests.

Tunisia, despite its weakness in terms of resources and military power, was initially supportive of Morocco, while President Sadat of Egypt met Hassan's request for aid by sending shipments of arms, ammunition and spare parts.¹⁶ Morocco and its conservative Arab allies fear the creation of a 'mini' revolutionary state along its southern border - just as conservative Arab states in the peninsula (and Jordan) fear the creation of a revolutionary Palestinian state which would threaten existing regimes. More recently, however, Morocco has come under some pressure from America, France and Saudi Arabia - all looking for flexibility from Rabat and a more positive response to the new administration in Algiers. The decline in oil prices was a major factor in Saudi pressure for a settlement, as the Saudi government was heavily subsidising the Moroccan campaign, including the construction of the defensive perimeter around the Western Sahara. But King Fahd of Saudi Arabia also appears to be increasingly sympathetic to President Chadli's

government in Algeria, perhaps because it is one of the few Arab states to enjoy the confidence of the revolutionary leaders in Teheran, Algeria seems a likely intermediary in any future peace talks within the Gulf. Moreover, from the Saudi point of view, a Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement would further the isolation of Kadhafi. While King Fahd undoubtedly feels closer to the Moroccan monarch, it is unlikely that he would have condoned, let alone approved the act of union signed by Hassan and Kadhafi in 1984.

Meanwhile the United States, having earlier supported Morocco, its traditional ally in Africa and the Mediterranean, has also modified its position in the light of Algeria's shift away from 'socialism' and towards the West under President Chadli. Washington is now ready to acknowledge that there is no East-West component in the conflict over Western Sahara. This is because Algeria, unlike Libya, is regarded as being genuinely non-aligned. The United States is also aware of the rivalry between Algiers and Tripoli and sees Algeria as a useful support for Tunisia as well as an obstacle to Libyan penetration of the Sahel. Algeria's role in securing the release in January 1981 of the Americans held hostage in Teheran has also improved its image with the American public as well as with the administration. In the early 1970s Algeria had been regarded as a haven for 'terrorists' and for Black Power militants. For the Reagan administration King Hassan II remains America's most reliable and trusted ally in the Maghreb. But there are pressures for a more even-handed approach not the least of which is the growing trade

between America and Algeria - coupled with demands for some reduction in military assistance to Morocco to offset the large budget deficit.

The Algerian government is no doubt anxious for peace in the region and for improved relations with Morocco. It would not, however, be easy for President Chadli to abandon a cause with which Algeria has been closely identified since 1975. That cause is also enshrined in the Charters of the United Nations and the OAU. Over sixty states, half of them African, have now recognised the SADR, and the OAU at its Summit in 1983 clearly identified Morocco and Polisario as the parties to the dispute - thereby placing Algeria outside the conflict. Meanwhile Polisario has grown into a relatively homogeneous and efficient, if numerically small force. It is well equipped with military matériel and its combattants are highly trained and efficient. Any agreement between Algeria and Morocco at the expense of Polisario would cost Algeria a good deal of diplomatic support among the African states that have now recognised the SADR, although by way of compensation Algeria could expect to improve her relations with the conservative majority of the Arab League. Libya would doubtless be quick to take advantage of any break between Algiers and the Polisario leadership, but Kadhafi is not well placed to give direct military support to Polisario and in any case needs Algerian support if only to shield his country from further American reprisals. His own cavalier treatment of the Polisario leadership at the time of the abortive Tripoli

summit of the OAU and his recent reverses in Chad would suggest reticence rather than a confrontation with the rest of the Maghreb.

A lasting settlement of the Western Sahara issue would seem to require some kind of diplomatic rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco. President Chadli inherited the issue from his predecessor when he took office in 1979. He was not himself directly involved in the events and actions of 1974-5 that precipitated the conflict in the first place. Moreover, he has had to confront new problems in the 1980s, with falling oil and gas prices, a large population whose growth is outstripping any improvement in Algeria's food production, as well as the steady depletion of the country's oil reserves. Which means a search for new policies, a review of existing partnerships, and some attempt at reconciliation with old rivals and opponents. King Hassan is also under pressure to reach an agreement with Algeria reinforced by the sharp decline in phosphate prices, the mounting domestic debt and a poor harvest in 1987. It is difficult, however, to see how Hassan can afford to make major concessions over the Western Sahara, e.g., involving the organisation of a fair and free consultation on the issue of self-determination. Having failed in his bid to absorb Mauritania, he cannot afford a second defeat, whether diplomatic or military. Sovereignty does not therefore seem to be negotiable, at least for the present, but Hassan has indicated

his willingness to consider granting the Sahara a measure of autonomy.

Meanwhile Hassan has two main strengths. He has 150,000 troops in effective occupation of the more settled areas of Western Sahara and those troops are now protected by the elaborate network of sand walls, electronic 'listening' devices, and lethal minefields. Although still liable to the occasional, surprise attack, the morale of the Moroccan troops would appear to be better than in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Hassan's other strength is the concern of other Maghrebin leaders, and notably the Algerian government, with the stability of the region as a whole, and their preference for the present regime in Morocco - given the likely alternative in the event of a successful coup. The Maghreb states are already more 'developed', in social as well as economic terms, than most of their African and many of their Arab counterparts. Their elites have come to see political stability and an orderly succession at the top as a pre-requisite of further development. Hence the long and delicate consultations that followed the death of Houari Boumedienne in 1978; and the complex intrigue that led to the replacement of President Bourguiba in 1987. Only Kadhafi's Libya has an interest in regional de-stabilisation and an open contest for power inside the other Maghrebin states.

Algeria's own concern for stability within the Maghreb is well reflected in her relations with the left inside Morocco.

Where the Moroccan socialists had since 1962 looked to Algeria for support in their opposition to the monarchy, Algerian governments have insisted that their revolution is for emulation - but certainly not for export. Even when Hassan was under severe pressure at home, in 1972, Boumedienne sought to maintain friendly diplomatic relations with Rabat - no doubt with an eye on the border agreement yet to be ratified by the Moroccan parliament. In 1970\$, at a time of mounting opposition to the King, a number of political refugees from the Moroccan left were forcibly repatriated to Morocco where they were tried and executed. Which doubtless contributed to the 'reconciliation' effected between the Moroccan socialists and the throne in the aftermath of the Green March. It was then the turn of the Algerian authorities to accuse the Moroccan left of betraying their cause and departing from the message and the example of earlier socialist leaders like Mehdi Ben Barka who was assassinated in France in 1965, at the instigation of the (then) Moroccan Minister of the Interior, General Mohammed Oufkir.¹⁷

Despite its rivalry with Morocco, Algeria has a strong interest in maintaining the monarchy in Rabat. It bears witness to the revolutionary and republican credentials of the Algerian rulers - all the more important as the emphasis of the regime has begun to shift from socialism to a form of economic liberalism. Even more important, however, it serves as an insurance against the advent either of a more stridently nationalist regime, with its base in the Moroccan army, or, much less likely, of a left-

wing revolutionary regime, close perhaps to Kadhafi or to the Ayatollahs. The inherent conservatism of the Algerian rulers was never more clearly demonstrated than in their continued support for the regime whose claims to the Western Sahara they have been contesting for over a decade. The explanation for this apparent paradox is simple. While the Algerian state is the embodiment of the revolution, which has been institutionalised and internalised within the army and the bureaucracy, it is the function of Algerian diplomacy to maintain stability within the region, permitting economic forces to complete the social transformation that began with independence in 1962.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the primary importance of the Western Sahara lies in its untapped mineral wealth, including iron ore and, above all, an estimated 1.7 billion tons of phosphates - reportedly the largest deposit in the world. This can be seen as the major contributing factor to Moroccan intransigence over this territory. Rabat no doubt estimates that, with the riches of Western Sahara, it can counter Algeria's economic superiority and advance a more credible claim to Maghrebin leadership. Hence the commitment by the Moroccan government, in 1977, to a massive civil aid programme, entitled the "Emergency Plan" and costing \$260 million to administer.¹⁸ Indeed, the very size of the Moroccan investment in the otherwise small territory, and the cost of its recently completed and very elaborate fortifications,

is a major incentive for the government to continue its present occupation. To surrender the territory to Polisario, with its pro-Algerian leanings would be to confirm Algeria's present dominance, both political and economic, within the Maghreb. It would also provide Algeria with an outlet to the Atlantic while limiting the potential for economic growth in Morocco itself and barring any further territorial expansion. Even the Secretary-General of the Moroccan Communist Party, Ali Yata, warned in 1980 against the machinations of Algeria whose purpose was to prevent Morocco "achieving its territorial unity".¹⁹

Meanwhile Algerian-Moroccan relations are likely to remain strained as long as the conflict in Western Sahara persists. The attempt to impose a military solution would benefit neither side. At a press conference in Marrakesh, in March 1985, King Hassan acknowledged :

I have a code for war : if you cannot defeat your adversary within a generation, then do not go to war against him. Morocco cannot defeat Algeria and Algeria cannot defeat Morocco.²⁰

A generalised war within the region could prove catastrophic for the two principal antagonists, particularly in the present highly unfavourable economic climate. In numbers and matériel neither military has a clear advantage and both are now heavily dependent on the United States for military supplies and equipment -

although Algeria still has large stocks of Soviet arms, tanks and aircraft. It is unlikely that either super-power would want to risk a direct confrontation here - or that the French and Americans would long tolerate an armed conflict in such a sensitive strategic area. The main beneficiary of such a conflict could only be Libya. Meanwhile the 'war of attrition' continues and is both difficult to manage and costly to run.

Hassan undoubtedly has more at stake, including his throne. He has the problem of trying to keep the Western Sahara without waging all-out war against Algeria. And at home there is mounting pressure for the 'democratisation' of political life which threatens the regime's fragile domestic base. The strikes of 1978 interrupted the "social peace" which the King obtained as a result of his Green March in 1975. The food riots of 1984 were a further reminder of the domestic problems facing the monarchy. The Western Sahara campaign in its initial stages was a great propaganda success for the throne - which received unprecedented support across the whole spectrum of Moroccan parties, from *Istiqlal* on the Right, to the Communists and Socialists on the Left. The occupation of the Sahara remains a unifying crusade within the country and would therefore seem to be a condition for future domestic stability.

For the Chadli administration the war in the Western Sahara provides a sense of national mission and a measure of continuity with the Boumedienne regime at a time when the government is

abandoning many of the political symbols that were central to the revolutionary state. Moreover, for Algeria the costs of the war are largely indirect - mainly the loss of potential markets - although the economy can ill afford the present high levels of military spending. The fact remains that the present stalemate reflects both the success of Algerian diplomacy and the ingenuity of the Moroccan strategists and their American advisers. The completion of the sand walls and construction of the defensive perimeter gives the Moroccans effective territorial control of the disputed territory. Pending a satisfactory plebiscite, however, their occupation has yet to receive international recognition. Hence the importance of India's recognition of the SADR in October 1985. This marked the successful culmination of a long campaign to secure international recognition for Polisario, a campaign conducted for the most part by the Algerian foreign ministry. Where Nigeria had earlier given a lead to the other states of the OAU in recognising the SADR, India's decision is likely to reflect the opinion of a majority within the Non-Aligned Movement. Which is not, however, to overlook either the military potential of Algeria (and Polisario), or the diplomatic support that Morocco can command from its Western allies and within the Arab League.

CHAPTER FOUR : ALGERIA AND TUNISIA

The problems of a small state

Tunisia is the smallest state in the Maghreb region in terms of territory and, like Mauritania, is weak militarily. The main objective of her foreign policy is therefore to ensure the survival of the state largely by a policy of appeasement directed at her more powerful and radical neighbours, Libya and Algeria. In the 1960s the image of a 'revolutionary' Algeria was perceived as a threat to Tunisia's security and stability. From the early 1970s, however, the threat seemed to come rather from the eastern frontier and the new radical regime of Muammar Kadhafi. Tunisia hastened, therefore, to settle its differences with Algeria looking for protection from that quarter against Kadhafi's more provocative policies which included a proposed 'union' between Libya and Tunisia. This move by Kadhafi, in January 1974, coincided with the opening in Tunisia of the so-called 'succession' crisis - following a sudden and marked deterioration in the health of the President. The crisis would not be resolved until 1987 and for much of the intervening time Bourguiba often seemed preoccupied with the need to reinforce his personal authority and to emphasise his control of policy, domestic and foreign. Where Bourguiba had initially accorded a rather favourable reception to the Libyan proposals of 1974 the

administration soon returned to its more traditional concern with survival which meant closer ties with Algeria.

From this point of view the beginning of the de-colonisation crisis in Western Sahara, in 1975, was unfortunate as Bourguiba had been personally involved in the negotiations that led to the tripartite agreement. The Tunisian President seems to have been concerned to avoid a breach between Algeria and Morocco at a time when Kadhafi was switching the direction of Libyan policy away from Egypt and the Sudan and towards the Maghreb and the Sahel. Through the 1960s Tunisia had consistently opposed Moroccan designs on Mauritania, identifying instead with the policy of self-determination and independence supported also by France and the great majority of francophone states. By 1975 the independence of Mauritania was no longer in question : indeed, it was the decision by President Mokhtar Ould Daddah of Mauritania to join with his former opponent., King Hassan II, in the partition of the Spanish Sahara that caused alarm and consternation in Algiers. It even seemed for a time as if Bourguiba's initiative would in fact provoke the very checkerboard response which the Tunisian administration had worked so long to avoid. Circumstances in 1975 worked to produce a temporary alliance between Algeria and Libya, over the issue of Western Sahara, and coinciding with the brief Tunisian-Moroccan consensus over the same question. Before long, however, Tunisian policy had re-assessed the strength of Algerian sentiment in opposition to the tripartite agreement and had begun to distance

itself from the more aggressive, unilateral line adopted by Morocco, beginning with the Green March. Algeria, for its part, was hostile to Kadhafi's evident designs on the Sahel states and suspicious of the new Libyan interest in the Maghreb region. And, if the Tunisians were anxious to avoid a closer *entente* between Algeria and Libya, Algerian policy-makers were just as concerned to prevent a Tunisian-Moroccan alliance.

By now the problem was no longer one of differentiation, or nation-building, which Zartman has identified as the main factor contributing to 'checkerboard' politics in the 1960s. That was perhaps more of a problem for Polisario after 1975. But for the existing states in North Africa it was rather a question of 'hegemony' - the search by states for a position of dominance over their immediate environment. This was no longer defined, as it had been in the 1960s, in terms of securing the inherited, often artificial colonial frontiers. Instead it was the attempt to maintain a rough but supportable balance of power within the region, while seeking to exploit any opportunity that would tip the balance decisively in favour of one's own state. Short of internal collapse or intervention by a major external power, such 'opportunities' were likely to be few and far between. Colonial withdrawal, as in the case of Mauritania and the Spanish Sahara, therefore assumed more critical dimensions here - as in Djibouti (Territory of the Afars and Issas) and, of course, southern Africa - than in other areas of the continent where there were no established states competing for dominance. The absence of real

or effective 'power', far from being an obstacle to the emergence of such conflicts, is in fact a stimulus, particularly in a continent where 'instant' acquisitions are not easily had (or retained) and where alternative routes to power, whether based on industrial growth or other forms of resource accumulation, involve lengthy and often painful adjustments - with little certainty about the outcome.

After 1975 Tunisian policy was looking for an improvement in relations with Algeria seeking to play down the inevitable tensions that would continue to arise from time to time. Tunisia derived a sense of security from her international status, carefully nurtured by President Bourguiba. She was never likely to follow Morocco into a kind of African and international isolation - particularly as there were no tangible benefits for Tunisia itself. Tunisia's one real interest in the Western Sahara was in containing the conflict and avoiding an open confrontation in the region that would inevitably threaten Tunisia's stability and perhaps its survival as an independent state. As the conflict entered on a period of stalemate in the early 1980s, with a political solution apparently as remote as ever, Tunisian policy moved even closer to Algeria. The high point in this new understanding was reached in March 1983 with the Treaty of Friendship between the two states, which would be extended to include Mauritania before the end of the year. Morocco and Libya were excluded from the Treaty apparently because of their expansionist designs and their refusal to accept

existing (and formerly colonial) borders. They responded in 1984 with their own short-lived 'Union'.

This time the issue went far beyond the defence of frontiers and the related issues of differentiation. For the regional powers, Algeria and Morocco, the rhetoric, the diplomatic gestures and the military confrontation were necessary ingredients in the struggle for regional 'hegemony'. For Tunisia, as for Mauritania, however, the aim was not domination but rather the need to avoid subordination or forcible incorporation by one of the two major predators, Libya and Morocco. Together with Somalia these two states have consistently campaigned for the revision of colonial frontiers in Africa to accommodate more 'traditional' affinities based on language and history or, in the case of Libya, some 'revolutionary' and anti-colonial imperative. However, foreign policy is not the monopoly of the powerful, or of potential or pseudo-powers, it is also the first (and perhaps the last) resort of the otherwise powerless. Perhaps more than any other country in Africa Tunisia has shown since independence that a state can quickly develop a distinctive foreign policy that not only secures the respect and attention of other states but by the same token creates linkages with larger, more powerful international partners - sufficient to deter the most predatory of neighbours. Which is why the smallest African states are such keen participants in African and international organisations. Under Ould Daddah, Mauritania sought to publicise its role as a link

between Arab North and Black West Africa and between francophone and anglophone states. Hence its membership of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as well as its participation in the more restricted West African Economic Community (CEAO) and its efforts to attach itself to the Maghreb Union and Algeria. Under Bourguiba, Tunisia aspired to be the link between Maghreb and Machrek, as well as between Arab, African and other members of the francophone community, and between Western Europe, the Middle East and Africa.

From Suspicion to Understanding

Tunisia had served as a sanctuary and base for Algerian fighters from the beginning of Algeria's struggle for independence in 1954. An estimated 20,000 Algerian *Moudjahidin* were stationed in Tunisia during that period.' It was their presence that led, on February 8, 1958, to the bombing by the French of the Tunisian border town of Sakiet Sidi Youssef. A year earlier, in March 1957, President Bourguiba and Colonel Amar Ouamrane, a prominent member of the FLN, signed the first formal treaty ever concluded by the Algerian nationalist movement. Under the terms of the agreement the traffic in arms across Tunisian territory would be the responsibility of the country's national guard, while Algerian wounded would be treated in Tunisian hospitals. The FLN, for its part, agreed not to meddle in the country's internal affairs and to limit its presence to areas officially designated as Algerian National Liberation Army

(ALN) camps. As Tunisia would in future deliver arms only to accredited units of the FLN, the FLN gained a useful means of leverage over dissident groups while Tunisia increased its own leverage over the FLN. In 1957, too, Bourguiba succeeded in moving the FLN seat of command from Cairo to Tunis where it would be subject to his moderating influence. And in April 1958 there was the Tangiers conference in Morocco between the Algerian FLN, the Tunisian *Neo-Destour* and the Moroccan *Istiqlal* parties. The purpose of such a meeting would seem to have been the confirmation of a Maghreb identity which would better enable the participants to resist Nasser's revolutionary influence which was then expanding throughout the Middle East.

The quartering of a big Algerian force - larger than Tunisia's own army - on Tunisian territory was bound to provoke friction. The government was under constant pressure from the loosely organised and imperfectly controlled guerrillas as well as being subject to threatened retaliation by the French. There were protests from the Algerian leadership when Tunisia agreed, in 1958, to a French request to receive the oil pipeline from Ejele, in Algeria, with its outlet in the Tunisian port of La Skhirra. Bourguiba, moreover, found it difficult after 1962 to accommodate the revolutionary rhetoric of an independent Algeria which identified with the 'progressive' Arab states, led by Nasser's Egypt, rather than with the more 'moderate' camp of which Tunisia was a prominent member. And here, as elsewhere in Africa, independence brought the inevitable crop of border

disputes which, as Zartman has pointed out, were such a prominent feature of African international relations in the 1960s. Prior to 1970 Tunisia sought to advance her claims to a part of Algerian territory, citing the controversial nature of the French frontiers in the Sahara, drawn up shortly before Tunisian independence in 1956 and favouring Algeria which was then still under French control. In 1970, however, Tunisia and Algeria concluded a Treaty of Brotherhood and Cooperation, valid for twenty years.² This was the result of efforts by the Algerian Foreign Minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, to persuade Bourguiba to abandon his country's territorial claims on Algeria - which he was in no position to enforce - in return for economic advantages offered by Algeria.

Bourguiba in any case had long identified with the moderate African consensus that insisted that existing frontiers could only be altered by mutual agreement. Hence his refusal to support Morocco in 1963 when she attempted to assert her sovereignty over what was now Algerian territory - and his rejection of Moroccan claims on Mauritania. But Bourguiba had even more pressing concerns in 1970. The emergence of a radical regime in Libya, after the coup of September 1969, had been enough to convince Tunisia of the need for a rapprochement with Algeria - if only to avoid being squeezed by its two radical neighbours who were already concerting their policies within the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Accordingly, the 1970 treaty between Algeria and Tunisia settled

the border problem as Tunisian claims were withdrawn. An exchange of visits between Presidents Boumedienne and Bourguiba, in April and May 1972, respectively, helped to symbolise the search for detente and consensus in the Magrheb. But even such manifest good-will on both sides could not conceal the underlying differences, particularly of economic strategy, which helped shape the direction of their foreign policies. While the state played a prominent role in economic management in both Algeria and Tunisia, the relatively liberal and pro-western economic policies of Tunisia were in marked contrast to the state socialist policies in force in Algeria after independence. Tunisia's friendship with the West, especially with France and the United States, was yet another obstacle to closer Maghrebin cooperation across the Algerian-Tunisian frontier.

Algerian-Tunisian relations since 1973 have been defined largely by Libya's expansionary policies directed at Tunisia, Chad and the Sahel, and by Morocco's irredentist policies aimed at the incorporation of most of the Western (former Spanish) Sahara. While the first seemed to require an even closer rapprochement with Algeria, the second created new sources of tension between Tunis and Algiers which would not be overcome until the early 1980s. Meanwhile, a deterioration in the health of the Tunisian President in 1974 raised the issue of the succession just as the Maghreb as a whole was entering a new phase of tension, with the imminent risk of armed conflict between its two major powers. Co-habitation in Tunisia, between

the President on the one hand and his Prime Minister and government on the other, also entered a long and increasingly troubled period. The broad lines of the country's foreign policy remained intact but there was less cohesion and consistency in its application and increasing confusion about the source of policy-making.

The Western Sahara : a new source of tension

As in the case of Algerian-Moroccan relations, the conflict in the Western Sahara after 1975 served to revive earlier mistrust and to aggravate existing tensions. Bourguiba had been the first head of an Arab State to recognise Mauritania, and even to encourage and facilitate its membership in the United Nations, thereby provoking a crisis with Morocco. In the case of the Western Sahara, however, Tunisia failed to recognise either Polisario or the SADR. Instead Tunisia aligned itself with moderate Morocco while trying to limit the damage to her relations with Algeria. Thus, in October 1975, Bourguiba expressed the hope that the issue would not affect his country's ties with Algeria. He recalled that President Boumedienne

had himself confirmed to me that the only thing that concerned Algerians was the evacuation of the territory by the Spanish. In the light of this I advised Morocco to review the future of the territory in association with Mauritania.³

It seems probable that Bourguiba played an active role in the reconciliation between Mauritania and Morocco at the end of 1974 that made possible the tripartite agreement over the Western Sahara in 1975 - when Bourguiba again seems to have been prominent. President Boumedienne does not appear to have anticipated the switch by Mauritania, from her former ally, Algeria, to an alliance with her 'traditional' antagonist, Morocco. This reversal of the normal pattern of alliances in the Maghreb threatened to exclude Algeria from any direct role in the outcome of the issue - and, more important, to effect a significant change in the balance within the Maghreb in favour of Morocco.

Algiers then stepped up diplomatic and military support for Polisario threatening to involve the Maghreb as a whole in a much wider and possibly prolonged confrontation. Libyan backing for Polisario left Tunisia in an exposed and rather vulnerable position as Bourguiba attempted literally to 'mend his fences' with Algeria by advocating a negotiated solution within the Maghrebin framework. This became much less viable after King Hassan's Green March into the Western Sahara in 1975 and the occupation of the territory by Morocco and Mauritania. The conflict entered yet another and more serious phase in 1977, when President Giscard d'Estaing of France authorised the use of French Jaguar aircraft, operating from French military bases in Senegal, to attack Polisario guerrillas based in Algeria. When Houari Boumedienne then called on Tunisia to condemn the French

action, Bourguiba refused to do so. Irritated by Bourguiba's failure to support the Algerian position, Boumedienne seems to have offered 'support' to the domestic opponents of the Tunisian regime.

Given the deterioration in the domestic climate since the opening of the 'succession' crisis, in 1974, this gesture assumed a more significant and threatening aspect - although it is doubtful whether Algeria had any real diplomatic interest in provoking unrest in a neighbouring state. Nevertheless, Kadhafi later alleged that a commando attack in January, 1980, on the town of Gafsa, in Tunisia, which was an open attempt to destabilise Bourguiba's regime, was originally prepared not by Libya - as was generally believed - but by Boumedienne. Although the raid was first conceived in 1978, before the Algerian President's death, there was connivance by some of his advisers in its later execution. Kadhafi conceded that the arms and finance for the Gafsa affair were supplied by Libya but complained that

it is unjust to say that we were responsible for the affair. The real instigator was Boumedienne, who asked for my help. He is dead but his collaborators who organised the affair are alive and with us...One day, in January 1978, Boumedienne returned from Tunisia in a furious mood, having had an altercation with the then Prime Minister, Hadi Nour, and the Defence Minister,

Abdullah Ferhat. I believe they had refused to condemn the intervention of the French Jaguars in the Western Sahara...Thereupon Boumedienne telephoned me to ask for our collaboration in a scheme to shake up Tunisia and overthrow Nour.4

Tunisia nevertheless refrained from denouncing Algerian involvement, despite further rumours that a section of the commando, armed and trained by Libya, had in fact reached Gafsa via Algeria - and that there had been some collaboration from the Algerian authorities, albeit without the knowledge and approval of the new Algerian President, Chadli Benjedid. If true, Kadhafi's account would suggest that Algeria's involvement was the work of Boumedienne's associates who, perhaps, did not wish to see an improvement in Algerian-Tunisian relations at the expense of Algerian-Libyan ones. Meanwhile Bourguiba may have calculated that, while reconciliation with Boumedienne would have been difficult if not impossible, his successor, Chadli, might be better disposed - coming as he did from eastern Algeria, bordering on Tunisia. Where Boumedienne (and Kadhafi for his own purposes) may have sought to exploit the 'succession' crisis in Tunisia, there was nothing to prevent Bourguiba (and again Kadhafi for his own purposes) seeking to take advantage of the change of leadership in Algeria.

Perhaps it was to prevent such a rapprochement, between Bourguiba and Chadli, that Kadhafi had hastened to implicate Algeria in the Gafsa affair. He may even have been assisted by those members of the 'old guard' in Algeria who feared and resented the prospect of a more 'liberal' economic regime after 1979, and a movement towards a more 'balanced' position in international politics. Certainly Bourguiba had every reason to work for closer relations between Tunisia and Algeria. In the last resort, he could expect to receive French and American support in any confrontation with Libya, but he might not be able to count on the same degree of cooperation in the case of a conflict with Algeria. And Bourguiba's pragmatism would in any case restrain him from involving his country in any permanent tension with his more powerful neighbours.

Towards mutual understanding in the 1980s

In fact relations between Tunisia and Algeria had evolved considerably starting as far back as 1979 when Chadli had relaxed restrictions on Algerians travelling abroad, particularly to Tunisia, mainly in search of goods not readily available in their own 'controlled' market. That summer some 350,000 Algerians were able to visit Tunisia. Meanwhile Tunisia, which lacked economic resources and needed fresh revenues, was promised a share in the proceeds from Algeria's exports of gas to Italy - through a projected pipeline to be constructed across Tunisian territory. Tunisia's energy requirements would also be

supplemented by the same pipeline. There were, however, tangible limits to cooperation between the two states set in part by Tunisia's frequent appeals for an Algerian-Moroccan reconciliation on the issue of the Western Sahara. In September 1979 Tunisia had proposed to convene a summit between Algeria and Morocco to find an exit from the Western Saharan impasse. There was a favourable response from Morocco who had always insisted that the real conflict was between itself and Algeria. Algeria, on the other hand, rejected the proposal recalling that the issue was rather between Morocco and Polisario.

It is wrong to ask Algeria to play the same role on behalf of the Saharawi people that Egypt plays vis-a-vis the Palestinians...Regional and international organisations are agreed in insisting that the population of the Western Sahara should freely determine its own future.⁵

There was again irritation in Algiers, in January 1982, following a statement by the Tunisian Prime Minister, Mohammed Mzali, once more inviting Algeria and Morocco to engage in negotiations on the western Sahara. Relations deteriorated further, in February 1982, after the Tunisian delegation had withdrawn from the summit of the OAU to which the SADR had just been admitted. The Tunisian authorities, for their part, did not take kindly to the comment by the Algerian media concerning Tunisia's close relations with the United States as revealed by Prime

Minister Mzali's visit to the United States in April 1982. There he had signed an agreement for the purchase of American military equipment. The mounting tension between the two countries resulted in the partial closure of their common border in the summer of 1982. Other, contradictory pressures were also at work, however, and in favour of an Algerian-Tunisian rapprochement.

Under Boumedienne Algeria had maintained good relations with Libya while relations with Tunisia had cooled considerably following Bourguiba's intervention in the Western Sahara issue in 1974-5. After 1979 President Chadli sought to reverse the direction of his predecessor's foreign policy. Libya's new involvement in the Maghreb and, above all, her military intervention in Chad, and her involvement elsewhere in the Sahel - notably attempts at de-stabilisation in Niger and Mali in particular - all posed something of a challenge to Algeria's own ambitions in the francophone (and Islamic) territories south of Tamanrasset. But the real motive for the change of policy towards Libya was the determination of the new Algerian leadership to break with the economic policies of previous administrations and to compensate for rapidly falling oil and gas prices by wooing western energy consumers while offering incentives for private capital investment at home. Algeria could not change the broad outlines of her foreign policy without losing friends, face and identity. The administration could, however, place less emphasis on radical rhetoric and more on

pragmatic solutions, particularly in the economic sphere, without repudiating all the policies and commitments of the previous regime.

By distancing itself from Kadhafi's Libya the new administration could extend the available range of options and partners without sacrificing existing allies. By looking for an accommodation with Tunisia, Chadli might hope to ingratiate himself with Bourguiba's main western partners, France and the United States. And Algeria was much better placed to help contain Libyan expansion westwards than Tunisia or even Morocco. Finally, the cordial relations that Algeria enjoyed with the revolutionary regime in Iran after 1979 greatly increased her value as intermediary particularly with western governments whose nationals were held hostage in Teheran or Beirut. Without the Iranian revolution it would have been exceedingly difficult for President Chadli to establish good relations with the Reagan administration after 1981, and the government of Jacques Chirac in France after 1986.

Meanwhile Tunisia was the main beneficiary of the change of direction in Algerian policy after 1979 and the growing distance between Algiers and Tripoli. There were tangible gestures of good will towards Tunisia including the condemnation in 1983 of an Algerian officer detained earlier for his role in the Gafsa raid of January 1980. On March 19, 1983, Chadli himself visited Tunisia and joined with Bourguiba in signing the Treaty of

Friendship between the two countries. The treaty, valid for twenty years, was to be the basis for a wider Maghrebin alliance whose rules of association manifestly excluded those states like Morocco and Libya that rejected the political status quo in favour of expanded frontiers, were ready to resort to force to secure their territorial objectives, and failed to respect the sovereignty and political independence of other states. In May 1983 it was the turn of Bourguiba to visit Algiers for the second 'summit' meeting, at which Tunisia undertook to endorse the right of the Saharawi people to self-determination.⁶

The meeting in May 1983 was heralded as a Maghrebin summit, yet there was little chance that either Kadhafi or Hassan II would attend. Instead Bourguiba and Chadli were joined by the Mauritanian President, Ould Haidallah who, at the end of the year, also signed the Treaty of Friendship. If the Treaty was supposed to be directed mainly against Libya, the effect was undoubtedly to isolate Morocco, in geographical as well as diplomatic terms - in an attempt to force Hassan to make concessions over the Western Sahara. Instead Hassan surprised almost everyone by signing the Moroccan-Libyan 'Union of States' in August 1984. The Union threatened to tilt the balance of power in the region in favour of the Moroccan-Libyan axis, given the human and military potential of Morocco and the large military arsenal stockpiled by Libya. To offset this discrepancy Algeria made formal approaches to the United States while President Chadli became, in April 1985, the first Algerian

President officially to visit Washington. The Reagan administration then agreed to sell American weapons to Algeria which, like Libya, had traditionally purchased its arms from the Soviet Union.

When Tunisia was threatened by Libyan provocations in the summer of 1985, President Chadli openly assured Bourguiba of Algeria's readiness and determination to protect Tunisia against any outside intervention. Meanwhile trade between Tunisia and Algeria quadrupled during 1984. Algeria's rapprochement with Egypt, in 1985, also seems to have been a diplomatic echo of the Ujda agreement between Morocco and Libya. Where Egypt, under Presidents Sadat and Mubarak, had maintained close relations with Morocco, Cairo may now have wished to indicate its unease at Hassan's new alliance with Libya. Likewise the French, the Americans and the conservative Arab monarchies displayed varying degrees of astonishment and disapproval of the Moroccan action. It is doubtful whether Hassan II ever took the 'Union' with Libya as anything other than a diplomatic ploy - to counter Algeria's threats of encirclement and isolation and as a warning to his Western allies not to take Moroccan support for granted. While Morocco and Libya shared expansionist designs the prospects for practical military collaboration were almost nil. But the new agreement did have the useful effect of stopping further Libyan supplies of arms for the Polisario guerrillas. Where Boumedienne had resented Algeria's exclusion from the tripartite agreement of 1975, Hassan was now displaying similar pique at his country's

exclusion from the Treaty of Friendship which suggested a privileged status within the Maghreb for Algeria and Tunisia. Morocco could not accept subordinate status within a regional alliance where the terms of entry were in fact being dictated largely by Algeria.

Where Bourguiba had chosen Morocco as a privileged partner in the mid 1970s, the continuing threat from Libya dictated the alliance with Algeria in the 1980s. Tunisia was ideologically closer to Morocco while Algeria and Libya both claimed to be 'radical' and 'revolutionary'. But fear of Libya prompted the re-alignment of Tunisia with Algeria, while Algeria took the opportunity to re-assert its own leading role within the Maghreb, scoring off its rivals in the process. Assured of Algerian support against Libya, Tunisia could resume the search for a diplomatic settlement of the Western Sahara dispute. Meanwhile Algeria hoped to improve its own position in any future talks on the issue. Like Tunisia, Algeria under President Chadli was greatly concerned about Libyan intervention in West Africa and the Sahel, and the possibilities for Libyan mischief-making in the Maghreb itself.

Hence Algeria's alarm at the prolonged succession crisis in Tunisia and the more recent conflict between the Tunisian government and the Trade Union Confederation (UGTT) which, in the view of Algiers, has Kadhafi's support. And, whereas Morocco has failed to ratify her border treaty with Algeria, Libya is the

one state adjoining Algeria which actively persists with her territorial claims. Perceptions like the above led Algeria to deploy its troops, en masse, along the Libyan frontier at the end of 1985.⁷ That also help to explain why the Chadian President, Hissène Habre, who in 1983 was described by Algeria as an "American puppet", had two years later become a "nationalist patriot" and the leader best placed to defend Chadian national unity.⁸ For Algeria the continuing conflict in the Western Sahara was a dangerous distraction from the real problems confronting the Maghreb, notably the economic crisis and the opportunities for Libya to exploit that crisis. However, the immediate effect of the 'Friendship Treaty' was to threaten Morocco with encirclement and isolation - prompting the 'unholy' alliance with Libya.

Indeed, the Moroccan-Libyan Union threatened to turn the tables and outflank both Algeria and Tunisia. Superficially, it was the 'checkerboard' pattern once again - but this time with the wrong partners. On closer examination it is clear that, far from marking a revival of 'ideological' confrontation, focussed on 'bad neighbour' relations, the division of the Maghreb into two rival camps in 1983-4 was not based on ideology - Libya and Morocco had even less in common, ideologically, than Algeria and Tunisia : Algeria and Libya, Morocco and Tunisia were the appropriate 'ideological' pairs. Rather it was dictated by '*realpolitik*' and cold, calculating '*rationality*', at least on the part of Morocco. *Realpolitik* would also determine the end of

the unlikely alliance in 1986 - given Morocco's evident reluctance to repudiate the American attack on Tripoli and Benghazi, and her failure to honour the terms of the 'Union' by offering military support to Libya. Which is not to say that the 'Union' had no rational base. Morocco and Libya appeared as the two 'revisionist' states, bent on territorial acquisition, while Algeria, Tunisia and now Mauritania were anxious to preserve at least the territorial (if not the economic) status quo. Differentiation, boundary de-limitation and nation-building were largely irrelevant here. Instead, the real issues concerned state-building, boundary revision and the regional balance of power. The main parties to the dispute were possessed of large, modern armouries and the capacity to deploy them. And if the alliances were in the end makeshift and failed to result in new, broader and more coherent groupings that surely reflects the international context and the wider pressures acting on the main participants, and their own perception of their immediate interests rather than the rigid logic of the 'checkerboard' pattern of relations.

In Tunisia, the combination of the 'succession' crisis, apparently resolved only towards the end of 1987, and the continuing Libyan 'threat', following Tunisia's rejection of Kadhafi's proposed union in 1974, effectively pushed Tunisia into closer alliance with its far larger neighbour, Algeria. The alliance, cemented in 1983, was certainly facilitated by the change of leadership in Algeria as a pragmatic style of diplomacy

- already obvious under Boumedienne - was wedded by Chadli to the promise of greater economic liberalism. But the real basis of the Friendship Treaty was the growing political and constitutional crisis inside Tunisia itself. Tunisia has always relied on the French or Americans to provide the necessary 'protection', while trying to buy additional security by involving itself in numerous international agreements - to such an extent that a Tunisian presence and a certain Tunisian 'style' are deemed indispensable to the transaction of a wide range of diplomatic business.

Since 1979 Tunis has played host to the headquarters of the Arab League - precipitating an Israeli attack on Tunisian territory in the aftermath of the hijacking of an Italian cruise liner. The incident seems to have somewhat shaken Bourguiba's usual confidence in his diplomatic skills : and it undoubtedly helped undermine the confidence of the domestic political elites in his conduct of affairs of state. In these rather ominous circumstances it became apparent to many interested observers that the governments best placed to intervene in the 'succession' crisis were those of Tunisia's neighbours, Libya and Algeria. From the viewpoint of the Tunisian elites and of the Western powers, mainly France and America, closer Algerian involvement to guarantee internal stability and a broad continuity of policy was preferable to Libyan de-stabilisation.

Bourguiba himself was reported to have told the French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, in the summer of 1985 :

I am concerned about Tunisia's security after my death.
You must know that I have confided its security to
Algeria and to President Chadli Benjedid.³

The fall of the Prime Minister, Mohammed Mzali, in 1986 did not seriously damage Algerian-Tunisian relations, although Mzali had been one of the architects of the Treaty of Friendship and was held in high esteem in Algiers. Indeed, Algiers helped facilitate his flight to Switzerland after his dismissal by Bourguiba - notwithstanding a Tunisian warrant for his detention. Nevertheless, the new Prime Minister, Rachid Sfar, paid an official visit to Algiers in October 1986 and the Tunisian authorities were careful not to criticise the Algerian action. Heading the agenda for his talks with President Chadli was the question of "economic complementarity" between their two countries - whose economies have both been seriously hit by the current economic crisis. The subsequent replacement of Sfar and the appointment of yet another Tunisian Prime Minister, in 1987, signified the climax of the 'succession' crisis. It would be resolved at the end of the year as the new Prime Minister, Ben Ali, a former Minister of the Interior, who was also a general and had long been responsible for security, deposed the senile President and himself assumed the office. All indications are that the substitution was effected with the knowledge and

cooperation of the Algerian government - and, presumably, with the support and connivance of the French and American authorities. With Ben Ali as the new President, the former Ambassador to Algeria, Hedi Beccouche, was then nominated Prime Minister. He had been prominent in the negotiations that preceded the signing of the Friendship Treaty and his appointment was popular with the government in Algiers. It also provided tangible evidence, if any were still needed, of the mutual confidence and the close ties that now exist between Algeria and Tunisia.

CHAPTER FIVE : ALGERIA AND LIBYA
FROM ALLIANCE TO LATENT CONFRONTATION

Libya : between the Machrek and the Maghreb

Of the Maghreb states it is Libya which most closely approximates Zartman's model of a Third World state with an "underdeveloped" foreign policy. Isolated in North Africa between former British and French zones of influence an independent Libya had to secure its frontiers and its control of its new-found oil wealth while at the same time seeking to integrate its small but dispersed population and to define its place in the Middle East and its role in the Arab world. Following the defeat of the Arab states by Israel in 1967 King Idris and his advisers were unable to contain the upsurge of national Arab sentiment, particularly in the military, whose officers had been strongly influenced by Nasserism and by anti-colonial sentiment at least since the time of the abortive Suez expedition in 1956. Pan-Arabism was the dominant sentiment among the young officers who seized power in Tripoli in 1969 at a time when Nasserism was on the decline elsewhere in the Middle East and, most notably, in Egypt itself.' Where Nasser at the end of his life may well have identified with the new Libyan leadership and with the youthful enthusiasm and militant ideals of Muammar Kadhafi, it was the pragmatic and 'moderate' Anwar Sadat who succeeded Nasser upon his death in 1970.

Kadhafi was never reconciled to the advent of Sadat who quickly managed to consolidate his rule by appealing to Egyptian national sentiment and contrasting his own secular, liberal views with the more extreme, less tolerant version of Islamic socialism associated with Kadhafi and his 'revolution' in Libya. Nor would Kadhafi ever be reconciled to his deliberate exclusion from the Arab coalition that planned and executed the successful crossing of the Suez Canal at the outset of the Yom Kippur war in 1973. The determined opposition of Sadat had effectively blocked Kadhafi's attempt unilaterally to impose a Libyan-Egyptian merger on the eve of the war. After the conflict, Kadhafi found his aspirations for Arab leadership in the Middle East blocked by Egyptian military strength and by the growing economic power of the Saudis and their conservative allies in the Gulf. While the separate peace treaty concluded between Egypt and Israel, in 1979, divided the moderate camp and led to Egypt's exclusion from the Arab League, the headquarters were removed to Tunis and not to Tripoli. Kadhafi's isolation was soon more complete and lasting than that of Egypt.

It was Egyptian not Libyan forces that crossed the canal in 1973. It was Saudi Arabia (and Kuwait) and not Libya who had the final word within the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries. It was Syria that intervened in the Lebanese civil war early in 1976 just as it would return a decade later, registering its interest in the future of that troubled territory as well as its claim to a prominent place in any future

international conference on the Middle East. In 1979 Kadhafi was upstaged by the Iranian Ayatollahs in his efforts to exploit the revolutionary potential of Islam. Morocco hosted the Arab summits of 1981 and 1982 while it was Algeria that finally organised the Palestinian conference of April 1987 in a partially successful bid to reconcile the factions that had been warring openly since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Libya had more success in Africa where its arms and subsidies enjoyed a small but appreciative audience. There, too, however, there were serious setbacks.

The fall of Amin in Uganda in 1979 saw the hasty evacuation of perhaps three thousand supporting Libyan troops. Kadhafi's shift of attention to the Sahel in the 1970s, which coincided with the severe drought in the region and a weakening of France's economic role, also failed to bring the hoped-for results. Whatever influence Libya may have achieved with Presidents Hamani Diori of Niger and François Tombalbaye of Chad, did not long survive their removal in 1974 and 1975 respectively. In the Sudan, Nimeiry, the one-time revolutionary, was more than a match for Kadhafi until the 1980s brought insurmountable economic problems and a recurrence of the earlier civil war in the south. Popular unrest and military intervention finally secured his removal in April 1985. But here, as in Liberia, Ghana and Burkina Faso, new and often junior military leaders seem to have used the threat of a rapprochement with Libya mainly to ensure a continuation of financial support from other, more traditional

quarters - namely the United States, France and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

There are some obvious (if limited) similarities between the Libyan approach to foreign policy under Kadhafi and the aggressive policies pursued by Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah after independence in 1957. Both leaders have been described as charismatic. Both were concerned to centralise power in their own hands as well as to project a radical, anti-colonial image of their respective countries on the international and African scene. By articulating distinctive foreign policies each hoped to create an identity for his state and to define a mission that would enable them to transcend the territorial and other limitations of their post-colonial inheritance. While Nkrumah and Kadhafi did both, in their different ways, work to forge a sense of national rather than 'tribal' or 'parochial' identity, neither made any real attempt to give substance to the notion of a 'national' interest as such, other than in a negative anti-colonial, anti-western context.

Nkrumah's pan-African zeal had its counterpart in Kadhafi's pan-Arab enthusiasm. But where pan-Africanism was finally buried at the constituent summit of the OAU, in 1963, pan-Arabism received its formal quietus in 1967 after the Arab defeat at the hands of Israel. In both cases ideology was used as a substitute for effective power, and there was a preference for rhetoric in place of stable alliances grounded on firm national and material

interests. Nkrumah committed himself to the Union of Ghana, Guinea and Mali as the microcosm of a United States of Africa. Kadhafi, too, sought union, first with Egypt, Syria and the Sudan, then with Egypt in 1973, with Tunisia in 1974, with Chad in 1981, with Morocco in 1984, and most recently with Algeria, in 1987. Threats of subversion and 'terrorism' also featured prominently in the vocabulary of the two states as foreign policy came increasingly to resemble a 'spoiling' operation. 'Bad neighbour' relations were largely the order of the day between Ghana on the one hand and the adjoining countries on the other - at least until 1965.

Much the same has been true of Libya's relations with the adjacent states since the arrival in power of Kadhafi. In the final analysis, however, neither Ghana under Nkrumah nor Libya under Kadhafi has had the power to impose itself, even on its immediate environment. Confronted by impending international isolation, and threatened reprisals, Nkrumah and Kadhafi have sought relief and a measure of security through more conventional diplomacy. Where Nkrumah had finally in 1965 to come to terms with African 'realities', namely the weight of moderate Nigerian influence and the strength of conservative francophone resistance, Kadhafi, two decades later, has had to conjure with the reality of Egyptian power and American as well as French and African resistance. In both cases the outcome was concerted pressure by neighbouring states and other interested parties to isolate the 'contagion' and to try and enforce on the

'delinquent' states a greater measure of conformity with accepted international diplomatic practice.

Algeria and Libya : allied in "the struggle against reaction"

Libya's growing association with the Maghreb (and with West Africa) dates largely from 1973 and was a direct reaction to Libya's exclusion from the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973. While certain other Arab leaders, including President Boumedienne of Algeria, were given advance notice of the war, Kadhafi had not been among them. Sadat had little use for the Libyan leader's revolutionary rhetoric - and still less for his pretensions to leadership of the Arab world. His efforts to impose an Egyptian-Libyan union on the reluctant Sadat culminated in July 1973 in a threat by Kadhafi to lead a peaceful invasion of Egyptian territory. The enterprise was halted only by the threat by Egypt to use force to repel any such incursion. The October war produced a marked shift in Libyan priorities : pan-Arabism lost ground as Kadhafi focussed on the wider struggle against 'imperialism' which began, not in the Sinai or along the Golan heights, but in Africa and at the frontiers of the Libyan state, themselves part and parcel of the alien colonial order. Kadhafi, together with the Iraqi President, Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr, declined to attend the 'victory' summit of the Arab League held in Algiers at the end of November 1973. He described it as a 'capitulation' summit.

Boumedienne strongly criticised the action of the Libyan and Iraqi leaders which detracted from the Arab cohesion that had been one of the more remarkable features of the recent war. But even the Algerian leader does not appear to have anticipated Kadhafi's next move which was a widely publicised attempt at fusion with Tunisia, in January 1974. The Djerba agreement, which carried the signature of the Tunisian Foreign Minister, was accompanied by broadcast appeals from Tripoli calling on Algerians to rise in revolt against their government. For their part the Algerians were anxious for closer economic cooperation with their immediate Maghrebin neighbours, but they were no more receptive than ~~was~~ Anwar Sadat to Kadhafi's appeals for political and territorial union. And where Kadhafi had not been consulted in advance about the October war, it was now the turn of the Algerians to complain that there had been no diplomatic contact with Tripoli or Tunis before the proposal for union had been published.

Bourguiba's own role and motivation in the affair remains obscure. He may at first have favoured closer economic ties with Libya hoping thereby to develop his economy - and large numbers of Tunisian workers were soon employed in Libya, to some extent replacing earlier Egyptian workers, while their remittances helped swell Tunisia's reserves of foreign currency which had been depleted as a result of the steep increase in the price of imported oil during the previous year. Bourguiba may also have hoped to exercise a moderating influence on the young

and idealistic Libyan leader - at a time when the French government was anxious to secure supplies of oil from Libya in exchange for sales of military hardware and jet fighters.

Algiers seems to have had considerable misgivings about the new direction in which Libyan policy was moving. After a visit by Kadhafi to Cairo, in February 1974, Boumedienne reminded his Algerian audience of their country's own revolutionary heritage.

Kadhafi declares that he is a Nasserite but we are neither Nasserites nor anything else. We are simply revolutionaries. We have survived the revolution which gave birth to us. Kadhafi speaks of revolution but where is this revolution? He says that he nationalised his oil! But we did that a long time ago.²

By the end of 1975, however, as the Algerian government feared diplomatic isolation over the Western Sahara, or a possible military confrontation with Morocco whose army was now quartered in the occupied territory, it turned for assistance to Libya. The threatened union of Libya and Tunisia had proved abortive and the two North African members of OPEC were already collaborating inside that organisation to try to maintain the real value of the price increases won in 1973 - and against strong resistance from Saudi Arabia. After a series of talks in Algiers and Tripoli the Algerian President was therefore able to describe Libya as "a natural ally in the struggle against reaction".³

In December 1975 an important agreement was concluded between the two states at Hassi Messaoud, in southern Algeria, under which the two Heads of State agreed to assist one another in case of outside aggression. For the first time Libya was openly admitted to partnership within the Maghreb. Despite the agreement, however, and a succession of meetings, the Libyans held back from recognition of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Indeed, Libya did not recognise the SADR until April 1980 - more than four years after the announcement of its creation, and only after thirty-seven other states had given their recognition, including some twenty-one African states.

Together with the majority of member-states of the Arab League, Kadhafi is opposed to the creation of multiple Arab entities which it is feared would detract from the ideal of pan-Arab unity. And like most other Arab and African states, Libya has experienced the damaging effects of ethnic/communal and other internal tensions. However, Kadhafi has been favourably pre-disposed towards the Saharawi cause if only on account of his particular hostility to King Hassan II of Morocco, and his disaffection towards the Arab monarchies generally. Libya's support for the agreement with Algeria was especially welcome in Algiers where the government suspected and feared French and American complicity in the demands being advanced by Morocco. In February 1976 Kadhafi and Boumedienne went so far as to agree to a detailed study of ways and means to implement the "organic ties" between their two countries, thus helping to realise their

"common destiny".⁴ Which seemed to be a diplomatic way of calling attention to their readiness at least to consider a fusion of their two countries.

Under the 1975 agreement each of the two countries was obliged to come to the assistance of the other in case of external threat or aggression. Two years later, however, in July 1977, it became clear that Algeria would not allow itself to become involved in Libya's border clash with Egypt. Nor did it support Libyan aid to Idi Amin's regime in Uganda, or to Jean-Bedel (Emperor Jean) Bokassa's self-styled Central African Empire. As the initiative for the Algerian-Libyan entente came mainly from 'above', it did not comply with Boumedienne's later conditions for a 'Maghreb of the peoples'. In any case, with Boumedienne's death in 1978, relations between Algeria and Libya suffered a gradual but steady deterioration. While the new Algerian administration was mending its fences with France and the EEC in the early eighties, Libya stepped up its attacks on French policy in Africa and, most notably, in Chad where Libya had been supporting an opposition since 1968.

The end of the Algiers-Tripoli axis

Meanwhile other African states registered their disapproval of Libyan involvement in Chad and elsewhere on the continent by

boycotting the O.A.U. summit due to have been held in Tripoli in the summer of 1982. If, as seems likely, the intention was to deny the chairmanship of the OAU to the Libyan leader, the manoeuvre, largely coordinated by the more conservative franco-phone states, was successful. Libya's isolation was most apparent in February 1983, when Kadhafi found himself effectively excluded from talks aimed at achieving détente and an early rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco. In February President Chadli Benjedid met with King Hassan II - a move encouraged by the Saudis and perhaps prepared at the Arab summit of September 1982. The Libyans interpreted this as yet another manoeuvre by conservative states to contain and isolate them - just as Nkrumah's Ghana had been ringed by a *cordon sanitaire* back in 1965. And, while Algeria had been seeking a diplomatic accommodation with Morocco focussing on the vexed problem of the Western Sahara, Libya had deliberately intervened to raise the stakes, threatening to outbid Algeria in its support for Polisario.

On March 2, 1983, Kadhafi responded by making the quarrel with Algiers official - demanding, in a broadcast speech, the application of the Djerba agreement with Tunisia and the Hassi Messaoud agreement with Algeria. Otherwise the Libyan government would have to resort to violence in order to realise Arab unity : there would be an appeal to the Tunisian and Algerian peoples over the heads of their respective leaders.⁵ Kadhafi was even reported at this stage to have threatened President Chadli with

assassination.⁶ Later in March President Bourguiba was received in Algeria at a mini-summit which saw the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship between Tunisia and Algeria. The admission of Libya to the Treaty would be subject to a resolution of the outstanding differences between Algiers and Tunis on the one hand and Tripoli on the other. Tunisia's conditions included delimitation of the continental shelf along the Gulf of Gabes and an end to the training in Libyan camps of opponents of the Bourguiba regime. Algeria likewise wanted agreement with Libya on frontier demarcation - along the lines of similar agreements with Tunisia, Mauritania, Mali and Niger - as well as an end to Libyan subsidies for those groups in Algeria who were opposed to the government and its policies. Former president, Ahmed Ben Bella was reported to have received \$20 million from Tripoli.⁷

Where Kadhafi had once seen in Algeria "a revolutionary sister state",⁸ he had quickly turned against the government of President Chadli Benjedid, probably supporting the Islamic fundamentalist group headed by Ahmed Ben Bella. Kadhafi's impatience with the Chadli administration seems to have grown after the failure of the OAU to convene in Tripoli for the nineteenth summit in 1982. While Algeria was willing to attend that summit, President Chadli was also active in the negotiations that finally led to the compromise decision to hold the 1983 OAU summit in Addis Ababa, and to elect Colonel Haile Mariam Mengistu as chairman in place of Kadhafi. The fact that the moderate African states had preferred a Marxist leader, allied openly with

the Soviet Union and Cuba, to Kadhafi, did nothing to reduce the latter's sense of growing isolation and encirclement. The Libyan leader has also accused President Chadli of wanting to exercise exclusive political influence over the Polisario Front while Libya in fact provides it with some eighty per cent. of its aid. Moreover, Algeria's policy of rapprochement with the Sahel countries - Niger, Mali and Mauritania - was seen by Libya as a move to thwart Kadhafi's proposed 'United States of the Sahara'.

Algeria had long been hostile to the Libyan annexation in 1973 of the Aouzou Strip in Northern Chad, partly because of her own interest in the Sahel territories and partly because of outstanding Libyan claims to Algerian territory. The Libyan claim to the northernmost region of Chad is based on the Laval-Mussolini accord of 1935, which awarded the Aouzou Strip to Libya but which was never ratified by the French. Algeria has submitted a counter-claim to the effect that the same treaty wrongly incorporated the Ghat region from Algeria into southwest Libya. The Algerian view is that existing borders offer the only stable basis for African political and economic development. The Algerian-Libyan frontier was defined by the Franco-Libyan accord of 1956 which the French did ratify. Whether or not the treaty gave an unfair territorial advantage to Algeria - which the French still considered an integral part of the metropole - is held to be beside the point.

Algeria, with its own ambitions to play a leading role in Africa, remains suspicious of Libya's quest for influence in the continent and for a dominant role within the Sahel and, possibly, the Maghreb. As the present balance of power in North Africa favours Algeria, successive Algerian governments have identified with the existing pattern of states inside their inherited borders. President Chadli has been more concerned, at least initially, to consolidate his domestic position and to provide fiscal incentives and a liberal economic climate more conducive to recovery and growth. He is understandably less sympathetic to the regime in Libya than was the avowedly socialist Houari Boumedienne. Thus Chadli repeatedly warned Kadhafi in 1981 that Algeria would not tolerate Libyan efforts at destabilisation directed at Tunisia, Mali, Niger or what was then Upper Volta (Burkina Faso). He publicly disapproved of Kadhafi's plan for a merger with Chad and of his intention to garrison Libyan troops there. "Episodes of this nature are likely to create unrest within the region and invite colonialist-sponsored provocations."⁹

The Sahel region, to the South of Algeria itself, has twice suffered extensive drought in the course of the 1970s and 1980s and includes a number of the poorest, most under-developed states of the Third World. While Algeria has long contested the dominant role of the French, the former colonial power, Algiers is unwilling (and probably unable) to compete with Libya and others in the distribution of economic and military subsidies.

Nor can the Algerian leaders exploit the same Islamic 'fundamentalist' appeals as their Libyan rivals. Nevertheless Algeria has closely monitored Libyan actions in Chad, at times offering an alternative haven to the leader of the GUNT opposition, Goukkouni Oueddei, whenever he sought to resist or escape Libyan pressures. Algeria has also been wary of Libyan support for various dissident groups in Niger - perhaps recalling Nkrumah's much earlier support for Djibo Bakary - as well as its sponsorship of an opposition movement in Mali, the Liberation Front of Northern Mali. At a summit conference of the Saharan states, held in Nouakchott, Mauritania, in March 1982, which Kadhafi declined to attend, Chadli pointedly insisted on the need for stability within the region if the governments were to begin to tackle the many and serious problems confronting its peoples.¹⁰

At the beginning of 1982 Kadhafi failed in yet another fusion attempt - this time with Mauritania - despite a prior agreement with the then Prime Minister, Sid Ahmed Ould Benejira. Nor did Kadhafi succeed in an attempt to replace Algeria as the main influence behind Polisario, notwithstanding his disproportionate contribution, in arms and money, to the liberation movement. Finally, there was Libya's exclusion from the "Maghrebun unification process" as Algeria looked for some way out of the Western Saharan impasse, signing the Treaty of Concord with Tunisia in March 1983. with which Mauritania was also to be associated later that year. Under mounting African and Western

pressure in Chad, Kadhafi sought to reinstate himself in the Maghreb by trying to effect a reconciliation with his now traditional opponent, King Hassan II of Morocco. Where Hassan would doubtless have preferred reconciliation with Algeria, the latter's support for Polisario created difficulties for both sides that were apparently insuperable. Libya on the other hand had already shown its readiness to subordinate the interests of Polisario to its own - when it was a question of Kadhafi's ambition to become chairman of the O.A.U. in 1982. Moreover, a Libyan offer to withhold further supplies of arms from Polisario, was attractive to the Moroccans as it would reduce the pressure on their beleaguered forces until the defensive fortifications around the Western Sahara could be completed.

The first meeting between Kadhafi and Hassan was from June 30 until July 3, 1983. This was clearly a response to the failure of the earlier talks between Chadli and Hassan in February and the Algerian-Tunisian 'summit' in March. Hassan was quickly able to judge the repercussions on his African and western allies. African support for Morocco had already been greatly weakened as a result of Moroccan intransigence over the question of self-determination for the Western Sahara. The leaders who remained loyal to Rabat were mostly drawn from conservative, francophone states, which looked to Morocco to contain the spread of Libyan influence in West and Central Africa. Fear of an impending reconciliation between Morocco and Libya had the effect of pushing several of these states in the direction of Algiers.

Morocco's reconciliation with their enemy (i.e., Libya) led them to a rapprochement with Algeria, Morocco's traditional enemy.

After the June 1983 OAU summit at Addis Ababa, Senegal, formerly a staunch supporter of the Moroccan position over the Western Sahara, became reconciled with Algeria. The Senegalese Head of State, Abdou Diouf, paid a visit to Algeria from 14-17 October 1983, where he called for direct negotiations between Morocco and Polisario on a cease-fire and the organisation of a referendum. That was an important and positive gesture in the direction of his Algerian hosts. Diouf's visit was followed by that of the President of the National Assembly in Guinea - also an ally of Morocco - from October 17-20, 1983. This, in turn, was a prelude to the visit to Algeria of the President of Guinea, Ahmed Sekou Touré, in 1984 and shortly before his death. Morocco nevertheless decided to proceed with the controversial 'Union of States', concluding a treaty with Libya in August 1984. This had its sequel at the OAU summit in Addis Ababa, in November 1984, when the SADR was admitted to full membership of the African community - following formal recognition of the SADR by Nigeria. Presumably the Moroccans had by then already discounted the diplomatic fall-out that would inevitably follow this uncertain alliance between two contrasting and formerly opposed states.

By its treaty Rabat had succeeded in disconcerting former opponents and allies alike. On paper the 'union' seemed to have created a new and, from the Moroccan point of view, much

more favourable balance of power within the Maghreb. If Morocco had been defeated in the diplomatic sphere, Hassan had taken much of the pressure off his forces which had long been on the defensive inside the Western Sahara. He had bought time in which to complete the sand walls that would soon surround the occupied territory. Without a political settlement, however, he could not legitimise what was, in effect, a military conquest. And there could be no political settlement without Algerian support. Inside Africa, Algeria had largely succeeded by diplomatic means in isolating Morocco. The Friendship Treaty with Tunisia threatened to rebuild the Maghreb essentially on Algerian terms and with a privileged central nucleus comprising Algeria and Tunisia.

The Moroccan-Libyan riposte threatened to outflank the two more central states leaving Morocco and Libya free to pursue their separate territorial ambitions. Morocco therefore abstained from intervention in Chad while Libya withheld arms from the Polisario guerrillas. King Hassan doubtless calculated that he had much to gain, at least in the short term, and little more to lose by his treaty with Libya. His Western and Arab allies would no doubt disapprove, but were unlikely even to consider let alone implement sanctions against Morocco. And withdrawal from the OAU, while something of a tactical retreat, did not mean that Morocco thereby cut itself off from the leading conservative African states, including Nigeria, Zaire, and Ivory Coast. While African leaders continued to see Marxist and radical regimes as a

'threat' to their own security, there would be a market, in Africa and elsewhere, for the kind of military support that Morocco was prepared to offer.

In the Maghreb there is now an Algiers-Tunis axis, with which Mauritania is also associated. This is a replacement for the Algiers-Tripoli axis that dominated Maghrebin politics between 1975 and 1979. More recently there has been the Libyan-Moroccan alliance of 1984-6, that threatened to upset the balance in the Maghreb and even to displace Algeria as the key, central power. This, however, proved to be only temporary. It was in fact defensive rather than offensive in character. The two regimes were under severe military pressure abroad and financial pressure at home. Each was isolated diplomatically - at least in the African context - and there was the additional threat of encirclement. Considerations of national security seem to have been paramount where the Libyan and Moroccan leaders were concerned, mixed with *realpolitik* or statecraft, and a will to survive. The division of Africa into rival ideological camps seems to have been largely irrelevant although it would be quite wrong to suggest that the ideological divisions are no longer there or that Africa is now aligned according to other issues. The older problems do persist and the patterns of political behaviour associated with them. Where Tunisia's rapprochement with Algeria in the 1980s has its explanation in the need to counter Libyan threats, Algeria saw it as a means both to thwart the Libyan drive for leadership in the Maghreb, and also to

prevent a possible alliance between Morocco and Tunisia based on similar ideological perspectives.

An examination of the patterns of alliance resulting from the conflict in the Western Sahara suggests that *raison d'etat* was featured more prominently than ideology in the behaviour of the relevant African leaders. If the alliances were often short-lived and inherently unstable it was not because the national interests they served were ill-defined or incoherent, but rather because rapidly changing circumstances after 1973, in the Sahel and Western Sahara, as well as in Africa as a whole, forced corresponding adjustments of foreign policy. It is significant that diplomacy was preferred to open confrontation, certainly where Algeria and Morocco were concerned. But neither state could in the 1970s and 1980s be described as powerless. It was not so much lack of military capability that prevented outright war as the realisation by both parties that armed confrontation was unlikely to serve their national interest either in the long or the short term. The response of the Maghreb states to the American raid on Libya in April 1986 was quite instructive in this regard. Where the conservative and pro-western Moroccans were embarrassed, not least because of their mutual defence treaty with Kadhafi, the President of radical and non-aligned Algeria, Chadli Benjedid, took the opportunity not only to condemn the attack but also to criticise Kadhafi's position on the question of 'terrorism'. While on a visit to Sweden, in late

April, Chadli was reported to have told Swedish journalists that

:

Kadhafi is an old friend but we cannot accept the methods
Libya uses...People who are fighting for their
independence have the right to use what others may call
terrorism, but not in the territory of an uninvolved
friendly nation.''

CHAPTER SIX : LIBYA AND MOROCCO

AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE

Kadhafi : no love for Arab monarchies

Since his overthrow of the Senoussi dynasty in Libya, in 1969, Kadhafi has not attempted to conceal his antagonism towards the Arab monarchies which he perceives as anachronistic and which he holds responsible for the backwardness, the weakness and divisions of the Arab peoples. For over a decade the Alawite monarchy of Morocco was the target of Kadhafi's pan-Arab nationalism. He openly celebrated news of the two *coup* attempts in Morocco in 1971 and 1972 and expressed disappointment at their failure. King Hassan II, on the other hand, has identified Libya as the principal threat to the stability of his kingdom, particularly through its encouragement and support for the domestic opposition. Until the early 1980s relations between Morocco and Libya were relatively uncomplicated, based as they were on straightforward enmity.

The spectacular Libyan-Moroccan rapprochement of 1984 has to be seen partly as a reaction against the isolation of the two regimes, at both the regional and international levels, as a result of their respective policies in Chad and Western Sahara. Partly, too, it was engineered as a response to the Treaty of Friendship concluded between Algeria and Tunisia in 1983. Morocco was able to use the time gained to consolidate its military position in Western Sahara while Libya experienced an

uninterrupted series of military setbacks in Chad, following the overthrow of Goukouni Oueddei as President of Chad and his replacement by his former colleague in arms, Hissène Habré, now close to the French and the United States. Mounting tensions between Kadhafi and Oueddei, detained for a time in Libya, and the African consensus in favour of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Chad, did nothing to relieve the sense of isolation in Tripoli. Even in the face of the American attack in 1986 Kadhafi received no tangible support from any Arab state - having to be content with expressions of regret at the nature and extent of American intervention whose ambivalence was doubtless intentional.

Meanwhile Morocco's 'union' with Libya had served as a warning to Hassan's western allies who were being actively courted by the Chadli administration in Algeria. Morocco also secured an interruption in the flow of arms from Libya to the Polisario guerrillas. It bought valuable time in which the military could consolidate their defences and secure their occupation of the Western Sahara. Perhaps most important, it distracted attention from the country's growing diplomatic isolation and helped conceal Hassan's failure to deliver a political, as distinct from a military settlement in the Saharan conflict after a decade of hard campaigning. There had never been any question of real integration between Morocco and Libya - just as two decades before there had been no question of effective integration between Guinea and Ghana. That union had briefly

helped to rescue Guinea from economic collapse and diplomatic isolation, whereupon Guinea had almost immediately begun to distance itself from its English-speaking partner. In the light of American sentiment antagonistic to Libya and the new, more conservative government in France, since the elections of 1986, Rabat concluded that the only realistic course was, after a decent interval, to repudiate the agreement with Libya. Any reluctance to quit the 'union' was largely on account of the financial benefits that had accrued to thousands of Moroccan workers employed in Libya in place of a similar number of Tunisian workers expelled by Kadhafi in 1985.

The hostility between Kadhafi and Hassan II began soon after the successful *coup* in Libya in 1969 and the establishment in Tripoli of the Revolutionary Command Council under Kadhafi's leadership. Libya had even sent a premature message of congratulations at the time of the attempted *coup* against Hassan in July 1971. Early in 1973, after Hassan had despatched Moroccan troops to Syria, in the aftermath of Israeli raids on Lebanon and the shooting down of a Libyan civilian airliner, Libyan Radio criticised the Moroccan action accusing the King of attempting to rid himself of revolutionary elements in the Moroccan army. The Libyan media were also responsible ^{for} broadcasts directed, twice-weekly, at Morocco and the other Maghreb states. These encouraged Moroccan soldiers to rebel against the monarchy and dismissed Hassan's support for the Palestinian cause as no more than verbal platitudes, while he himself was described as being

'soft' on Israel. Supporters of the Moroccan opposition had the opportunity to publicise their cause in regular broadcasts in both Berber and Arabic languages. The authorities in Rabat responded with just one radio programme, beamed at Libya on a twenty-four hour, non-stop basis, and consisting exclusively of the sounds of yapping dogs.'

The October 1973 war against Israel brought a respite in the media war with the suspension - on October 13 - of Moroccan transmissions denouncing the Kadhafi regime. It was presented as a gesture of Arab solidarity in a time of crisis and came after Libya had agreed to facilitate the transit of Moroccan troops to the 'front'. Despite his rejection of those conservative Arab leaders whom he accuses of treachery and corruption, Kadhafi has usually presented himself as working for Arab unity and against any further 'balkanisation' of the Arab camp. Thus, while Kadhafi was increasingly alienated after 1973 by the conservative, pro-western bias of the Arab League, dominated by Egypt and the wealthy oil-producing monarchies, he did take the opportunity in 1975 to associate himself with the Maghrebin case for de-colonisation in the Spanish Sahara. In 1975 Libya went so far as to applaud Moroccan policy on the Sahara, offering to provide troops to assist Morocco and Mauritania in their campaign against the Spanish presence. While diplomatic relations between Libya and Morocco had been broken in July 1971, as a result of Libya's support for the abortive military coup of that month

against Hassan, they were resumed from January, 1975, at an ambassadorial level.

In June 1975. Moroccan journalists visiting Tripoli were told of Kadhafi's willingness to place his army at the disposition of Morocco so that "its" Sahara might be liberated. After reminding his audience of his opposition to the multiplication of separate national entities, and the division of "the Arab nation", Kadhafi declared :

It is important for the Moroccan people to know that it has an ally in the Libyan Arab Republic. Morocco is a part of us and we are a part of it. We will therefore be at its side when it engages in the struggle for the liberation of Ceuta, Mellila, Rio d'Oro and Saquiet Al Hamra.²

After Spanish withdrawal from the Western Sahara and the transfer of responsibility to Morocco and Mauritania, Libya , like Algeria, gave its support to the Polisario Front whose aim has been the complete independence of the territory. Kadhafi seems to have reasoned that support for this genuinely revolutionary force would help unseat the obsolete and decadent dynasty in Morocco, and that Arab unity could then be realised in accordance with revolutionary principles and with Kadhafi's own designs.

Fragmentation of the Arab nation was to be avoided at all costs - the experience of British 'de-colonisation' in the Gulf, after French 'de-colonisation' in North Africa was sufficient proof of the dangers of 'balkanization' and the creation of mini-states dependent on and subservient to western interests. Arguing from these premises Kadhafi seems to have inclined initially towards the incorporation of the whole Spanish Sahara into Mauritania. But when Mauritania and Morocco became joint beneficiaries of the tripartite agreement, and proceeded to occupy and partition the territory, Kadhafi announced his support for the Saharawi nationalist movement, Polisario, supplying it with arms and equipment along the so-called *piste de Kadhafi*, (Kadhafi trail), through southern Algeria and northern Mali. To justify this shift of position Kadhafi maintained that the liberation of the Western Sahara and its incorporation with its Arab neighbours should have been the result, not of military conquest but of a popular or people's union. "If the Sahara is Moroccan, then why are tens of thousands of Moroccan soldiers fighting in the Sahara?"³

Libya, Algeria, and the Western Sahara

The emergence of the Western Sahara issue widened differences between the Moroccan and Libyan regimes at a time when Kadhafi had seemed instead to be looking for rapprochement. Now Libya would return to its earlier policy of support for Hassan's opponents, at home and abroad, while the Moroccan sovereign

sought to return the compliment. And, in a further effort to isolate the King and to bring Polisario more closely under his personal control, Kadhafi undertook to supply the Polisario guerrillas with lavish quantities of often sophisticated Soviet weapons, while continuing to provide moral support. He nevertheless refrained, until 1980, from according recognition to Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), as a distinct and would-be independent entity, demanding instead the creation of a revolutionary front that would comprise Libya, Algeria, Mauritania and Polisario.

Libya's interest in the Saharan issue, which seemed to diverge also from that of Algeria, seems to have had three main objectives. Firstly, there was support for the revolutionary guerrilla campaign that would, hopefully, shake the Moroccan monarchy and de-stabilise it through a war of attrition. Then there was the more distant goal of a new Islamic state in the Sahara, incorporating Mauritania as well as the territory now to be liberated and perhaps other states as well - under Kadhafi's influence and Libyan control. And finally there was the objective of exporting the Libyan revolution by promoting the "cause of popular democracy" in what was undoubtedly a strategic corner of North West Africa. Possibly Kadhafi hoped to erect a non-Marxist but radical state in the North West that would be the military (and Islamic) equivalent of the Mengistu regime in the Horn of Africa. It is not clear, however, how Kadhafi hoped to overcome Algerian suspicions, let alone the opposition of French

and western powers, to say nothing of the resistance of other Middle Eastern and African governments.

What is clear is that, with the death of the Algerian President, Houari Boumedienne, in December 1978, and the shift of emphasis by the new administration of Chadli Benjedid - away from socialism and towards moderation, at home and abroad - Kadhafi seemed an increasingly isolated figure. He seemed to have respected Boumedienne in a way that he could not respect his successor. After all it was Boumedienne who, through the Treaty of Hassi Messaoud, in 1975, had first brought Libya into the Maghreb sub-system as a full partner. Chadli's insistence on "good neighbourliness" and his search for reconciliation in the Maghreb threatened in the 1980s to return Libya to her former isolation. Thus, after a Libyan-backed commando was implicated in an abortive attempt to de-stabilise the Bourguiba regime - by an attack on the Tunisian border town of Gafsa, in January 1980 - Hassan II at once declared his solidarity with his Tunisian colleague. "If Tunisia is attacked Morocco is prepared to come to its defence and has set in train whatever military steps are necessary to ensure that we can take our place alongside the people of Tunisia."⁴

The Libyan response was to recognise the SADR, on April 18, 1980, which then led Morocco once again to break off diplomatic relations with Tripoli. Only for a short time, however. A year later Kadhafi's envoy, Colonel Mansour Abdulhafid, was received

by King Hassan II and later revealed that diplomatic relations would be restored for the sake of Arab unity and the Palestinian cause.⁵. Despite these developments Tripoli was unhappy about the situation in the 1980s, both in the Maghreb and in Africa as a whole. First there was the failure of the 19th OAU summit to convene in the Libyan capital - which deprived Kadhafi of his turn as Chairman of the African organisation. This was followed by Chadli's efforts, at the beginning of 1983, to effect some kind of reconciliation with Morocco, in response mainly to Saudi intervention and the need for a display of Arab unity after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Kadhafi was nevertheless convinced that Algeria was betraying its revolutionary principles. Where he may have anticipated an open confrontation between Algeria and Morocco - with Libya well placed to take advantage of the subsequent weakness of both states - the contending parties seemed more interested in achieving a negotiated settlement that would enable them to save face and cut their military expenditures. Neither side seemed anxious to extend the conflict.

Morocco was also under increasing diplomatic pressure as growing numbers of states accorded formal recognition to the Saharawi Arab and Democratic Republic (SADR). But as long as Algeria continued to support Polisario - and refused to apply pressure for a cease-fire - Morocco had little alternative but to pursue and extend the military campaign in the south while contriving to limit the inevitable political and diplomatic fall-

out. Meanwhile Libya and Morocco both came increasingly to see Algeria as responsible for their growing isolation and for their double failure at the 19th summit of the O.A.U. Where Morocco had failed to prevent the admission of the SADR as a full member, Libya had likewise failed to defeat a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the troubled state of Chad. Algerian diplomacy had been active and ultimately successful in putting together a majority in favour of both resolutions.

Having abandoned his claims on Mauritania at the end of the 1960s, King Hassan was in no mood to surrender his claims to the Western Sahara. Since 1975 the territory has served as a symbol of national unity and of political reconciliation inside Morocco. It has provided a welcome respite from internal opposition and military and labour unrest. Morocco is in effective occupation of a territory which also serves as a link with black Africa, providing a useful counter-weight to Algeria's own Saharan region. From the Libyan point of view northern Chad is seen as a part of their own "vital space" and as contributing the mineral resources needed to confirm Libya's pretensions as a nuclear power. It also provides a channel for Libyan ambitions further south, among the Islamic states of the Sahel and the Sahara. Hence Libya's annexation of the Aouzou Strip, in northern Chad, in 1973, its attempted 'fusion' with Chad in 1981, and its goal of one day constituting the 'United States of the Sahel (Sahara)'.

During 1983-4 events conspired to overturn the alliance of Algeria and Libya that had been the dominant feature of the North African political landscape since 1975 - in favour of an even less stable and less likely alliance between Morocco and Libya. Kadhafi resented Libya's exclusion from the Treaty of Concord and Fraternity signed in March 1983 between Algeria and Tunisia - largely in response to Libyan threats directed at both, and most immediately at Tunisia. The treaty marked the lowest point in relations between the two former radical partners, as Algeria made Libyan acceptance of their common frontier a condition for participation in the Maghrebini alliance. The former Libyan ambassador to Jordan, M. Omar Chenib, who resigned in July 1983, maintained that he had himself been asked by Tripoli to execute King Hussein of Jordan, while Kadhafi had also ordered the assassination of President Chadli Benjedid.⁶

Kadhafi certainly blamed the new Algerian leadership for deserting the 'Rejection Front', formed in December 1977 by Libya, Syria, Algeria, South Yemen and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), following Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. The two states also differed in their approach to the PLO after its eviction from Lebanon in 1983. Algeria consistently supported the Chairman, Yasser Arafat, and his more conciliatory approach to Middle Eastern issues, while Kadhafi, like President Hafez Assad of Syria, backed more extreme factions of the PLO who refused to accept Arafat's leadership. Kadhafi also resented Chadli's conscious attempts to improve his country's relations

with France following the election of the socialist leader. François Mitterrand, as President in 1981. The French presence in Africa was increasingly resented by Kadhafi who saw it as an obstacle to the realisation of his ambitions in Chad and elsewhere in the region. Finally Algeria was accused by Tripoli of seeking to undermine Libyan influence both in the Maghreb and with Polisario and with the Sahelian states as a whole.

A marriage of convenience

In the circumstances it was perhaps not so astonishing that Kadhafi should seek to outflank the Algerian position by attempting a reconciliation with some of his staunchest enemies. From June 8-12, 1983, Kadhafi visited first King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, at Riyadh, before going on to North Yemen and Jordan and concluding his journey in Morocco where he was received by King Hassan. This was in the context of Saudi efforts to organise an Arab consensus on Middle Eastern problems in anticipation of a new international peace conference. Where Algeria had tried to use Saudi influence earlier in the year to effect a détente with Morocco, Kadhafi had rather different reasons for seeking a reconciliation with Hassan. Their meeting was the first in fourteen years.⁷ It was aimed largely at breaking their diplomatic isolation and underlying the discussions was their recognition that each had a common interest in upsetting the territorial status quo and that each was under considerable

pressure to explain and justify their military involvement outside their own frontiers - in Chad and the Western Sahara.

Similar circumstances had, in the early sixties, first brought together Morocco with Nkrumah's Ghana and Sekou Touré's Guinea in the 'Casablanca' bloc - formed at the start of the 1960s, ostensibly in opposition to colonial influence. On that occasion the pan-African and radical 'socialist' ideals of Kwame Nkrumah and his ally, Touré, had found little echo in Rabat where the conservative monarchy was pursuing more traditional dynastic claims against its southern neighbour, Mauritania. There was, however, convergence even then between the Moroccan and the radical point of view. Both wanted an end to French rule in Algeria - albeit for rather different reasons - while both hoped to benefit from a weakening of French influence elsewhere in West Africa, particularly in the Sahel.

After the passage of two decades, ideology had even less to do with the political 'union' that would emerge in 1984 as a result of Kadhafi's meeting with King Hassan. The basis of this new alliance was not a shared ideology or common political perspective, but the imperatives of statecraft : *raison d'état*, the sense of mounting isolation, playing for time, hoping to raise the stakes for one's opponents, and a measure of pique at being excluded from the Friendship Treaty recently concluded between Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania. It was even suggested that Hassan was prepared to drop his opposition to Libyan moves

in Chad provided Tripoli ceased its logistical aid to the Polisario guerrillas active in the Western Sahara. Interestingly, Kadhafi in his visit to Morocco in 1983 declared that Libya was now "neutral" on the question of the Sahara.²⁴

The idea of a 'deal' between the two countries received some substance when Hassan declared, in late 1983, that there was historical justification for Kadhafi's claims in Chad : "There were blood ties between northern Chad and southern Libya".²⁵ The rapprochement between Morocco and Libya reached a peak on August 13, 1984, when Kadhafi arrived in Oujda, in western Morocco, to attend a mini-summit with Hassan and possibly Chadli, who had also been invited. Chadli, however, refused to attend - just as Hassan had declined to attend an earlier mini-summit convened in Algiers in March 1982. The outcome of the meeting was a 'Union of States' treaty signed between Kadhafi and Hassan II, which would later be 'endorsed', on August 31, by 99.97% of Moroccans voting in a referendum organised for that purpose.

The speed and the ease with which the union was ratified by a plebiscite contrasted with the reluctance of the Moroccan parliament to ratify the earlier border agreement between Hassan and Boumedienne concluded in the early 1970s. Since one of the objects of the 'union' was to 'buy time', Hassan had nothing to gain by postponing ratification. In any case he could the more readily approve of the 'union' in the conviction that it would never be implemented - particularly the clauses concerning mutual

defence and political fusion. The two states, besides their other very obvious differences, and the contrasting outlooks, policies and temperaments of their leaders, had no common frontier - which, admittedly, eliminated one possible source of contention. Otherwise Kadhafi might himself have had second thoughts about the wisdom of union given Morocco's advantage in terms of its population and given the extent of popular support for Hassan since the Green March of 1975. The union nevertheless brought a temporary respite after fourteen years of mutual recrimination and insult.

Hassan seems to have been influenced mainly by the prospect of ending Kadhafi's financial and military support for Polisario whose activities, since 1975, had done so much to drain the Moroccan economy - suffering from the combined effects of higher prices for imported oil after 1973 and again in 1979, and much lower prices for Morocco's principal export commodity, phosphates. Hassan would also have hoped to exploit Libya's seemingly insatiable appetite for foreign workers - their remittances would greatly benefit a country crippled by an unemployment rate of at least 20% and an estimated \$12 billion in foreign debts.¹⁰ Kadhafi, on the other hand, argued that the rapprochement with Morocco was designed only to rescue their Arab brothers from their abject misery and to guarantee them a better future in association with their Libyan compatriots.

While the union seems to have been mainly a response to immediate pressures on both states, one cannot rule out more strategic and longer term considerations - certainly on the part of Kadhafi. While Kadhafi has been active in his efforts to encourage and exploit the 'succession' crisis in Tunisia, following the evident deterioration in Bourguiba's health in 1974, there was much less opportunity for intervention in Morocco, whether direct or indirect, particularly after Hassan's success in mobilising popular support for his dynasty by means of the Green March. Through a policy of 'fusion' Kadhafi may have hoped to penetrate Hassan's formidable security apparatus. He might build up support in Morocco either by mobilising and indoctrinating Moroccan emigrant workers before repatriating them homewards (Trojan horse), or by creating a core of 'free officers' within the Moroccan army, who could then seize power and overturn the monarchy (Fifth column).¹¹ In either case Kadhafi is at a distinct disadvantage in Morocco, compared with Tunisia, if only because of the distances involved and the very distinctive political and cultural traditions of Morocco.

Hassan has himself remarked, in a radio broadcast, that the decision to offer some form of union with Libya was made without premeditation and on the spur of the moment : "I myself was personally surprised."¹² He added that the proposal was received by Kadhafi with evident amazement. While the Libyan leader has certainly been known to act precipitately, that has not been a pronounced feature of the Moroccan ruling family. Moroccan

foreign policy has always given every sign of long preparation and careful consideration. No doubt Hassan was under considerable pressure to justify his new alliance to those of his more conservative allies who had been under the impression that his opposition to Kadhafi was unshakeable. But there was no chance of the 'union' surviving long. Since coming to power, in 1969, Kadhafi has signed no less than six abortive union agreements : two with Egypt, two with Sudan, and one each with Tunisia and Syria. The treaty of Hassi Messaoud, concluded with Algeria in 1975, although it looked forward to a possible union, never evolved beyond an agreement for mutual aid and defence that neither side ever cared to invoke. The fusion with Chad in 1981 was the result of an 'agreement' signed by Goukouni Oueddei but in circumstances that left him little if any option. Nor was the treaty with Morocco Kadhafi's last attempt at Arab union. Some three years later he again wanted fusion, this time with Algeria!

Conclusions

In explaining the background of the Libyan-Moroccan treaty one should not, perhaps, ignore the 'personal' factor and the way that relations fluctuated over time between the various Maghrebin leaders. While personalities remained important in Maghrebin politics, however, the twenty-five or thirty-years that have elapsed since independence have also seen a considerable growth in the bureaucratic apparatus and some attempts at refining the concept of national interest. Groups have also emerged with a

specific interest in particular aspects of foreign policy while foreign policy has itself become involved with the other concerns of government including trade, industry, energy, defence, education, natural resources and agriculture. While the leaders certainly insist on taking what they consider to be the most important and most pressing foreign policy decisions, they are subject to many domestic as well as external constraints.

Nevertheless, the Moroccan-Libyan union, although it served many distinct purposes, was formed in response to and in reaction against the Friendship Treaty of 1983 between Algeria and Tunisia which seemed to discriminate against Morocco and Libya - and to establish a privileged nucleus or group of states within the Maghreb who could then set conditions for the admission of the remaining states. But for the Algerian initiative, which was perhaps aimed more at Libya than at Morocco, it is doubtful whether Kadhafi would have made common cause with the "corrupt and decadent" monarchy in Rabat. But Algeria was determined to exclude Libya from the terms of the agreement until such time as Kadhafi agreed to 'play the game' according to the rules set out in the Charter and contained in the Statement of Principles of the OAU. Meanwhile Hassan had also been anxious for a rapprochement with the new administration in Algiers, aware of its interest in ending the conflict in Western Sahara and in expanding trade with its regional neighbours. Hence the meeting between Hassan and Chadli in February 1983, which Saudi Arabia had helped prepare.

But Chadli was unwilling or unable at the time to endorse Morocco's continued occupation of the Western Sahara; nor does Chadli seem to have been prepared to apply pressure on Polisario to accept a cease-fire and possibly a plebiscite that would confirm and legitimise Morocco's claim to the territory. The Moroccan reaction was to demonstrate both her own effective occupation of the territory and the inability of the Algerians to make good their promise of self-determination for the Saharawi and of independence for the SADR. Instead of détente the outcome was a continuation of the conflict, but at a lower level of intensity and with the emphasis now on a political and diplomatic rather than a military solution. Through a shifting pattern of local alliances each of the states attempted to occupy the most favourable ground in preparation for what promised to be the last phase of the conflict : the end game.

The Moroccan-Libyan union elicited a wide range of external comment. The event itself was a *fait accompli* - unpalatable to Morocco's conservative and western allies and just as disconcerting to Libya's remaining radical supporters, who by now were probably accustomed to the unwanted and the unexpected. In different ways the Saudis and the Americans both seem to have shown some diplomatic displeasure, the one by moving to cut their economic subsidies, the other by threatening to reduce levels of military and other funding. The Saudis in any case had previously indicated that some settlement of the Saharan conflict was highly desirable and they seem to have pressed the Maghrebis

states to reach a negotiated settlement. They had helped promote Chadli's meeting with Hassan in 1983 - and a subsequent meeting in 1987. They probably also encouraged Kadhafi to go on to Rabat after leaving Riyadh in 1983. They may even have hoped that Morocco would exert a moderating influence over Kadhafi, perhaps returning him to the mainstream of Arab politics, thereby easing the way towards an Arab consensus on Middle Eastern questions in preparation for a future international peace conference. What they do not seem to have anticipated, or indeed wanted, was the emergence of new and rival alliances within the Maghreb between Algeria and Tunisia on the one hand, and Libya and Morocco on the other.

The French also had an obvious interest in the Moroccan-Libyan alliance in so far as Hassan might now have sufficient influence to be able to persuade Kadhafi to withdraw his forces from Chad, as a *quid pro quo* for a similar French withdrawal. It is perhaps significant that President Mitterrand of France claimed to have reached an agreement along these lines with Kadhafi in September 1984, shortly after the conclusion of the Moroccan-Libyan union and following several days of talks between Mitterrand and Hassan. French hostility to the 'union' seems to have grown as it became evident that Kadhafi would not in fact withdraw all his forces from northern Chad.

The American administration showed less sympathy for and little comprehension of the Moroccan position - as they were

convinced, in any case, that Kadhafi was not amenable to diplomatic pressures and would respond only to direct military action. They would soon make their own position clear with the bombardment of Tripoli and Benghazi by American aircraft in April 1986. Meanwhile Moroccan diplomacy had been active trying to retrieve what support they may have lost in Washington as a result of the alliance with Libya. Shortly after the American attack on Libya, when Morocco failed to come to the aid of its most recent ally, Hassan nevertheless received an official visit from the Israeli Prime Minister and Labour Party leader, Shimon Peres, ostensibly in connection with the setting up of an international conference on the Middle East.

The visit was not well received in Arab capitals and the Moroccan initiative was vigorously attacked by Colonel Kadhafi. Hassan was then able to use this as an excuse to terminate his own increasingly embarrassing 'union' with Libya and on an issue guaranteed to win maximum publicity and support in Washington and the other West European capitals. Morocco's former African allies were less forgiving than the Americans but were also less well placed to give substance to their disapproval. President Hissène Habré of Chad nevertheless voiced his readiness to join the majority of African states in recognising the SADR

Notwithstanding the critical western reaction to the agreement with Libya, King Hassan gave first priority to his own state's national interests. As the European Community's

protective tariffs and farm subsidies made it increasingly difficult for Morocco to export and market its large agricultural surplus - and to earn the foreign exchange needed to repay her mounting debts - Morocco, like other African states, was tempted to divert some of Libya's oil revenues to help meet her socio-economic problems. Declining subsidies from Saudi Arabia and American problems with a growing domestic deficit threatened at the same time to undermine the Moroccan effort in the Western Sahara - just as the defensive perimeter was nearing completion. On balance the immediate political and economic advantages of a union with Libya seemed to outweigh temporary embarrassment or diplomatic inconvenience. With the Western Sahara perimeter secured, with a series of good harvests - including a record cereal crop in 1985 - and renewed credits from the IMF and the World Bank in 1986, Morocco could afford to sever the Libyan connection and resume its traditional conservative stance.

Following the visit to Morocco of the Israeli Prime Minister, in July 1986, Kadhafi denounced the "treachery" of his former Maghrebin partner. King Hassan for his part renounced the treaty of union with Libya at the end of August while, in September, Kadhafi declared :

Perhaps this break was imposed on the King, signifying that Morocco is not yet a free country. I do not believe that the King is in his right mind; perhaps he is experiencing a crisis like Reagan.¹³

In breaking with Kadhafi and Libya, Hassan was obviously anxious to avoid an even more embarrassing situation should the United States again decide to mount an air or naval strike against Libya. When America bombarded Libya in April 1986, Morocco was able only to assure Libya of its "total solidarity" - which was the least that could be expected in view of the terms of the Oujda treaty which stipulated that "any aggression against either of the two states is to be considered an aggression against the other." Yet, to balance his position and to please the Americans, Hassan firmly condemned "terrorism".¹⁴ And in receiving the Israeli Prime Minister later in the year he sought to convince American opinion of his loyalty and to remind them of the useful and sympathetic role he continues to play in the complex affairs of Africa and the Middle East.

CHAPTER SEVEN : LIBYA AND TUNISIA

THREATS AND APPEASEMENTS

Unsuccessful appeal for union

Rebuffed in the Arab Middle East, in 1973, where he aspired to play a leading role in the promotion of pan-Arabism, Colonel Kadhafi turned instead to the Maghreb where he envisaged a similar role. His first efforts in this direction involved an attempted fusion with his western neighbour, Tunisia. But the failure of the Djerba agreement, initialled by Libya and Tunisia in January 1974, would profoundly affect subsequent relations between the two adjacent states - in terms of population the smallest in North Africa but with a considerable imbalance in terms of their respective economic and military strengths. There followed a series of attempts by Libya to de-stabilise the government in Tunisia, including an assassination attempt, two years later, against the Tunisian Prime Minister, M. Hedi Nouira, whom the Libyans rightly held responsible for the failure of the union project. The Libyans also threatened a confrontation over the continuing dispute regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Gulf of Gabès.

However, the most serious consequence following the collapse of the Djerba agreement was the Gafsa affair of January 1980, when a Libyan-sponsored commando attacked the southern Tunisian town of that name - with the evident aim of threatening the government. The Libyan action was widely condemned, most notably

by Tunisia's western allies. During the 1980s Tunisia drew closer to its other large neighbour, Algeria, while the new Algerian administration of President Chadli sought to distance itself from the socialist bloc and to move closer to the United States and France. The rapprochement with Algeria culminated in the Treaty of Friendship, signed in March 1983, from which Libya was pointedly excluded along with Morocco. This was a source of considerable and deep irritation to the Libyan leadership which had doubtless hoped to take advantage of Algeria's preoccupation with its own change of government after 1978, and the mounting problems in Western Sahara, to exercise a more direct and effective influence on the outcome of the Tunisian 'succession' crisis. In an endeavour to raise the stakes when the Tunisian authorities were already under severe economic pressure - in the aftermath of the serious bread riots of 1984 - Kadhafi embarked on the mass deportation of Tunisian migrant workers in the summer of 1985. Algeria responded, however, with the promise of additional protection while Rabat sought to take advantage of the new situation, and their previous 'union' with Libya in 1984, to substitute Moroccan for Tunisian 'guest' workers.

Tunisia was, until recently, one of the few Third World countries to have enjoyed a long period of relative tranquillity from the beginning of the 1960s. Apart from the eviction in 1969 of M. Ahmed Ben Salah, the Economics Minister who tried to dragoon the entire Tunisian economy into a new pattern of cooperative socialism, the only major upheavals were as a direct

consequence of the abortive attempt at union with Libya in 1974 - which seems to have been related to the discovery, two years later, of an assassination plot against Bourguiba's Prime Minister, Hedi Nouira. The fall of Ben Salah was generally interpreted as a clear move to the right on the part of the regime and a further consolidation of President Bourguiba's own authority within the country. It occurred, moreover, only a few days after the Libyan revolution of September 1, 1969. And there is no doubt that Bourguiba has since perceived the ambitions of his wealthy and restless neighbour as the most serious threat to his small country's security and his government's internal stability.

The continuing problems in Libyan-Tunisian relations were undoubtedly compounded by the differences in age and temperament on the part of their two leaders, to say nothing of their contrasting ideological positions. Tunisia's moderate, secular nationalism and its pro-western, francophone orientation are anathema to Kadhafi and his brand of revolutionary pan-Arabism with a strong and deep undercurrent of Islamic piety. Bourguiba has always approached the question of Arab unity from a regional and territorial, rather than a supra-nationalist point of view, and with an emphasis on pragmatism and the pursuit of material advantage for his people. The approach to unity is evolutionary as well as 'functional' - through economic cooperation. Thus, when the Tunisian Prime Minister, Hedi Nouira, met the Algerian Minister of the Interior, at Sakiet Sidi Youssef, in February

1974, after the failure of the Libyan-Tunisian merger, he took the opportunity to emphasise that : "For us, Tunisians and Algerians, unity consists first in speaking the same language - that of reason, realism and a common interest above all."

The main architects of the abortive union with Libya were Kadhafi, himself, and the Tunisian Foreign Minister, M. Mohammed Masmoudi, who shared some of the Libyan leader's pan-Arab enthusiasm. The Djerba Agreement, signed on January 12, 1974, proclaimed the unity of the two countries in a single "Islamic Arab Republic", with one constitution, one flag, one army, and one President! Interestingly, Bourguiba was to be the first President with Kadhafi as Vice-President, while Mohammed Masmoudi would remain as Foreign Minister. A referendum to approve the agreement was scheduled to be held in the two countries on March 20, 1974 - the 18th anniversary of Tunisia's independence. Perhaps confronted by a rather unwelcome *fait accompli*, Bourguiba tried to extract what advantage he could from the situation while looking for possible ways out of his unenviable predicament. Trapped by the wave of popular enthusiasm, in the wake of the October 1973 war against Israel, Bourguiba declared in a more forthright tone than usual :

Libya and Tunisia wish to be joined by Algeria, Mauritania and, perhaps, Morocco when it has overcome its domestic problems...Thanks to this unity we are able to

confront and challenge our enemies and, in particular, Israel²

Just a year before, however, Bourguiba had more skilfully parried an earlier suggestion by Kadhafi that their two countries should merge. He had then taken the opportunity to remind Kadhafi that :

Unity between two underdeveloped countries has never yet given rise to a new power. Uniting two million Libyans and five million Tunisians will not greatly transform the present situation of the two peoples...Unity requires decades, even centuries of efforts, otherwise we will make the same mistake as others in the Arab world who have created short-lived and artificial unions which fell at the first obstacle.³

Not surprisingly, perhaps, Masmoudi was dismissed as Foreign Minister within days of the conclusion of the Djerba Agreement. He was removed on the authority of the Prime Minister, Nour, who had been on an official visit to Iran when the agreement was signed. The agreement itself was then revoked by the Tunisian authorities.

Masmoudi was later expelled from Bourguiba's *Parti Socialiste Destourien* (PSD), at its 9th congress in mid-September, 1974.

Shortly after his enforced departure he declared that he had earlier been dismissed from the government following intervention by the United States which had complained of his good relations with the Palestinian resistance, his support for China's admission to the United Nations, and his recognition of the government of Prince Sihanouk government in Cambodia.⁴ Nouria who had acted to block the merger, presumably with the consent - and possibly at the prompting - of President Bourguiba, told the National Assembly on February 1 that : "without a consensus of the Maghrebin states, union with Libya is out of the question."⁵ He then launched an appeal for national unity and the creation of a 'Greater Maghreb' which attracted the particular censure of the Libyan President.

The 'Arab Islamic Republic' was ephemeral like most of its successors. Kadhafi had turned to the Maghreb only after his advances to Egypt and other leading Arab states had been rebuffed. His Maghrebin neighbours seemed less well placed to offer effective resistance, particularly in view of Algeria's own revolutionary and anti-colonial aspirations. What he did not at the time realise was that, with the exception only of Libya, nationalism was a stronger force than pan-Arabism, at least among the Maghrebin leadership. The three former French territories had all had to struggle for their independence and nowhere was nationalism felt more strongly, perhaps, than in Tunisia. Since 1920 the *Destour* Party and its successor, in 1934, *Néo-Destour* had been among the first to be formed in Africa, antedating both

Messali Hadj's *Mouvement National Algerien* (MNA) (1926) and the *Istiqlal* Party in Morocco (1944).

The point was clearly made by President Bourguiba when, on March 18, 1974, he had spoken at length of the importance he had always attached to the preservation of national identity. Only cooperation could "open the path for a union which will take centuries to realise". Meanwhile it was his ambition to realise, before his death, the equality of the sexes in Tunisia. The nationalist theme featured prominently in another speech by Bourguiba, in September 1974, when he remarked that :

Kadhafi dreams of a fusion of the Arab countries that will never take place...We have problems enough in trying to integrate the regions of a single country...In any case we in Tunisia have no need to depend on others. We can realise our plans and objectives without having recourse to someone who wants to impose on us his own conditions.⁶

Neither Algeria nor Morocco seems to have been advised of the proposed merger between Libya and Tunisia and their angry reactions translate their misgivings as to Kadhafi's objectives and this unilateral approach to regional cooperation. In Algeria *El Moudjahid* queried whether the simple fact of a meeting of personalities at Djerba, and the brief verbal exchanges that took

place there, were sufficient to dictate the fate of two peoples who in all numbered some seven million.⁷ President Boumedienne had evidently not forgotten Kadhafi's refusal to attend the summit of the Arab League in Algiers in November 1973, after the October war, which Kadhafi had dismissed as the "capitulation summit". Morocco viewed the Libyan initiative with the same suspicion and hostility it had already shown for Kadhafi's earlier ventures in the Maghreb and elsewhere - including his alleged involvement in the two *coup* attempts against King Hassan II, in July 1971 and August 1972. Meanwhile the assessment of most Arab leaders was that Kadhafi had engineered the move mainly as a way of hitting back at Egypt for its failure to implement the earlier agreement, in September 1973, that had provided for a merger between Egypt and Libya. President Sadat's rather impatient and peremptory dismissal of Kadhafi's suit, and his pointed exclusion of Libya from the inner circle of Arab states who would be associated with the October war against Israel, provoked Kadhafi to an abrupt change of focus - away from the Machrek and towards the Maghreb.

A policy of blackmail

After the failure of the Djerba agreement, relations between Tunisia and Libya deteriorated rapidly. On the 20th anniversary of Tunisian independence, March 20, 1976, the government announced the arrest in Tunis of three Libyans said to have been implicated in a plot to assassinate the Prime Minister, Hedi

Nouira. The choice of the Prime Minister as the intended victim and the alleged complicity of the Libyan Embassy all pointed to the abortive merger as the principal motive for the plot. Where Kadhafi had previously viewed the ageing Bourguiba as the one serious obstacle to the realisation of his ambitions vis-a-vis his western neighbour, he had also had to contend since 1974 with the opposition of Bourguiba's younger "constitutional successor". If anything Nouira seemed even more hostile to a fusion of the two states. A climate of mutual suspicion and hostility followed the breakdown of the merger proposal, feeding on a number of existing disputes, including the dispute over the ownership of the off-shore continental shelf and its potential oil reserves.

In a speech on the 9th anniversary of the Libyan 'revolution', on September 1, 1978, Kadhafi recalled the Djerba agreement only to observe that other, more revolutionary methods would have to be devised if Arab unity was ever to become a reality. The impetus for unity would have to come from below, in this case from popular revolutionary committees to be established all over the Arab world with a view eventually to seizing power and removing existing obstacles to union. Already at the end of 1978 the Tunisian authorities claimed to have unearthed quantities of arms buried along the Libyan-Tunisian border. In January 1980 Libya seems to have mounted a commando operation whose immediate objective was the capture of the southern Tunisian town of Gafsa. Those involved were recruited from the substantial Tunisian community inside Libya - estimated at around

90,000, most of whom had come as immigrant workers from the Gafsa region with its phosphate deposits. According to Kadhafi the commando was part of an "Arab and African Liberation Army", which had paraded in Benghazi on September 1, 1979, and was said to number around 7,000 men. At the head of each unit in this army there was a Palestinian - a symbol of the army's ultimate goal, the liberation of Palestine.²

Four members of the commando squad were killed in the unsuccessful raid, together with twenty-two members of the Tunisian forces and some fifteen civilians. The Tunisian press was prompt to attribute the responsibility for the Gafsa attack to the Libyans. The

aggression must be attributed to a neighbouring country which has no respect for the rules of good neighbourliness and which defies international law...Intoxicated by its wealth and the size of its military arsenal that country has launched itself on a most dangerous course.³

Bourguiba spared Kadhafi nothing.

He of course plays the Soviet game but is too weak to be of any use to them...He believes that with his dollars and oil he can buy territories and consciences. Wherever

there is chaos we can find traces of his passage : in the Philippines, in Northern Ireland, even in Corsica. And just what does he hope to achieve in Corsica?'¹⁰

In the circumstances even the Tunisian opposition hastened to condemn the attack, including Mohammed Masmoudi, who was thought to be the architect of the Tunisian-Libyan merger. He was said to have cabled his support for Bourguiba : "The first priority is to close ranks around you in order to bar the route to any and all foreign intervention."¹¹ As in Morocco where the opposition parties had won a degree of tolerance by reason of their support for the regime's policies in the Western Sahara after 1975, so too the Tunisian opposition won formal recognition from President Bourguiba a year after the Gafsa affair and were accorded the right to participate in parliamentary politics. Far from destabilising the regime, the Gafsa raid considerably strengthened the position of the President - with statements of support from the strong (but illegal) opposition parties. In much the same way the outbreak of war between Morocco and Algeria in 1963 had swung the Kabyle opposition behind the Algerian President, Ahmed Ben Bella. It is clear that, in the Maghreb at least, a threat to national security is likely to re-unite the population and to strengthen the political consensus.

After Gafsa the French navy patrolled the Tunisian coast with the aim of protecting and safeguarding the threatened

country. Libya, which denied its involvement in Gafsa, reacted angrily to the French move, describing it as an insult to the Tunisian people. There was criticism in Tripoli of the action of the Tunisian authorities who had "resorted to a foreign and imperialist power to threaten the interests of two brother peoples who were bound together by fraternity, good neighbourliness and their common participation in the anti-imperialist struggle". The Tunisian government was prompt to justify its appeals for support. As M. Mohammed Sayah, Director of the PSD, explained : "While remaining non-aligned Tunisia lacks logistical resources comparable with those available to and deployed by the adversary."¹² Relations between Libya and France deteriorated to the point where each recalled its respective diplomats. The Libyans, for their part, demanded a meeting of the Arab League and an emergency session of the OAU - to stop French "intervention" in Tunisia. Meanwhile the United States agreed to despatch a large consignment of arms to Tunisia which were due for delivery in 1981.

Morocco, which had joined Saudi Arabia in despatching aid and assistance to the Tunisian government, accused Libya of acting to undermine the stability of governments in the region - on behalf of the Soviet Union. The Moroccan government condemned the Libyan conspiracy, whose objective was to de-stabilise the entire region, and called on the leaders of the Maghreb states to "forget their differences in order to confront the subversive actions of Kadhafi and his masters". In a personal message to

President Bourguiba, King Hassan II expressed his willingness to provide military assistance for Tunisia.

There is no need to explain matters to me. I understand everything only too well which is why I am taking the initiative in proposing to send you, without delay and without condition, whatever you need - and to the full extent of our resources. Our military resources are also at your disposition.¹³

Soon after, on February 18, 1980, Kadhafi was advising the correspondent of the left-wing Paris newspaper, *Libération*, that Gafsa marked the "beginning of the end for the Tunisian regime. Henceforth our opposition will be irresistible."¹⁴

Ownership of the continental shelf extending out into the Gulf of Gabes has long been the subject of opposing claims by the Libyan and Tunisian governments, particularly after reports of important under-water oil deposits. The issue first appeared at the start of the 1970s but the conflict escalated with the collapse of the Djerba agreement in 1974. With its small population and petroleum surplus Libya sees the dispute over the continental shelf as yet another opportunity to harass and threaten the Tunisian government. A crisis was engineered in February 1977 when Libya installed a drilling platform in the Gulf of Gabès, at the centre of the disputed zone. Tunisia complained that its sovereignty was being threatened and placed

its army on full alert. The following May, and presumably in response to the Tunisian protest, the Libyans dismantled the offending oil rig. In June the dispute was, by common accord, submitted to arbitration by the International Court of Justice.

Despite its efforts to industrialise Tunisia is relatively deficient in sources of energy - unlike its two North African neighbours. It has been estimated that the off-shore reserves of the continental shelf could increase Tunisian oil production five-fold - its output in 1980 having reached five million tons a year and representing Tunisia's first and only source of exports. The reserves in the Gulf of Gabès are estimated at some two hundred million tons¹⁵. Hence the Libyan interest in denying access to the oil to the present Tunisian regime. Moreover, in December 1981 Libya vetoed Tunisia's admission to the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), with its headquarters in Abu Dhabi. Libya seems to have feared that Tunisia would benefit from the Organisation's support should the International Court give judgement for Tunisia. In the event the decision of the court, in 1982, favoured Libya - after which Tunisia was admitted to OAPEC, on March 2, 1982, as its tenth member.¹⁶ In late 1985 Tunisia asked the court to re-consider its verdict in the light of new evidence since acquired by Tunisia. The court, however, rejected the request on the grounds that if the evidence was not available to Tunisia in 1982 it was because of the government's own negligence.¹⁷

Conflict between Libya and Tunisia has been sharpened by the failure of the Tunisian leadership to support Kadhafi's interventions in Chad as well as by its refusal to condemn the French presence in that territory. According to Tunis the solution of the conflict in Chad lies with the OAU and the Chadian people themselves. In 1980 when Kadhafi launched a campaign for mass mobilisation in Libya, together with appeals to all Arabs living in the state to enlist in the army, Tunisia, fearing a threat to its own security, requested a special session of the African group in the United Nations to examine the "grave situation which prevails in Chad and which presents a threat to peace and security in Africa".¹⁸

The succession of Benjedid Chadli in Algeria, following the death of Boumedienne in 1978, brought Tunisia closer to its Western neighbour - at the expense of Libya whose conduct was becoming increasingly threatening. The Tunisians were reassured by Chadli's new approach to regional politics with its emphasis on "good neighbourliness" as a substitute for Boumedienne's "Maghreb of the peoples". The Treaty of Friendship concluded between Tunisia and Algeria in March 1983 signified the temporary exclusion of Libya from the Maghrebin arena - although it was soon the turn of the Moroccans to enlist Libyan support in their own national cause. When the Libyan opposition launched a commando attack on Kadhafi's own barracks in Tripoli, in the summer of 1984, the Libyan authorities accused Tunisia of harbouring dissidents. Later they allowed the tension to subside

as the Libyan Foreign Minister, Ali Abdu Salam Tureiki, proposed a "joint security commission" to examine and report on issues in dispute between the two states. Having few opportunities to intervene in Libyan affairs, the Tunisians immediately accepted the suggestion. Kadhafi may have offered the commission as a concession, hoping thereby to secure his inclusion in the Treaty of Friendship. Later that summer he would be in Rabat proposing a very different kind of alliance to King Hassan.

Following the signing of the Oujda treaty of August, 1984, Kadhafi threatened to repatriate some 90,000 Tunisians working in Libya, who would then be replaced by a similar number of Moroccans. Both governments were well aware of the economic problems that would confront Tunisia should the Libyans proceed to implement their threat. In the event many Tunisian workers were expelled in the summer of 1985, which resulted in the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two states. Given the continuing 'succession' crisis within the Tunisian state there were growing fears for national security since the Tunisians living in Libya included some leading critics of the regime. The Tunisian authorities also expressed concern for the safety of leading members of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, who had moved to Tunis after their expulsion from Lebanon and who had since quarrelled with Kadhafi.

In September 1984 Kadhafi made yet another threatening speech warning that :

The Libyan revolution has an historic responsibility for the construction of Maghrebin unity...I declare that there is no longer any frontier between Libya and Tunisia. Libyan forces have been strengthened for the express purpose of liberating peoples and destroying frontiers.¹⁹

What Kadhafi continues to ignore, however, is that the frontiers between states in North Africa no longer appear simply as artificial obstacles and impediments to trade and traffic. Together with the creation of states there has emerged and crystallised a real and (surprisingly) well entrenched sense of nationalism and national identity. And no where is this more obvious than in Tunisia. It is difficult to export revolution to territories where national sentiment is already strong and which, in terms of their living standards and social composition, do not resemble the Chadian mosaic.

In the summer of 1985 Kadhafi finally ordered the mass expulsion from Libya of Tunisian workers. In August alone some 30,000 were repatriated. The official rationale for the expulsions was that their remittances were helping to sustain regimes that were "capitulationist" and "colonialist" in outlook. In the words of Mohammed Charaf, Libya's Secretary of

Information : "Libya would not consent to support reactionary regimes with the billions of dollars that are sent home by their workers."²⁰ He made no mention, however, of the 50,000 Turks who remain in Libya and whose country is a full member of NATO, to say nothing of the 15,000 workers from South Korea, which is even closer to the United States - or the many American, British, Italian and Danish technical advisers and experts! And in 1984 Libya had allied itself with Morocco, one of America's closest military allies, which offers military facilities for the American Sixth Fleet, and whose government helped orchestrate the Camp David agreements - the symbol of "capitulation" in most countries of the Arab world.

The expulsion of Tunisian workers was clearly intended to undermine the fragile economy of the country and also, presumably, to precipitate the long-awaited 'succession' crisis. Certainly the economic pressures on the government in Tunis - with the fall in receipts from tourism and the mounting interest payments on the national debt - were formidable. On September 26, 1985, Tunisia broke off diplomatic relations with Libya - citing the latter's violation of Tunisian air space and the apparent discovery of explosives contained in letters from Libya concealed in diplomatic cases.²¹ On October 1, 1985, the Tunisian government was even more embarrassed by an Israeli raid on the headquarters of the PLO in Hammam Chatt. No warning seems to have been received and, while relations between Tunis and the PLO leadership had recently been showing distinct signs of

strain, the incident did nothing to bolster Bourguiba's authority in the capital. His moderate views on Middle East questions were often unpopular with the Tunisian public and the Israeli attack, coming shortly after the Libyan reprisals against Tunisian workers, did nothing to reduce the mounting tensions within the country. The small Jewish community in Tunisia, numbering around 5,000 - about 20% of whom lived in Djerba - were quick to condemn the Israeli action as "an act of aggression committed against the territorial integrity of Tunisia."²² Nevertheless, on October 8, three Tunisians, two of them Jews, were killed by a state security agent in Djerba.

After the American air strike against Libya, on April 15, 1986, the Tunisian armed forces were placed on high alert. Libyan media accused Tunisia of allowing the United States to use its air space although this was denied by the Pentagon. There were demonstrations in Tunisia directed against America and against the government which was virtually alone in the Arab world in failing to condemn the American raid. Tunisian conditions for a reconciliation with Libya now include full payment and financial compensation for all Tunisians expelled since 1985. President Chadli of Algeria argued the Tunisian case during his meeting with Kadhafi at Ain Amenas, in southern Algeria, towards the end of January 1986. Algeria has continued since then to work for the normalisation of relations between Libya and Tunisia and, indeed, within the Maghreb as a whole. Having laid down the principles of "good neighbourliness", as a

condition for membership of the Treaty of Friendship, it remains for Algeria to secure the compliance first of Libya and then of Morocco. This was the principal item on the agenda of a conference of foreign ministers of Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania, scheduled for Algiers at the end of 1987.

Towards cooperation in the Maghreb?

Relations among the Maghreb states have been governed largely by mutual suspicion, endless rivalry, frequent conflict and occasional confrontation. Algeria's ambition to be acknowledged as leader of the Maghreb has been countered by Morocco's drive for territorial expansion and economic growth to match Algeria's undoubted advantage in terms of size, resources, a central location, and a reputation as a leading Third World state. Tunisia, on the other hand, is the smallest state of the Maghreb in terms of territory, resources and military power. Accordingly it has adopted a low profile. trying to maintain a 'balance' in North Africa that will permit the exercise, here as elsewhere, of its leader's undoubted skills particularly in matters of diplomacy and statecraft.

The Libyan approach to foreign policy is different again. Kadhafi has long neglected diplomacy, preferring to exploit his own personal charisma coupled with a variety of symbolic appeals, mainly focussed on Arab union and anti-imperialist rhetoric. joined to a conspicuous display of military and economic power.

And if all else fails there is the ever present threat of subversion. Libya under Kadhafi, like Morocco under Hassan, is prepared to dispute Algeria's claims to leadership of the Maghreb. But Kadhafi prefers to direct his attention to 'soft' targets like Chad and Tunisia, presumably hoping that less vulnerable states like Algeria and Morocco will succumb to internal tensions, aggravated by the war of attrition in Western Sahara, as well as by declining energy and commodity to say nothing of escalating debt repayments.

Algeria is the largest and, in terms of resources, the richest of the Maghreb states as well as occupying the strategic centre ground. It is the one North African state that at the same time borders Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania and the Western Sahara, as well as Mali and Niger. At independence the other states of the Maghreb attempted to secure a redistribution of regional wealth by contesting the colonial frontiers which the French finally defined only when Tunisia and Morocco were about to gain independence. Believing that their occupation of Algeria would continue indefinitely the French concentrated much of the wealth of the Sahara inside its new borders. In 1963 Morocco had failed to secure an adjustment of her eastern border with Algeria after a brief and, on the whole, inconclusive war. Having also failed in her bid to absorb the newly independent state of Mauritania in the 1960s, Rabat was all the more determined to assert its claim to the former Spanish Sahara once the Spanish had withdrawn in 1975. The Algerian aim in supporting the

Polisario movement and later in recognising the SADR was to block Moroccan expansion southwards and to try to maintain the existing (and favourable) balance within the Maghreb.

Despite its radical and socialist pretensions, Algeria is, in terms of its foreign policy, an essentially conservative power wedded to the status quo in North Africa. From that perspective Morocco and Libya appear rather as 'revisionary' powers, committed (to the extent of their limited means) to a policy of territorial expansion. The Algerian view was well expressed by the late President, Houari Boumedienne, when he disclosed his own preferred solution to the Western Saharan problem.

President Giscard [d'Estaing] is favourable to Hassan's point of view and to the re-establishment of a 'Greater Morocco' which would have the effect of isolating and even de-stabilising Algeria. Had France been consistent with its earlier policies, however, it would have favoured the creation of a Mauritanian-Saharawi grouping which would contribute an element of balance and stability to this region which is potentially the Ruhr of the Maghreb.²³

The existence of divergent ideologies and competitive, rather than complementary economic systems, has been encouraged by the rapid growth of separate, state-based nationalisms. From the

outset, as Zartman has indicated, the emphasis was on distinctiveness. A major contributing factor was the French decision to grant independence to Tunisia and Morocco in 1956 but to withhold it from Algeria. Despite a common language, a shared history and a similar culture the prospects for closer cooperation are not good. The 1970s began with an emphasis on reconciliation and ended in near confrontation over Western Sahara. The 1980s began with a widespread desire for détente on the part of all the Maghrebin states other than Libya. As the decade draws to a close the region finds itself divided by competing alliances and unable to take a common stand even in the face of external armed attack. If the domestic policies and the external relations of three of the four Maghrebin states appear to be converging - this has more to do with the external circumstances than with any internal dynamic in favour of cooperation. The weakening of Soviet influence in much of the Middle East since 1972 and the debt crisis of the 1980s have been the main factors in the shift within the Maghreb towards economic liberalism and the West and away from state control and the socialist and East European connection.

In the unique circumstances of North Africa the drive for cooperation and unity becomes yet another factor differentiating the Maghrebin states and their policies. The Algerian approach to unity, like that of the Tunisians, is essentially 'functional' and evolutionary. Integration begins with closer economic cooperation among neighbouring states which is only possible

where there exists a basis for mutual respect and political understanding. And that means non-intervention in the affairs of other states and acceptance of existing frontiers. It is difficult to establish any common ground between this position and that of the Libyan leader, Kadhafi, for whom 'union' means nothing less than complete political integration with the abolition of inherited borders and the replacement of 'reactionary' elites by governments who share his own radical and Islamic aspirations. Morocco, for its part, remains wedded to a more 'traditional' concept of the state based on a common history and shared culture and focussing on the values, privileges and territorial claims of the reigning dynasty. It is unlikely that Hassan would willingly sacrifice any of those claims for the sake of a Maghrebin unity based, not on the past, but on a decidedly rational and technocratic blueprint for the future. These seem to be the continuities that persist beneath the shifting alliances and the complex political manoeuvres of the years 1973-1987.

Kadhafi's 'surprise' visit to Algiers in July 1987 recalled similar 'surprise' visits in the past - to Tunisia and Morocco and, before that Egypt - which ended in still-born or short-lived treaties of 'union'. But Kadhafi must by now have perceived that Algeria at least will not accept political union - unless, of course, it is one dictated largely by Algiers itself. And without Algerian cooperation it is difficult to see how any form of cooperation can be established either in the Maghreb or,

indeed, in the Sahara. No doubt Kadhafi's object in 1987 was to repair the damage to his reputation and to relieve his country's obvious isolation in the aftermath of the American bombing and the recent military setbacks in Chad. In the Middle East, too, Kadhafi has moved to rejoin the ranks of the other Arab states by distancing himself from Iran, by calling for a cease-fire in the Gulf war, and by seeking a reconciliation with Yasser Arafat, and the majority of the PLO, whose moderation Kadhafi has frequently denounced in the past.

President Chadli of Algeria has sought with considerable success to project a more balanced image of his country's foreign policy than was the case under his predecessors. In particular he has taken every opportunity to be useful to Washington and Paris, notably in their efforts to negotiate with the Ayatollahs in Iran as well as with Amal, Hezbollah and the Islamic Jihad groups active among the Shi'a population of Lebanon. Algeria has likewise cooperated with Saudi Arabia within the framework of the Arab League to try to re-construct an Arab political consensus as a preliminary to an international conference on Middle Eastern problems. In the Maghreb Algeria has been mainly concerned to prevent Morocco securing international political acceptance for its military occupation of Western Sahara. By means of the Friendship Treaty of 1983 Algeria and Tunisia sought to define the basis of a future Maghrebin community, on grounds that appeared to exclude both Libya and Morocco.

With the defeat in Chad Libya may now be prepared to accept the conditions laid down for membership by Algeria and Tunisia. By agreeing to receive Kadhafi for talks in 1987, President Chadli would appear to be considering a new Libyan application to join the 'Treaty' states - Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania. Libya would once again be 'admitted' to the Maghreb. It was his predecessor, Boumedienne, who first involved Libya actively in the affairs of the Maghreb : in 1975, when he was confident that Algeria would remain the senior partner in an alliance of the two 'radical' states. Chadli seems equally confident now of his ability to retain the upper hand inside this new alliance which would leave Morocco isolated within the Maghreb and under considerable pressure to negotiate a political settlement of the Western Sahara issue.

The return of Libya to Maghreb affairs - with the consent of Tunisia - would go far to restore Algeria's old dominance, threatened as it was by Morocco's occupation of the Western Sahara in 1975 and her alliance with Libya in 1984. Re-assured on this point Algeria may well be considering new overtures to King Hassan. The resumption of more 'normal' relations would help relieve the strain on both economies suffering the effects of the conflict in the Sahara as well as more difficult trading conditions inside the European Community and with the rest of the world. It would then be left to Polisario to conclude the best possible terms with the authorities in Rabat - on the strength of their international position and the evident desire of the

Moroccan government to cut its defence expenditures and resume closer control over the military itself.

Other developments in the region also seem favourable to Algeria. The new Tunisian President, Ben Ali, is a pragmatist who, like Chadli, is pre-occupied with the country's economic problems and is more sympathetic than his predecessor to the idea of tapping Tripoli's still considerable oil revenues and using them to help finance Tunisia's debt repayments. The new economic climate in Algeria is also congenial to the Tunisian government which is no longer separated from its western neighbour by major ideological differences. There is little fear now in Algiers of an alliance between Algeria's two 'moderate' neighbours since all three states are now moving, albeit slowly, towards 'liberal' economic policies.

Conclusions

If there is a single pattern underlying inter-state relations in the Maghreb then it would appear to be that of 'bad neighbour' relations, outlined by Zartman in the mid 1960s. The picture is one of recurring conflict rather than one of growing cooperation. as disputes between the states over ideology, frontiers and the ownership and control of resources are aggravated by differences of personality, temperament and outlook among their leaders. The description is also consistent with his model of a 'developing' state's foreign policy, where the role of leadership and

personality are emphasised, while the state and bureaucracy occupy a subordinate place, national identity is at a discount, and power is all but non-existent. Meanwhile alliances retain their parochial orientation and are preoccupied with such 'basics' as political differentiation and territorial integrity. They are usually characterised by inconsistency, incoherence and instability. In Zartman's view the 'mistake' of such 'developing' polities was to have chosen rhetoric and ideology in place of the customary ingredients of a more 'developed' foreign policy, namely pragmatism, a readiness to compromise, and a preference for tangible, readily-identifiable objectives that can be pursued by the usual diplomatic means.

That view of African foreign policies seems more appropriate to the 1960s, when the new states were close to independence and did, indeed, exhibit most of the features outlined by Zartman. That was much less true, however, of the period 1973-1987. By then the North African societies were showing the signs of growing complexity; the constraints on leadership were more obvious; and there had developed a much clearer sense of *raison d'état*, as well as a more consistent view of national interest increasingly shared by different segments of the elite, whether bureaucratic, military or, more recently, economic. Of the Maghreb states it is Libya whose foreign policy most closely resembles that of the 'developing' polity described by Zartman. But there, too, the undoubted continuities in style may serve to conceal a change of emphasis and direction after 1973 - away from

pan-Arabism and an exclusively Middle Eastern orientation, and towards a new and narrower focus on state and national interests in so far as these related to the affairs of the Maghreb and the Sahel.

PART THREE

THE MAGHREB AND THE MIDDLE EAST

THE MAGHREB AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Introduction

The Middle Eastern wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973 were major formative influences in the development of the North African states and of their foreign policies. The war of 1956 saw the unsuccessful attempt by the British and French to re-occupy the Suez Canal and remove President Nasser of Egypt. The impact on nationalist sentiment throughout North Africa was substantial, the more so as it came at the height of their own nationalist agitation against French rule. This was the year when Tunisia and Morocco achieved independence; and the year when the French took the critical decision to use military rather than political means to contain the growing rebellion in Algeria. Nasserist sentiment was widespread in the Middle East, although the North African states had already evolved their own distinctive patterns of organisation and their own unique brands of nationalism. These were based more on historical factors and on the recent experience of the colonial occupation rather than on notions of pan-Arabism and Baathist socialism still prevalent in Syria, Iraq, Egypt and also Libya.

But it was the Six Day war of 1967 that had the greatest impact not only on the Maghreb but throughout the Middle East. The scale and nature of the defeat and the loss of

territory were such as to generate a new sense of solidarity among Arab peoples throughout the region. But this was a solidarity based on existing states and on cooperation between governments rather than on a vague pan-Arab ideal. There was a new awareness of the need to re-define the nature and the goals of Arab unity. Any future action to recover the lost territories would have to take into account the balance of military power within the region, which heavily favoured Israel. That balance could not be changed without enlisting international and, above all, American support. And that, in turn, implied a willingness to seek a negotiated political settlement of the problems of the Middle East.

Meanwhile the balance among the Arab states themselves was shifting - away from the traditional core states of Egypt, Syria, Iraq and towards the conservative oil-producing states of the Gulf, led by Saudi Arabia. The shift of Arab opinion was therefore in a rightwards direction - which did not escape the notice of the Maghrebin leaders, particularly Algeria with its radical, 'revolutionary' regime. Meanwhile the Arab defeat and the eclipse of the central Arab powers did serve to bring the Maghrebin states into greater prominence within the Arab world and to associate them more closely with the Arab cause as a whole. It did not, however, produce any convergence of policy on the Middle East but seemed rather to provide new

opportunities and new arenas within which to pursue existing quarrels.

The war of 1973, which began with the successful crossing of the Suez Canal by Egyptian forces, succeeded in its otherwise limited aid of alerting international opinion to the fact that the status quo in the Middle East was not acceptable to Arab opinion, and was no longer tenable. The sense of bitterness engendered by the defeat of 1967 gave way to a spirit of optimism while the direction of Arab policy in the 1970s was mainly determined by President Sadat of Egypt, who had succeeded Nasser in 1970, and who was now supported by a conservative Arab coalition largely comprising the oil-rich states. These last had not only substantially increased their oil revenues in the course of the year but had conducted their own economic offensive - an oil embargo - against the United States and certain West European states. While the embargo was short-lived and its success was, at best, mixed, world opinion was nevertheless alerted to the political as well as the economic significance of the oil 'cartel'.

While the 1973 war was largely confined to Egypt and Syria, the North African states nevertheless made a contribution out of proportion to their size and, for the most part, their resources. They helped to mould the short-lived Arab consensus that followed the 1973 war and which

was very much in line with their own pragmatic, state-based outlook. They sought to involve the African and other Third World states in their common cause for political and economic justice - justice for the Arab states, for the Palestinians, and for commodity producers everywhere. Algeria's was "an African solidarity for an Arab solidarity". But in this they were soon overtaken by the Arab states of the Peninsula with their much greater wealth and resources and their abiding suspicion of 'radical' Arab states like Algeria and Libya.

The Maghrebin states were quick to adapt to the new balance of power within the Arab world and to the prevailing conservative sentiment. This was easier, on the whole, for Morocco with its conservative monarchy and its pro-Western orientation. In the case of Tunisia, Bourguiba's secular outlook and his impatience with Arab religious and political sensibilities cost him what influence he might otherwise have had with the dominant Arab coalition. Unable to compete within the Arab League with the larger and wealthier states, Algeria opted instead in the 1970s for a leading role in the Third World, North-South and Non-Aligned Movements.

The North African states did not appear again on centre-stage until the collapse of the Arab consensus after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, Camp David in 1978, and the

separate Egyptian peace treaty with Israel in 1979. These developments effectively took Egypt out of the Arab League at the end of the 1970s. With Iraq involved in the Gulf war after 1980 and Syria heavily committed inside Lebanon after 1976, the Arab leadership was increasingly dispersed, divided and ineffectual. With the Arab states increasingly leaderless and threatened by new pressures, not the least of which was the fall-out from the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Maghrebin states pursued their own local contests regardless, mainly in the Western Sahara but also in Chad and the West African Sahel. Their participation in wider Middle Eastern affairs was increasingly subordinate to their rivalry within the Maghreb.

Morocco continued to draw on American, French and Saudi good-will, in return for the many services it had services rendered its conservative allies over the previous decade, both in Africa and the Middle East. Algeria, meanwhile, attempted to neutralise Moroccan influence in the West by developing trade with the United States, by distancing itself from the Soviet Union and from socialism, and by courting American and French opinion through negotiating the release of Western hostages held captive in Iran and Lebanon. Libya continued to pursue its idiosyncratic foreign policies - in the process shedding most of its former allies and succeeding finally in provoking the Americans into retaliatory action while their appeals to the

new Soviet leadership and to other Arab states went largely
unheeded.

CHAPTER EIGHT : ALGERIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

In Search of Arab Solidarity

During the 1970s Algeria had to face up to the ever-growing conservatism of the Arab world. Despite its substantial contribution to the prosecution of the October 1973 war and its militant attitude on issues such as the rights of the Palestinians, the Algerian regime was suspect in the eyes of the conservative Arab monarchies and there was a distinct and mounting coolness in Algerian-Egyptian relations that had not been there under President Nasser. Hence the support of a large majority of the Arab League for Morocco in the dispute with Algeria over the Western Sahara. As the centre of gravity in the Arab Middle East shifted towards the large oil producing states, and as the weight of vocal Arab opinion seemed to move away from Nasserism and in favour of moderation, Algeria came under pressure to adjust its Arab policy. The opportunity came with the collapse of the fragile Arab consensus as a result of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, his endorsement of the Camp David accords in 1978 and his signature of the Peace Treaty with Israel in 1979. The suspension of Egypt from the League, following the 1979 Baghdad summit, severed the alliance between Egypt and the oil-rich states of the Peninsula that had been effective since 1967 - and which had since set the tone of Arab international discourse.

The Maghreb had been increasingly involved in Middle Eastern affairs, most notably after the Arab debacle of 1967, in the artillery war that followed across the Suez Canal and, above all, in the war of October 1973 when Moroccan soldiers saw active service in Syria while Algeria despatched large quantities of arms to the Egyptian front. The departure of Egypt in 1979, after playing a central role in the affairs of the League since its inception, left a vacuum in Arab affairs which the Maghreb states tried to fill, playing a much more active and important part. Moreover, the growing polarisation of opinion within the Arab world, symbolised first by the Lebanese civil war in 1975-6 and later by the deliberations of the Baghdad summits, in 1978-79, provided an opportunity for the Algerian leadership to capitalise on its reputation for even-handedness and to exercise its undoubted talent for mediation.

The death of Boumedienne at the end of 1978 and his replacement by President Chadli Benjedid early in 1979 was equally opportune in that it made it easier for the latter to volunteer his 'good offices' to the monarchs of the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, who had been accustomed to regard Algeria as one of the more radical and intransigent of the Arab states. Finally, the revolution in Teheran in 1979 was convenient in so far as Algeria's support for revolution and for the Palestinian cause, and her long opposition to Arab monarchy, quickly won her the sympathy of the new leadership - particularly as Algeria's principal antagonist, Morocco, insisted on proclaiming its

support for the Shah even after his removal. Algeria was then able to use its influence to help secure the release in 1981 of the American hostages, captured when the Embassy in Teheran was stormed by revolutionary guards.

Later Algeria was able to volunteer its services as mediator in the long drawn-out Gulf War between Iraq and Iran - in the course of which the Algerian Foreign Minister was killed in an aircraft incident in May 1982. And more recently President Chadli has been directly involved in negotiations to secure the release of French hostages held in southern Beirut. There was also the Algerian role in 1987 in effecting a reconciliation between Yasser Arafat of the PLO and a number of his more radical Palestinian opponents, which was thought to be a useful preliminary for any future international conference on the Middle East. In this and other ways the Algerian government has earned the good opinion and gratitude of such leading conservative figures as President Reagan, King Fahd and now M. Jacques Chirac, while managing to retain something of its earlier radical and revolutionary reputation - sufficient at least to satisfy opinion at home and to reassure Hafez Assad of Syria, if not Muammar Kadhafi of Libya.

Given these considerations it would be difficult to continue to deny that Algerian diplomacy had 'come of age', benefiting from the new divisions first in the Arab and then in the Moslem world, while seeking to adjust to the new international balance

in the Middle East since 1973 - and, in particular, the success of the Americans in their bid to 'roll back' Soviet influence, notwithstanding their own difficulties in Iran and Lebanon and now in the Gulf. Chadli hopes no doubt that his new friends, both in the Middle East and the West will reciprocate with favourable trade, investment and energy agreements - and the French have certainly done so by contracting, under President Mitterrand and now under Prime Minister Chirac, to purchase Algerian gas at prices well above the market rate. In that sense Algeria's new Middle Eastern diplomacy complements President Chadli's continuing reforms of the domestic economy in the direction of greater liberalisation, the break-up of the old state monopolies and the efforts to ensure efficient management and profitable operation.

Zartman is no doubt right in emphasising that Algerian diplomacy has always been firmly anchored in Maghrebin politics. Behind the recent changes in Algerian foreign policy - beginning perhaps as early as 1973 - lay more parochial considerations and, in particular, the threat to the balance of power in the Maghreb from Morocco's occupation of the Western Sahara in 1975. But foreign policy at every level is the quest for allies and for political, economic and military advantage - usually against some identifiable rival or potential antagonist. Algeria's rivalry with Morocco has taken her close to the socialist camp and, more recently, via Camp David, Teheran and Beirut, towards the West and a truly remarkable reconciliation with her former colonial

master. It only remains to be seen how détente between Algeria and Morocco, a down-grading of the Western Sahara dispute, and an escalation of the conflict in the Gulf - accompanied by the return of Egypt to the Arab League - will in turn affect Algeria's international position and her continuing bid for leadership in the Maghreb.

1967-73 : an opportunity for militancy

For the first years after independence Algeria lacked a distinctive Arab policy, largely because of the priority given to the Maghreb itself, as well as its involvement in the politics of the African continent - to say nothing of Nasser's and Egypt's hegemony in Arab politics. Algeria nevertheless accepted Egyptian leadership the more readily because of Egyptian support for Algerian independence and the close ties later forged between Nasser and the first Algerian President, Ahmed Ben Bella. Ideological affinities were also made conspicuous when Egypt backed Algeria in its brief border war with Morocco in October 1963. Algeria returned the compliment by supporting Nasser's involvement in the war in Yemen and it followed his diplomatic lead in severing relations with Britain over Rhodesia in 1965. For these reasons the change of regime in Algeria, in June 1965, was not well received in Cairo. It was some time before Egypt, in company with the Soviet Union and the more 'radical' of the African states, abandoned their early attitude of suspicion and hostility towards President Houari Boumedienne.

Boumedienne, for his part, was irritated by Nasser's rather patronising attitude and for a time Algeria remained absent from Arab conferences as the new administration devoted itself to laying the basis of the new industrial and political structures and to consolidating the domestic base of the regime. The Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 nevertheless gave the government the opportunity to proclaim its militancy and assert its pan-Arab orthodoxy. Following the Israeli strike against Egyptian bases on June 6, the Algerian Foreign Minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, saw the secretary-general of the Arab League, Mahmoud Riyad, in Cairo and assured him that Algeria would place all it possessed in the way of military equipment at the disposal of Egypt. The next day the Algerian ambassador was able to assure Riyad that nineteen aircraft had arrived from Algeria while another fifteen were on their way : he requested more Egyptian pilots so that additional aircraft could be supplied.¹ Again, according to Riyad, Algeria sent a battalion-size combat team of infantry and artillery to Egypt, and about a hundred MIG fighter aircraft.² But as the war only lasted six days neither the aircraft nor the equipment were deployed in battle.

Acceptance of a cease-fire by Egypt, Syria and Jordan came as a blow to the Algerian government which had anticipated an escalation of the war to include all Arabs. It is also possible that Boumedienne, recalling the early humiliations he had suffered at the hands of Nasser after taking power in 1965, saw an opportunity to embarrass and strike back at the now ageing

leader of a defeated Arab coalition. Algeria persisted in the conviction that 1967 was not a defeat because "we did not use all our assets" - for example, by liquidating all western and Anglo-Saxon interests in the Middle East including oil concessions and military bases, by ordering the suspension of oil supplies to the imperialist countries for a year, and the withdrawal of Arab funds deposited in Western banks.³ The implication was that the Arabs were defeated not so much by Israel as by its western allies - to say nothing of their own mismanagement of their resources. In fact Algeria did sever its diplomatic relations with the United States on June 6, having earlier broken off relations with Britain over Rhodesia. The Algerian expeditionary force remained stationed along the Suez Canal until July 1970, anticipating the collapse of American-sponsored peace negotiations. Meanwhile Algeria refused to recognise United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, of November 1967, calling for the withdrawal of troops to secure and recognised boundaries and for acceptance of the state of Israel by the Arab states.

Algeria regarded the resolution as unfair since it persisted in treating the Palestinians as mere refugees and its implementation would, in effect, deprive them of their right to regain their homeland. When Nasser emphasised the military weakness of the Arab states, in a speech to the Arab Summit in Rabat, in December 1969, and called for an increase in that strength as a diplomatic counter in peace negotiation, Algeria

and Saudi Arabia both demanded an absolute commitment to war, each seeking to embarrass the Egyptian leader and to emphasise Egypt's new dependency on its Arab brothers. And in a gesture of protest at Nasser's decision to accept the Rogers' Plan, in August 1970, Algeria withdrew some 2,000 troops from the Canal zone and refused to attend the Arab Summit in Cairo in September 1970.⁴ The Rogers' Plan was rightly taken to reflect the advance of American influence in the Middle East in the wake of the earlier Israeli victory. Algeria had also concluded that the main objective of the front-line Arab states was to recover the occupied territories - with little or no concern for the plight of the Palestinians who would be left to fend for themselves.

This is one reason why Algeria was so outspoken in its support for the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), after its formation in 1964, and especially for the Fatah faction, easily the largest in the PLO, and, like the PLO itself, led by Yasser Arafat.⁵ From the outset Fatah had been influenced in its strategy - armed struggle - and its objectives - independence in a national, secular state - by the example of the Algerian revolution. After the Arab defeat of 1967 the PLO won considerable prestige among Arabs who saw it as the only Arab organisation actively engaging, harassing and, very occasionally (with Jordanian military support), inflicting military reverses on the Israelis - as at Karamah. The close identification of the Algerian government with the Palestinian cause after 1967 made Algerian foreign policy appear more radical than ever - even if

Algeria could never provide the front-line bases which the PLO now tried to establish, first in Jordan and then, after 'Black September', 1970, in Lebanon. In that sense Algeria may be said to have had the best (or worst?) of both worlds in the 1960s. It won a militant and radical reputation without suffering direct military defeat or being exposed to Israeli retaliation.

During the confrontation between the Jordanian government and the Palestinians, from June 1970 to July 1971, Algeria openly identified with the Palestinians, provoking the bombardment of the Algerian Embassy in Amman by the Jordanian army in September 1970. Shortly afterwards, in January 1971, Boumedienne appealed to all Arab leaders to intervene to prevent a massacre of the Palestinians in Jordan. In July there were reports of arms being supplied by Algeria to the Palestinians, through the Syrian port of Ladhiquiyah. The consignment was said to be sufficient to equip over 7,000 men.⁶ It was at this time that Algeria also broke off diplomatic relations with Jordan : they were restored only after Jordan had sent troops to the Syrian front during the war of October 1973. By September 1971 Algerian aid to the Palestinian resistance was estimated at \$20 million in arms and equipment, while 80% of the arms for Fatah were believed to have been provided by Algeria.⁷ Which suggests the symbolic ('revolutionary') importance to the Algerian leadership of the Palestinian connection. There is a special sense of identification with the Palestinians who are struggling to

liberate their homeland from foreign rule and settlement using force where necessary.

Which does not prevent the Algerians from being openly critical of the divisions within the PLO, the tactical blunders of the movement's leadership, and its failure to conduct a systematic and continuing campaign of indoctrination among the Arab masses inside Israel and the occupied territories. There was criticism, too, of the way the Palestinians handled relations with their host governments in Jordan and, more particularly, in Lebanon. Similar criticisms, of course, were once levelled against the Algerian FLN itself, and its relations with its Tunisian hosts - to say nothing of its internal divisions (Ben Bella once likened it to "a zoo") and the absence of political structures in much of Algeria especially after the brutal but successful French campaign in 1957 to liquidate the movement in Algiers and the surrounding countryside.

The gist of the Algerian argument was that the PLO should be left to make its own decisions with as little intervention as possible from other Arab states and leaders. This attitude was well received by the PLO if not by the other Arab leaders who found themselves under more direct and effective pressure either to support or to restrain their own Palestinian combatants. Boumedienne was also insistent that no one could negotiate away Palestinian territory without the express consent of the Palestinian people themselves. Which answered many of the fears

of the Palestinians about the American-sponsored peace process after 1967 - but was also intended to immobilise (and emasculate) the now largely conservative majority within the Arab League. Boumedienne summarised his government's thinking as follows :

We think the three parties in question are Egypt, Syria, and the Palestinian resistance, and we support any line on which these three parties are agreed. But if there is a dispute between the Palestinian resistance and one of the other parties, we will stand by the resistance.²

The Algerian commitment to the Palestinian cause was sufficient to bring allegations from the Israeli newspaper, *Haaretz*, that Algeria was training pilots for the Palestinian Liberation Army. In May Boumedienne was quoted by *Reuters*, as rejecting a politically flexible approach on Israel.

I do not believe that the Arab lands can be liberated without a heavy price being paid...a tough line must be adopted. Egypt must adopt the same policy as that of Vietnam.³

1973-79 : an active diplomacy for the Arab cause

The Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 re-awakened Algerian hopes for a united Arab front and renewed and lasting Arab

solidarity. Algeria made a substantial contribution to the war effort where the principal burden necessarily fell on Egypt and Syria. As in 1967, the Algerian air force was again placed at the disposal of the Egyptians. The Algerian contribution to Egypt and Syria has been assessed at several score of planes, hundreds of tanks and armoured vehicles, and about 25,000 troops. Only those troops despatched to the Syrian front were able to participate in the fighting : those sent to Egypt arrived after the cease-fire. Algeria also forwarded two complete medical teams and twelve tons of medicines to Syria.¹⁰

Another source has revealed that Algeria was responsible for the transfer of some two million tons of oil to Egypt and half that quantity to Syria, not to mention the \$200 million paid to the Soviet Union during Boumedienne's visit to Moscow, on October 14-15, 1973, so that the Soviets could at once despatch tanks to the beleaguered Arab armies.¹¹ That amount was the equivalent of the remittances transferred each year by the million Algerian workers in Europe. The Algerian contributions to Egypt also compared favourably with those of the Libyans and Moroccans - an armoured brigade each from Algeria and Libya but three squadrons of MIGs and Sokhois from Algeria compared with two squadrons of Mirages from Libya.

There was also an infantry brigade from Morocco and a battalion from Tunisia. It is even possible that Boumedienne was notified in advance of the impending war in October - which would

be a further tribute to his sense of commitment and responsibility. As early as August, in an interview with a Lebanese journalist, he had underlined his country's preparedness in the event of a war against the Israeli enemy. Afterwards a senior Syrian officer was said to have credited Boumedienne, his government and his people with "an extraordinary role in the war".¹² In the context of Arab solidarity Algeria resumed diplomatic relations with Jordan on October 13, after the Jordanian forces had engaged the enemy on the Syrian front.

Algeria maintained a fairly discrete silence about its contribution to the war - in contrast to the publicity emanating from Rabat about the important but much smaller Moroccan effort. Algeria was also directly involved in the oil boycott decreed on October 20 by the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting States (OAPEC) and directed at those western consumers most closely identified with Israel.¹³ After President Nixon had formally asked Congress to approve \$2.2 billion in emergency funds to finance a massive airlift to Israel, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia declared an immediate 10% cut-back in Saudi production without even consulting his fellow oil producers. Some days later he suspended all shipments to the United States. The example was followed by other Arab producing states and was the kind of embargo Algeria had first demanded at the time of the unsuccessful 1967 war. Operation 'Badr' was a limited success. As a non-Arab state Iran did not participate. Iraq publicly dissociated itself from the decision of the other Arab producers,

describing the strategy as counter-productive and the result of pressure from the Saudis who would never sanction effective action against their American allies.¹⁴ Instead the Iraqis nationalised the shares in Iraqi oil first of American and then of Dutch companies, before finally imposing an embargo on both.

The producing states had not prepared for the boycott in advance and before long there was pressure, particularly from the Gulf states, to relax the embargo. The Gulf producers were suffering as a result of Iranian competition while the Saudis were under mounting pressure from their American partners. President Boumedienne nevertheless upheld the oil boycott as an indication of what the oil producing states could achieve given western dependence on imported sources of energy. Commenting on the Geneva peace conference of December, 1973, he maintained :

We are the only ones who have the solution to the Middle East problem...Israel and the United States have reached a dead end. There is in fact the prospect of a solution which would be both acceptable to the Arabs and relatively honourable. Today we can deal as equals with the big powers.¹⁵

Although the loss of revenues adversely affected the implementation of the Algerian plan, it was only with considerable reluctance that Algeria consented on March 19, 1974,

to the OAPEC decision to lift the embargo on the United States. Not only did the Algerians identify closely with the oil boycott, but much of their oil production was destined for European markets and not the United States. The Algerian leadership was not averse to exploiting the predicament of the Gulf states, whose income was heavily cut by the boycott, while emphasising its own attachment to Arab militancy. By way of contrast Algeria opposed the decision by the Arab producing states to maintain the embargo against Holland.

On the diplomatic front Algerian action was equally intensive. While Boumedienne was still presiding over the Non-Aligned Movement, whose summit was held in Algiers in September 1973, he arranged for cables to be sent on October 7 to the leaders of countries represented on the United Nations Security Council inviting them to condemn Israeli aggression and drawing their attention to a resolution of the recent Non-Aligned Conference, critical of Israel's open defiance of the international community and of the United Nations. As mentioned earlier, Boumedienne also visited Moscow on October 14-15 to ensure the prompt delivery of arms to Egypt and Syria and to try to extract from the Soviet leadership an unequivocal statement of their support for the Arab cause. Notwithstanding his efforts, the Soviet position remained ambiguous if only because the first priority, as in 1967, was to safeguard the policy of detente and coexistence with the United States. In these circumstances the best the Soviets could offer was a limited and conditional aid to

the Arab states engaged in what, to Moscow, appeared a local or at best a regional conflict.

Boumedienne was also active in other areas and organisations, seeking to isolate Israel within the international community while trying to mobilise support for the Arab cause. With Kadhafi, he succeeded in persuading a large number of African states to sever diplomatic relations with Israel, maintaining that the "cause of freedom is indivisible" whether the source of oppression was Israel, Portugal, white Rhodesia or racist South Africa. Algeria became even more active in the United Nations after the election of the Foreign Minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, to the presidency of the General Assembly, in 1974. That same year also saw the recognition of the PLO by the Soviet Union (in August) while Yasser Arafat was permitted to address the General Assembly in October, being accorded the kind of reception usually reserved for a Head of State.

Where Algiers had served in September 1973 as the venue of the Non-Aligned Summit, Algeria was also host to the Arab League Summit in November of that year. This was the conference that Iraq and Libya declined to attend, dismissing it contemptuously as the 'capitulation summit'. Jordan was represented but King Hussein absented himself, personally, anticipating that the Summit would see the recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Boumedienne singled him out for particular criticism, recalling that this was

the second time Hussein had avoided doing battle for the Arab cause - the first being the war of October 1973. It was also the first Arab summit attended by Mauritania, close to Algeria since the 1960s and true to its strategy of enlisting in any and every organisation that could serve the goals of domestic unity and economic development. President Mobutu of Zaire also attended the inaugural meeting of the conference as a symbol of African solidarity with the Arab cause.

Already, however, there was evidence that Algerian policy was adjusting to the new, more conservative Arab consensus, most clearly reflected in President Sadat's earlier break with the Soviet Union and his acceptance of Henry Kissinger's 'shuttle diplomacy'. Indeed, Boumedienne was regularly consulted, in one capacity or another, by the American Secretary of State. Boumedienne, in his turn, was resolute in his determination to allow nothing to undermine the display of Arab unity - unprecedented in the history of the Arab League : hence his strong censure of those like Kadhafi and King Hussein who, for different reasons, had nevertheless absented themselves.

Increasingly, however, Algerian policy found itself aligned with that of Egypt and the other front-line states whose first priority was to recover the territories occupied by Israel in the wars of 1967 and 1973. To that extent Algeria had backed away from its earlier and unequivocal commitment to the liberation of Palestine and the constitution of a single Arab nation as the

principal goals of the Arab leaders. Arab diplomacy after 1967 and, more particularly, after 1973 was, as F. Ajami has perceptively argued, dominated by the emergence of the State and the substitution of state interests for the earlier doctrines of pan-Arabism. The PLO had already broken with pan-Arab orthodoxy after the 1967 war - so far as to demand the creation of a Palestinian state. It was not surprising, therefore, that Algeria, with its own recent and strong tradition of national resistance to the French, should quickly identify with the new direction being taken by Arab political discourse.

This was the gist of Boumedienne's remark that "we cannot be more Egyptian than the Egyptians, more Syrian than the Syrians, or even more Palestinian than the Palestinians."¹⁷ Then there were his concluding remarks to a press conference at the end of the Algiers Arab summit.

The war goes on notwithstanding the cease-fire agreed on the battlefield by the two Arab belligerents and we are still very much involved in it. The enemy continues to occupy our territories of which it has surrendered not an inch. Furthermore, nothing has been done as yet to secure the rights of the Palestinians. The promises that were made to them, in this context or that, remain mere promises.¹⁸

Algeria continued nevertheless to insist that the Palestinian cause - the right to their Palestinian homeland - should not be compromised by the insistence of the Egyptians and Syrians - understandable in the circumstances - on recovering their own lost territories. During the summer of 1974 Boumedienne vigorously contested the argument presented by Egypt and Jordan to the effect that the PLO was the legitimate representative only of those Palestinians living outside the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. For Algiers, the PLO had been recognised by the Arab summit as the legitimate representative of all Palestinians wherever they might be found. In the words of President Boumedienne :

If King Hussein asks us to choose between Jordan and the Palestinian revolution, we will always and without any hesitation come down on the side of the Palestinian revolution.¹³

The Palestinians were evicted from their bases in Jordan after 1971, with the PLO looking for sanctuary in the small, weak and multi-confessional state of Lebanon, where Palestinians had first settled after the 1948 war and which, by the seventies, would harbour a Palestinian population of some 300,000. Tensions were inevitable between the large Christian communities of Lebanon on the one hand - notably the Maronites who supplied the President and commander of the mixed military forces - and the

Moslem majority on the other, comprising Shi'a as well as Sunni Moslems. The 'balance' established among the different communities, and between the Christian and Moslem populations at the time of independence and embodied in the so-called 'national pact' was increasingly contested inside Lebanon where the Moslems were now a clear majority - reinforced by the presence of the Palestinians. Large areas of the south of the country and whole districts of Beirut, the capital, were policed by PLO guerrillas to the exclusion of the national army. Nor were domestic relations between the rival communities improved by PLO attacks across the frontier into Israel which then invited Israeli retaliation against Lebanon. In 1978 and again in 1982 such attacks would be cited by the Israelis as justification for the invasion and occupation of Lebanese territory.

Meanwhile the tensions inside Lebanon reached a climax in April 1975 as the right-wing Christian militias sought to reinforce their grip on the country's political institutions and to affirm its Christian character - largely at the expense of the Palestinians whose guerrillas were to be disarmed, while the Palestinian refugees, besieged in their camps, would be given notice to quit Lebanon. The left-wing, revolutionary forces, on the other hand, insisted on the country's Arab character and demanded the reorganisation of the country's political structures so as to reflect both that fact and the preponderance of Moslems in the population. To that end the left sought to enlist the cooperation of the PLO military forces, which was resisted by

Yasser Arafat and his lieutenants in Fatah until the Christian siege of the refugee camps in Beirut threatened the Palestinian population not only with starvation but also with extermination. There followed a split in the Lebanese army, along confessional lines with the defection of a large part of the Moslem rank and file. Just as the military balance swung clearly in favour of the revolution and of the left-wing coalition, Syrian forces intervened in 1976, initially on the side of the Christians. President Hafez Assad seems to have feared that a Moslem victory in Lebanon would invite Israeli military intervention on behalf of the Christian minority - now increasingly looking to Israel rather than Britain, America or France for protection.

As tensions grew in the Lebanon after 1973 Boumedienne exerted his personal influence with the Palestinian leadership to try to ensure that the re-conquest of a Palestinian homeland should not be at the expense of Lebanese national integrity and that the rights of Lebanese citizens, whatever their religious convictions, should be respected. Arafat himself seems to have been aware of the threat and to have used his considerable influence with the Fatah movement, and within the PLO, to counter the views of more militant factions like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and its Marxist - previously Nasserist - leader, George Habash, who from the outset of the civil war in 1975 had openly sided with the revolution. However, as in Jordan in 1970-71, Arafat's opponents were able to take the initiative and force the pace while latent antagonism towards the

Palestinians among a large section of the population (by no means confined to the Christian community) soon threatened the Palestinians not only with vicious and murderous reprisals but with an inevitable blood-bath.

In the circumstances it was therefore unfortunate that President Boumedienne, who inclined towards moderation and conciliation in the Lebanon, and who was well placed to mediate in the escalating dispute, was in 1975 pre-occupied with another crisis - that in the Western Sahara. Here the consensus of the moderate majority among the Arab states favoured Morocco rather than Algeria : notwithstanding their commitment in one form or another to the eventual creation of a Palestinian state, the Arab leaders had always been wary of the militant Palestinian leadership and displayed no enthusiasm whatever for the radical and revolutionary programme of the Polisario movement. The creation of a Saharawi Arab and Democratic Republic (SADR) would not only offend the Moroccans but could conceivably enlarge the ranks of those Arab states critical of the 'peace process' - fearing that Palestinian interests were to be sacrificed to Egyptian and Jordanian interests. In the event all Arab states supported the Moroccan (and Mauritanian) position on the Western Sahara, with the exception only of Libya, South Yemen and, of course, Algeria. Which ensured that the issue was not even included on the agenda of the Arab League. Algeria, anxious as ever to preserve the Arab unity forged in October 1973, preferred to take its case instead to the Organisation of African Unity and

the United Nations, where it could count on a more sympathetic reception.

Algeria was therefore under pressure to accept the official Syrian account of its intervention in Lebanon in 1976 notwithstanding the fact that Syria was effectively supporting the Christian minority against what appeared to be a clear Moslem and Palestinian majority. Where Egypt and Jordan were evidently ready to make concessions on the Palestinian issue in return for Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 frontiers, the Syrians gave priority to the defence of their national interests over the plight of the Palestinians in neighbouring Lebanon. At the beginning of Syrian involvement Palestinian forces armed and trained by Syria even engaged in open confrontation with PLO forces defending Palestinian settlements in the Lebanon. If Algeria refrained from denouncing the Syrian intervention it was because Syria had remained neutral on the question of Western Sahara - distancing herself from Morocco despite active Moroccan military participation in the defence of Syrian positions in the Golan Heights during the war of October 1973. After 1980 Syria would, under Algerian pressure, finally recognise the SADR

Meanwhile, as an indication of its concern, the Algerian authorities did permit Palestinians in Algiers to occupy the Syrian Embassy, while anti-Syrian demonstrations were organised on the streets of the Algerian capital. Meanwhile the Algerians resorted to mediation, as the Education Minister, Abdulkrim Ben

Mahmoud, joined Kadhafi's 'deputy', Abdul Salam Jallud, in seeking a reconciliation between Syria on the one hand and the Palestinians and Lebanese progressives on the other. The fact that such a junior minister was chosen to act for Algeria suggests that the government was not optimistic about the probable outcome of the mediation - and was content to allow the Libyans and Kadhafi to bear the major responsibility. In an attempt to influence Syrian policy, and perhaps to pre-empt other Arab (or foreign) intervention, Algeria, Libya and Iraq did agree to despatch symbolic contingents to the Lebanon, to serve alongside the Syrian forces in a 'peace-keeping' role. Some four hundred Algerian soldiers arrived in June 1976.

The Syrians refused, however, to evacuate Lebanon and their role in the fifty-two day siege by Christian militia of the Palestinian camp at Tell El Zaater, in the summer of 1976, finally convinced the Algerian government of Syrian complicity with right-wing phalangists to weaken the Palestinian resistance. Where the Syrian authorities had long since emasculated the Palestinian organisations formed in that state, they were now seeking to subordinate the independent Palestinian formations in Lebanon to their own will and interests. The weekly organ of the Algerian FLN, *Révolution africaine*, even warned of possible collusion between Syria and Jordan with a view to territorial aggrandisement following the dismembering of the Lebanese state and the absorption of the West Bank by Jordan.²⁰ For the duration of the crisis in Lebanon the Algerian government

preferred, however, to keep a fairly low profile, pleading distance and other preoccupations closer to home, which did not prevent the authorities in Algiers from multiplying more discrete diplomatic initiatives while, like Libya and Iraq, providing financial assistance to the Palestinians allied with the Lebanese progressives and the revolutionary coalition in Beirut.

Where the 'progressive' Arab countries were unable to obtain a cease-fire in the Lebanon, the 'conservative' states achieved just that - during the emergency Riyadh summit of October 17, 1976. Using their influence with the other Arab leaders as well as their undoubted financial muscle, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were able at the conference to effect a reconciliation between President Assad on the one hand, and President Sadat of Egypt and Yasser Arafat of the PLO on the other. The outcome recalled the much earlier Cairo Agreement of 1969 when the Arab states had intervened in the quarrel between the PLO and the Lebanese government and army to ensure the continued independence of the Palestinian military bases in Lebanon and of the forces involved in the defence of the Palestinian refugee camps. Where that settlement had favoured the Palestinians, however, the Arab intervention following the Riyadh conference saw the imposition of a cease-fire between the contending forces in the Lebanon and the creation of a deterrent Arab force to police the cease-fire. In the circumstances this was predominantly Syrian with the Saudis achieving some degree of leverage (where the radical Arab

states had earlier failed) by offering to finance the entire operation.

By now it was obvious that the balance of power in the Arab world, and in the Middle East as a whole, favoured the established order at the expense of the radicals. Arguably that had been the situation since 1967 and the defeat of Nasser and his Syrian and Jordanian allies. Certainly the death of Nasser in 1970, the removal of the PLO camps from Jordan in 1971, the expulsion the following year of Soviet personnel serving in Egypt, and Sadat's participation in the American-sponsored 'peace process' after 1973 - were so many milestones along the path towards moderation and conformity with western designs. The states that had intervened to secure the cease-fire in Lebanon in 1976 would soon challenge Algeria on what Boumedienne would have considered his 'home ground'.

Since 1973 Algeria had been calling for an Afro-Arab summit to underline the African commitment to the Arab cause in the Middle East - and the reciprocal Arab commitment to African development and the liberation of southern Africa. When the summit did finally convene, however, in March 1977, Egypt acted as host while Saudi Arabia announced a surprise contribution of \$1 billion to the African states, followed by a pledge of \$240 million by Kuwait, \$136 million by the United Arab Emirates, and \$70 million from Qatar. Which was in addition to funds already being channelled to Africa through the Saudi dominated Islamic

Conference Organisation (ICO) and, since 1973, through the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting States (OAPEC). Three-quarters of the Gulf aid pledged at the Afro-Arab conference would be bi-lateral and not multi-lateral in character.

The direct challenge by the Saudis and their allies to Algeria and Libya and the conscious and well publicised attempt to reduce their role and influence on the African continent had their counterpart in Saudi financial aid for Morocco and Gulf support, generally, for the anti-communist and anti-Soviet positions of the Moroccan sovereign, Hassan II. The success of the Marxists in South Yemen, their support for the insurgents in Dhofar province of Oman and the Marxist orientation of the military regime in Ethiopia after 1974 had alerted the Saudis to what they saw as a concerted communist bid for power in the region as a whole. Thus, while Algeria was able to outmanoeuvre Morocco inside the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), it did not have anything like the same success within the Arab League or in other Arab bodies. Where Algeria could convince the majority of the OAU that the issue in Western Sahara was one of self-determination, the Arab leaders could not be convinced that the Western Sahara was, indeed, a second Palestine! There were even some who might have been prepared to exchange Palestine itself and the Palestinians for an undertaking that would help secure their oil wealth and the political influence and material comforts that came with it.

In his speech of May 24, 1978, delivered in Algeria before the fifth congress of the Association of *Moudjahidin* (ex-servicemen), President Boumedienne reproached Saudi Arabia - though without naming her - for its lack of generosity towards the poorest states, but especially for the diversion of Arab funds to European or American banks, and their use to finance counter-revolution in Africa and the Middle East.²¹ Algerian relations with Kuwait and, more particularly, the United Arab Emirates have not been subject to the same intense pressures. Although basically supportive of Morocco, they have occasionally displayed a certain neutrality which the Saudi leadership has found to be both disconcerting and occasionally embarrassing. Thus it was to the United Arab Emirates that Algeria entrusted its diplomatic representation after breaking off relations with Morocco and Mauritania in March 1976. The same country also agreed to act for Algeria after ties were severed with Egypt, in December 1977, following Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem.

For Algeria, Sadat's journey to Jerusalem represented a dangerous breach in Arab solidarity which threatened a serious weakening of Arab resolve in the continuing confrontation with Israel. It was to prevent such a breach that President Boumedienne had laboured with such determination since 1973 and the Algiers Arab summit. There was little, however, that Algeria could do to deflect the Egyptians from their course of action - particularly as the conservative Arab majority had abetted and encouraged Sadat in his earlier pursuit of the 'peace process'

and in his hopes of a negotiated settlement first of Egyptian then of wider Arab claims. Algeria nevertheless joined with Libya, Syria, South Yemen and the PLO in forming the "Steadfastness and Confrontation Front" (*Jabhat Al Somud Wal Tasadi*) which, at the constituent meeting in Tripoli, Libya, from December 2-5, 1977, undertook to lead the Arab opposition to Sadat's policy.

Already, from 1973 on, Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, and several of the more radical groups within the PLO had opposed Sadat and his participation in the 'peace process', forming themselves into a "Rejectionist Front". Iraq declined, however, to join the new Steadfastness Front, ostensibly because its resolutions were not sufficiently "radical". In reality, the historical animosity between Iraq and Syria was largely responsible for the defection of the former, together with the (not unexpected) failure of her attempts to persuade the Syrians to reject Resolution 242 of the United Nations which, among other things, recognises the right of all states in the area, including Israel, to secure borders.

The Tripoli conference called for the cutting of diplomatic links with Egypt while inviting members of the Arab League to consider a proposal to remove the headquarters from Cairo. They should also institute a boycott of Egyptian companies engaged in trade with Israel. In fact Egypt reacted first by breaking off its diplomatic relations with the members states of the Steadfast

Front while PLO offices in Cairo had been closed the previous November after Sadat's visit to Israel. The Gulf states and Lebanon hesitated to take sides in the growing Arab confrontation and were therefore labelled *Jabhat Al Samt* (The Silent Front); while Sudan, Morocco and Oman expressed their support for the Egyptian initiative, forming the *Jabhet Al Qubul* (Front of Support) or, as others called it, "Capitulation Front".

Most Arab countries, however, were later disappointed with the results of the Sadat initiative, whatever the initial response in Egypt itself which seems to have been largely favourable. In March 1979 there followed the second Baghdad summit of the Arab League, where the majority issued a statement condemning the Egyptian action in signing a separate peace treaty with Israel. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait reluctantly undertook to cut off the generous financial support they had been giving Egypt since Nasser's defeat in the 1967 war. Aid to Syria and Jordan would, however, be continued. On May 3, twelve other Arab states agreed to suspend relations with Egypt, including Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, North Yemen and Djibouti (Territory of the Afars and Issas).

President Boumedienne had criticised Sadat's participation in Camp David before a conference of the ruling FLN party. Sadat had received no authorisation to speak for or sign any document on behalf of the Palestinian people. While it had to be admitted

that independent states are sovereign entities and must be presumed to "know their own interests best", nevertheless, "no one was at any time authorised to speak out for or negotiate with the Zionist State in the name of the Arab nation".²² The death of Boumedienne at the end of 1978 was singularly unfortunate, coming as it did at a particularly difficult and critical juncture in the affairs of the Arab world. The contest for the succession in Algeria, however orderly, did nevertheless distract attention away from events elsewhere and weaken the impact of the country's external policy. It then fell to President Chadli Benjedid, at the very outset of his rule, to draw the lessons of Camp David and the separate peace treaty signed in 1979 between Egypt and Israel. He had then to re-orient Algerian foreign policy in ways that might serve to revive her influence abroad and to strengthen her economic base at home. Much later in 1983 President Chadli would describe the Camp David agreement as :

a shock that distorted the political and geopolitical balance in the area to the benefit of the Zionist entity...What we have seen is but the first step in an imperialist onslaught designed to compensate imperialism for some of the damage it sustained in South-East Asia.²³

1979-1987 : in accordance with the Arab consensus

With the death of Houari Boumedienne, Algerian foreign policy moved even more rapidly towards moderation. In March 1980, just over a year after his arrival in power, President Chadli undertook a rapid tour of Middle Eastern states, which was designed to project Algeria's new image abroad, to reassure members of the Arab League of Algeria's continuing support, and to consolidate his personal position back home. The countries visited included Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, South and North Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Libya. Egypt was, of course, omitted but otherwise the countries reflected a rather eclectic mixture of the more radical as well as the more conservative elements in the Arab world. At the summit of the Steadfastness Front in Tripoli. Libya, in summer 1980, Chadli adopted a very moderate position and then absented himself from the two subsequent meetings when Algeria was not otherwise represented. That same year Algeria agreed to upgrade its diplomatic representation in Cairo to ministerial level which, in the circumstances, was a significant gesture towards an isolated Sadat.²⁴ Egypt eagerly reciprocated by despatching a high ranking diplomat to Algiers.

Algeria nevertheless kept a foot in the 'radical' camp, absenting itself from the Amman summit of the Arab League in November 1980 - after the PLO had decided not to attend along with Libya, Syria and South Yemen. There was concern that The Amman summit, being held in Jordan, might be ready to entrust King Hussein with a more positive role in the resolution of the

Middle East problem, to that extent threatening to nullify the resolution of the 1974 Rabat summit which had recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The discomfiture of the Arab states was completed by the invasion of Lebanon by Israel, in June 1982, and its sequel : the defeat and pull back by the Syrian forces, their failure to defend Beirut and the eventual eviction of the Palestinians, first from Beirut and, in 1983, from the northern port of Tripoli - following a split in the PLO and direct and hostile Syrian intervention which reflected the bad blood between President Assad and Yasser Arafat.

The Arab world, which had assumed responsibility for the Palestinian cause since 1948, was paralysed by the traumas of 1982-83. After the short oil 'boom' of 1979, following the steady fall in the 'real' price of oil after 1973, the producing states had seen the start of a collapse in oil prices in 1981, reflecting 'monetarist' policies and a recession in the developed economies. The contraction of international markets created severe problems for the OPEC states, aggravated by the mounting competition from non-cartel producers like Britain, Norway, Mexico and even Egypt after 1980. Meanwhile the Islamic revolution in Iran, culminating in the eviction of the Shah and the return of the Ayatollah Khomeini early in 1979, threatened the stability of the Gulf area and the Peninsula as a whole, while repercussions were soon being felt as far away as Lebanon and even in Nigeria.

The renewed tension in the border area between Iraq and Iran erupted in 1980 in President Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Iran, hoping to take advantage of the confusion following the revolutionary upheaval. Hussein had never willingly accepted the agreement arrived at between the two states on the demarcation of their common frontier at the special conference in Algiers in 1975. Increasingly the war between Arab Iraq and Persian Iran came to overshadow even the question of Israel and the predicament of the Palestinians. The continuing enmity between Syria and Iraq largely explains the defection of President Assad from the Arab camp and his support for Iran - coupled with generous Iranian subsidies for the bombed-out Syrian economy. Libya, too, was drawn towards revolutionary Iran although Khomeini's fundamentalism bore little resemblance to the Islamic socialism of Kadhafi.

Then, as Iran was able to resume the offensive, after 1982, taking the war onto Iraqi territory, the Gulf states began to look for foreign allies who would interpose their own forces in the event of an Iranian breakthrough or the collapse of the Iraqi defensive perimeter. The United States and even the Soviet Union found themselves being courted by the conservative monarchs of the Gulf while Egypt, with the assassination of Sadat in 1981 and the assumption of office by Hosni Mubarak, again became eligible for a more prominent role in Arab affairs. Meanwhile it was the Saudis who attempted to fill the vacuum in Arab politics and to provide the leadership and policy initiatives that had

been so obviously lacking since Sadat's break with the consensus in 1977-9.

The outcome of this Saudi initiative was the Arab summit at Fez, in Morocco, in September 1982, after the adjournment of an earlier summit in November 1981. At this, the last conference of the Arab League for some five years, the Algerians, like the PLO, fell into line behind the moderate plan advanced by Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia and previously agreed by the Saudis and their conservative colleagues of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Plan was strongly supported by two other Arab monarchs, King Hussein of Jordan and King Hassan of Morocco who was sponsoring the summit. In Fez the Arab leaders agreed, with apparent unanimity, to renounce the logic of war against Israel. Instead they hoped to resume the 'peace process' by renewing their support for international negotiations, effectively accepting as definitive the division of Palestine in 1947 and offering their support for the 'two state' hypothesis on condition only that Israel should recognise the Palestinian right to a homeland. Of the major Arab figures only Kadhafi refused to associate himself with the proposals or even to attend the summit. The President of South Yemen walked out of the summit while Syria's position remained ambiguous to the end and Yasser Arafat's qualified acceptance was not considered binding by the PLO as a whole.

With the onset of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, in 1982, Algeria sent Soviet weapons, valued at \$20 million, as emergency

aid to be delivered direct to the Palestinians from Moscow. Which was in addition to several tons of arms despatched to the PLO from army stocks in Algeria.²⁵ The disparity between Algeria's contribution to the Lebanon in 1982 and that to the Arab cause in October 1973 is an accurate reflection of the lower priority President Chadli attached to confrontation with Israel and to support for the Palestinian resistance - although Algeria's commitment in principle to the Palestinian cause remained as strong as ever. Meanwhile Algeria avoided taking up any definite position on the dispute that has raged within the PLO and that reflects animosities within the Arab world as well as tensions inside the PLO itself.

While most Arab states have aligned with either the 'rejectionists' or the 'moderates', Algeria has preferred to maintain friendly relations with the different tendencies and factions, working instead for an eventual reconciliation. There is the risk, however, that by distancing herself from the internal conflicts of the Palestinians, Algeria may forfeit her earlier claims to be included among the Arab 'powers', along with Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Egypt and Syria can claim to have been directly involved on more than one occasion in the Arab/Israeli confrontation, while Iraq now projects itself as leader of the Arab military front attempting to contain Iranian expansion westwards. Algerian policy, by contrast, seems to have turned inwards, pre-occupied much more than before with economic issues and in particular with the shift in priorities away from heavy

industry and centralised state control and towards agriculture and commerce, with a greater emphasis on incentives and efficiency, investment and profit.

In the 1980s Algeria's role in the Middle East and in international negotiations has emphasised mediation rather than confrontation, conciliation rather than mobilisation, unity and compromise rather than an orthodoxy maintained by the threat of exclusion. Arguably the strategic position that Egypt has long occupied in Arab affairs was never more apparent than during her recent absence from Arab councils. In the absence of Egypt no other Arab state had the political clout or the military muscle to contain the old animosities between Syria and Iraq, or to intervene effectively in the conflict in the Western Sahara, or to hold the line against Iran along the Shatt-al-Arab. It is not that Egypt was ever a force for consensus within the Arab world - quite the contrary irrespective of whether Nasser or Sadat was at the helm. Nor was Egypt able to prevent either the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan or the civil war in Lebanon. But the Egyptian presence in Arab councils did lend a semblance of authority and offer a prospect of action that made a notable contribution to their international as well as their regional and local significance.

In their own ways neither Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia or Algeria can hope to fill that role. It remains to be seen whether Egypt, with its massive economic problems, can do so

again. Meanwhile Algeria under Chadli tries to keep alive the Arab 'conscience' and to project its image, already developed under Boumedienne, as the 'honest broker' - in the Middle East as elsewhere - hoping by such services to enhance its reputation abroad accumulating political capital that can hopefully be exchanged for the inputs needed to rescue the Algerian economy from stagnation and to avert the threatened conflicts at home. In this new and somewhat more modest role Algeria has nevertheless a number of achievements to its credit.

In concert with Saudi Arabia Algeria worked to preserve the unity of the Palestinians and offered to host the Palestinian National Congress (PNC) in contrast to Syria and Libya who promoted the alliance of left-wing organisations formed in 1983 within the PLO to challenge the decisions of the Fez summit and the conduct of the Chairman, Yasser Arafat, both there and in his subsequent attempts at rapprochement with Jordan. A meeting of the PNC was finally convened in Algiers in mid-February 1983 which approved the pursuit of 'dialogue' with Jordan although it continued to reject the Camp David accords with their vague and unsatisfactory provisions for an autonomous Palestinian entity.²⁶ The consensus achieved at Algiers represented a victory for Arafat and the moderates of the PLO, but the success was short-lived.

There was a stormy meeting between Arafat and President Assad of Syria in May 1983, which was followed by a revolt by Syrian-

backed Fatah dissidents, led by Abu Musa and based initially in the Beka'a Valley. Assad feared a negotiated peace between Jordan and Israel, along the lines of the earlier peace treaty with Egypt, which would leave Syria alone to confront the Israelis in the Middle East - and with no immediate prospect of recovering its lost territory in the Golan Heights, much of it now formally 'incorporated' into Israel. After the eviction of Arafat's PLO from Lebanon by the Israelis Syria was more than ever determined to assert effective control of the Palestinian movement, which meant removing Arafat as chairman - in view of his preference for a negotiated solution of the Palestinian problem. After his experience of the civil war in Lebanon and the invasion of 1982 Arafat had no reason to be sympathetic to the Syrian position. He could still count on a degree of Soviet backing and, after his expulsion from Lebanon hastened in December 1983 to visit Egypt and President Mubarak. The object was to secure Egypt's re-admission to the Arab world with a view to a new diplomatic initiative and the start of peace talks involving Israel and the Palestinians.

Algeria expressed its opposition to any attempt by an Arab state to bring the PLO under its effective control, although there was sympathy in Algiers with the Syrian predicament and suspicion of Hussein's motives in trying to draw closer to the PLO despite the legacy of 'Black September'. But there was also suspicion on the part of Arab governments that Assad was cynically accumulating bargaining counters with a view to gaining

some leverage over the Israelis in his efforts to recover the annexed Golan Heights. Without Syria, however, there could be no effective peace in the Middle East. Algeria nevertheless refused to join Syria and Libya, the remaining members of the Steadfastness Front, in their condemnation of the negotiations between Israel and the new Lebanese government, conducted under the auspices of the American Secretary of State, George Schultz, in 1984. To indicate his appreciation of the Algerian attitude, the Lebanese President, Amin Gemayel, visited Algiers in November of that year.

Algerian efforts to reconcile the warring factions of the PLO were finally rewarded with success when leaders of many of the tendencies met in Algiers in late April 1987, to discuss their differences within the framework of the Palestinian National Congress. This long-awaited meeting of the PNC followed a succession of 'fractional' conferences in the mid 1980s. Not all the leaders attended the conference although most were in fact present in Algiers at the time, thanks again to the efforts of the Algerians. The conference was generally regarded as at least a partial success both for Arafat and for the Algerians. Only the Egyptians expressed their vocal displeasure at the critical references to the Camp David accords, while some western observers claimed to have seen Abu Nidal, one of the more extreme Palestinian dissidents, in the Algerian capital.

Algeria's involvement with the Iran-Iraq conflict went back to 1975 when Boumedienne had convened a conference in Algiers to effect a settlement in the long-standing dispute over the demarcation of the frontier in the Shatt-al-Arab. The two sides were threatening war as Iran attempted to exploit the discontent of the Iraqi Kurdish population. Algeria and the other OPEC states were concerned lest the issue should compromise their efforts to maintain the pricing advantage they had gained in 1973 over the western consumer nations. At the first OPEC summit in Algiers, in March 1975, Algerian diplomacy did in fact achieve a major breakthrough with a compromise settlement by both sides to the dispute. In 1979 Algeria had welcomed the fall of the Shah and friendly relations were soon established with the new revolutionary government in Teheran. Hence the crucial role played by Chadli's Algeria in the release of the American hostages in Iran in January 1981.

Like Libya Algeria had welcomed the Iranian revolution as a defeat for imperialism in the region and a contribution to the Arab cause in the Middle East. When Iraq abrogated the 1975 agreement and launched its invasion of Iran in 1980, Algeria therefore announced its support for Iran. At the same time, however, the Algerian Foreign Minister, Mohammed Seddik Ben Yahia, engaged in intensive mediation to try to settle the dispute which threatened to undue the earlier Algerian achievements. While actively involved in this mission he lost his life somewhere along the Turkish-Iranian border in May 1982.

With the escalation of the Gulf war after 1982 and, above all, 1984, Algeria began to distance itself from Iran and to adopt a more neutral stance in the expectation once again of being asked to play a conciliatory role. That was, indeed, the main purpose of King Fahd's visit to Algiers, on March 11-12 1985, as the Saudi monarch looked for leverage to restrain the more militant of the Ayatollahs and to avert the impending Iranian military offensive against the besieged city of Basra. King Fahd also expressed his support for Algerian efforts in re-uniting the Palestinian factions, while his subsequent visit to Morocco was intended to reduce tension in this region with a view to bringing together the leaders of the two countries. That would meet Chadli's own hopes for detente with Morocco while enabling the Saudis to ease the financial pressure on their budget - by cutting their subsidies to the Moroccans. In 1986 Chadli and Hassan did in fact meet on their common frontier thanks to the efforts of King Fahd.

Meanwhile Algeria participated in the Amman summit of the Arab League, at the end of 1987, with its emphasis on cementing an Arab consensus in the mounting confrontation with Iran - with agreement that individual Arab states would henceforth be free to re-open diplomatic relations with Egypt whose military contribution is much needed in the Gulf. A large number of states, including those of the Gulf, immediately availed themselves of the opportunity. Algeria has taken no steps as yet to alter its diplomatic arrangements with Cairo although

relations between Mubarak and Chadli have been cordial. Meanwhile Libya has followed Algeria in distancing itself from Iran, calling for a cease-fire and warning the Iranians of possible reprisals should they persist in the war. Syria, however, despite some gestures in the direction of Arab unity, has stuck to its alliance with the regime in Teheran, well aware of the growing influence of Teheran in Beirut where Syria has again had a military presence since 1986.

The Algerian government has made considerable capital out of its ambivalent situation, as an Arab state that has consistently tried to support Arab positions, and as a revolutionary state committed to genuine independence and self-determination for all peoples, Arab and non-Arab alike. Her connections in Teheran since 1979 have since won her the sympathy and good-will of regimes far removed, ideologically, from herself. Who in 1978 could have anticipated the extent of the rapprochement between once radical Algeria and the administrations of President Reagan in Washington, and Prime Minister Chirac in Paris? But politicians in the West are subject to re-election and voters in France, Britain and the United states are likely to reward governments that can protect their citizens from arbitrary arrest and detention in Middle Eastern capitals - and to censure those that can not.

Algeria has not changed its formal position on the need for Arab unity. The National Charter of 1976 saw Algeria as an

integral part of the Arab world. "Algeria would work for the achievement of Arab unity which it believes can be realised."²⁷ It regretted "the present Arab predicament which is characterised by misunderstanding and disunity" and which was responsible for the failure of the Arab states "to halt the onslaughts of imperialism". President Chadli, in his report to the fifth congress of the FLN, in December 1983, defined the situation in similar terms.

Algeria sees the divisions in the Arab world as a victory for imperialism whose aim has always been to keep the region in a state of subjugation. An Arab consensus would seriously threaten imperialist interests in a vital area of the world, endowed with the natural resources essential to our present epoch...The inability of the Arab world to speak with one voice has encouraged imperialism to infiltrate our ranks, and has also permitted the Zionists to expand in new directions, doubling the number of their settlements, annexing Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and embarking finally on the invasion of Lebanon - all of which pose a continuing threat to the Palestinian national movement and to the front-line Arab states.²⁸

The difference, of course, is that Algeria under Chadli has not only shifted its position markedly, in the direction of the

moderate Arab consensus, but has also tilted visibly in the direction of the western powers and, most notably, America and France. Increasingly since 1973 Algerian policy has been framed with a view to her state and national interest. The concern with Arab solidarity is genuine, if only because without it Algeria, like her Maghreb partners, would be condemned to remain largely on the periphery of international relations. Her participation in the Arab cause is the price to be paid for a real and continuing, if necessarily limited influence in affairs far beyond the range of her immediate capabilities.

Located at the heart of the Maghreb it is natural that Algeria should be concerned with solidarity although her approach has, from the start, acknowledged the reality, in the Maghreb as elsewhere, of territorial, state-based nationalisms, becoming more and more deeply entrenched. Algerian and Maghrebin leaders, perhaps even more than their counterparts elsewhere in the Arab world, have often been impatient with the more confused, sentimental and demagogic expressions of pan-Arab ideologues. Arab unity is nothing if not based on strong, secure states supplemented by a network of regional linkages organised around common interests and agreed objectives. Algeria continues to favour economic cooperation as a first and obvious instalment on any future regional community, but its leaders also appreciate that economic cooperation is unlikely in the absence of certain shared values and political objectives.

During the 1980s Algerian leaders would seem to have modified Algerian foreign policy to bring it more into line with political and economic reality. The change had already begun by 1973, if not earlier, but the new political configuration in the Middle East, resulting from Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, and from the Iranian revolution in 1979, coupled with the economic problems confronting the oil-producing states after 1981 (and more particularly after the cut in Saudi oil prices, in 1986), have prompted an even more sweeping re-alignment of Algerian priorities following the death of Houari Boumedienne. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and its consequences for inter-Arab relations and the PLO, together with the escalation of the Gulf war about the same time have all had the effect of accelerating the changes in Algerian policy.

One can appreciate the desire of the new President, Chadli Benjedid, to distinguish himself from his predecessor, who to the end had retained his commitment to 'revolution' and his distrust of 'imperialism' in its various guises, along with something of the charisma of a 'founding father'. Above all Boumedienne was identified with the construction of the state and with the technocratic impulse of the elites who graduated after independence, who were impatient for economic growth but rejected capitalist values in favour of state enterprise and an ideology that came increasingly to approximate state socialism along East European lines. Towards the end of his life Boumedienne was himself beginning to express considerable dissatisfaction with

the record of the Algerian economy. It remained for Chadli, however, to take that economy in hand and subject it to the same critical scrutiny that he would also apply to much that passed for 'radical orthodoxy' in Algeria's relations with the external world. Algeria remains non-aligned, but now in the sense of trying to deal with the two super-powers on a more or less equal footing where before Algeria had been identified, like Egypt before it, with the East European states.

Symptomatic of the new policy was the favourable reception given the American Vice-President, George Bush, in Algiers in October 1983, as was Chadli's visit to the United States and Washington on April 17-22, 1985 - the first ever by an Algerian President. Chadli had taken that opportunity to re-affirm his government's support for the resolutions of the Arab summit at Fez in September 1982. But he also warned his audience to be wary of what he described as "partial solutions" and reminded them that, for Algeria and the Arab peoples, the Camp David accords had dealt only with "partial problems" and had ignored "the fundamental question which still remains to be settled and persists as a source of constant tension" - that "essential problem" was "the future of the Palestinian people".

Where Boumedienne had not failed to criticise the Soviet position on Middle Eastern affairs, Chadli has also kept his distance from the West, insisting on Algerian and Arab priorities. And if his policy has had a much larger economic

content that surely reflects the changed international situation in the 1980s, and the new balance (or imbalance) in North-South affairs - as much as it reflects Chadli's own conviction that sound and efficient economic management is the surest path to economic growth, political stability and international influence.

CHAPTER NINE : TUNISIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

For a political settlement in the Middle East

Tunisia has long been considered a 'loner' in the Arab world, largely because of Bouguiba's pragmatic and well-publicised views on the most sensitive aspects of the Middle East 'problem'. His modernist, almost secular approach to Islam has not recommended him to other, more conservative or 'traditional' Arab states, particularly those of the Gulf who have dominated the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) since its inception in 1969. While Bourguiba had little sympathy with the pan-Arab doctrines associated with Gamel Abdul Nasser of Egypt (later the United Arab Republic) and the Baathist regimes of Syria and Iraq, in the 1950s and 1960s, he was no more at ease with the traditional Islamic doctrines of the rival ICO. Bourguiba was rather the product of French liberal/constitutionalist and secular/rational thought, coupled with the administrative pragmatism and something of the autocratic style of the Ottoman Empire, long represented in Tunis by the authority of the Bey. Although himself a leading exponent of Tunisian nationalism, with a strong base in the *Neo-Destour* Party, itself derived in 1934 from the more traditional *Destour* Party of the 1920s Bourguiba had little patience with the more strident forms of Arab nationalism to be encountered in Syria and Egypt in the 1950s and no great sympathy for the religious sensibilities of many Middle Eastern rulers - and of the great majority of their subjects.

Despite (perhaps largely because of) its comparatively high levels of (western) education and social formation, Tunisia was equally at a disadvantage in the Arab politics of 1956-67, when pan-Arabism was the vogue, as well as in 1969 when it was displaced by the more conservative sentiments of the Islamic Conference Organisation. While Tunisia could feel more comfortable with the new, more moderate emphasis on territorial states and their different interests and character, there could be little rapport with the attempt to install a new religious (and political) orthodoxy at the centre of Arab affairs, based on a particularly narrow and puritanical (Wahabi) variant of Islam. Moreover, Tunisia did not become an oil producer until 1969 and oil accounted for only about 40% of Tunisia's export earnings in 1979. The country played no part therefore in the deliberations of OPEC, which was closely linked with the fortunes of Arab states and their leaders during the 1970s and 1980s. Shortly after winning its battle for admission to membership in the Organisation of Arab Oil Producing States (OAPEC) in 1982, Tunisia would petition to withdraw from the organisation. It was Egypt's suspension from the Arab League in 1979, following the Baghdad summit of that year, that at last enabled Tunisia to insert itself in Arab affairs. In that year the headquarters of the Arab League was transferred from Cairo to Tunis.

From 1973 onwards the Arab world had been moving inexorably towards Bourguiba's own once controversial views on Palestine, with its acceptance of the fact of Jewish settlement and the

reality of Israel coupled with its demands for a separate Arab Palestine - which would entail Arab recognition of Israel within pre-determined frontiers. Bourguiba had tried through the 1960s to persuade other Arab leaders to accept an Israeli state based on the 1947 United Nations Partition Plan. By 1973 moderate Arab leaders were themselves moving towards the idea of two states with Israel withdrawing to her pre-1967 borders as prescribed in UN Resolution 232. After the Egyptian peace treaty with Israel, in 1979, it was difficult to see how the Arab states could long continue their collective refusal to acknowledge the reality of the state of Israel. Meanwhile, once the reluctance of Saudi Arabia to impose sanctions on Egypt was overcome by the other states attending the Baghdad summit, the Arab League was compelled to find a new headquarters. By reason of its small size, its moderation, and its good relations with the key western states (as well as with Egypt), Tunisia was given preference over other larger or more militant states. At the same time the government in Tunis revealed its own interest in integrating itself more fully into the Arab world now that other Arab leaders had belatedly come round to Bourguiba's views on Palestine and had had the courage to say so. The very reasons that had previously disqualified Tunisia from playing a more active role in Arab politics - were now beginning to be perceived as positive advantages.

Indeed, the Middle East Plan presented to the Fez Arab summit of September 1982, by Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia, seemed

to have been largely inspired by Habib Bourguiba's earlier proposals and was, therefore, something in the nature of a triumph for the Tunisian attitude. The later transfer of the PLO headquarters to Tunisia, after the Organisation's forcible removal from Lebanon in 1982, reinforced still further the now strategic position occupied by Tunisia within the councils of the Arab states. Tunisia now enjoyed a form of diplomatic immunity - an additional safeguard if not a guarantee against attacks by its neighbour, Libya. Which did not, however, prevent the Israelis mounting an aerial assault against the PLO headquarters close to Tunis on October 1, 1985, described as reprisals for 'terrorist' actions undertaken elsewhere by Palestinian factions. There was irony in the attack by the Israelis against the one Arab leader who had consistently demanded recognition of Israel - long before Sadat had given the idea wider circulation in the Middle East. Irony, too, in fact that Tunisia's promotion to a more 'central' position in Arab affairs, which owed so much to Bourguiba's *realpolitik*, should have coincided with the physical decline and eventual replacement, in 1987, of the country's historic leader.

A rational approach in confrontation with Arab sentimentalism

Tunisia's relations with the Arab states to the East, dominated by Egypt, have traditionally been hostile. During his stay in Cairo, after World War II, Bourguiba soon became aware of the very big differences separating the Arab East (Machrek) from the Maghreb, with its experience of French colonisation and its

closer ties with Western Europe. In the year of Tunisian home rule, 1955, the open hostility between Cairo and Tunis was expressed through Nasser's support for the militant Yousefist movement which had set itself up in opposition to Bourguiba. Ben Youssef, a radical pan-Arabist, was the secretary-general of the *Neo-Destour*. Rather than accept independence for Tunisia he wanted to carry on the nationalist campaign against the French until Algeria also became independent. After independence, in 1956, Tunisia in turn boycotted the Arab League, which it viewed as a pliant tool of Nasserist diplomacy. The Tunisians could not accept domination by any one state of a League which aimed at mutual defence and the strengthening of ties among the member states. of the League by any one state.

Meanwhile the good relations between Bourguiba and successive French governments of the Fourth Republic, that somehow survived until February 1958 and the bombing by the French air force of the frontier town of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef, were seen as an affront by the Egyptians, particularly in view of the French military campaign against the Algerian nationalists and the Franco-British collaboration with Israel in the Suez expedition. And in 1958 Tunisia accused Egypt of plotting against the Tunisian regime which led to a break in diplomatic relations between the two states. While Tunisia had generously placed its territory and facilities at the disposal of the Algerian nationalists and the Liberation Army, at the risk of French displeasure and threats of retaliation, Bourguiba worked consistently to reduce Algerian

dependence on Cairo and on Egyptian diplomatic and military assistance.

Reconciliation with Egypt was delayed until 1961, when Bourguiba found that he required Nasser's support to ensure a place at the Non-Aligned Conference being hosted by Yugoslavia in Belgrade. Algerian independence in 1962 removed yet another source of contention between the states and, in December 1963, Bourguiba was able to celebrate the departure of the last French troops from Tunisia with Nasser at his side. Relations quickly deteriorated again, however, when Bourguiba, on a visit to a Palestinian camp at Jericho, in 1965, advocated a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict. Seventeen years after the creation of Israel, as Nasser and the other Arab leaders were being drawn into preparations for a further military confrontation, Bourguiba did not hesitate to recommend implementation of the 1947 United Nations partition plan for Palestine. In a speech in Beirut, on March 11, 1965, he also denounced the "all or nothing" approach of the Arabs, warning that the rejection of compromise was only likely to prolong the present unsatisfactory situation for another seventeen years.¹ Other Arab leaders were scandalised while the United Arab Republic (by then reduced to Egypt) once more broke off diplomatic relations with Tunisia.

One outcome of the new split between Nasser and Bourguiba was that Tunisia was the only Arab state not to attend the Arab

League summit in Casablanca in September 1965. It also helps explain why Bourguiba gave limited support to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia when he attempted in the late 1960s to organise an Islamic summit as a rival organisation. When Faisal toured the Islamic world (and America) in 1965 and 1966 he was welcomed in Rabat and Tunis despite the differences between Saudi theocracy and Bourguiba's commitment to secularism. In 1966 Bourguiba agreed to accept and enter into the scheme advanced by Saudi Arabia and other conservative Arab states for an Islamic Conference - that would, hopefully, circumscribe the influence of Nasser and the more militant pan-Arab leaders, now contesting Saudi influence by participating in the Yemen war and opposing the British-sponsored South Arabian Federation of sheikhs in Aden (later South Yemen).

Tunisia could hardly play a leading role in an organisation based primarily on Islam and including states as distant as Indonesia and Malaysia, but Bourguiba had already shown his willingness to support other movements - notably the Monrovia conference and its successor, the Organisation of African Unity, formed in 1963. These were designed specifically to re-group the moderate states in opposition to militant radical leaders, like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Nasser of Egypt, who appeared to reject the territorial status quo in favour of pan-African or pan-Arab 'solutions'. Not surprisingly, the radical Arab states, including Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Algeria, condemned the Saudi project as American-inspired. Isolated within the Arab world,

Bourguiba turned increasingly towards Africa where, with the Senegalese President, Léopold Senghor, he became a leading spokesman for the *francophone* project, which was an important ingredient in General de Gaulle's new foreign policy.

Bourguiba returned to Arab politics under the shock of the overwhelming Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel. The crisis spelt the end of pan-Arabism in its more romantic version - although the earlier predicament of the Egyptians in Yemen and the rapid deterioration in the Egyptian domestic economy had done little to sustain the illusions of the radicals. Bourguiba emerged from the crisis with his confidence in his own convictions greatly strengthened. Tunisia had sent reinforcements to the Arab front but which had then to be recalled even before they arrived at their destination - because the war had ended. Bourguiba also attended the Arab summit later that year in Khartoum which accepted the reality of a Middle East divided into separate Arab states which, notwithstanding their essential unity, were grouped into three main geo-political regions - North Africa (including Egypt), the Peninsula, and the Fertile Crescent. Even at Khartoum, however, Bourguiba could not restrain his maverick temperament - impatient as ever at the mistakes and missed opportunities of the past to say nothing of the reluctance of those present to accept and learn to live with the present. Which, of course, meant the reality of Israel, with its military strength and its international support, and the

obvious military deficiencies and strategic weakness of the Arab camp.

With the 1967 war behind them and the cease-fire a reality, diplomatic relations were resumed between Tunis and Cairo. The initial intransigence of the Arab leaders, which Nasser deplored as much as Bourguiba, had given Israel a major propaganda advantage, allowing it to portray itself as eager for a negotiated settlement while Arab states persisted in repudiating negotiation on the one hand, while trying to enlist international support and sympathy on the other. Bourguiba was perhaps better placed than most Arab leaders to understand western and American sentiments in particular, just as he was among the first to welcome American intervention in the peace process and the so-called Rogers Plan for a cease-fire - accepted by Egypt and Jordan in 1970 despite the misgivings of other Arab leaders including President Boumedienne of Algeria. Although Nasser had considerably modified his views after, if not already before the 1967 war, his death in 1970 removed an obstacle to the improvement of Tunisia's relations with the Arab states to the East. Nevertheless Bourguiba's views on the Middle East remained unpopular in the Arab world until 1973, by which time even PLO leaders were openly advocating something approaching Bourguiba's 'two-state' structure for Palestine.

For Bourguiba the Palestinians were at the heart of the Middle East problem but, in the context of Tunisian policy, that

statement was not just a platitude, worn out by constant repetition. Palestinian rights could, however, best be defended by negotiation and not by confrontation. Bourguiba was as convinced as Kadhafi that the countries most directly involved in the Middle East conflict, Egypt, Syria and Jordan, were committed mainly to the defence of their own particular interests - since 1967 the recovery of their own occupied territories. Unlike Kadhafi, however, Bourguiba advocated dialogue and greater mutual understanding between Palestinians and Israelis as the only basis for a lasting settlement in the Middle East. Unlike Morocco Tunisia itself did not offer an example of fellowship and successful reconciliation between Jew and Arab. Indeed, there had been a massive exodus of Jews from Tunisia, a reaction not to official pressure but to widespread popular hostility based on claims that Tunisian Jews had long collaborated with the French and had continued to support France even after independence, e.g., in the international crisis over the naval base of Bizerta in Tunisia in 1961.

Before the creation of Israel in 1948 there had been 120,000 Jews in Tunisia although their numbers were reduced to 86,000 by 1956, the year of Tunisian independence. At the time of Bizerta 15,000 Jews fled the country accused of having assisted the French. During and after the 1967 war it was the turn of the British and Americans to incur the displeasure of the populace but again Jewish shops and synagogues were the principal target of popular anger. During the war of October 1973 Bourguiba

expressly called on Tunisians to leave the Jewish community, down to 7,000, unharmed.² By the early nineteen-eighties the Jews in Tunisia were said to number less than 5,000. Where King Hassan of Morocco has pointed to the intellectual advance of the Jews and the inter-dependence of the Jewish and Arab communities in the Middle East - Jewish brains and Arab wealth - Bourguiba has long emphasised the technological gap between Israel and the surrounding Arab states.

Above all the struggle between the Arabs and the Zionists reflects their scientific and technological inequality. Israel's power lies in its mastery of modern science and technology.³

Which has not dissuaded Bourguiba from pursuing his efforts in the direction of a peaceful, negotiated solution to the Palestinian problem.

Bourguiba has projected an image of himself as the embodiment and symbol of 'realism' in the Arab world. Apparently intractable problems can be overcome, step-by-step, by a policy of compromise - moving onwards, slowly, but on a firm basis of earlier agreements and the good will and cooperation without which any solution would, indeed, be far-fetched. The style has been described (often only to be dismissed) as 'bourguibism'. In 1973, before the October war, Bourguiba was thus the first and most obvious - if not the most representative - Arab Head of

State to be in line to meet Israeli officials. No other Arab leader had called so long and consistently for a dialogue with Israel. In 1973 Bourguiba announced his willingness to meet an Israeli representative if such a meeting could further the prospects for peace in the Middle East. Arguing that "it was essential to have recourse to dialogue and reason", he underlined that "it would be easier to arrange a meeting in Rome, Athens, Malta or elsewhere, because meeting in Israel would be dangerous for me."⁴ He then disclosed that President Sadat would be prepared to recognise Israel provided it first renounced its military conquests.

Israeli officials, and notably the Prime Minister, Golda Meir, and her Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, declared they were ready for such a meeting. The latter disclosed to the Knesset that Israel was in fact awaiting information regarding a possible meeting with President Bourguiba. For his part Bourguiba was careful to insist that there could not be a meeting unless Israel first accepted the partition plan put forward by the United Nations in 1947 as the basis for any dialogue. "The Israelis should keep what was bestowed on them by the United Nations in 1947 and should leave the territories which were occupied by force." If the only reason for retaining such territories was the desire for security, then he could tell them "they would never be secure while they continue to occupy Arab territories". Only the Arab states could offer Israel real security, along with a meaningful peace and a cooperation beneficial to both sides.

Then came the critical point of the argument. "But the Arabs will never make peace if the Palestinians do not agree. So a Palestinian state must be created."⁵

Should his initiative not succeed this time, Bourguiba assured the Israelis, they would regret it just as the Arabs now regretted their earlier failure to pursue a negotiated settlement. "The Arabs blamed me in 1965 because I told them the truth and yet today they praise me."⁶ But even Bourguiba was not going to risk a meeting with Israeli representatives without some kind of Arab sanction. Before making contact therefore he would summon an Arab summit. "If a single Arab state is opposed, I will withdraw my proposal."⁷ And if that seemed to weight the chances heavily against success he recalled that

Even Nasser, on the eve of his death, showed himself willing to recognise Israel provided it evacuated Sinai and respected the rights of the Palestinians.⁸

Tunisian diplomacy was accordingly centred around the Bourguiba plan, of June 1973, which enunciated as conditions for peace in the Middle East : (1) the right of the Palestinians not to be dispossessed of their homeland; and (2) the right of the Israelis to enjoy the fruit of their labours in complete security and without fear of extermination. Bourguiba obviously enjoyed a large degree of latitude in international Arab circles,

presumably because his views threatened no one but himself and may even have reinforced a hostile consensus, because of the support he enjoyed in the Anglo-Saxon world (Canada and Britain as well as the United States) in addition to his ties with France, because his moderate views on other issues were appreciated by the more conservative Arab leaders, and, not least, because of his personal popularity at home - where, however, on the question of Israel most of the population was probably closer to Arab sentiment generally than to the views of their own historic leader.

At this critical juncture Bourguiba was particularly careful to maintain a rough balance of views within his administration. From 1970-74 the Prime Minister, Bahi Ladgham, was a moderate close to the President's views but aware, too, of the need to maintain a consensus inside Tunisia if the government was to continue to function effectively. By way of contrast the Foreign Minister, Mohammed Masmoud, was a radical pan-Arabist, determined to play a crucial and militant role in Arab affairs. After 1973 the balance shifted further in the direction of moderation and support for the President's policies with the removal in January 1974 of the Foreign Minister held responsible, as we have seen, for the treaty of 'union' with Libya.

1973-87 : the triumph of Bourguibism

Tunisia was able during the war of October 1973 to resume its place within the Arab community and without its loyalty being called in question. By announcing on October 7 that Tunisia would commit troops to the front and calling on others to join him, Bourguiba could be said to have given a lesson in solidarity to Saudi Arabia, which was not involved militarily and, above all, to Jordan which did afterwards despatch a contingent to the Golan front. Tunisia, like Algeria, had broken diplomatic relations with Jordan in July, 1971, after her Prime Minister's efforts to mediate in the conflict between King Hussein and the Palestinians had failed to prevent a renewed outbreak of fighting. They were restored on October 14, 1973, twenty-four hours after a similar gesture by Algeria. While Tunisia's contribution to the war was modest, in keeping with its means, it was nevertheless very effective and included an infantry regiment of more than a thousand men seconded to the Egyptian front. They were exhorted to cooperate with the units of other Arab countries and it is even possible that the Algerian air force helped transport them to Egypt. Two medical teams were sent to Syria and another to Egypt while medicines were donated to the Palestinian Red Crescent.⁹

After the war, where the Arab leadership regained something of the honour and respect that had been lost in 1967, Bourguiba continued to urge his colleagues to press for peace with Israel. "If the Israelis begin to see reason and show their readiness to take account of the rights of the Arabs, we should not turn our

backs."¹⁰ In Bourguiba's own administration, however, there were critics of the cease-fire and opponents of American intervention who preferred to ignore or discount the success of the Israeli counter-offensive. They included Masmoudi, the Foreign Minister, who insisted that the outcome, "fabricated in certain capitals and on the initiative of certain big powers" had "surprised everybody".¹¹ Bourguiba himself continued to insist "without the Palestinians nothing is possible". The Jewish people, with its own long history of suffering and persecution, dispersion and recovery, should have been well placed "to understand and sympathise with the unhappy predicament of the Palestinians".¹²

There was a Gaullist undertone, too, in Bourguiba's insistence that "Palestine was a historic reality, whereas Jordan is only the name of a river." The implication was clear both before but more particularly after the 1973 war. Tunisia could not accept King Hussein's claims to speak or act on behalf of the Palestinian people. The Kingdom of Trans-Jordan was a creation of the British who, to suit their own interests had quite simply "amputated the desert region of Palestine" to create a fief for their client, Hussein's grandfather, the Emir Abdullah. By way of contrast "Palestine is a historic reality : from the time of the Pharaohs there has been a Palestine".¹³ Even Britain's forthcoming entry to the Common Market - thanks to President Pompidou - could not erase the memory of Franco-British rivalry in the old Syrian province. Accordingly, at the Algiers Arab summit of November 1973, Bourguiba was ready to dismiss Jordanian

ambitions to recover the West Bank and even Gaza and to re-attach them to Amman. The solution was not through Jordan and the creation of a new federal entity, even more artificial than the last, but through acceptance of the United Nations plan for partition in 1947 with two states existing side by side, learning to respect each other's integrity. But in the aftermath of the war this may have been asking too much of the other Arab leaders attending the summit and Bourguiba's speech was received with a glacial silence, suggesting that the Tunisian leader had once more acted precipitately threatening the brief consensus that he himself had helped create in October 1973.

Which did not prevent Bourguiba returning to the same theme a year later, in September 1974, when the outlook already seemed more favourable to his views. Bourguiba was then able to insist that

The Palestinians were coming around to his point of view, also the Syrians. And as far as the Israelis were concerned the lesson for them was that they could have either territory or security but not both together. Back in 1947 they had received over half of Palestine. In another ten to twenty years they would have to confront an Arab population that would be larger, more advanced and, thanks to oil, would command much greater resources than was now the case. In those more favourable

circumstances the Arabs might not be prepared to concede so much to the Israelis.¹⁴

The first problem was to convince the other Arab leaders, including Yasser Arafat and his more militant rivals in the PLO, of the desirability of recognising the state of Israel within its pre-1967 frontiers. The other question, that persuading the Israelis to withdraw from Jerusalem and to abandon their more recent settlements on the West Bank and in Gaza, was postponed for later consideration. In January 1975 Bourguiba criticised Arafat's suggestion, at the United Nations the previous year, for the creation of a secular Palestinian state.¹⁵ That would imply the disappearance of the present Israeli state which was unlikely to win widespread acceptance outside the Arab League. It hardly constituted "a winning card" for the Palestinian revolution. At the same time the Tunisian President gave strong support to Egypt and Sadat who had just successfully negotiated with the Israelis the second phase of the disengagement of their forces from the Sinai.

President Anwar Sadat's peace initiative began with his historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977, followed by the Camp David talks in America in 1978 and the signing of a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. The Arab states and the PLO were, by then, caught up in the 'peace process' and had little room for manoeuvre. Sadat had seized the initiative and the size and

military strength of Egypt, coupled with her central role in the Arab League and in the Middle East generally, left her allies and opponents alike surprised, disconcerted and at the mercy of events - and, in the case of Lebanon, the PLO and the Palestinians, increasingly at the mercy of the Israelis. American influence with Sadat and with the Saudis did not, unfortunately, give them effective leverage over Israeli foreign and defence policies. In that respect Washington was the victim of its prior commitments, to say nothing of congressional and public opinion. Increasingly Arab opinion was polarised between those who hoped to be able to extend the peace process beyond the Sinai, so as to negotiate settlements of the other outstanding questions - notably Palestine and Syria - and the more radical states who disputed the wisdom of any negotiations with Israel or any international settlement that was reached without Soviet participation. Those most disappointed with Sadat joined in the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, created in Tripoli, Libya, in December 1977 and included Algeria, Libya, Syria, South Yemen (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen), and the PLO

Tunisia refused to participate in the new Front arguing that such a venture would only deepen existing Arab divisions when circumstances clearly called for dialogue and conciliation. Shrewdly the Tunisian authorities announced their support for any Arab conference at any time provided it was attended by all the Arab states. Bourguiba, who had shown so little concern for Arab consensus in the past, now showed a special concern to revive a

consensus that, in fact, had lasted for only a few months at the end of 1973. Before long, in August 1978, Tunisia declared its own opposition to Sadat's initiative on the grounds - according to the Foreign Minister (later secretary general of the ICO), Habib Chatti - that "it was a regrettable illustration of the *fait accompli* (with which Bourguiba should himself have been only too familiar), that it "was contrary to Arab strategy and called in question the principles of Arab policy", and that it threatened to disrupt the common Arab front "at the very moment when cohesion is needed most".¹⁶ In May 1979, two months after the ultimatum issued by the Baghdad summit, Tunisia finally broke with Egypt in company with eleven other Arab states. The long history of animosity between Egypt and Tunisia was thus revived with Tunisia this time able to lay a convincing claim to Arab orthodoxy - just as earlier, in 1971, and again in 1973 Tunisia had turned the tables on Egypt's former partner, Jordan, with its defence of the Palestinians and its participation in the October war.

Tunisia was thus well placed to succeed Egypt as the new headquarters of the Arab League after the latter's suspension in 1979. The great majority of Arab states were still firmly committed to seeking a comprehensive solution to Middle Eastern problems by means of negotiation and diplomacy rather than by 'steadfastness' or 'confrontation'. The mood, set by the earlier Rabat summit in 1974, was still 'realistic' and 'pragmatic'. Meanwhile a former Tunisian diplomat, Chadli Klibi, then serving

as Information Minister, was chosen as the new general secretary of the League, after the resignation of the Egyptian, Mahmoud Riyad. His nomination to the post was unanimous and followed an extraordinary meeting of Arab foreign ministers on June 27, 1979. The Tunisian Prime Minister, Hedi Nouira, justified the appointment on the grounds of efficiency and ease of communication, disclaiming any wish to 'pack' the League with Tunisian personnel.¹⁷

The choice of Tunisia as the site of the League headquarters undoubtedly reflects the growing rapport between Tunisia and the other Arab states. This is itself a consequence of the growing moderation among Arab leaders after 1967 and, more particularly, after 1973; a consequence, too, of the belated recognition of Israeli strength and Arab weakness; and it follows from the re-appraisal by the Arab states of the global balance of power which, in the Middle East at least, continues to favour the United States, despite the fall of the Shah in Iran, while the Soviet position has been badly compromised by its precipitate action in Afghanistan in 1979. While Arab opinion has been moving steadily towards Tunisian views, it must also be pointed out that President Bourguiba was showing much greater sensitivity after 1970 to Arab sensibilities, indicative perhaps of his fears from the revolution in neighbouring Libya, in 1969. There is evidence that Bourguiba was under considerable pressure, both from Libya and from within his own administration, to agree a fusion with Kadhafi in 1974. And there can be little doubt that

Bourguiba himself was strongly opposed to such a move, if only because of his own long and intimate association with Tunisian nationalism.

However, the prospect of support from other prominent Arab states and their leaders, must have been attractive to Bourguiba - at a time when the changing situation in France, the eviction of the Gaullists from the Presidency, and France's own growing dependence on oil from Iraq and Libya, paid for largely by arms and other purchases by the same two Arab states. Any aggression against Tunisian territory after 1979 could be presented as an aggression against the Arab League and Arab states as a whole. The transfer of the headquarters of the PLO to Tunis, after 1982 and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, elevated Tunis to the unaccustomed status of a leading Arab capital. It was congenial, moreover, to Yasser Arafat who, since 1974, had been committed to a negotiation solution for the Palestinian problem and who now, on the North African coast, and in close proximity to his Algerian allies, attempted to mend his bridges with King Hussein of Jordan as well as paying an unexpected and highly controversial visit to President Mubarak of Egypt, who had succeeded Sadat in 1981.

International and regional developments in the early 1980s continued therefore to favour Tunisian diplomacy and its integration with what remained of the Arab world. The administration had good relations with the new French President,

François Mitterrand, and together both were active, and successful in working to improve relations with neighbouring Algeria - under the more pragmatic and moderate leadership of Chadli Benjedid. If this then prompted a brief but threatening alliance between Morocco and Libya in 1984, that came to an end two years later and following the American air strike against Libya. While American action may have been counter-productive in so far as it weakened any internal opposition and enabled Kadhafi to re-shuffle the military high command - and to move it out of the capital and into a more remote area - it did put an end to Kadhafi's threats against his neighbours, above all Tunisia, at least for a time. Meanwhile Algerian policy seemed to be inspired, increasingly, by a pragmatism in the Middle East and a preference for liberal economic policies at home, that could have been inspired by the Tunisian example.

The height of Tunisian influence in the Middle East was probably reached at the adjourned Arab summit in Fez, Morocco, in November 1981, which was then re-convened in September 1982, also at Fez. The proposals presented by Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia had first received the consent of the Saudi royal house and of members of the newly-constituted Gulf Cooperation Council. But the proposals were really based on the theses formulated by Bourguiba in 1965 and first presented in published form on controversial visit to Jericho. These contained rather more than the germ of the later Fahd Plan, which was itself an attempt to present an Arab alternative to the so-called Reagan Plan,

formulated in some haste in 1982 in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The Fahd Plan involved a negotiated settlement of the Palestinian question, with implicit recognition of the Israeli presence in the Middle East, within secure frontiers, in return for Israeli acceptance of the creation of an independent Palestinian state. The UN Security Council would ensure the application of the plan and would act in the last resort to guarantee the security of the states within the region.

While the Saudis were anxious to ensure unanimity among the Arab states in support of the Plan, the results fell somewhat short of their expectations. Yasser Arafat could not altogether rely on the support of the dissident factions of the PLO, or even on his own lieutenants within Fatah. Kadhafi withheld his agreement while President Assad of Syria appeared first to support the plan and then to withdraw (or heavily qualify) that support. Even the adjournment until September 1982 failed to secure the Saudi objective which was unanimity, despite the active diplomacy of the Moroccan host, King Hassan. On the other hand only Kadhafi and South Yemen rejected it outright. It is symptomatic of the state of Arab politics in the eighties that no further summit was attempted until 1987 when the Arab leaders assembled again in Amman to consider the threat in the Gulf from Iran. Nevertheless the Fahd Plan was the closest the Arab leaders would come to the formulation of a consensus on the Middle East. And that consensus recalled the much earlier proposals of Habib Bourguiba.

On other issues, too, Tunisia has tried to conform to what it perceives to be the Arab consensus. From its beginning in 1980 Tunisia has tried to maintain a low profile towards the Iran-Iraq war. However, as the Saudis and some of the Gulf states moved closer to Iraq, while the Arab states led by Jordan and Saudi Arabia looked increasingly to Egypt and Hosni Mubarak to reinforce their military front against Iran, Tunisia took a more prominent and more militant line against the regime in Teheran. In March 1987 the government in Tunis broke off diplomatic relations with Teheran accusing the Iranian Embassy in Tunis of sponsoring agitation by religious 'fundamentalists' and of recruiting Tunisian 'extremists' for subversive undertakings against the government. On Iran, then, the Tunisian position differs from that of the Algerians, while moving closer to Rabat which has consistently opposed, and been opposed by, the Ayatollahs in Iran. But the real irony, as we have suggested, was that the final acceptance of Bourguiba's theses on the Middle East, which focussed on a negotiated settlement of the Palestinian question, coincided with the eclipse and final removal of the founder-president himself. In the second half of the 1980s the political struggle in Tunisia was at its peak as Bourguiba resisted pressures from many, at home and abroad, who hoped to influence or even secure the appointment of their nominee as constitutional successor. By the end of 1987, which also saw the reunion of the Arab leaders in Amman, in the first summit since 1982, Bourguiba had been forcibly retired.

CHAPTER TEN : MOROCCO AND THE MIDDLE EAST
FROM THE GOLAN HEIGHTS TO CAMP DAVID

A foreign policy for domestic consumption

In terms of structure and ideology the Moroccan regime has more in common with the conservative monarchies of Jordan, the states of the Arabian Peninsula, and the Iran of the Pahlavis, than with its immediate North African neighbours. Between such 'natural' allies, however, lie the more radical, republican regimes entrenched in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, and later Algeria and Libya. Moroccan foreign policy had therefore to come to terms with a militant Arab radicalism whose insistence on direct confrontation with Israel created problems, both domestic and external, for the less 'progressive' states. It had also to respond to the new balance of power in the region following Algerian independence in 1962. This favoured Algeria, by reason of its size and geographical situation, its infrastructure, and the availability of oil and gas. Since gaining independence from the French, in 1956, Morocco had agitated for the modification of existing frontiers in North and West Africa. The objective was to recover something of the Sultan's former jurisdiction, in pre-colonial times, which had extended to areas now incorporated in neighbouring states. De-colonisation had served only to confirm the existing boundaries, which rejected 'historical' and 'traditional' considerations in favour of administrative convenience and consistency with colonial practice. Meanwhile Rabat was under pressure from the new leadership in Algiers which

now proclaimed its own 'revolutionary' values - while resisting Moroccan attempts to overturn the territorial status quo.

Like other new states Morocco consciously sought to fashion a foreign policy that would enable the state to respond effectively to the new situation that it faced, exploiting the opportunities that arose while trying to neutralise the threats. To a large extent, however, the policy evolved in response to isolated problems and to specific incidents. In Morocco, as elsewhere in the Maghreb, domestic considerations had priority in the elaboration of foreign policy whose first and principal objective was, in any case, to secure the regime. The function of foreign policy was therefore to uphold the dynasty at home and to serve its interests abroad, to that end asserting traditional claims and exploiting religious, ideological and even personal affinities. Initially, the role of the dynasty in securing the country's independence from the French, which had involved a period of exile for Hassan's father, Mohammed V, had contributed greatly to the regime's popularity. But the more enduring basis of the regime's legitimacy lay in its religious and traditional character, with the monarch claiming descent from the Prophet.

Search for a role in Arab affairs

The 'patrimonial' style of administration and the personal character of government helped establish a clientelistic relationship between the centre and the periphery, that also cut

across emerging class and status differentials. By means of foreign policy the same government then sought to establish similar ties of a political, economic and military character with other 'kindred' states. While Morocco was the recipient of special 'favours' from its American, European, and Middle Eastern patrons, so too Rabat sought to bring other African states within its orbit. At the centre of the system there was the dynasty and a distinctive kind of Moroccan nationalism committed less to the defence of a territorial entity than to the realisation of dynastic pretensions - a policy of irredentism, mainly at the expense of other, neighbouring states. All else, including the experiment with 'controlled' modernisation and a liberal economic policy, were subordinate to the defence of the realm and the pursuit of its interests.

The second objective of Moroccan foreign policy was to overcome the country's geo-political isolation so that it might integrate itself more fully into the political life of the Middle East and Africa. The aim was to circumvent the physical and political barriers that otherwise threatened both the development of the economy and the realisation of Morocco's wider regional and global interests. Morocco looked over the Mediterranean to Western Europe and the markets of the European Community; across the Atlantic to the United States with its strategic interests in the Mediterranean and the Levant and its preference for stable, conservative clients. On the other side of the Sahara there were the recently constituted black African states, closely dependent

on French economic and military assistance, and presenting both a challenge and an opportunity to policy makers in Rabat. Some, like Mauritania in the 1960s, were viewed as territorial dependencies, to be integrated or re-integrated into the *Sharifian* kingdom at the first opportunity and without too much regard to the territorial status quo. Other African states like Senegal and Ivory Coast (and later Mauritania) were seen rather as allies to be mobilised in defence of the ideological status quo and against the challenge from more militant, perhaps 'marxist' states. From the outset there was thus a certain ambiguity about Moroccan foreign policy, which was basically conservative but, where dynastic claims were at stake, or when the dynasty was at risk from domestic pressures, was ready to adopt a more militant and aggressive posture and even to seek out radical allies.

To the East there was Algeria and Libya from whom Morocco could expect little in terms of sympathy and less by way of support, given its territorial claims on the first and its ideological antipathy to the second, particularly after Kadhafi overturned King Idris in Libya, in 1969. Only Tunisia could be said to have shared a good number of the concerns and objectives of Moroccan foreign policy - but not their ambition to 'revise' the inherited, colonial frontiers. But the small size of Tunisia, its partial integration with the economy of eastern Algeria, and the idiosyncratic views of President Bourguiba on Middle Eastern questions, where he was often at variance with

conservative as well as radical Arab leaders, seemed to exclude a checkerboard-style alliance - save in the most exceptional circumstances. The dominant strand in Moroccan policy is therefore conservative - a defence of the ideological status quo, a rejection of radical, particularly marxist doctrines, an attachment to the western camp - whether to France, America or the European Community as such - and a determined opposition to anything that might facilitate Soviet or Communist penetration.

In the context of Arab politics this translates into opposition to pan-Arabism - except for a brief 'flirtation' in the 1950s with Nasser (and Kwame Nkrumah) when Morocco wanted support for its role in the Algerian war, as well as for its campaign to annexe the adjacent territory of Mauritania. It also explains Morocco's predictable backing for the Saudi-sponsored Islamic Conference Organisation, set up in 1969 to rival the secular, and pan-Arab pretensions of their Egyptian, Syrian and Iraq opponents. After 1973 Morocco would become even more directly aligned with Saudi Arabia and the conservative regimes of the Gulf, as well as being close to President Sadat of Egypt and to the American leaders. Hassan's consistent defence of a negotiated settlement in the Middle East and his adoption of conservative, if cautious positions within the Arab League won for the Moroccans a prominent, even pivotal role after 1973 in the controversial 'peace process', alongside Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Saudi support for Morocco and the rapport between their two monarchs was not unconnected with the choice of

Rabat in 1974, and of Fez in 1981/1982, as the venue for key meetings of the Arab Foreign Ministers and Heads of State. There was also the generous financial as well as diplomatic support the Moroccans received from the Saudi government following their military interventions in Zaire as well as in the Western Sahara - at a time when the Saudis were troubled by developments in South Yemen and the Horn of Africa and the prospect of communist 'expansion' here and elsewhere in Africa.

But there is also evidence of Moroccan support for more militant even radical positions. The object here has usually been (1) to counter or deflect strong domestic pressures on the dynasty, from the opposition parties, from within the military or from other key constituencies, or else (2) to maximise external support by other states for dynastic claims that are likely to threaten entrenched conservative interests and provoke considerable opposition abroad. Both factors contributed to Moroccan membership of the short-lived Casablanca group, formed in 1960 and linking Black and Arab African states - Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and Egypt - in their support of Algerian independence and their opposition to colonial and neo-colonial 'dependency'. The 'bloc', led by Ghana and Kwame Nkrumah, was particularly critical of the retention of colonial frontiers in Africa after independence and the colonial, pro-western orientation of many of the new African leaders. Ghana, Egypt and Morocco also had large territorial claims against neighbouring states. On Middle Eastern issues, too, Morocco under Hassan has

more often been associated with militant Arab sentiment than, for example, Tunisia under Bourguiba. Nor were Morocco's relations with Egypt punctuated by the same sharp discontinuities as characterised Tunisian-Egyptian relations in the same period. The exception was in 1963 when Hassan himself attacked Nasser for openly aligning his country with Algeria during the short 'war of the sands'. While Hassan undoubtedly felt a much greater affinity with Sadat than with Nasser and his populist style and radical views, there was no break in Moroccan-Egyptian relations until 1979 - and on that occasion the severance was regretted by both leaders.

Intermittent but well publicised support by Morocco for the Palestinian cause and, above all, her active participation in the 1973 war on the Golan front were calculated gestures designed to attract international attention, which helped to earn respect for the Moroccan leadership, even among the more 'progressive' states. More important Moroccan participation in the war of October 1973 and her close identification, then and later, with the Arab cause enabled Hassan to re-assert his authority over the military at home - involved in several abortive coup attempts in 1971/1972. And more recent events suggest that Hassan still retains the capacity to surprise allies and opponents alike. His public and controversial reconciliation with Kadhafi, in 1983, after nearly fifteen years of confrontation, and the 'union' between their states that followed in 1984, displeased the Americans and alarmed the French. Within two years of this

alliance with Kadhafi, leader of the Tripoli group and the Rejectionist Front, Hassan would again surprise observers by his invitation to the Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, to visit Rabat for confidential discussions.

It is not that Hassan has a split personality, or that Moroccan policy exhibits a dual character, or is characterised by instability and inconsistency. On the contrary, Morocco's more 'radical' or 'progressive' gestures can invariably be explained in terms of domestic priorities : above all defence of the realm and an awareness of the sources, both immediate and historic, of its legitimacy. As in Jordan and Saudi Arabia (and in Egypt under Farouk and his father) the monarch cannot afford to detach himself or his state from the Arab cause, or from the Palestinian question which retains the capacity to arouse and direct public opinion throughout the Middle East. This is particularly the case with the *Sharifian* sovereign whose claims to legitimacy derive from religious (Islamic) precedent. Thus King Hassan II, like King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, was able to blame radical Ba'athism and secular Nasserism for the defeat of 1967 while 'extremists' were held responsible for most of the Arab misadventures. Hassan had a very simple explanation for the outcome of the 'six day war' : the "Arabs had turned their back on God and God had turned away from them". Or, more specifically, "the defeat of the Arabs was a consequence of the ideologies that divided them and their reliance on the Soviet Union".

Other gestures, including the decision to commit troops to serve alongside the Syrians in the defence of the Golan Heights, shortly before the 1973 war, have been 'explained' in terms of the domestic pressures on the regime, notably the two failed coup attempts of 1971 and 1972 - the second being attributed to the redoubtable Interior Minister, General Mohammed Oufkir, widely held to have been implicated in the disappearance and death of Mehdi Ben Barka near Paris in 1965. The regime (i.e., dynasty) had to recover its popularity and to regain control over a fractious military. The least reliable officers could be sent to the front on active service along with any frustrated professionals who wanted action and an opportunity for promotion. Again, the more militant African initiatives undertaken by the regime, notably the pursuit of its claims on Mauritania in the 1960s and, above all, the Green March into the former Spanish Sahara in 1975, are likewise linked with domestic problems which, in the peculiar circumstances of Morocco, have also been dynastic problems. They reflect the attempts by the regime, under intense local pressure, to strengthen its legitimacy and retrieve its popular base.

More generally Morocco, with its high military profile in Africa and its aggressive pursuit of territorial claims against its neighbours, has pursued a diplomatic offensive calculated to maximise domestic support while minimising the risks of international isolation. Where Morocco in the 1960s had offended conservative opinion in France and the more moderate African

leaders by her designs on Mauritania, Rabat tried to compensate by (briefly) courting the more radical Arab and African leaders. The failure of her expansionist policies in North Africa, however, soon prompted a shift of emphasis away from Africa and towards the Middle East. Even in 1972-73, when Hassan was Chairman of the O.A.U., Africa remained a relatively low priority for Moroccan foreign policy. It was only in the mid-1970s, with the emergence in Africa of a new generation of socialist states, and the threat from the new oil wealth of Algeria and Libya, that Morocco returned again to African issues, staking out its prior claim to the Spanish Sahara, its mineral wealth and its fisheries. And as Algeria, Libya and some of the more 'progressive' of the African states registered their opposition to the Moroccan claim, the government turned for support to the conservative majority of the Arab League - who were opposed to further fragmentation in the Middle East, particularly where the proposed new state was likely to be radical in orientation and aligned with the socialist camp. Even Libya voiced its opposition to 'balkanisation'.

Finding an unsympathetic response in the Arab League, Algeria turned instead to the OAU and the United Nations - where the success of its diplomatic efforts left Morocco increasingly isolated and vulnerable, and with no alternative in the end but to withdraw from the first and to ignore the resolutions of the second. In his determination to avoid isolation and to fund his military campaign in the Sahara Hassan is the more anxious,

therefore, to retain the backing of the Arab League, the one body to have consistently supported him on the issue of Western Sahara. Which is why, despite the similarity of their views on the Middle East and its problems, Hassan cannot afford the more quixotic gestures of Bourguiba. More than Bourguiba, Hassan has to consider opinion back home as well as the sensitivities of Arab opinion, conservative and radical alike, reflected in the deliberations of the Arab League and other Arab councils. Even his most daring initiatives are carefully prepared and their timing and presentation are calculated so as to maximise support from as many quarters as possible : the intention being to retain existing conservative support in the Arab League, the OAU and among the western states while trying to keep open his lines to the Soviet Union and to other leaders whose support, political as well as economic, could conceivably be useful in the future.

Militancy in the October war

While Morocco has long favoured a political settlement of the Middle East problems, it nevertheless participated actively in the war of October 1973. As a result of that involvement, which received widespread publicity throughout the Middle East, Morocco became prominent for the first time in the politics of the region as a whole, and was no longer seen simply as an actor in the North African arena. Lacking oil and mineral wealth, however, Morocco could not hope to achieve the same degree of autonomy or the influence of Algeria or even Libya. It would remain the

client of other Middle East 'powers', like Saudi Arabia, or of France or the United States. By skilful diplomacy King Hassan II could re-dress the balance to some extent, penetrating the inner circle of Arab rulers in the role of arbiter.

His talents in this capacity were particularly appreciated in the aftermath of the 1973 war, as King Faisal of Saudi Arabia sought to maintain the momentum of the 'peace process' while preserving an increasingly delicate Arab consensus regarding its direction and its objectives. As the Saudis struggled to maintain their close and privileged relationship with Sadat's Egypt and Assad's Syria, they found an indispensable ally in the Moroccan monarch whose troops had been despatched to both fronts in 1973 and had distinguished themselves in the fighting on the Golan Heights. And as Hassan began to focus increasingly on the Spanish Saharan territory immediately to the South of Morocco, and to revive dynastic claims to sovereignty in the area, the financial support of the Saudis and the approval of the Arab League became increasingly useful.

Moroccan participation in the 1973 war is open to many interpretations. Like President Sadat of Egypt, Hassan would have viewed the conflict not so much as a renewal of the confrontation politics of the previous decade, but more as a means of upsetting the territorial status quo imposed by the Israelis following their sweeping victory in 1967. Where the often repeated threat of war had failed to alert the Israelis and

their American patrons to the instability inherent in the present arrangements, Egypt and Syria had been compelled in 1973 to deploy their troops in an offensive operation that was initially as successful as it was unexpected. The exact numbers of Moroccan troops involved in the 1973 campaign are not available. Estimates vary from 5,500 to 7,000 soldiers.² According to one source two units of the tank brigade had been sent to the Golan front in Syria as early as May, five months before the war began. They were equipped with Russian-designed T54 tanks and numbered around 1500-3000 soldiers, under the command of General Abdeslam Sefrioui.³ A second expeditionary force was despatched to Egypt after the war began. composed of four units of the tank brigade and some 2,000-5,300 soldiers under Colonel Hassan Hatim, the brigade commander. They were accompanied by an Air Force squadron.⁴

One view is that the operation was mounted not in a display of revolutionary fervour but rather to strengthen the position of the throne in Morocco, whose legitimacy derives from Hassan's claims to be descended from the Prophet. Elbaki Hermessi has argued that practices such as fund-raising during religious rituals and the despatch of army contingents to the front were destined, like the later appeals for a people's march to 're-occupy' the Western Sahara, to help legitimate the monarchy.⁵ Reviewing a contingent of the expeditionary corps en route to Syria, in advance of the war in May 1973, Hassan reminded the

troops of the holy nature of their mission, which recalled Mohammed's earlier defence of the Faith.

Today we are called on to make sacrifices to liberate Jerusalem and to retrieve the dignity of all Moslems...we are participating, together with our Arab brothers, in this struggle for emancipation which is for the glory of Islam and the triumph of its holy values.⁶

And to reinforce the religious symbolism, flags were distributed by the sovereign bearing the legend : "For the defence of the Arab nation". Hassan also revealed that other contingents would follow and the despatch of a second to the Egyptian front was announced on October 6, 1973.

Others have seen the gesture more as a response to the two abortive coup attempts directed against the throne, in July 1971 and August 1972. These furnished clear evidence of widespread unrest among the officers of the army and air force. The transfer of the first contingent of the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) to Syria, in May 1973, suggests that Hassan was preoccupied above all with the internal unrest in the military but also with the rejection by the opposition parties of the proposed political concessions and their refusal to participate in the proposed government of national unity on the terms outlined by the monarch. There was the temptation to despatch the least reliable units to the Syrian front where Israeli raids had been frequent

and casualties were likely to be high. The gesture would serve as a warning to the more fractious of the military as well as providing opportunities to the more professional elements to distinguish themselves militarily and, once more, in loyal service to the throne. Hassan himself insisted that the decision to send troops to Syria was in direct response to the appeal for military support made by the Syrian Foreign Minister, Abdulhalim Khaddam, on a tour of the Maghrebin states in January 1973. Hassan's favourable reply, on February 22, was as prompt as it was unexpected. There was no question about the loyalty of the army to the throne.

The Royal Armed Forces remain loyal to their pledge to defend God, Fatherland and the King. They now have the opportunity to join in a struggle for liberty, dignity and glory, in support of Islam and the Word of God.⁷

Hassan also invited the super-powers, and China, to impose a lasting peace in the region, based on justice, and which would "guarantee to the Arabs their dignity and to the Palestinians the recovery of their territory and their homeland". Direct participation by Moroccan forces on the Syrian front was undoubtedly a bold diplomatic initiative for which the other Maghrebin states were unprepared and which therefore enabled Hassan to pose, before the world, as the militant champion of Islam and the Arab nation. Morocco was clearly staking out a

claim to greater prominence in the affairs of the region while Hassan, himself, sought to improve his diplomatic profile and to introduce himself into the inner circle of Arab leaders who were trying, essentially by diplomatic means, to re-assert Arab interests following the humiliation of the Six Day war and the eclipse of radical pan-Arabism. Aware that the emergence of oil politics in 1973 threatened Morocco's new, enhanced status in the councils of the Arab states, to say nothing of its exclusion from such key bodies as OPEC and OAPEC, Hassan was anxious to exploit his own unique position as an Arab leader on good terms at once with the Palestinians and with the Israelis. As memories of October 1973 faded, and with it the renown achieved by the Moroccan forces in Syria, Hassan turned his attention to the 'peace process' which offered significant new opportunities for Moroccan diplomacy, linking Rabat even more closely with her conservative allies in the Arab League and with her Western patrons, notably the United States.

Morocco's new and enhanced status in the Middle East, following the 1973 war, was soon reflected in the choice of Rabat as the venue for the important Arab League summit in 1974, after Algiers had acted as host for the immediate post-war summit in November 1973. Hassan had described that conference as signalling the "Arab renaissance" - "the revival of a civilisation and the renewal of its history".

But can a people be content with the reliving the glories of the past? Peoples die not of poverty but of humiliation...We have been united as one man despite the differences that separate us and despite our different political views...and soon we will pray together in Jerusalem.®

While such militant sentiments accorded well with the spirit of the Algiers summit and underlined the Moroccan role in the October war, it was rather as an 'honest broker' and diplomat that Hassan approached the 1974 summit in Rabat. With the peace process well under way the question of Palestinian representation became crucial. Where King Hussein of Jordan and the PLO under Yasser Arafat both contested the right to act as spokesman for the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, it was the PLO that was finally designated the "sole legitimate representative" at the Rabat conference.

Camp David and the Moroccan Jewish community

The choice of Morocco to host the Rabat summit was deliberate and reflected the country's pivotal role particularly in any future dialogue involving Israelis, Arabs and the Palestinian question. Although relatively poor in income and resources, Morocco had consistently supported the PLO since its inception in 1964, levying a special tax for that purpose. But Morocco has also - secretly - played host to a succession of Israeli

political figures, beginning with Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister in 1976, followed by Moshe Dayan, the Foreign Minister in 1977, who made contact in Morocco with the Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister, Hassan Tuhami, to make preparations for Sadat's visit to Jerusalem later that year. In 1978 it was the turn of Shimon Peres, then leader of the Labour opposition, who would return in July 1986, this time as Israel's Prime Minister in the coalition government. While Morocco cannot entertain open diplomatic relations with Israel until a general peace agreement is first achieved, Hassan is known to favour a two-state approach to the Palestinian problem and eventual Arab-Israeli cooperation.

This is the less surprising in that Morocco is unique among Arab countries in so far as it retains a flourishing and respected, though much depleted Jewish community numbering around 20,000. Moreover, they are in close and virtually unrestricted contact with Israel where the Moroccan Jews exercise considerable influence and are now the largest single ethnic group, estimated in 1978 at around 400,000. In that sense Hassan's support for the 'peace process' after 1973, together with his encouragement of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and his more cautious support for his subsequent participation in the Camp David talks, represent a continuation of his own tolerant attitude to the local Jewish community - which he inherited from his father. For their part the Moroccan Jews had come to appreciate the treatment they received under Islam, after independence, which contrasted favourably with the behaviour of the earlier French (and

Christian) rulers, notably under Vichy. Moroccan Jews are proud to recall that King Mohammed V - then the Sultan Ben Arafa - had refused point blank to implement the anti-semitic decrees transmitted from Vichy, which ordered the persecution of the Moroccan Jews. A number of european Jews were even able to take refuge in Morocco, a fact which impressed itself not only on the young Hassan but also on the world in general. By 1948 the Jewish community in Morocco numbered a quarter million, although the creation that year of the new state of Israel and the appeals for immigration launched by Zionist agencies contributed substantially to their rapid decline thereafter.

Immediately after Morocco's independence, in 1956, King Mohammed V appointed Dr. Leon Benzeguen, a Jew, as Minister of Post and Telegraphs (PTT), a portfolio he retained in the subsequent government. It was a tribute, however, to his standing in the wider society and not a conscious effort to provide representation for a particular constituency. And in 1965 the *chef de cabinet* of the Minister of Defence was also a Jew : further evidence of the degree of religious tolerance within Morocco after independence.³ It is true, however, that the emergence of Arab nationalism, as reflected in the press of the *Istiqlal* Party, helped foster a feeling of insecurity within the Moroccan Jewish community, particularly when coupled with Morocco's entrance into the Arab League, in 1957, and the arrival in power of *Istiqlal*.

Yet, as late as November 1976, the Moroccan Prime Minister, Ahmed Osman, indicated publicly that those Jews who had emigrated, particularly to Israel, were free to return to Morocco at any time. would be made welcome and would continue to enjoy the same rights as Moslems.¹⁰ And on July 10, 1984, King Hassan II conferred the Order of the *Wissam Al Arch* on David Ammer, the President of the Council of Jewish communities in Morocco, on the occasion of his fifty-fifth birthday. Ammar is among the wealthiest members of the business community in Morocco, with a spread of economic interests. The previous May he had organised a Jewish Congress in Rabat with the participation of an Israeli delegation that included some thirteen officials, some eight of them members of the Knesset. Among those invited was the President of the World Jewish Congress, Edgar Bronfman. The Moroccan Minister of the Interior, Dris Bassri, was present at the inauguration of the conference while the Crown Prince, Mohammed, presided over the closing dinner.¹¹ In September 1984 the first Jewish deputy was elected to the Moroccan parliament on the platform of the Constitutional Union (UC).

In 1977 Morocco also provided facilities for senior Egyptian and Israeli officials concerned with the preparations for Sadat's forthcoming visit to Jerusalem. Hassan himself was afterwards invited to visit Israel. He defended his actions against those of his Arab critics, notably Syria, who levelled accusations of 'treason' against the Moroccan leader. Such countries did not understand that

what we are undertaking here will in fact advance the Arab cause. Their leaders know very well that Morocco has always complied with its undertakings and will always stand beside its brothers in defence of their sacred rights.¹²

Because of Morocco's participation in the 1973 war, on the Golan and the Sinai fronts, Hassan can afford to go further than other Arab leaders in his pursuit of a negotiated Middle Eastern settlement. As an official commented to a visiting French journalist : as the one Arab country outside the 'Rejectionist Front' to have suffered casualties in 1973 in both Sinai and the Golan, Morocco has earned the right to participate fully in the discussion of Middle Eastern affairs. It is well placed to mediate between Arab countries themselves and between Arab states and Israel and

nothing will prevent Morocco from having contacts with Israel or even from inviting such contacts - in the interests of peace. Morocco does not favour a separate peace between Egypt and Israel. It does, however, continue to accept the three conclusions of the 1974 Rabat Arab Summit conference : no separate peace; the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people; and Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.¹³

Moroccan support for a peaceful, negotiated settlement of Middle Eastern problems provides the incentive for continuing talks and consultations with Jewish leaders and Israeli officials. In October 1985, Raphael Ederly, a member of the Israeli Knesset and himself of Moroccan origin, appealed to King Hassan II, urging him to take the initiative in fostering direct negotiations, on Moroccan soil, between Israel and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to be led by King Hussein - but excluding the PLO. That did not, however, reflect the letter or even the spirit of the Rabat summit. In October 1976 the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, paid a secret visit to Morocco when he met King Hassan for discussions, and contacts between the two continued after Menachem Begin had replaced him as head of a Likud administration in 1977. In February 1977, Nahum Goldman, then President of the World Jewish Congress, was received by Hassan and, shortly afterwards, Shaoul Ben Shimon, leader of the powerful Israeli trade union organisation, Histadruth, visited Morocco to meet with the local Jewish communities.

Hassan had then taken the opportunity to outline his view that all Arabs were now ready to recognise Israel.

I do not know a single responsible Arab leader who does not want once and for all to close the Israeli file. They are ready to recognise Israel provided she returns to its pre-1967 frontiers. Israel must be prepared to bargain (trade) for peace.¹⁴

He had spoken of the inherent genius of the Israeli people and the desirability of channelling their energies into peaceful cooperation rather than into war and confrontation.

Just think what the Arab world, endowed as it is with considerable financial and economic resources, could accomplish by way of transforming the entire region, if matched by Israel's innovative genius.¹⁵

There could be no doubt that Morocco was ready and willing to recognise the legitimacy of the Israeli state provided it, in turn, was prepared to meet the Arab conditions for such recognition. And it was in Morocco that the first steps were taken towards Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem and here, too, that Camp David and the peace process can be said to have started.

With Menachem Begin in power, Moshe Dayan, Israeli Foreign Minister, received an invitation from King Hassan II, which resulted in a first visit to Morocco on September 4, 1977, which would soon be followed by others. During their meeting the King apparently promised to try and arrange a meeting between Dayan and a representative of the Egyptian government to consider peace talks. An agreement on such talks soon followed in Cairo, the Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister, Hassan Tuhami, being delegated to meet with Dayan. That meeting took place in Morocco on 16 September 1977. Presenting Hassan with a Canaanite sword and a

bronze arrowhead, both from the second millenium B.C., Dayan commented :

Before the invention of the Phantom and the MIG empires were conquered with weapons like these, and it was ... with such armaments that the Israelites subdued the petty kingdoms of Canaan in the late thirteenth and early twelfth centuries B.C. - some forty years after their exodus from Egypt.¹⁶

Thanking him, Hassan replied that such weapons were "a reminder of past wars. The time has now come to make peace". For his part the Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister emphasised the boldness of his government's present move, which was known only to himself and Sadat, but which entailed the most serious risks.

In the course of the secret discussions between the two sides, Hassan intervened to re-assure the Israelis about Sadat's intentions.

From what I know of Sadat's thinking, after talks with him, I am prepared to give my word of honour that Sadat will meet with Begin and will shake hands with him provided Begin can give a personal undertaking that the bi-lateral talks will proceed on the basis of an understanding that Israel will withdraw from the [occupied] territories.¹⁷

The outcome of the talks in Morocco was Sadat's controversial visit to Jerusalem where he addressed the Knesset on November 20, 1977. Before Sadat left for Israel King Hassan had telephoned him personally to convey his "high esteem" for Sadat and his "keen desire" that the initiative "undertaken with great courage" might be "crowned with success - for the good and the interest of Egypt, of the confrontation states, and of the entire Arab nation". Always cautious, however, Hassan also ~~seems~~ to have emphasised his "complete certainty" that Sadat would not make concessions at the expense of the Arab nation and its interests, "including those of the Palestinian people".¹⁸

Since 1975 Morocco had been in conflict with Algeria and the Algerian-sponsored Polisario movement, over Rabat's territorial claims on the Western Sahara. Hassan was therefore sensitive to criticisms like that of the Algerian news agency (APS) which insisted the King was "responsible for the policy of surrender (*capitulation*) and for the division it had created in the Arab world. The same agency recalled the speech of the Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, to the Knesset on the occasion of Sadat's visit, in which he had congratulated King Hassan for having encouraged Sadat to go to Israel. Morocco's support for the Egyptian initiative was made even more public in an interview given by the Foreign Minister, Mohammed Boucetta, to the correspondent of the French newspaper, *Le Monde*. He had insisted that Morocco's support for Sadat's initiative was in complete

agreement with the three main conclusions of the 1974 Rabat Arab Summit.

All Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967, including Jerusalem, must be evacuated; the Palestinian problem must be resolved by the establishment of a state; and there must be a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem which would exclude any notion of a separate agreement.¹⁹

Sadat's visit to Morocco in February 1978 provided further confirmation that the two leaders were working together on their 'peace strategy' for the Middle East. The United States also conveyed its appreciation of Hassan's efforts by despatching shipments of arms to Morocco to help deter the Algerian-backed Polisario. The *New York Times* remarked that :

In order to compensate King Hassan II for his support for President Sadat, the Carter administration proposed to sell anti-guerrilla war planes and armed helicopters to Morocco.²⁰

Following the Israeli raid on Lebanon, in March 1978, itself a response to a Palestinian commando operation inside Israel, King Hassan sent a message to the Israeli Prime Minister via the U.N. General Secretary, in which he expressed his 'concern' and called for an end to the aggression and for the withdrawal of Israeli

forces engaged in Lebanon - as it threatened the prospects for peace in the region. There was a warning that, despite Moroccan support for the recent peace initiatives, the government might be forced to revise its policy in the light of such incidents.²¹

The Arab states were indeed to be disappointed by the results of Sadat's initiative, whose only outcome was a separate peace treaty signed in 1979 between Israel and Egypt, providing for the phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai. At the first Baghdad Summit of the Arab League, in November 1978, the Arab states conclusively rejected Sadat's policy and his failure to pursue a comprehensive Middle Eastern settlement covering the other issues raised in 1974 at Rabat. There was growing support for the view that Sadat had been a pawn in the American-Israeli power game to dominate the Middle East and secure their own presence to the exclusion of other interested parties, including the Syrians, the Palestinians and the Soviet Union. Where the first Baghdad Summit had issued a warning to Sadat against concluding a separate treaty with Israel, the second Baghdad Summit, in March 1979, proceeded - albeit reluctantly on the part of the Saudis, the Moroccans and their conservative allies - to suspend diplomatic relations with Egypt.

Egypt seemed by 1979 to have opted out of the Arab-Israeli conflict leaving the Israelis a more or less free hand on their northern border with Lebanon and Syria. It was at the second Baghdad Summit that the Arab states considered transferring the

headquarters of the Arab League away from Cairo. Despite the Moroccan presence at the summit and the decision to suspend relations with Egypt, King Hassan himself refused to condemn Sadat and seems, personally, to have thought him justified in concluding a separate deal. In May 1979, in a speech which directly contradicts an earlier statement by the country's Foreign Minister, Mohammed Boucetta, Hassan commented that

President Sadat thought it right to take a certain number of initiatives which were within his competence. As long as he continues to act for Egypt, it is not for me to tell him that he has exceeded his rights. Had I, too, been pre-occupied for as many years with the same problems I might have reacted as he did. I do not know.²²

Sadat, for his part, made no attempt to conceal his support for the Moroccan monarch when, at a press conference on September 1, 1979, he indicated his readiness to help Morocco, militarily, in its war in the Western Sahara. "If Hassan II were to ask for Egyptian help I would seek the approval of the People's Assembly and that of the National Democratic Party."²³ Hassan, himself, had not yet abandoned all hope of a political settlement of the outstanding issues in the Middle East. In September 1980 he advised representatives of the press that the PLO was ready to recognise Israel provided Israel would recognise the PLO as a political entity with the right to a homeland. Hassan had

strongly supported the offer by the PLO to act as intermediaries in seeking the release of the American hostages, seized in 1979 by the new revolutionary authorities in Iran. He had recommended the proposal in a note to Ayatollah Khomeiny, pointing out that "should it succeed, the PLO and Arafat would have to be received in Washington as accredited intermediaries."²⁴ There is little doubt that behind Hassan's proposal was the hope of pre-empting Algeria's own mediation efforts and a possible rapprochement between President Chadli, the new Algerian President, and the United States.

Hostility to the Iranian revolution

Hassan, however, had little or no influence with the authorities in Teheran, if only because he had earlier agreed, together with Sadat, to receive the former Shah of Iran after his overthrow. Relations between Hassan and the Shah had, in any case, been close before the revolution when both had been major recipients of American military and other aid. Then there was the report that Hassan saw an American military intervention in Iran as the most likely outcome of the protracted American-Iranian crisis. In the event Hassan's initiative failed while the Iranian Foreign Ministry recalled its diplomatic personnel from Morocco on December 20, 1979 - citing the King's openly hostile attitude towards the Iranian revolution. By way of retaliation, Teheran gave official recognition to the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in Western Sahara in February

1980. A year later it was announced that Iran had recalled its envoys from Jordan and Morocco (and severed diplomatic ties) because of their governments' support for the Iraqi regime which had meanwhile embarked on an invasion of Iran - ostensibly with a view to securing a revision of their common frontier in the Shatt-el-Arab.

At the beginning of that conflict, in 1980, Hassan had declared himself "concerned and heartbroken". But on September 24, 1980, Rabat announced its complete support for Iraq - which also supplied Morocco with most of its oil. Three days later the leading Moroccan parties, the *Rassemblement National des Indépendants* (RNI), the *Istiqlal* Party, and the Socialist USFP all announced their support for Iraq in its conflict with Iran.²⁵ Meanwhile, the Foreign Minister, Mohammed Boucetta, in a speech calling for an end to hostilities, insisted that

we have supported the historic rights of Iraq because we consider that no agreement can last or guarantee stability that is not even-handed and based on the principle of equity.²⁶

He maintained that Khomeiny, who had passed much of his exile in Iraq, should himself have denounced the earlier agreements. These, particularly the 1975 agreement effected in Algiers, had been imposed on a reluctant Iraq by the government of the Shah - and without proper consideration of the merits of the Iraqi case.

Iraqi islands and territory that were the subject of dispute today had simply been annexed by Iran under the terms of the 1975 treaty. Where Morocco had tried, unsuccessfully, to undermine Algerian attempts to mediate in the dispute between Teheran and Washington, Rabat was now concerned to emphasise Algeria's complicity in the elaboration of the terms of the 1975 treaty between Iran and Iraq. Which provides further confirmation of Zartman's hypothesis that the quarrels within the Maghreb are the source of most foreign policy initiatives taken by Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers and Rabat.

Moroccan support for Iraq in its conflict with Iran can be seen as a *quid pro quo* in return for Iraq's decision to support Morocco's policy in Western Sahara. Indeed, Iraq had agreed to supply Morocco with oil at a discount price of \$3 a barrel²⁷. The differences with Teheran have their origins in the close rapport that existed between the Shah and King Hassan and the threat that the Iranian revolution represented to the conservative monarchies and sultanates of the Gulf and elsewhere in the Arab world. An American newspaper report described a dinner given in honour of the visiting Richard Nixon, former American President, by the United States ambassador to Morocco, Joseph V. Reed, in March 1982, which was attended by the twenty-three year old son of the late Shah, seated next to Nixon. He was described as living in Morocco at the time and as being a regular visitor to the American Embassy.²⁸ Despite the break in diplomatic relations between Morocco and Iran the Iranians were

nevertheless present at the summit of the Islamic Conference Organisation held in Casablanca, in January 1984.

Morocco's initiatives towards peace with Israel had the support of the conservative Arab states, and especially that of King Hussein of Jordan who, from the end of the 1967 war until the arrival of the Likud government in power in 1977, was reported to have had around five hundred hours of secret meetings with Israeli leaders, most of them representing the Israeli Labour Party, including the party leader, Shimon Peres.²⁹ Morocco was chosen as the venue of the Fez Arab Summit in November 1981 at which Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia was to present a new set of Arab proposals for a peace settlement in the Middle East. Hassan was unable, however, to secure consensus on the proposals and the summit was therefore adjourned after only a few hours discussion. It was reconvened a year later in very different circumstances, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The summit appointed Hassan chairman of a 'team' to explain the Fahd Plan to other states and it was in that capacity that the King, on October 26, 1982, expounded the Plan to the United Nations General Assembly, commenting on its realistic nature and its positive approach. He described it as the first serious Arab effort for peace in the Middle East.³⁰

In fact the appearance of new divisions among the Arab states and within the PLO itself rendered the proceedings at Fez rather pointless and no new summit was convened until 1987. The main topic then was no longer Palestine or the recovery of Arab

territory from Israel, but the Iran-Iraq war in which the Maghrebin interest was, at best, only marginal.

Moroccan diplomacy continued therefore to focus on the conflict in the Western Sahara. Other initiatives aimed to maximise external support or to neutralise the opposition, in this case no longer domestic but foreign - and led by the Algerians. Where the unexpected rapprochement between Libya and Morocco and the treaty of union concluded in 1984 made little sense in terms of ideology or of Arab politics in general, it was a response to re-alignments within the Maghreb and to growing fears of diplomatic isolation on the part of the two states - the one involved militarily in Chad and in confrontation with American and western policy, the other involved militarily in the Western Sahara and receiving American and western assistance. While the conservative Arab states were prepared to show sympathy for the predicament of the Moroccans - and even hoped for some moderation in Libyan policies as a result - Washington lost no time in expressing its own distaste for the 'union', to the extent of cutting military assistance while moving closer to Algeria. President Chadli visited the United States in April 1985.

After the military action by the United States against Libya, in 1986, Hassan felt a pressing need to restore American confidence in himself and his policies and to ensure a continuation of American aid. He therefore invited the Israeli

Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, to Morocco in July 1986, proving once again that on Middle Eastern issues his country remains a useful as well as a reliable ally - more reliable, for example, than Algeria even under its new moderate President - and an ally whose policies do not depart, in any important respect, from those of the United States. And this from an Arab leader who was also President of the Saudi-funded Islamic Conference Organisation, of the *Al Quds* (Jerusalem) Liberation Committee, and of the Arab League. The result was a break with Libya and the end of their 'union', while Hassan hastened to resign from the presidency of the Arab League.

CHAPTER ELEVEN : LIBYA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

A MAVERICK POLICY OF NO COMPROMISE

Arab unity as an instrument of policy

Zartman has emphasised the relevance of 'nation-building' and differentiation as ingredients in foreign policy-making by the Maghreb states, particularly in the years just after independence. Within the region there develops a kind of 'adversary politics' based on differentiation, and the desire to create a distinctive sense of identity among peoples and groups whose links with the state (and one another) are often tenuous and whose loyalty to that state remains, at best, conditional. A foreign policy is not just a symbol of independence but is also a weapon of domestic policy as well as a source of external leverage. Pressure for union or unity remains a weapon in the hands of Maghrebin leaders attempting to embarrass their opponents or to steal an advantage over their rivals. Some are better placed than others to employ that weapon. Geographical factors have strongly favoured Algeria over its immediate neighbours - if only because of its central situation.

At the eastern end of North Africa the weight of advantage is overwhelmingly with Egypt, because of its population, its level of industrialisation, the strength and stability of its state and, above all, its commanding position at the point of intersection of the three main zones of Arab settlement : North Africa, the Fertile Crescent, and the Peninsula. Where Kadhafi

has been intent, since his seizure of power in Libya, in 1969, on playing a prominent, even a predominant role in Middle Eastern affairs, his attention has therefore focussed primarily on the East and Egypt, rather than being directed westwards towards the Maghreb. Using his country's main asset, oil, to acquire regional influence and international leverage, he has attempted a reverse take-over : seeking to attach the Egyptian state to the Arab cause of unity - that he claims to have inherited from Nasser after his death in 1970. If, on the one hand, Egypt shelters Kadhafi from an Israeli land offensive, on the other hand it also serves as a barrier to the Libyan leader's regional (and global) ambitions.

Kadhafi's neo-Nasserism and Sadat's Egypt

Kadhafi came to power determined to reverse the decline of pan-Arabism and aspiring to play a pivotal role in Arab affairs. As self-proclaimed heir to the Nasserist tradition of Arab union the young and inexperienced Kadhafi was soon outmanoeuvred by Anwar es-Sadat. The latter, while ready to avail himself and his impoverished country of the bounty freely disbursed by Tripoli, had no intention of standing down as President in favour of an upstart pretender with large ambitions but generally without the means or the opportunity to realise them. While Kadhafi's pronounced Arab, Islamic and socialist views may have served to differentiate (and isolate) Libya from her immediate neighbours and from the rest of the Middle East, they also provided Sadat

with a useful weapon against the Nasserists at home, while providing extra leverage over the conservative Arab governments of the Gulf.

Before 1967 Egypt had provided a defensive perimeter against Israel for the states of the Peninsula, from 1969 Egypt would serve instead as a barrier to Libyan expansion eastwards. Sadat rather than Kadhafi would seize and hold the political initiative in the 1970s. The Egyptian leader had grasped the basic fact that, after the defeat of 1967, it was pointless to try to revive earlier hopes of Arab unity and a single nation. Kadhafi's coup, inspired by Nasser and his militant *legacy of the 1950s*, failed to adapt to the changing situation in Egypt and the Middle East. The point of the 1973 war against Israel was not to revive the politics of confrontation but to provide an opportunity (and international support) for those, like Sadat, who were committed to a new policy of accommodation. As we have seen Kadhafi does not appear even to have been given advance notice of the war.

By 1973 Kadhafi was unable to realise his aspirations for union with Egypt and for leadership of the Arab cause. Even the hopes he may have entertained for union with Sudan, which had experienced a 'progressive' coup in 1968, were quickly disappointed. Jaafar Numeiry had taken power with the intention of modelling himself on Nasser and forming an Egyptian-Sudanese federation. After 1971, however, Numeiry had taken the opportunity of a failed left-wing and pro-communist coup, to

dissociate himself from the far left, and from pan-Arabism. By 1979 Kadhafi had lost his last reliable ally in East Africa with the overthrow and removal of Idi Amin in Uganda. The 'union' of 1981 with the Marxist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam, in Ethiopia, and with the Democratic People's Republic of South Yemen (PDY), although welcomed by the Soviet Union and deplored by Saudi Arabia and Washington, offered few if any opportunities for effective joint action. The Ethiopians were not Arab - nor was the leadership predominantly Islamic. And the government of Ethiopia, like that of South Yemen, was preoccupied with its own very considerable domestic problems.

With the increasing isolation of Libya in the Middle East, after 1973, Kadhafi turned instead to his western and southern neighbours - to the states of the Maghreb and those of the Sahel. But the states of the Maghreb were already well established and their leadership was more or less entrenched before Kadhafi came to power. Nor was Libya particularly well qualified to assume the leadership of the three states previously administered by France. In the Sahel, the Libyan appeal was religious, economic and political in character rather than racial. Here Kadhafi was able to exploit the revival of Islam, as well as the devastating impact of a prolonged and extensive drought, and the heavy cutbacks in French military and economic assistance to the former colonies. There was resistance, however, from the other Maghreb states - notably Algeria and Morocco. Moreover, the French, responding to Libyan 'provocation', and fearing the

emergence of a new radical bloc in Africa, strengthened their own military dispositions.

In the 1980s Kadhafi suffered a series of reverses in West and North Africa that were comparable with his earlier setbacks in the Middle East. The policy of "union" was no more successful after 1973, in North Africa, in the case of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, than it had been before 1973 - with Egypt and the Sudan. The growing sense of isolation was confirmed by a series of humiliations, as the Maghrebin states, like Egypt before them, concluded 'marriages of convenience' with Libya only to repudiate them once they had served their limited purpose. The record elsewhere in the Sahel and black Africa were scarcely more encouraging, beginning with Kadhafi's failure to secure the chairmanship of the OAU, in 1982, and ending with the rout of Libyan forces in Chad in 1987.

Where Libya is now an established actor in the Maghrebin sub-system, her foreign policy continues to be defined by a rivalry with Egypt that is hardly central to Maghrebin politics. Kadhafi turned westwards only after his approaches to Egypt had been repeatedly and definitively rejected. Egypt required financial and diplomatic support on a scale that, apart from the United States, only Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could supply. Effectively excluded from the arena of his choice, Libya then sought entry to the Maghreb and the African states of the Sahel. But this was on terms that the other states and their leaders could not, for the

most part, endorse. A policy of unity with Egypt had nearly ended in war. Unity with the Sahel could not survive the lost war in Chad. Unity with the Maghrebin states produced a succession of dishonoured treaties to say nothing of the failure of those states and their leaders to make any effective gesture of solidarity towards Kadhafi, following the American raid on Tripoli in 1986.

Libya's pursuit of Arab unity has been a continuing source of division within the Arab camp where the predominant outlook has been conservative since 1973 if not since 1967. Kadhafi's increasing intransigence and his espousal of radical solutions to Middle Eastern problems has helped polarise the Arab world, while confirming his own country's deepening isolation. From 1974 Libya was a member of the 'Rejectionist Front' which opposed any move towards a peaceful, negotiated settlement with Israel. Libya was also a founding member of the 'Steadfastness Front', formed in December 1977 to insist on the severance of relations with Egypt following Sadat's initiative for a separate peace. There, too, the Libyan leader was forced to yield ground at the last Arab summit in Amman, in 1987, when member states were authorised, although not recommended, to resume normal diplomatic relations with Cairo. Libya could, however, derive some small satisfaction from the fact that Egypt continues to be excluded from the Arab League.

There has been polarisation, too, in the Palestinian camp as a direct result of Libyan intervention. The effect has been to encourage the more intransigent factions in their opposition to the Chairman, Yasser Arafat, and in their rejection of a negotiated settlement that would recognise Israel within her pre-1967 borders. Libyan foreign policy continues to react to Egyptian initiatives in a way that recalls the long-standing rivalry between China and the Soviet Union. It was President Chadli of Algeria who finally organised a 'session of national unity' in Algiers, in April 1987, attended by most of the rival factions, either as participants or as observers. Kadhafi, himself, had no option but to agree to meet Arafat after the conference to signal to Saudi Arabia and other leading Arab states his desire - after American action in 1986 - to 'come in out of the cold'. Indeed, after the April conference Kadhafi announced that the PLO office in Tripoli would be allowed to re-open, having been closed for over three years.

Where Tunis continues to house the headquarters of the Arab League and the PLO, where Algiers has taken the initiative in bringing together the various factions of the PLO, and is actively working for a settlement of the Gulf war, and where Rabat has once again tried to press forward with Arab-Israeli dialogue - Tripoli favours policies that divide rather than unite Arab states and persists with approaches that Nasser himself had begun to question as early as 1961 - after the collapse of the union with Syria, and well before the debacle of 1967. The roots

of Libyan policy lie in Kadhafi's obsession after 1969 with a dream of Arab union : a dream that was already discredited by 1967, and and was formally repudiated - as an immediate and practical goal - by the Arab summit held in Khartoum. The failure of his strategy of union with Egypt - as well as with Syria, Iraq and Sudan - seems largely to have prompted his subsequent interest in the Maghreb - while the natural suspicions of the Maghrebin leaders may have helped deflect his interests further south to the Sahel. Rejection by Egypt, defeat in Chad and declining oil revenues have greatly reduced the scope for Libyan foreign policy. Formerly condemned to a subordinate role on the margins of the Machrek, Libya seems condemned now to an even more subordinate role at the periphery of the Maghreb.

The intervention that brought Kadhafi to power, on September 1, 1969, was not a classic *coup d'etat*. For Kadhafi and his twelve fellow officers this was only the beginning of a far more ambitious project elaborated some years previously. No sooner had they entered secondary school at Sabha than they came under the influence of another schoolboy, Muammar Kadhafi. Even at this early stage Kadhafi was encouraging them to enlist and join the officer corps after graduation, with a view to toppling the conservative regime of King Idris and bringing Libya into the United Arab Republic, alongside Egypt and Syria. In 1969 Kadhafi remained determined to revive the cause of Arab unity, despite the military defeat of 1967 and the eclipse of Nasserism. It was but a short step from the conquest of power in Libya to the

fulfilment of a childhood ambition : a fusion of Egypt and Libya as a first symbolic step towards complete Arab unity.

Kadhafi's generation in Libya was that of the *Saut Al Arab* (The Arab Voice), derived from the Egyptian radio station of that name, whose propaganda in favour of pan-Arabism greatly influenced the Arab world and the Arab youth in particular. If Kadhafi saw Nasser as his political mentor he and his Libyan military colleagues did have some reservations about the secular emphasis of the Egyptian revolution. By neglecting the importance of Islam, particularly among the rural masses, they had conceded support to more traditional Arab forces. and leaders like King Feisal of Saudi Arabia and King Idris of Libya, who could turn the issue to their advantage, using it as a weapon against Nasser, himself, and more generally against Arab socialism. Moreover, Libyan nationalism had little attraction for those who made the revolution with Kadhafi in 1969. Unlike Egypt Libya had no long history of statehood and independence and regionalism remained, at least until 1969, a major factor in Libyan politics. The goal of Arab unity and the pursuit of a single Arab nation enabled those officers who were more politically aware to circumvent the all too obvious divisions within the country and to draw together in a common cause.

After the 1969 *coup* the Foreign Ministry was re-named the Ministry of Unity. Its policy was based, as the title suggests, on Arab unity and the approaching confrontation with Israel.

Which did not prevent Kadhafi from implicitly recognising Arab rivalries and divisions and exploiting them when it served his purpose. The significance of Islam for Kadhafi was its ability to transcend such divisions thereby enhancing Arab unity. The Prophet Mohammed had once been able to unite warring tribes and families under the banner of Islam. Now it was for Egypt, as the largest, most powerful Arab state, to assume the leadership of the Arab states in their contest with Israel and Zionism. Because of her size, human resources and geographical situation Egypt was the obvious choice. History for Kadhafi is the product of two important factors, religion and nationalism, and the interaction between them. Where a common religion enabled the Arab peoples to transcend their many differences, for Kadhafi Arab nationalism, i.e., the sense of belonging to a single nation with a common destiny, would enable Christian Arabs to stand alongside Berbers, Kurds, and members of other faiths, in the struggle against colonialism and underdevelopment.

What was at issue after the death of Nasser, in 1970, was the question of Arab leadership and the role of Egypt in the common struggle of the Arab states and peoples. Kadhafi had no doubt that Nasser himself had entrusted him with the spiritual mission to which he had long dedicated his life as well as the resources of his country. Nasser had once remarked to Kadhafi : "You remind me of my youth"; and, visiting Libya in January 1970, he had announced : "My brother, Muammar, is the guardian of Arab nationalism, of the Arab revolution, and of Arab unity." After

Nasser's death Kadhafi professed to look on Egypt as a country endowed with human resources but without a leader, while Libya, with its scant population and oil wealth, had a leader in search of a country. Kadhafi's ambition was therefore to unite Egypt with Libya and thereby open the path whereby he might assume the leadership of the Arab world. Without such unity the Arab peoples could know neither genuine freedom nor a real socialism.

The year of Nasser's death was also the year of Black September, when the Jordanian army, loyal to King Hussein, confronted and finally defeated the forces of the Palestinian Liberation Army, after a fierce civil war, expelling them from Jordanian territory. From the outset of his rule Kadhafi had therefore to take sides in a conflict that set Arab against Arab. The Libyan leader was openly critical of the Jordanian attempt to restrict the activities of the Palestine resistance, notwithstanding the threat they posed to what remained of Hussein's kingdom after 1967. Which did not prevent Kadhafi from despatching his deputy, Abdul Salam Jalloud, to Amman to try to mediate in the conflict and bring it to an early and satisfactory conclusion. When arbitration failed Kadhafi, supporting the Palestinians, went so far as to halt his country's economic aid to Jordan, finally breaking off diplomatic relations with that country in late 1970.

Kadhafi continued his support for 'progressive' Arab forces by backing two attempted *coups* in Morocco against King Hassan II,

the first in July 1971, the second in August 1972. Nor did relations with Jordan improve until April 1976. In November 1972 King Hussein claimed to have evidence that a *coup* against his regime was being planned by Palestinian guerrillas acting in complicity with Colonel Kadhafi.² But Kadhafi could react with equal determination to what he perceived as threats to Arab unity from the secular forces of the Left. He re-affirmed his support for Jaafer Numeiry in the Sudan in July 1971, following the announcement of an abortive *coup* supported by the Sudanese Communist Party. Leaders of the *coup* fleeing Sudan were forced to land in Libya and were then returned to the Sudan, to be executed by Numeiry. Kadhafi was later to regret this gesture of support after Numeiry turned his back on his original supporters and looked instead to the West and to conservative forces both in the Arab world and inside Sudan.

Despite the defection of Numeiry, whose government was besieged by communists, as well as by the Mahdist opposition, and by black secessionists in the South, Kadhafi was able in 1971 to declare a federation of Arab republics, to comprise Egypt, Syria and Libya. However, where Libya favoured complete union, Egypt and Syria insisted on federation as a first stage towards that final goal.³ In 1972 Kadhafi then pressed Sadat for further steps in the direction of Arab unity. Sadat had yet to consolidate his domestic position after Nasser's death, and was dependent on Libyan generosity to help maintain Egypt's economy in a precarious state of balance. He appeared to accept

Kadhafi's case for union while it was the turn of the Syrian President, Hafez al Assad, to resist and finally reject the Libyan proposals for integration. Sadat for his part seems to have been playing for time, making concessions to Libya that he would later withdraw, while preparing his country for a war against Israel.

After the Israelis had shot down a Libyan civilian airliner, flying over occupied Sinai on February 21, 1973, there was an outburst of anti-Egyptian sentiment in Libya as a result of Egypt's alleged failure to protect the airliner. Such riots were quickly condemned by Libyan radio which insisted that "accusing and condemning certain of our brothers is tantamount to support for and collaboration with Israel". According to Sadat's own account, Kadhafi then asked the Egyptian leader to supply Libya with two submarines to provide additional "protection" against further Israeli action. After Sadat had hastened to comply, Kadhafi proceeded to order one of the submarines to torpedo the British liner, *Queen Elizabeth II*, cruising towards Israel in May 1973 with a complement of Jewish tourists on their way to celebrate Israel's twenty-fifth anniversary. When the submarine commander reported back to his Egyptian superiors for advice he was instructed to take no such action and to return his vessel to an Egyptian port.⁴ Again there was no open criticism in Libya of Egyptian inaction. Unity with Egypt presumably remained the first priority.

To expedite matters Kadhafi visited Egypt twice, once in June 1973 for a meeting with Sadat and with Egyptian intellectuals, and again the following August, while Sadat was in Saudi Arabia. Between these two visits there came the 'Green March' of Libyans into Egypt, designed to apply further pressure to the Egyptian leader, already busy with preparations for the October war with Israel. The Egyptian authorities promptly arrested some forty thousand enthusiasts close to the border with Libya, hoping to avoid a repetition of earlier incidents when students had demonstrated in Cairo against Sadat's 'moderate' policies. Sadat did agree to meet with a delegation from the marchers and to receive a petition, written in blood, asking him to announce the abolition of the 'artificial border' between the two countries. The six-point petition also called for a single Head of State and an integrated ruling party. Shari'a law would apply throughout the new state where there would be "no place for waverers, cowards, capitalists, or bourgeois who did not subscribe to the principles of the Arab revolution".⁵ The petition also insisted on respect for "the principles of the late Egyptian President, Nasser".

Confronted with the reality of the Libyan revolution and Kadhafi's insistence on strict observance of the Islamic codes, the Egyptian elites hastened to confirm their support for Sadat and their rejection of the merger with Libya. Kadhafi himself seems to have perceived the risks to his own Islamic revolution that would follow from a closer union with the predominantly

urban and secular middle classes of Egypt. There was no attempt to repeat the 'Green March' or to export cultural revolution to Egypt. Instead, on the twenty-first anniversary of the 'free officers' coup that removed King Farouk of Egypt, on July 23, 1973, Kadhafi 're-assumed' the functions of leader of the Libyan state, having relinquished them a week earlier in the interests of the 'Libyan-Egyptian union'. He would retain those functions until such time as the Egyptian government was replaced along with its corrupt and bureaucratic administration which could not sustain a war against Israel.²⁴ Only then would a merger become possible.

Kadhafi was not even consulted in advance of the war of October 1973. Nor could he claim to have played a substantial role in the conduct of the war, despite his pretensions to Arab leadership. And the result of the war, with its initial successes for the Arabs, was further to isolate Libya in the Arab world. Sadat emerged from the war greatly strengthened both at home and in the community of Arab states. There developed an Arab consensus for the first time - from which Kadhafi was excluded. Algeria had made a substantial contribution in men and materials to the war effort. Morocco had sent troops to the Syrian and Egyptian fronts. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia had helped finance the preparations for the war and was responsible for the selective boycott of western oil consumers. Immediately after the war was over Kadhafi went on to the offensive, opposing the cease-fire and any settlement short of the "destruction" of

Israel. Where the Soviet Union had denied the Arab states the modern, offensive armaments they required to defeat the Israelis, the Americans had joined with the Soviets to impose a cease-fire calculated to serve their interests rather than those of their Arab clients.

In June 1974 Libya revealed details of its contribution to the October war, amounting in all to some \$968 million.⁷ Seventy MIG 21 aircraft were said to have been placed at Egypt's disposal, together with three hundred modern tanks, forty-seven armoured troop carriers and many other vehicles. Once a cease-fire was announced, however, Libya halted all aid to Egypt. Of the four million tons of oil promised by Libya, only 800,000 tons were received by Egypt - and the 750,000 tons of butane gas likewise failed to arrive. Supplies had to be secured from Algeria instead, while Algeria also doubled its contribution of oil to Egypt from one million to two million tons.⁸ The policy of reconciliation and peace subsequently followed by Sadat after the October war reinforced Kadhafi's already critical attitude towards Egypt. Sadat's Egypt was henceforth the principal target of Libyan attacks. Kadhafi was provoked and outraged by Sadat's more moderate outlook on issues ranging from accommodation with the western world to a willingness to accept the fact of an Israeli presence in the Middle East.

Where the Libyan monarchy had revealed no ambitions beyond its frontiers and had followed a policy of accommodation with the

west the Libyan revolution and the advent of Kadhafi had transformed the country's foreign policy. Moreover, the monarchy had failed to enlarge its domestic options even under the impact of buoyant oil revenues in the 1960s, neglecting this last opportunity to build a broader political base of support. Kadhafi's regime not only addressed a much wider Arab audience but was also able to exploit the new possibilities arising from oil wealth to win support in the international and regional as well as domestic spheres. Despite these advantages the Libyan revolution has been disappointed in the poor response to its leader's message. Frustrated in his hopes for union with Egypt, Kadhafi embarked on steps to subvert the regime in Cairo. In 1974-6 he repeatedly called on the Egyptian military to intervene against their President. He also courted the student movements and the more radical Islamic elements, close to 'fundamentalism', who were fiercely opposed to any policy of rapprochement with Israel. The most serious ^{yet} attempt on Sadat's life took place at the Cairo Military Academy, in April 1974, claimed twenty victims and was the work of a religious fanatic trained in Libya.³ Unsuccessful in its object it led to a break in relations between the two governments.

Hostility to moderate Arab regimes

In an interview, in 1976, Kadhafi admitted that regimes did not interest him any more. "I address myself to the Arab masses."¹⁰ One does not have to seek far to find the reason.

Relations with Sudan were also hostile at this time, when Libyan 'mercenaries' were held responsible for an attempted coup in Khartoum in July 1976. The outcome was a 'holy alliance' between Egypt, Sudan and Saudi Arabia, with the avowed objective of countering Kadhafi's subversive activities. By July 1977 Libyan 'provocations' were such that, after a series of bombings in Cairo, the Egyptian and Libyan armies fought an engagement along their northern frontier. Egypt, with moral support from Sudan and Saudi Arabia, launched a large punitive raid against Libya, hoping to provoke unrest in Libya and to de-stabilise the Kadhafi regime, and at the same time to mobilise patriotic opinion in Egypt behind Sadat. A cease-fire was achieved by the combined efforts of Algeria's President, Houari Boumedienne, and the Chairman of the PLO, Yasser Arafat. Libya had suffered most casualties and its forces had the worst of the engagement.

There now ensued a fundamental change in the direction of Libyan foreign policy. Egypt had become a non-permeable barrier : a state whose frontiers could not be penetrated by the Libyans. Kadhafi was effectively cut off from the Machrek with which he had always identified and where he had hoped to play a decisive role appearing as a new political prophet. In response Libya began to move away from its position of strict non-alignment. Although a staunch enemy of Communism - unpopular in Moscow after his treatment of Numeiry's left-wing military opponents in 1971 - Kadhafi nevertheless moved closer to the Soviet Union at the very time when Sadat's policy was drifting towards the West in general

and the United States in particular. Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 must have swept away any remaining hopes on Kadhafi's part for unity with Egypt and a major role at the centre of Middle Eastern politics. There was a wave of anti-Sadat demonstrations and attacks on the Egyptian Embassy in Tripoli, culminating in the suspension of diplomatic relations with Egypt scheduled to coincide with Sadat's arrival in Israel. Meanwhile Libya called for the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League and for the establishment of an Arab 'Rejectionist Front' to continue the struggle for liberation.

Egypt had now moved from being the object of Kadhafi's most ardent attentions, to being the main target of his abuse. There were attacks on what he termed the "Pharaonic, Hebrew, American alliance" and allusions to the possibility of Sadat being himself a Jew.¹¹ And on the tenth anniversary of the Libyan revolution (September 1, 1979) Kadhafi denounced the Camp David agreements as "a monument to defeatism". Sadat was portrayed as "a false prophet" and Kadhafi insisted that one day "the Zionist colonialists would leave Palestine just as the French colonialists had left Algeria and the Italians had departed from Libya".¹² For Kadhafi the 'reactionary' Arab regimes are now the main obstacle confronting Arab unity. Once such regimes are removed the artificial frontiers would dissolve and a single Arab nation would confront the world, having recovered both her dignity and her strength. This then is Kadhafi's new crusade. His response to the American military build-up in the Gulf region

during summer 1980, and the Carter administration's quest.. for facilities for a Rapid Deployment Force, was to launch an appeal for 'jihad' or holy war. to cleanse and defend the holy shrines from the enemies of Islam.

While the holy land itself was being profaned by the American presence and the introduction of American AWACs (Airborn Warning and Control System) aircraft, Kadhafi advised Moslems against the annual pilgrimage. During the pilgrimage season of 1980 he asserted :

Yesterday we called on Moslems to liberate Jerusalem from the Jewish occupation; today it is Christians who are occupying Mecca, Medina, and the Arafat mountains.'³

This "occupation" of the holy land was a "prelude" to the occupation of the entire Arab world by Christians and Jews. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which sees itself as the Guardian of the Moslem holy shrines, was sufficiently provoked by Kadhafi's utterances to break off diplomatic relations with Tripoli in October 1980. Its government already felt itself to be threatened by the new revolutionary administration in Iran, that followed the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 and by the confrontation between Iraq and Iran which threatened the peace and stability of the Gulf region as a whole.

That same month Kadhafi sent a message to the Heads of State in the Gulf warning that Libya was ready to lead the Arab states in the fight against America. But this apparently entailed support for Persian-speaking Iran against Arab-speaking Iraq! It was clear that Kadhafi's reaction against Egypt and its American patron now involved him in a breach with Arab unity as, together with Syria, he supported Iran in its confrontation with Iraq.

It is the duty of those loyal to Islam to ally with the Moslems of Iran in their present confrontation, instead of fighting them for the American cause... America is taking advantage of the Iraq-Iran war to introduce into the Arabian Peninsula advanced aircraft whose role is spying and surveillance.¹⁴

However, following the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear plant under construction (by the French) at Tamuz, on June 7, 1981, Colonel Kadhafi charged Yasser Arafat with a delicate diplomatic mission - to secure a rapprochement between Libya and the moderate Arab states including Saudi Arabia as well as Jordan and Morocco. All three had been strongly criticised by Kadhafi in the past as "stooges" of the United States. While Jordan had more recently supported Iraq in its war against Iran and Morocco was campaigning actively against the Saharawis in the Western Sahara.

Now Kadhafi was anxious to secure the support of 'moderate', pro-western Arab governments, evidently fearing a similar attempt

against his own nuclear facilities. Had not the Libyan leader often proclaimed his ambition to make his country the first Arab nuclear power?¹⁵ Was not the Libyan presence in Chad connected with reports of large nuclear deposits inside the Aouzou Strip? Moreover, by all accounts Libya appeared even more vulnerable to a surprise air strike than Iraq. And the Iraqi military, although much larger and better equipped than Libya's, and in a state of war-time alert, had been unable to defend such an obvious and vulnerable target. Saudi Arabia and Libya announced, on December 31, 1981, that they were resuming diplomatic relations after a break of fourteen months - but as late as January 1983 Saudi officials revealed that their Ambassador to Libya had yet to resume his functions. Meanwhile Kadhafi was on probation as the Saudi government sought further assurances of his future good conduct.

Indeed, if one is to believe Sadat's personal account, Kadhafi's growing sense of isolation pushed him in the direction of a reconciliation with Sadat himself. Despite Egypt's expulsion from the Arab League in 1979, after Sadat had signed the separate peace treaty with Israel, many Arab states did maintain diplomatic and other contacts with Cairo. According to Sadat, however :

Kadhafi's cousin came to see me on my birthday at my home village. He offered me reconciliation with Kadhafi on one condition : that it should be secret. I replied by

saying : "You do not respect the deals you make in public, so how can I respect a secret one?...I am sure Kadhafi would deny it."

Libya and the Palestinian question

At the core of Kadhafi's Arab nationalism is the concern with unity and the conviction that the Palestinian question can serve as a catalyst in the creation of a single Arab nation. Faithful to the pan-Arabism of the fifties and early sixties Kadhafi remains convinced that the future of Palestine lies not in the creation of a micro-state somewhere in the West Bank but as an integral part of the new Arab nation. It is not the Jews who are the real enemy, but Zionism and its western supporters. Because of their hatred for Islam and their greed the imperialist powers have, in his view, created Zionist Israel with a view to blocking Arab union and exploiting Arab resources. By the same token Kadhafi accuses the moderate Arab regimes of 'reaction' and being 'traitors' to the Arab cause : by their collaboration with the imperialist powers, they necessarily collaborate with Zionism. It is the role of Islam and of pan-Arabism to diminish western, communist and other foreign influences beginning with Zionism, the outstanding example of a foreign presence at the heart of the Arab world. And because Israel is the primary enemy of the Arabs, Kadhafi logically backs the extremist wing of the Palestinian movement, as well as African states willing to sever

diplomatic ties with Israel, and dissident groups wishing to overthrow more moderate Arab and African leaders.

Since coming to power, in 1969, Kadhafi has consistently advocated war as the only and the most appropriate means to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute. In the first half of the 1970s the Libyan government enthusiastically supported the use of 'terrorism' against Israel, when the moderates among the Arab states and within the PLO were drawing very different lessons from the war of October 1973. The position of the PLO itself was strengthened while the oil embargo had proved to be a much more effective weapon against the West than the earlier experience with terrorism. Kadhafi, however, has always maintained ties with the Palestinian 'Rejectionist Front'. And in contrast to Sadat, who viewed the October war as the one to end all wars and open the path to diplomacy and negotiations, Kadhafi continued to oppose UN Resolution 242 of November 1967, and to support the idea of an Arab Palestine which would incorporate only those indigenous Jews who had lived there under the British mandate. All other Jews who had migrated to the 'occupied' territory, after 1948, would be returned to their country of origin. Kadhafi has consistently rejected proposals for the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip just as he has resisted proposals for the formation of a mini-state in the Western Sahara. The first priority is for unity not division within the Arab nation.

Kadhafi saw the October war as one fought chiefly for Egyptian and other narrow 'state' interests and not for the Palestinian cause which he insisted would be betrayed once the Arab states had regained their occupied territories. It was for that reason that Libya, together with Iraq, declined to attend the Algiers Arab summit of November 1973. In Beirut the Libyan Prime Minister, Abdul Salam Jallud, said that his country was boycotting the summit because Egypt had already decided to make peace.

We contacted Egyptian leaders and we realised they are determined to seek a settlement. The summit is therefore useless because, when the kings and heads of state gather, peaceful resolutions will have reached a point of no return. We would have nothing to do but bless all that and that is just what we refuse to do.¹⁷

Indeed, unlike the Khartoum summit of August 1967 where the Arab consensus had rejected the idea of a negotiated peace, the Algiers summit had given Egypt and Syria a free hand to attend the Geneva peace conference of December 1973. Sadat might even have been grateful for the absence of Libya and Iraq - which made his task all the easier.

In February 1974, when *Fatah*, *Saiqa* and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the last two of which have Syrian connections, concurred on the principle of

establishing Palestinian sovereignty in any part of the West Bank and Gaza relinquished by Israel, the radical Arab states and the more radical Palestinian factions, including the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), adamantly opposed the idea of a political solution which they assumed would necessarily lead to separate and exclusive compromises with Israel. Thus, in October 1974, Iraq, South Yemen, Libya, and several Palestinian factions formed the Rejectionist Front (*Jabhat al Ra'fd*), with the object of countering the peaceful intentions of the moderate Arabs and Palestinians.

In 1975 Libya also became involved in the internal conflicts in Lebanon. In January it offered to fortify the southern part of the country against Israeli attacks. Kadhafi's subsequent support for the Palestinians and the Lebanese factions of the left provoked attacks on the residence of the Libyan ambassador in Beirut, and an official complaint by President Suleiman Frangieh to Kadhafi, in June, about Libyan interference in the domestic affairs of the Lebanon.¹⁸ In 1976, when the PLO entered into a formal alliance with the Lebanese National Movement and in opposition to the Christians, Libya extended its backing to this alliance. Meanwhile, the Libyan Prime Minister, Major Abdul Salam Jallud, embarked on a tour of the Middle East, including Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, presumably with a dual mission : to prevent any reconciliation between Egypt and Syria and to promote one between Syria and the Lebanese Leftist-Palestinian alliance.

When Syria moved troops into the Lebanon, in June 1976, Libya feared they might be deployed against Tripoli's allies. Besides trying to protect the Palestinians, Kadhafi also wanted to block intervention by non-Arab states, and to avoid the partition of Lebanon which could only serve the opponents of the Arab cause in Palestine and elsewhere. Kadhafi claimed to have no objection to a genuine union between Syria and Lebanon but insisted that suppression of the Palestinians or their left-wing allies would be tantamount to treason.¹⁹ Libya continued with its attempts at mediation, entrusted to Major Jallud, to effect a cease-fire between the Lebanese rightists and the Palestinian leftist alliance. Libya also persisted with its efforts to induce Syria to withdraw her troops from Lebanon but, on both counts, Libyan diplomacy was unsuccessful.

When Libya sent troops to join the Arab peace-keeping force, set up largely at the instigation of Saudi Arabia, their neutrality was challenged by the Lebanese rightist leaders who claimed that the Libyans were fighting for the opposition. In October 1976 Libyan-Syrian relations were severed when Syria launched new offensives against the Palestinians and the Lebanese leftists. Libya then recalled the head of the Libyan relations office in Damascus and threatened a complete break in diplomatic relations. Kadhafi's policy in Lebanon reflected the complex issues at stake. He was sympathetic with those who wished to change the status quo, in a situation that appeared to give the advantage to the Christians over the Moslems and to favour the

interests of the rich over those of the poor. He was also aware of the ideological conflict between pan-Arabism and parochial nationalism. Which was why he encouraged the Moslem PLO alliance to continue the struggle to which he gave material support. And which also explains his anger at the Syrian attack on the Palestinians and their Lebanese allies. But President Assad of Syria also had reason to suspect Kadhafi's motives. Pan-Arabism offered at best an insecure base for a continuance of Alawite (minority Shi'a) rule in Syria. Indeed there was some evidence of Libyan money going to the Syrian Sunni Moslems, who were long-standing opponents of Assad's regime and claimed to represent a majority of the Syrian population.²⁰

From June 13-16, 1979, there was an extraordinary conference in Tripoli of members of the Libyan Revolutionary Command together with the leaders of all the Palestinian factions other than the two pro-Iraqi groups, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) and the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF). Opening the conference the Libyan Prime Minister, Major Jallud, reminded delegates that "after the downfall of Egypt, the Libyan Jamahiriya became a confrontation country against the Zionist enemy".²¹ The General Secretary of the pro-Syrian PFLP-General Command added :

We must coordinate the actions of the Libyan and Palesinian revolutions, in anticipation of a possible assault on the *Jamahiriya*, and with a view to confronting

those who wish to end the Palestinian presence in south Lebanon.²²

Libya promised to meet the needs of the Palestinian resistance but asked for greater unity and cohesion on the part of the resistance leadership.

By now, however, Kadhafi could find little to choose between Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, and Sadat. And there would be no rapprochement between the two before 1981 - which was the year of the Israeli attacks on the Iraqi nuclear reactor and against Beirut and Palestinian positions in southern Lebanon. At that time, as mentioned earlier, Kadhafi was ready to entrust Arafat with a mission to effect some reconciliation between Libya on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and Morocco on the other. Relations with Arafat soon deteriorated, however, and in 1982, as the Palestinians were besieged in Beirut by the Israeli army, Kadhafi publicly urged Arafat to die rather than accept disgrace. "Your suicide will immortalise the cause of Palestine for future generations...the path to victory [lies through] the conscious choice of death."²³ Later, in October 1983, when PLO loyalists were again besieged, this time in the Lebanese port of Tripoli - by dissident Fatah leaders supported by Syria - Arafat supporters in Libya were ordered to leave within forty-eight hours.²⁴

Kadhafi's attention remains focussed on the need to assure "justice for the Palestinians" and to acquire a credible

political, diplomatic and military capability for Libya. Libya's major contribution to the Palestinian cause has been to counter Israeli influence in black Africa, especially by offering aid and assistance to states and leaders prepared to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. There was disillusionment there too, however, and on both sides, as African states complained of lack of financial assistance from the Arabs, and of support for their campaign against South Africa, while Arab leaders bemoaned the greed and opportunism of African governments. In the Middle East, itself, Kadhafi's main contribution has been his rejection of a negotiated settlement with Israel and his support first for the Rejectionist Front, after the Rabat summit in 1974, and later for the Steadfastness Front, after Sadat's separate peace initiative. But the volatility of Libyan foreign policy under Kadhafi has prevented the development of close and stable relations with other Arab states, while relations with most of the major powers, including the Soviet Union, have also been turbulent.

The Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war

Like Algeria, Libya welcomed the fall of the Shah and the success of the Iranian revolution, viewing it as a major defeat for imperialism in the Middle East and as a formidable contribution to the Arab cause, although coming from a non-Arab source. Kadhafi's hostility to the Shah had grown since Iran's seizure of the Tunb islands in the Persian Gulf in 1971. He had

then seen the Shah as "a big enemy of the Arab people". Libya also disapproved the Algiers Agreement of March 1975, between Iran and Iraq, particularly Iraq's readiness to abandon its claim to the Khuzestan oil-producing province of Iran which has a substantial Arab population. Libya was also disturbed by the Shah's role in helping the Sultan of Oman, Qaboos Bin Said, suppress the rebellion in Dhofar province which Libya was supporting. Libya repeatedly warned Qaboos, in 1975, to expel the Iranian troops or face Libyan intervention. And in June 1975 Libya again threatened to intervene unless all foreign troops were withdrawn from Oman. Jallud issued a statement urging "Britain, America and Iran to withdraw Iranian, Jordanian and American forces immediately".²⁵

The new Islamic regime in Teheran therefore augured well for Kadhafi. Where the Shah had continued to supply Israel with oil ignoring the sanctions imposed by OAPEC - to which Iran did not in any case belong - the new government promised more militant action against Israel and in support of the Palestinians. Khomeini's attacks on corrupt and reactionary Arab governments matched the criticisms earlier made by Kadhafi himself. On February 18, 1979, the Iranian government severed its diplomatic relations with Israel and, on the same day, the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, received a triumphant reception in Teheran. The next day he was able to open an office in the premises of the Israeli trade mission. Within a fortnight Iran had severed diplomatic ties with South Africa, confirming the previous

decision not to send further supplies of oil to the white minority regime.²⁶ Relations with Egypt were severed on April 30, after a message from Kadhafi to Khomeini, while relations with Libya were quickly restored after an interval of seven years. The Iranians were even prepared to ignore earlier allegations that Kadhafi had been responsible for the disappearance, in August 1978, of the Shi'ite spiritual (and political) leader, Musa Sadr, whose activities in Lebanon had been a cause of some concern to Kadhafi.

Meanwhile the Iranian leadership began to emphasise the Islamic dimension of the Palestinian problem, in anticipation of the approaching contest with Saddam Hussein of Iraq and the Baathist regime in Baghdad. Teheran was anxious that this should not be seen as an Arab/Iranian conflict. Thus, in May 1979, the Iranian Director of Radio and Television stated that his country viewed Islam as the only force capable of defeating Zionism.

We must abandon the notion of a conflict between Arabs and Israilis replacing it by the notion of a conflict between Moslems and Zionism. That is what really matters!²⁷

For Kadhafi the Iranian revolution represents a modification of the status quo in the region, following the expulsion of the Americans and the decision by Khomeini to align with the Arabs in their conflict with Israel. And it was this that dictated

Libya's decision to support Iran after the Iraqi invasion of 1980. The Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, was accused of trying to undermine the Iranian revolution - literally "stabbing it in the back". In October 1980 the Iraqi government accused Libya and Syria of delivering arms to Iran and withdrew its diplomatic personnel from both Arab states.²⁸

After the failure of Jallud's mission to Baghdad, in mid 1981, in search of reconciliation, there were reports of increased arms sales from Libya to Iran. These pointed to large deliveries of arms, including 190 Soviet T54, T55 and T62 tanks shipped from Libya to the naval base of Bandar Abbas. Meanwhile personnel to man the first tanks had completed their training in Libya and returned to Iran in June 1981.²⁹ Libya continued to support Iran against its former ally in the Rejectionist Front, although Libyan policy was modified after the American attack on Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986. In the absence of tangible evidence of Arab solidarity with the regime in Tripoli, Kadhafi was anxious to improve relations with the other Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia. Shortly before the fifth summit of the Islamic Conference Organisation, in Kuwait, in January 1987, Kadhafi called for a cease-fire in the Gulf war and the insertion of a peace-keeping force with contingents from Nigeria and other non-aligned states. In April of that year he attacked Iran for its intransigence in the pursuit of war rather than peace. There were even reports of contacts between Kadhafi and Saddam Hussein of Iraq about the normalisation of relations between their two

states. Iraq had broken off relations in Jun 19.85 to protest against Libya's alliance with Iran. While repeating his advice to Teheran to agree to a cease-fire with the government in Baghdad, Kadhafi nevertheless refused to attend the Arab summit in Amman, Jordan, in November 1987. He was aware that a majority of states were now prepared to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt and insisted, therefore, that the summit would only serve American interests.

Libya's support for the Iranian revolution did not ease the Libyan position in Lebanon. There Kadhafi had long supported radical Palestinian groups against both the right-wing, phalange-dominated status quo, and against the more orthodox PLO and the Moslem militias. But the Lebanese Shi'a population, who have recently emerged as the largest single group in Lebanon and as a new force in national politics, also have a long-standing dispute with Kadhafi over the disappearance of their former political and spiritual leader, the Imam Musa Sadr, while he was on a visit to Libya in August 1978. Doubtless it was the 'parochial' character of the movement led by Musa Sadr and Kadhafi's concern with pan-Arab unity which prompted the abduction of the popular, charismatic Lebanese Shi'ite leader. Thereafter Libya became the target for Shi'ite militants in Lebanon, whose activities included the hijacking in June 1983 of a Libyan Boeing 707 en route from Athens to Tripoli. The aircraft was forced to land at Larnaca Airport, Cyprus, where the hijackers were persuaded to release the thirty-two passengers and crew and to surrender to

the Cypriot authorities. The following August they were sentenced to seven years imprisonment.³⁰

After maintaining a long silence about Musa Sadr's abduction, Kadhafi eventually responded to the Cyprus incident with an impassioned outburst during the ninth ordinary session of the General People's Congress (GPC) in Libya in February 1984. He denied any role in the death of the Imam but at the same time accused him of being an agent of the Shah of Iran, and, by implication, working for Israel and imperialism and against Arab and Moslem unity in the Lebanon.

But I am insistent on saying it so that Libya is no longer accused of [complicity in] Sadr's disappearance. Thousands of Sadrs have died in Lebanon and in the Arab world. Why then should we cry only for Musa Sadr, the agent of the Shah?³¹

In reply to this outburst the Libyan *Chargé d'Affaires* in Beirut, Mohammed Feitouri, who was also the highest ranking Libyan diplomat in Lebanon, was abducted in July 1984 by militants of the Sadr Brigade. Another Libyan diplomat had been held by the same organisation for forty-eight hours, the previous month, until he was freed by forces loyal to Nabih Berri, the new Shi'ite leader and head of the *Amal* militia.³²

Conclusions

There appear to have been few if any attempts to coordinate the Middle Eastern policies of the Maghrebin states. Each of the four claimed to be concerned for the welfare and the future of the Palestinians but the content and style of their policies has been far from uniform. Tunisia's moderate approach and its appeal for a solution to the problems of the Middle East on the basis of international law and jurisprudence has been balanced by Libya's uncompromising intransigence, projected by its constant calls for armed struggle and the elimination of the Israeli state, and its support for 'terrorist' measures in defiance of the rule of law. And while Algeria has consistently pressed for an Arab solidarity in an effort to reach an honourable settlement of the problem, Morocco, despite a pretence of militancy, has frequently practised a policy of accommodation with Israel - as well as being a major influence behind Sadat's initiative for peace and his visits to Jerusalem in 1977 and to Camp David in 1978.

On the issue of the Iran-Iraq war the Maghreb seems to have been polarised, with Libya and Algeria initially aligned with Iran, while Tunisia and Morocco supported Iraq and denounced Iran whom they accused of meddling in their internal affairs. In return for their solidarity with the Arab states of the Gulf, the Arab League has extended its support to Morocco in its confrontation with Algeria and Libya over the Western Sahara. Algeria's recent attempts at rapprochement with Morocco and her

attempts to mediate in the Iran-Iraq conflict do, however, seem to have produced some relaxation in the attitude of the Arab states.

It is Zartman's contention that the foreign policies of the Maghrebin states are dictated by the state of inter-Maghrebin relations. There is a large measure of truth in this, particularly in the first years of independence, and it is still the case that Algeria's actions in the Middle East must take account of any Moroccan initiative, while wider alliances are concluded primarily with a view to undermining the opposition of neighbouring states and promoting essentially parochial interests. It would be wrong, however, to interpret Morocco's contribution to the peace process and to rapprochement with Israel solely, or even largely in terms of her rivalry with Algeria and their continuing dispute over the Western Sahara. It would be wrong, too, to interpret Algerian support for the Arab cause in the wars of 1967 and 1973 as though it were dictated by Maghrebin rivalries rather than by a sense of solidarity with the Arab cause.

In analysing the foreign policy of any state, one has first to disentangle the various issues and strands of policy which, over time, and under pressure of a continuous sequence of events, have become enmeshed. For the observer, therefore, there is always the temptation to oversimplify and to engage in 'reductionism'. Foreign policy nevertheless remains the product

of complex forces, often contradictory interests and overlapping concerns, while it is also the case that issues and disputes closer to home, however parochial, are likely to take precedence over other questions - irrespective of their intrinsic significance.

Our analysis does, however, suggest that the Middle Eastern policies of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are to a large extent dictated by events within the Maghreb itself, even when they are obviously responding to developments elsewhere in the world. In that sense Libya remains an anomaly. Although it has been part of the Maghreb scene, at least since the Hassi Massaoud agreement with Algeria in December 1975, it is clear that Libyan initiatives and Libya's foreign policy as a whole, continues to be a response, not to events in the Maghreb, but to the current state of relations with Egypt. Where Arab unity is usually a means to other ends in the case of the Maghreb states, in Libya since 1969 it has largely dictated Kadhafi's foreign policy. Unity, first with Egypt and then with other Arab states, is the goal. All else in Libyan policy is subordinate to that goal.

Even Kadhafi, however, has had to respond to events and to accommodate more urgent pressures. The disparity between Libyan aspirations for unity on the one hand, and her almost complete isolation by the mid eighties on the other, was only too apparent following the American raid in 1986, the unsympathetic response of the other Arab states, and the final collapse of the Libyan

position in Chad at the end of 1987. For the foreseeable future Libya is likely to remain an actor in the politics of the Mackrek and of the Maghreb; it is unlikely, however, that it will become a "power" in either context. Libya's revenues have been (and are still) substantial, but its population smaller even than Tunisia's while its economic base is extremely narrow and therefore particularly vulnerable to global market forces. Its military potential is considerable in relation to the forces that the sub-Saharan states can muster. But it is more than balanced by Algerian forces and effectively contained by Egyptian strength while France and the United States retain a visible presence in the region.

PART FOUR

THE MAGHREB AND AFRICA

THE MAGHREB AND AFRICA

Introduction

Despite their geographical proximity, their common Islamic and Arab-Berber cultural identity, and a similar colonial past, the North African countries today present a broadly differentiated spectrum of social classes and interests, with considerable variation in their domestic policies as well as in their external alliances. Other than Algeria, the remaining Maghrebin countries gained their sovereignty before the wave of independence that swept Africa in the early nineteen-sixties. Thus both Tunisia and Morocco achieved statehood and a separate international identity in 1956, while Libya received independence as early as 1951.

Where the foreign policies of other African states are largely conditioned by domestic issues, notably political stability and internal unity, and are directed mainly to the black continent, the North African states are relatively privileged in so far as stability has not been a constant preoccupation while their favourable location, natural resources, and levels of social development can support more ambitious and wider-ranging foreign policies. The Maghrebin states are not only a part of the black continent but also 'belong' to the Middle East to which they are linked by 'language' as well as by religion and 'culture'; they also share a common Mediterranean history with the Southern European and Levantine states.

If there was less emphasis on the African 'connection' for much of the 1960s, the events of 1973 produced a conspicuous rapprochement between Arabs and Africans, following the Arab-Israeli war of October. Immediately after the war the Maghreb states, led by Algeria and Libya, invested time and resources trying to persuade the African states to sever diplomatic relations with Israel and drawing a parallel between the situation in South and Southern Africa and that in the Middle East. Subsequently, the Algiers Arab summit of November 1973 set out the basis for future Arab-African cooperation and prepared the way for the Afro-Arab 'dialogue' and for the first Afro-Arab summit in Cairo, in 1977. By then, however, the Maghrebin efforts, pioneered by Algeria and Libya, had been largely overtaken - overwhelmed rather - by a diplomatic offensive sponsored by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

This was mainly directed at the African states south of the Sahara, had little to do with African support for the Arab cause and betrayed no enthusiasm for revolution in Southern Africa or for rapid social change elsewhere. On the contrary, the Saudis professed to be anxious on account of growing Soviet penetration in the Horn of Africa and the adjacent Red Sea. Like their American allies they were alarmed at the scale of Soviet and Cuban support for the Marxist military regime that had seized power in Ethiopia in 1974. Contrary to the consensus among the black African states which favours respect for existing boundaries - the Saudis later backed the Somali invasion of

Ethiopia in 1977-78. Saudi Arabia's aims in Africa were to block further Soviet expansion and to halt the activities of radical states like Algeria and Libya. Huge amounts of financial assistance were on offer to convince African governments that only the Gulf states had sufficient resources to permit a meaningful 'dialogue'.

The political situation in Africa in the 1970s came in some ways to resemble that of the early sixties, with the emergence of new Marxist regimes in Mozambique and Angola and the return of ideological alignments following the collapse of Portuguese rule in April 1974. The civil war that accompanied Angolan independence in 1975 served to polarize the other African states with the reappearance of the moderate-radical divide. The revolution in Ethiopia in 1974, the subsequent war with Somalia in 1977-8, and the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco over the future of the former Spanish Sahara reinforced the impression of polarization - as did the conflict in Shaba province of Zaire in 1977 and again in 1978 where Moroccan troops were soon active in support of the conservative, pro-Western government of Mobutu Sese Seko against dissident elements infiltrating from Marxist Angola.

Although not involved militarily - other than in Western Sahara - Algeria continued to support 'progressive' or 'radical' governments elsewhere in Africa, including the MPLA in Angola. While Libya and Tunisia were less conspicuous in the divisions

over Angola and Zaire, they ranged themselves behind Algeria and Morocco respectively. Tunisia condemned the presence of Cuban troops and the supply of Soviet weapons to Africa - Algeria and Libya were the two largest purchasers of Soviet arms - and appealed for an American presence to restore some kind of 'balance'.

The year 1973 was critical in other respects for the Maghreb states and their interaction. It saw the first moves in the contest to remove and afterwards replace the Spanish in the Western Sahara, taking advantage of General Francisco Franco's imminent death - he died on November 20, 1975. And at the other end of the Maghreb it also marked the advent of Libya's direct intervention in Chad with the occupation of the disputed Aouzou Strip. The result was a further deterioration in the situation within that troubled country, which had experienced uninterrupted civil war and foreign involvement since independence a decade earlier. While Kadhafi may have hoped to extract from northern Chad the uranium cake that he required to satisfy his nuclear ambitions, it was also Libya's declared intention to challenge and eventually replace French influence throughout the Sahel.

These issues would paralyse the OAU in the 1980s, undermining the little consensus that had survived the crises and divisions of the 1970s. The summit, due to be held in 1982 in the Libyan

capital, would be cancelled for lack of a quorum, reflecting the strength and persistence of the ideological divide within the African organisation. Libya's interventions elsewhere in Africa were, like the Saudi involvement in the war in the Horn, obviously contrary to the principles of the OAU, notably its recognition of colonial boundaries and its defence of the sovereignty and independence of existing states. In the end Libyan actions provoked a hostile coalition that came to include states on both sides of the ideological divide - although it has to be admitted that Kadhafi's policy in Chad was in some sense only a continuation of earlier Senoussi policies designed to stem French penetration in the region and to replace their political and cultural influence.

While Tunisia has neither the means nor the ambition to be a 'power' in Africa or in the Maghreb, that has not been the case with Libya, Algeria and Morocco. There has been continuing rivalry between the last two, each a candidate for regional leadership and their competition has prompted the need for allies and for alliances, not only in the Middle East but also south of the Sahara. As antagonists in the Maghreb, Algeria and Morocco have had to do battle elsewhere with a view to neutralising the other's strengths and exacerbating his weaknesses. While Algeria embarked after 1973 on an ambitious programme of Arab-African cooperation and South-South trade as well as North-South dialogue, it has since had to withstand a diplomatic offensive by the Saudis and the Gulf states, aimed at restricting its

influence with the black African states. Meanwhile Libya and Morocco have each pursued expansionist policies in the Sahara itself and beyond which, to the extent that they were successful, would have contained Algerian influence in the region while posing a direct challenge to Algeria's role as the leading power in the Maghreb itself.

The year 1973 was in many respects critical for the Maghreb as well as for Africa as a whole, with the appearance of new issues that before long would threaten existing structures and procedures, and would challenge the fragile consensus reached ten years before at the constituent congress of the OAU. However, developments in 1987 held out the promise of an end to the more intense and bitter conflicts involving the leading Maghrebini states. There were signs of a rapprochement between Morocco and Algeria, raising hopes of a negotiated settlement to the long-standing problem of the Western Sahara. The year also witnessed the crushing defeat of the Libyan army and its allies in Chad after a series of military engagements in March. Chad has thereby won at least a temporary respite from the chronic battles that have divided it since independence. Moreover, within the OAU there seems to be a real and growing desire to set aside the differences and divisions of the past decade and once again to take up the economic issues that are so crucial to the future development of the continent. Here the differences, if no less obvious, are not so intensely felt : nor are they as likely to be exploited by outside powers.

With regard to Maghrebin foreign policies it is clear that Zartman is correct and that the conflictual and competitive relations that characterise the Maghrebin states are also reflected in their relations with sub-Saharan Africa, just as they are reflected in their relations with the Middle Eastern states. Their policies in Africa are largely contradictory while their rivalry, here as elsewhere, is a further obstacle to unity and integration within North Africa itself. Before colonial rule and the erection of artificial barriers to trade and migration, the Sahara was no obstacle to Afro-Arab cooperation. Since independence there have been attempts by Sahel states like Mauritania and Sudan to bridge the old divisions and to facilitate interaction. The main obstacles to closer Arab-African cooperation are two-fold : there is the racial issue - Arab rule being equated with white rule - and there is also the residue of colonial history which favours the European rather than the Arab connection.

This preference for the West over the Middle East stems not only from a rational calculation of national interest, but also from an understandable prejudice against the Arab merchants once involved - albeit with African connivance - in the slave trade. There remains the view that "yesterday they sold us, today they want to buy us with the income from their oil". With the exception of Libya, the Maghreb countries nevertheless seek to overcome the religious and linguistic barriers that separate Arab from black Africa, employing a secular approach that emphasises

common material interests and overlapping political concerns. But racial and cultural ties are largely missing. To that extent it would seem that a country like Nigeria is better placed to provide leadership for black African states - on account of its large and heterogeneous population, its central location overlapping the three main cultural zones of West Africa, rain forest, savannah and sahel - to say nothing of its long and often painful experience of religious and ethnic diversity.

Algeria and Morocco and, more recently, Libya have grasped the significance of Nigeria as focal point for influences from West, Central and Southern Africa and as a state that is in tune with 'moderate' African thinking while seeking to remain genuinely non-aligned. Where Algeria was aggressive in its defence of Nigerian unity throughout the civil war, Morocco attempted, briefly and unsuccessfully, to enlist Nigerian support for its territorial claims in the Western Sahara. Libya also - unsuccessfully - solicited Nigerian support for a cease-fire in Chad that would enshrine partition between North and South. Nigeria was no more sympathetic to Libyan intervention here than it was to Moroccan intervention in the Western Sahara. In any case Kadhafi had long been suspect in the eyes of the Nigerian leadership. However, while Nigeria called for the removal of all foreign troops from Chad, her own difficulties with Hissène Habré, in the pursuance of her peace-keeping role, occasionally made for a temporary rapport with Libya.

CHAPTER TWELVE : ALGERIA AND AFRICA

AFRICAN SOLIDARITY FOR A THIRD WORLD SOLIDARITY

A militant African policy

Algeria's African policy was defined at a regional level by the continuing rivalry with Morocco and Libya, each of which had ambitions in the Sahara, in Western Sahara and Chad respectively, and each of which disputed territory claimed by Algeria. At a continental level Algerian policy was directed to the goal of Afro-Arab understanding and solidarity, as Algeria worked to win African support for the Arab cause and South-South cooperation, and in an endeavour to exclude Israeli influence from the black continent. In the international sphere Algeria played a leading role in the quest for a New International Economic Order to be based on African non-alignment and on solidarity between black Africa and the Third World as a whole, facilitating a major revision of existing North-South arrangements in favour of the latter. And finally, because of its ambitious strategy for economic development, Algeria hopes to extend its own influence southwards, with the objective of securing new markets for its surplus industrial production; first, however, it has had to resolve outstanding border issues.

After 1958 and the establishment of a provisional government in exile - the GPRA - Algeria was at the heart of African preoccupations. The Algerian problem featured on the agenda of various international bodies, while active support for Algerian

independence and opposition to its forcible integration with France constituted one of the principal lines of political cleavage among the newly independent African states. The radical states of the Casablanca group, including Ghana and Morocco, were supportive, while the Monrovia groups, including the great majority of the francophone states were more reserved in their attitude to the French, content to demand a cease-fire and negotiations that would stop somewhat short of independence. Thus, most of the independent francophone states represented at the 1960 session of the UN General Assembly opposed the demand by the Algerian Liberation Front for a referendum on self-determination to be held under UN auspices. Several African countries, however, notably Ghana and Guinea, did recognise the GPRA, enabling it to open formal diplomatic relations and establish a physical presence in black Africa.

Algeria's independence in 1962 was therefore greeted in Africa with a sense of relief mixed with a certain feeling of self-satisfaction at the triumph of African will over colonial might. The FLN could rightly boast that the armed struggle in Algeria had accelerated the pace of de-colonisation in Africa as a whole, and particularly in the former French territories of West and Central Africa. Hence the title of the FLN weekly journal, *Révolution Africaine*, recalling the prediction of Frantz Fanon that revolution in Algeria would serve as the catalyst for revolution in Africa as a whole. Under President Ahmed Ben Bella the Algerian leadership was ambitious to provide for Africa the

kind of leadership that President Nasser of Egypt furnished for the Arab states of the Middle East. In the early 1960s, therefore, Africa emerged as a 'vital space' for Algerian foreign policy, offering apparently unlimited scope for the new state's diplomatic ambitions.

Independence brought new difficulties, however, in the shape of border disputes with neighbouring governments which intensified existing differences, constitutional and otherwise. Which increased the determination of the Algerian leadership to win support in Africa to bolster its position within the Maghreb, while using Algeria's new standing in Africa to advance its claims as a prominent contender for power within the Middle East. The decision by the African leaders in 1963 to form an Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was supported by all the Maghrebin states attending the first conference. The Charter, however, gave especial prominence to two principles that were central to Algerian (as well as to African) concerns : respect for the existing states and frontiers - if not always for existing regimes; and support for liberation in those regions and territories where colonial (white) rule was still entrenched. While Algeria could readily identify with such principles, and continues to do so, the same cannot be said of Morocco or, since 1969, of Libya.

Again Ben Bella was ahead of his Maghrebin neighbours in emphasising that

Algeria believes that its Maghrebin and Arab vocations should be viewed in an African context. Apart from the more obvious points I, myself, have some difficulty understanding the meaning of 'Arabism'. And, in the final analysis, just what is the Maghreb? It is only a small North-Western slice of the Great African continent. There can be no Maghrebin action, no Arab action outside the vast framework of African struggle and African aspirations. Africa is the central objective, the polar star, the cornerstone of the struggle against a colonialism whose aim, today as yesterday, remains the balkanisation of our continent.²

And this at a time when Tunisia was pursuing a policy of francophone cooperation or *Francophonie*, while Morocco was increasingly isolated, even within francophone Africa, by its continued attempts to deny independence to Mauritania and then to incorporate the new state within the frontiers of the Greater Morocco.

Moreover, while Algeria's relations with the Maghreb and with the Arab world were constrained by the rivalries and alliances, frictions and disputes familiar among existing states and within any established system, her relations with Africa were sufficiently recent, and at the same time sufficiently flexible and at a sufficient distance to minimise possible causes of friction and to permit a more relaxed and satisfactory form of

cooperation across a wide spectrum of activities. The grounds for cooperation are of course different in the case of the Maghreb and the Arab states on the one hand, and Africa on the other. The first two involve a range of subjective and emotional elements comprising a community of religion, 'language' and 'culture', while African unity is perceived more in a political and secular sense and in terms of anti-colonial solidarity and the struggle against dependence and exploitation.

Ben Bella's term as President (1962-65) coincided with an upsurge of revolutionary excitement reflected in an African policy dominated by anti-colonial sentiment. His bid for African leadership rested on his country's recent history of successful struggle against a major colonial power and on his subsequent support for liberation elsewhere in the continent. And there were few other leaders in Africa at that time who could match his militancy or his flamboyant but attractive style. Nasser furnished him with an ideal and a model, but it was an Arab ideal and an Arab model that had to be adapted to African needs and conditions - a task that Nasser had once attempted, in the company of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, but had found uncongenial. Where other Arab leaders would largely dissociate themselves from the African cause - at least until the 1970s - Ben Bella was already offering to provide 10,000 Algerian volunteers³ for a combined African army to help liberate the Portuguese territories and other parts of 'occupied' Africa. Algiers offered to house two of the leaders of the Angolan resistance, first Roberto

Holden of the Government in Exile (GRAE), then Agustino Neto, president of the MPLA - and at a time when Algiers was also offering accommodation to the Palestine Liberation Organisation, despite Nasser's misgivings.

With the removal of Ben Bella in 1965, following a military coup by the army commander, Colonel Houari Boumedienne, Algeria's reputation suffered a setback in the Third World as a whole, as the intervention came on the eve of a major international Non-Aligned Conference, heralded as 'Bandung II' and scheduled for June 19. The conference was first postponed and then cancelled after a number of states had withdrawn, including the Popular Republic of China. The preparations had occupied Algerian diplomats for the past three years as the government strove to maintain good relations with both China and the Soviet Union, while trying to avoid a major split among the recently united African states - over the continuing crisis in the Congo. Where the conference was designed to help legitimise the government at home and to confirm its international status abroad, the actions of the military set a term to Ben Bella's ambitions and at the same time ended Algeria's pretensions to a leading role in Africa or, indeed, in the Third World.

In a continent where military intervention was yet to become commonplace, the *coup* in Algeria - against a leader who was widely popular with Africans and Arabs alike - resulted in a diplomatic freeze that would continue until 1967. In contrast to

Ben Bella, Boumedienne began by giving priority to domestic over international questions and by emphasising the Arab rather than the African character of Algerian policy. For example, Algeria ceased to be prominent in the agitation over Rhodesian UDI, thereby losing ground in Africa to other militant and non-aligned states, notably Ghana (until 1966) and Tanzania. Relations with Britain had been severed in 1965 and Boumedienne continued that policy but in a "low profile". On the other hand, the disastrous Arab-Israeli confrontation of 1967 provided Algeria and its new leader with a much needed opportunity to resume the diplomatic offensive, this time in the context not of Africa but of the Middle East.

The African connection was revived, however, in September 1968, when Algiers was host to the Fifth summit of the OAU. The summit was dominated by the Nigerian civil war as the majority of the African states, supported by Algeria, sought the exclusion of foreign forces and an early end to the fighting - but not at the expense of Nigeria's territorial unity. A year later Algiers was also the venue for the first Pan-African Cultural Festival, convened under the auspices of the OAU. The two events in 1968-69 were crucial in effecting a reconciliation between the Boumedienne government and the majority of African states. Whether under Ben Bella or Boumedienne there was no question, however, about Algeria's ideological preferences or about her commitment to OAU principles, namely respect for the integrity of sovereign states within their existing frontiers.

Respect for sovereign states did not, however, always imply support for existing regimes. Where the issue was one of secession, as in Katanga and later Biafra, Algeria gave unequivocal support to the central government - the more readily, perhaps, because in each case secession was supported by conservative and/or colonial (usually French) interests and was perceived as a challenge to African independence. In Chad, on the other hand, Frolinat benefited from Algerian support in its long struggle against a central government maintained in power largely by French military forces. But there the issue was not secession but the conquest of power and this time it was the central government in N'Djamina (Fort Lamy) that was identified with the former colonial power. In Angola, on the other hand, the Marxist-led MPLA was actively supported by Algeria in its struggle first against the Portuguese (until independence in November 1975) and then, during the civil war that raged immediately before and after independence, against its two, pro-western rivals, the FNLA and UNITA. Although opposed to secession and to active, armed intervention in the affairs of other African states, Algeria was nevertheless ready to support armed resistance to regimes that were closely identified with colonial interests and thus served to perpetuate Africa's internal divisions and its external dependency.

From the outset Algeria has maintained an office to organise and conduct relations with the African liberation movements, led by an FLN activist, Jelloul Malaika, but maintaining close links

with the presidency. By 1982, however, some of its functions were transferred to one of the two subordinate committees operating within the External Relations Commission of the FLN. Algeria has also joined in the world-wide condemnation of the minority racial regimes in South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia, lending its support to armed resistance movements wherever they were active. Faced with competing resistance movements Algeria has consistently preferred those that were most active and most intransigent in their opposition to white rule. In Namibia, for example, it is SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation) that has received Algerian support at the expense of SWANU (South West African National Union), the latter being perceived as less representative and also less combative. In South Africa Algeria has supported the ANC (African National Congress) in preference to the more exclusive, albeit initially more militant PAC (Pan-African Congress), and the ANC is permitted to maintain a permanent delegation in Algiers. In contrast to many of the francophone states - and several that are English-speaking - Algeria has consistently supported the imposition of sanctions against the South African regime.

Ideological preference has also largely dictated the Algerian position in inter-African conflicts with support for 'radical' and 'secular' regimes. In contrast to Libya, for example, Algeria backed Tanzania in its conflict with Uganda in 1979. And the same ideological considerations may also explain Algeria's change of position in the long conflict between Ethiopia and the

Eritrea Liberation Movement (ELM) As long as the Emperor Haile Selassie was in power the ELM benefited from Algeria's more or less declared support, a distinction being drawn between self-determination for Eritrea, forcibly incorporated in Ethiopia in 1951 and secessionist movements elsewhere in Africa. After the change of regime in Addis Ababa, however, in 1974, Algeria drew closer to the new Marxist military rulers and began to distance itself from the ELM. The shift might, of course, have been explained in terms of the confusion and atomisation that has been such a feature of the ELM, particularly in the mid 1970s.

In some cases ideology does seem to have taken second place to more pragmatic considerations and *raison d'état*. Which may be presumably why Algeria has also withheld its endorsement from the Marxist wing of the rival Eritrean organisation, the Eritrean Liberation Front. At the same time Algeria has consistently refused to support the claims of Somalia, even under a Marxist regime after 1968, to the Ogaden province of Ethiopia. Here, as elsewhere, Algeria seems to have been influenced by the African consensus : that territorial revision in the Horn of Africa carried a real risk that border conflicts would become widespread, threatening the security of existing states, Algeria included. There is a large element of self-interest here. Many of Algeria's neighbours consider that they were unfairly discriminated against in the demarcation of Algeria's frontiers, carried out by the French at a time when they expected to occupy Algeria for the indefinite future. Which may be why Algeria

refused to receive the representatives of the ELF at the Algiers summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in September 1973.

For an Afro-Arab solidarity

Even before the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 Algeria was pursuing the goal of Afro-Arab solidarity, working within the framework of the OAU to try to neutralise Israeli influence in black Africa. Drawing a parallel between the forces supporting Zionism and those behind Apartheid in South Africa, Houari Boumedienne appealed to African leaders, at the OAU summit in Addis Ababa, in May 1973, to sever their diplomatic relations with Israel as a "concrete manifestation of African unity", warning them against applying a "double standard" in their attitude towards colonialism.

Africa cannot adopt one attitude to colonialism in South Africa and a completely different one towards Zionist colonialism in Northern Africa.⁴

The Middle Eastern conflict was not just one opposing Israel and the Arab states, but rather a contest between an occupying power and a disinherited people, dispossessed of their land and divorced from their livelihood. It was a struggle against a colonial power that practised both racial and religious discrimination. Boumedienne called for African solidarity in the fight against the "two plagues" threatening the continent.

The struggle against colonialism and racial discrimination cannot, in any way, be dissociated from the struggle against Zionism and domination.⁵

Algeria's diplomatic efforts, together with those of Libya, resulted in a growing number of African states breaking off relations with Israel, in the latter part of 1973 and in anticipation of reciprocal Arab intervention in support of African independence and economic development. Togo, for example, severed ties on September 21, and Zaire, part of whose military had been trained by the Israelis, cut its ties on October 4. The October war accelerated the movement, opening the way for what would become known as Afro-Arab dialogue. The eighth extraordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers, met in Addis Ababa, November 19-22, at the request of Algeria, Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia. After reviewing the prospects for Afro-Arab solidarity in the economic sphere it carried a resolution inviting all member-states to use their influence to obtain international support for an all-out economic boycott of Israel, Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia - with particular attention to terminating the supply of oil.⁶

Afro-Arab solidarity was taken a step further at the sixth summit of the Arab League in Algiers, in November 1973, when President Mobutu of Zaire, previously known for his sympathetic attitude towards Israel, made a symbolic appearance at the

summit where he was greeted effusively by President Boumedienne. It was at this summit, too, that Boumedienne was able to announce the admission of Mauritania to the Arab League. The Algerian president delivered an enthusiastic speech in praise of Afro-Arab cooperation.

In Africa we have seen something that many in the past had refused to credit. The African continent is now pledged to solidarity : a solidarity expressed through a severing of diplomatic relations with Zionism, as well as through support for justice and for the African states which continue to be victims of flagrant and repeated acts of aggression...Which is why we are convinced that it is time to consolidate those organic links by joint political initiatives and by stepping up cooperation in different fields. From this historic moment onwards we will do everything in our power to further political and technical cooperation between member states of the O.A.U. and the Arab League.⁷

Largely on the initiative of Algeria a number of bodies were set up after the 1973 summit of the Arab League with a view to pursuing dialogue and cooperation. They included the Arab Bank for the Economic development of Africa (ABEDA); the Special Arab Fund for Africa (FASA); the Arab Fund of Technical Assistance for Arab and African Countries (FAATAA). The ABEDA did not begin

giving aid until November 1975 although, by June 1976, some twenty-two African projects were being financed by the bank absorbing half of its paid-up capital.² Loans were advanced at concessionary rates and for periods of between fifteen and twenty-five years. The 1973 Arab summit also agreed to step up the Arab diplomatic presence in Africa; to sever all diplomatic, economic, cultural and other ties with South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal; to discontinue supplies of Arab oil to such countries; to strengthen and extend economic and cultural cooperation with the African countries; to extend immediate assistance to those African states afflicted by drought and other natural disasters; and to provide material support for African liberation movements.

Algerian resources were, however, limited, while other Arab states, much better placed financially to offer assistance to Africa, were reluctant to support an initiative that they feared would discriminate in favour of more radical regimes - while enhancing Algeria's own prestige in Africa and the Middle East as well as in the Maghreb itself. Aware of its large population and limited resources, the Algerian government called increasingly for global solutions to what was perceived as a global economic crisis. Only international cooperation could begin to tackle the real problems at the heart of the crisis, namely unfair terms of trade and artificially low prices for the raw materials and cash crops supplied to the industrial world by the countries of the Third World.

Far from alleviating the problems confronting the Third World, lower oil prices would mainly benefit the already privileged North at the expense of producer countries in the South. The answer was not cheaper oil, which would only impoverish much of the Middle East, but higher prices for African, Caribbean and Pacific produce, to enable them not only to maintain their oil imports, but also to earn a surplus that would finance industrialisation. The message of Afro-Arab solidarity was quickly transposed therefore into an appeal by Boumedienne, at the international level, for Third World cooperation and North-South dialogue, and for a concerted effort to bring about a global redistribution of income, through new patterns of investment and trade.

But no amount of rhetoric could conceal the fact that the oil producers of the Gulf and the Peninsula, with large oil reserves, low cost production and a small population, were much better placed than Algeria to bear the financial responsibility for Afro-Arab cooperation. They were reluctant, however, to allow Algeria and other radical states to take the credit for schemes that they themselves were financing. And they were obviously well placed to be able to determine the amount of their aid and the purpose for which it was allocated, as well as to select the recipients. They preferred a more selective, discriminatory approach to the question of Afro-Arab solidarity, with a preference for Moslem countries in Africa or for those who shared their own political conceptions. Which is why most of the aid

from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf has been directed to countries like Senegal, Niger, Mauritania, Burundi and the Sudan. Nevertheless Saudi Arabia was rightly credited by the African leaders with the success of the first Arab-African summit, held in Cairo on March 7-9, 1977. Where the African leaders had set an optimistic target of \$2 billion as the amount of assistance they required, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia finally saved the conference by himself agreeing to contribute \$1 billion for the African states. Other Gulf states followed the Saudi lead until some \$1.5 billion was finally subscribed.⁹

Unable to compete on equal terms with offers such as these, the Algerian government opted instead for a more pragmatic Arab-African cooperation free from the more obvious ideological constraints, religious or otherwise. Hence President Boumedienne's astute sponsorship of the North-South dialogue with its secular emphasis and its non-discriminatory approach to the Third World. Algeria was attempting to create a model for Third World development based on its own struggle for independence from the French and its own efforts to secure control, through nationalisation, of its own resources. Economic as well as political sovereignty seemed a necessary condition for any autonomous development. But to be assured of success such a struggle must have the support of other developing countries whose governments would come to see the advantages of South-South cooperation, where practicable, over North-South dependence. This then was the Algerian message during the 1970s.

Divisions in the Arab world, particularly after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, created new problems for Afro-Arab dialogue - which was not assisted by Libya's interventions in the affairs of African states. There was growing resentment among the African states at being treated as a mere appendage of the Arab world or worse, becoming involved in inter-Arab disputes. After Sadat had signed a separate peace treaty with Israel in 1979 a number of African states began to question the desirability of maintaining a cold war with Israel. At the OAU summit in Monrovia, in 1979, many African states refrained from condemning the Camp David agreements while a few even showed their readiness to respond to Israel's renewed diplomatic offensive in black Africa. Egypt was the leading Arab state and the only Arab state in Africa whose territories had been occupied by Israel, and if Sadat had come to terms with Israel why should the African states withhold their support from such a positive development?

After 1975 Algeria's African policy was dominated by the Western Sahara conflict and the mounting rivalry between Algeria and Morocco for leadership of the Magrheb. A victory for Morocco in the Western Sahara would, according to Algiers, enable Morocco to extend its influence in sub-Saharan Africa. The challenge from Morocco would no longer be confined to North Africa but would extend through the continent. The Moroccan military interventions in Zaire in 1977 and 1978 pointed to wider ambitions on the part of Rabat. Aware that the majority of states in the Arab League were inclined to look favourably on

Moroccan claims to the disputed territory, Algeria maintained that the OAU was the only body authorised to adjudicate the dispute. The principles of the OAU Charter upheld the existing frontiers and the right of the colonial peoples to self-determination. Morocco seemed to be contesting those principles to which Algeria had, for the most part, consistently subscribed. The Algerian diplomatic offensive began in 1978 with the decision to give Africa a disproportionate share of the country's diplomatic posts abroad. In 1979 the number of posts in Africa was increased to twenty - leaving aside Sudan, Somalia and Mauritania which were integrated in the Arab world.¹⁰

By 1982, five of the twelve directors in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had served as ambassadors in Africa. The secretary general, the administrative head of the Ministry, had been ambassador in Cameroon, while the new African director had been ambassador to the People's Republic of the Congo. Algeria by then had some thirty ambassadors covering forty-two African countries.¹¹ Algeria's own industrial strategy pre-supposed the extension of her influence southwards into black Africa which alone could provide the necessary markets for her products. As early as 1960 Frantz Fanon, on a visit to Angola, had underlined Algeria's African ambitions.

Having carried Algeria to the four corners of Africa, we shall return with all of Africa towards Algeria, towards the North, towards Algiers, that continental city. What

should I like to see? Great lines of communication, great channels of navigation across the Sahara. Demolish the desert, deny it, rally Africa and create the continent!...Reach out for the absurd and the impossible and whatever goes against the grain, and launch an entire continent in an assault on the last ramparts of colonial power.¹²

Two decades later Algerian foreign policy remained attached to this vision with its flattering view of Algeria as the intermediary between Africa and Europe - a view also shared by a number of countries favourably positioned, in close proximity to the Mediterranean and adjoining the Sahara. The French, too, had once had similar ambitions for their Algerian departments which were described by General de Gaulle as "the door opening out on the Third World".¹³ Meanwhile in 1971 Boumedienne seemed motivated by considerations not that different from those expressed by Fanon a decade earlier - although his approach was certainly more practical. In that year the President launched his project for a highway linking Algeria to its southern neighbours. To be named the Trans-Sahara Highway (or Road of African Unity) its construction was entrusted to the *Armée Nationale Populaire* (ANP). And when complete it will extend for some 2,000 kilometres linking Algeria to Niger and Mali in the Sahel. A Trans-Saharan Liaison Committee was established to ensure the necessary coordination and consisting of

representatives of Tunisia, Algeria, Niger and Mali. Morocco and Libya each had rival plans for sub-Saharan routes linking their states with black Africa and neither therefore participated in the Algerian proposal.

The connection with Niger is valuable because of the latter's uranium deposits and other strategic resources, in which Libya had shown considerable interest as early as 1973-4. Moreover, it would bring Algeria closer to Nigeria whose population was approaching a hundred million and offered the largest single market in the entire continent. Algeria was also anxious to develop air and maritime communications with the other African states, by means of *Air Algérie* in addition to the proposed road across the Sahara which could be utilised by the Algerian *Société Nationale des Transports Routiers* (SNTR). By opening up the Saharan region Algeria also hoped to encourage trade and development in an otherwise landlocked area, with linkages perhaps to the Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) then being proposed jointly by Nigeria and Togo. Perhaps most important of all the new channels of communication would help contain the threat of Libyan and Moroccan expansion, both military and commercial.

Nor was the highway Algeria's only route southwards into black Africa. Since the 1960s Algerian administrations had courted the government of independent Mauritania hoping on the one hand to block Morocco's expansion to the South, while on the

other seeking to attach Mauritania to itself and also to the Arab cause and the idea of Maghrebin unity. Mauritania was one of several 'hinge' states to be found in the Sahel zone stretching right across Africa, whose vocation it was to bring together 'black' and 'white' or 'Arab' Africa. Prior to 1975 and the eruption of the Western Sahara dispute, Algeria and Mauritania had enjoyed an exemplary and close relationship, based among other things, on their mutual suspicion of Moroccan irredentism. President Mokhtar Ould Daddah of Mauritania was a frequent guest in Algiers and his country was often spoken of as but "another province" of Algeria. Ould Daddah on one occasion seems to have taken the initiative in proposing to Boumedienne union of the two states in the form of a federation.¹⁴ Boumedienne worked energetically to have Mauritania accepted as a member of the Arab League in November 1973, earning the following tribute from Ould Daddah.

Mauritania will spare no effort to serve the Arab cause and to work for a better understanding between the Arab and African worlds, themselves complementary. Mauritania will do everything in its power in both Africa and the Arab world to forge a new movement for Arab-African solidarity and to create a new front for the liberation of Africa and the Palestinian people.¹⁵

Algerian-Mauritanian cooperation had led in 1974 to the creation of the *Compagnie Mauritanienne de la Pêche* (CALMAP), as well as the *Compagnie Mauritanienne de la Navigation Maritime* (COMAUNAM). The same year also saw the formation in the West African state of Benin of another joint navigation company (CODANAM) as well as other Algerian investments in that francophone state. In 1975 a joint fishing company was set up in newly independent Guinea Bissau (GUIALP) while the Algerian gas and electricity authority was entrusted with an electrification project. In Mali, too, the Algerians helped with the creation of the *Société Africaine de Transport* (SAT).

The establishment of such joint companies and participation in public works projects was usually accompanied by some form of Algerian aid, a grant or a loan or, more often, technical assistance (e.g., with the training of qualified staff). Prior to 1982 there were cooperation agreements with some thirty African countries while Algeria was involved in a score of joint companies with other African governments. Algerian participation in projects extended as far south as Madagascar on the east coast and to Angola on the west. There were also extensive cultural ties, dating for the most part from the first Pan-African Cultural Festival, held in Algeria in 1969. They are mostly with francophone countries and provide, among other things, grants for African students who wish to complete their studies in Algerian universities. There is also the technical aid and assistance

described above and covering a variety of programmes and undertakings.

Algeria has continued its active pursuit of regional and continental cooperation during the 1980s. In March/April 1981 President Benjedid Chadli undertook a long journey across Africa, visiting eleven states in all - Mali, Niger, Nigeria, the Congo, Madagascar, the Seychelles, as well as the five Front-Line States (Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania). In addition to soliciting support for Algeria in her dispute with Morocco over the Spanish Sahara, Chadli also expressed his interest in genuine non-alignment; in strengthening the authority of the OAU, particularly in light of the contest in Chad; in the struggle against apartheid, the pursuit of Namibia's independence, the elimination of foreign bases from Africa, the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and the development of South-South cooperation. The itinerary itself and the questions developed show a somewhat more pragmatic emphasis than under previous Algerian administrations. There remains the stress on liberation and non-alignment, but the states visited include a cross-section of moderate as well as of more radical governments.

Indeed there has been a growing emphasis since the 1970s on improving diplomatic links with the moderate states, perhaps reflecting the movement by the Soviet Union in the same direction beginning with the Nigerian civil war in the late 1960s - perhaps a response to Algeria's own closer relations with Nigeria as a

result of its support for General Yakubu Gowon and the Federal Government during the civil war. Perhaps also reflecting the substitution of economic for strictly ideological priorities in the appeals for North-South dialogue (in cooperation with France and other sympathetic industrial powers) and for South-South cooperation. In May 1981, following Chadli's earlier tour, the Algerian Foreign Minister, Mohamed Sedik Ben Yahia, visited Ivory Coast and Senegal, the leading francophone and conservative states of West Africa. Ben Yahia declared that the era of difficult relations between Algeria on the one hand and Ivory Coast and Senegal on the other was now over, and he stressed the need for greater cooperation between Algeria and these leading francophone states on the basis of mutual respect and African solidarity.¹⁶ As a result of this more open diplomacy Algeria was able to persuade a number of African states to recognise the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).

Algeria has been sensitive to the criticisms voiced by moderate black leaders in Africa to the effect that the recent divisions within the OAU have largely been the product of quarrels between Arab members of the organisation - to the detriment of the black African states and their common interests (largely economic).¹⁷ The point was made by President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast and, earlier, in June 1984, President Mobutu of Zaire had proposed despatching the problems of Chad and the Western Sahara to the Arab League and creating a new organisation of black, sub-Saharan African states to discuss

matters of mutual interest - to the exclusion of the North African states.¹⁸ Algeria has been working to convince such moderate states that dialogue is now possible, and indeed highly desirable, irrespective of any ideological differences. Their common objective must be the economic development of the continent and to that end three separate agreements were signed between Algeria and the Ivory coast to create an institutional framework for future cooperation. It is probable that this new step in Algeria's African policy owes much to the improvement in relations with France since 1981 and to the preferential agreement reached with successive French governments for the export of Algeria's gas. The agreements with Ivory Coast concerned cultural, scientific and technical, as well as economic cooperation. The resulting joint commission will meet every other year in order to permit continuing consultations on a permanent basis.

Despite these efforts on the part of the Algerian government it has to be conceded that trade between Algeria and the rest of the African continent remains very limited indeed : amounting to no more than 0.7% of her exports and 1.7% of her imports.¹⁹ And there is little that Algeria can now offer Africa other than the products of her few industries and, of course, crude or refined oil - at prices set by the other OPEC states. The diplomatic efforts can only be understood in the context of the current dispute with Morocco in the Western Sahara and with a view to the future industrial expansion of Algeria and the desirability of

working to overcome the very considerable barriers that stand in the way of future trade and commerce. To that end Chadli has been active in trying to settle outstanding border issues with countries like Niger and Mali who, in 1983, concluded treaties with Algeria defining their common borders. Mauritania, too, after adhering to the Algerian-Tunisian Treaty of Friendship, in December 1983, concluded an agreement with Algeria two years later approving their common frontier. No doubt a contributing factor here were fears in Mauritania arising from Moroccan policy in the Western Sahara, as well as from Libyan attempts to destabilise Haidallah's regime after his recognition of the SADR in February 1984. This had amounted to a rejection of Kadhafi's plan for a Mauritanian-Saharawi federation.

Algeria has conducted a long and active campaign against big power intervention in African affairs and to try to ensure that African states would themselves cooperate to ensure the continued political and economic independence of the continent. Algerian governments have been critical in the past of French military intervention in Africa and of organisations like OCAM or the West and Central African Monetary Unions that were exclusively francophone in character and maintained close political as well as economic ties with France. Algeria has resisted association with the European Community, unlike Tunisia and Morocco, and has also remained outside the various forms of Franco-African cooperation. These had seemed too closely

identified with neo-colonialism which Algeria has consistently condemned.

With the arrival of the Socialist in power in Paris in 1981, however, coinciding with the new administration of President Chadli in Algiers, there was a distinct thaw and, before long a marked improvement in French-Algerian relations. Algeria is anxious and ready to explore new possibilities for cooperation with France with a view to transforming their economic relations in the direction previously suggested by the North-South dialogue. The object is for the two states to work together, each respecting the sovereignty and independence of the other, to try to overcome the many obstacles to economic development in Africa - notably debt and low commodity prices.

As a first step the Chirac government in 1988 approved the signature of a new contract between the Algerian government and *Gaz de France* guaranteeing a continuation of existing arrangements whereby Algeria receives a substantial premium (over the prevailing world and european prices) for supplying gas to the French public utility. The agreement followed protracted negotiations extending over twelve months and was concluded despite the opposition of *Gaz de France*. The contract owed much to President Chadli's successful intervention with the Iranian government to secure the release of French citizens held captive in the Lebanon - and in time for the French presidential election of 1988. It remains to be seen whether that kind of cooperation,

for which Algeria is now well placed, can in fact be extended to other African (or Western) states.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN : MOROCCO AND AFRICA

IN THE SERVICE OF MODERATE CAUSES

A conservative bias

Events in Morocco prior to independence in 1956 favoured the dominance of conservative over progressive or radical forces. The nationalist *Istiqlal* Party was itself divided between traditionalists and modernists. A tense political climate was engendered by the exile of the Sultan, Mohammed Ben Youssef (later King Mohammed V), in 1953, on the initiative of the French Resident and at the prompting of a highly reactionary and insubordinate French administration. This arbitrary and 'unauthorised' action by the French had the unexpected, if quite predictable effect of making the hereditary Sultan, now in exile, the uncontested leader of the growing nationalist movement.

The outbreak of rebellion the following year in Algeria alerted the French government to the need for a more enlightened policy in Morocco and a tighter rein on the local administration. It also convinced the conservative landlords and the Moroccan bourgeoisie that an early compromise with the French was desirable if they were to avoid a similar revolution before long in Morocco itself. By now the more progressive and secular *Istiqlal* leaders were themselves either in exile or in prison and were therefore unable to provide effective leadership for the new (if headless) movement which looked instead to the more

traditional elements, namely those close to the throne and to the landowning class.

By 1955 the French government, under Radical leadership, was finally convinced that only the return of the Sultan would appease the nationalist agitation in Morocco and prevent the rebellion in Algeria from spreading to the two neighbouring protectorates. Ben Arafa, the 'pretender' to the Moroccan throne since 1953, was promptly deposed by those who had set him up in the first place, while the government in Paris concluded that self-government (later independence) for Morocco and Tunisia was a small price to pay for a continued French presence in Algeria. The Sultan was duly re-instated in November 1955.

From the time of independence, therefore, there was a strong conservative bias inherent in the Moroccan state and in the ruling institutions. This bias was later reflected in the country's domestic as well as in its foreign policies, and influenced the Moroccan positions within both the Arab and the African political communities. Moroccan independence, coming in 1956 and as a result of political compromise rather than armed struggle, did not evoke the same sympathy in Africa as the contemporaneous rebellion in Algeria. While several traditionalist leaders of *Istiqlal* had been exiled in Africa and were conscious of the similarity between their own struggle for independence and African aspirations for similar emancipation, no

enduring bonds were forged.' The cultural and political differences could not easily be bridged.

The more 'progressive' and secular among the *Istiqlal* leaders had encountered future African leaders in the course of their studies in French universities, but the contacts had remained superficial as the Africans were more concerned with issues like securing equal treatment and overcoming discrimination rather than with independence as such. For the first years of independence, therefore, the Moroccan elites evinced little interest in developments within black Africa. In any case it was the King and not the party leaders who (then as later) defined policy, both foreign and domestic.

A taste of radicalism

As independent Africa became polarised in the 1960s between the conservative, mostly francophone states, and the radicals which included Egypt (for a time), together with Ghana, Guinea and Mali, the obvious place for Morocco was within the moderate camp, led by Félix Houphouët-Boigny and Léopold Sedar Senghor, leaders respectively of Ivory Coast and Senegal. This equation was, however, to be upset by Moroccan opposition to the forthcoming independence of Mauritania. The leadership in Rabat was split between those who favoured annexation and another group urging self-determination. The first comprised the traditionalist leadership of *Istiqlal*, led by Allal Al Fassi, who

as early as April 1956 had maintained that only the restoration of Greater Morocco could assure the revival of the Moroccan nation. Mauritania, for Al Fassi, although colonised by France in the nineteenth century, was an "integral part of Morocco",² while Rabat also had historical claims over other territories in the Sahara and the Sahel. Visiting Cairo in 1956 Al Fassi had also established contact with a Mauritanian leader, HormaOuld Babana, whose party, *An Nahda* (Renaissance Party), favoured the Moroccan connection.

The left tendency within the *Istiqlal* Party, led by Mehdi Ben Barka, favoured a more democratic solution to the Mauritanian question insisting, upon his return from America in 1957, that "it was more important to be concerned with solving human and economic problems instead of insisting on the demarcation of frontiers".³ King Mohammed V himself favoured annexing Mauritania, while his heir, later King Hassan II, proposed a referendum that would permit the Mauritaniens to choose their own destiny. General de Gaulle's support for Mauritanian independence, influenced as it was by the consensus among the black African states close to France, was strongly resented in Morocco, not least by the monarch who had long been on close and friendly terms with the French President. Rabat nevertheless rejected the French decision and ignored the views of the great majority of francophone states in West Africa. Morocco persisted with its claims on Mauritania alleging, however, that French imperialism and colonial intransigence were at the heart of the

inter-African dispute - and that, left to themselves, the Mauritaniens would naturally have chosen to be integrated with their northern neighbour.

From this new anti-colonial perspective (rather than the earlier traditionalist one) Morocco's obvious partners were not the conservative African states, who favoured independence within existing frontiers, but the radical, 'revolutionary' ones who insisted on African unity and the re-casting of the inherited colonial borders. Morocco therefore participated in the founding conference of the radical African group of states held, appropriately, in Casablanca in January 1961. This radical alignment did not survive long, however. In February 1961 Mohammed V died, to be succeeded by Hassan II who was much less concerned about Mauritania. Instead there was the prospect before long of Algerian independence and the opportunity to re-negotiate the frontier rather arbitrarily drawn by the French. At the very least the issue would provide an opportunity to test the strength and cohesion of the new Algerian leadership with its 'socialist' ideology and its 'revolutionary' pretensions. While Morocco attended the constituent assembly of the OAU in Addis Ababa in 1963, it joined Somalia in refusing to subscribe to the organisation's view demanding respect for existing, inherited frontiers.

The subsequent military confrontation between Morocco and Algeria, in October 1963, did something to clarify the ideological confusion in as much as the other members of the Casablanca group felt closer to Algeria than to Morocco, provoking Morocco's departure from the group and its disintegration. Morocco's brief alignment with the radical states was prompted more by opportunism than by ideological conviction. After 1963 Rabat re-directed its policies once more towards the moderate states with their francophone majority. Senegal and Ivory Coast were soon among its closest allies. Even then the contacts were mainly political rather than cultural or economic. Although Morocco signed a cultural agreement with Senegal, in July 1963, any exchanges remained exceedingly modest. In the course of the seventies there was an overall decline in the numbers of Senegalese students studying in Morocco, who dropped from 2,000 in 1973-4 to only thirty-two in 1978-9.⁴ Apart from the economic difficulties in Senegal after 1973, this may also have reflected the preference of the Senegalese government that its elites should be formed in a non-Arab environment.

By way of contrast, commercial exchanges between Morocco and Ivory Coast have been growing rapidly. Already in 1966 some 41% of Moroccan imports from Africa were drawn from the Ivory Coast, while 31.8% of Morocco's exports to Africa were directed towards the Ivory Coast. Such commercial exchanges, however impressive, conceal the fact that, in 1972 at least, the value of Ivory

Coast's exports to Morocco was six times the value of her imports from Morocco.⁶⁵ Ties with Ivory Coast and its President, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, were further strengthened in September 1973 when the two states signed an agreement of friendship and solidarity as they abolished entry visas between their respective countries. The support of the francophone states and the principle of rotation were largely responsible for the election of King Hassan II as Chairman of the OAU in 1972, after the summit held in Rabat. Hassan's preoccupation with his domestic opposition and the first of two abortive military coups in 1971, followed a year later by the second, discouraged Hassan from participating actively in continental African affairs - and an opportunity was lost for bridge-building between Rabat and the black African capitals.

Since 1975 Morocco's African policy has largely been dictated by her territorial claims on the former Spanish Sahara. The African states have shown no more sympathy with the Moroccan position on Western Sahara than they displayed for her earlier ambitions in the case of Mauritania. This time, however, Morocco managed initially to attach Mauritania to her cause by proposing an arbitrary (and unfavourable) partition of the Western Sahara between their two states. It was this early success that seems to have taken the Algerian president by surprise, provoking a backlash in the direction of both Morocco and Mauritania, with Algerian recognition of and support for Polisario. Another difference with Moroccan policy over Mauritania in the 1960s was

the extent to which Hassan was able to mobilise domestic opinion in support of his policy in Western Sahara. There were no dissentient voices before or after the Green March. The internal opposition and the parties, from *Istiqlal* on the Right to the Socialists on the Left, were united in their support for the King's crusade with its traditional and religious connotations. The issue at last gave Hassan the opportunity to outflank his opponents, in the parties as well as in the army, and to win a popular mandate and secure a broad political base for the throne.

For most Moroccans the Western Sahara was a problem only in so far as Algeria wished to pursue its now traditional confrontation with its rival in the Maghreb. Where Algeria had earlier refused a reasonable offer to re-negotiate its border with Morocco, and had then invited Morocco and Mauritania to negotiate a common position on the future of the Western Sahara, President Boumedienne was now determined to exclude Morocco from a territory that, for the Moroccans, had long and close historical ties with Morocco and the Alawite throne. In the Western Sahara Morocco's undoubted military success has been largely offset by Algeria's efforts on the African diplomatic scene. By 1987 some sixty-eight states, including thirty-two in Africa, had recognised the SADR. Nor was Morocco in any position to implement anything resembling the celebrated Hallstein Doctrine, as Morocco has little economic power compared with that enjoyed in the fifties by the Federal Republic of Germany.

Hassan did try to enlist his francophone African allies to counter Algeria's diplomatic and Polisario's military efforts. Thus, when the Mauritanian regime seemed on the point of collapsing under constant pressure from (and repeated attacks by) Polisario, President Senghor of Senegal issued a warning that any change of leadership in Mauritania and any concessions to Polisario would lead Senegal to support self-determination for Mauritania's black population.⁶ The warning was repeated immediately after the *coup d'état* in Mauritania in July 1978. And at the Khartoum summit of the OAU, in July 1978, Senghor again insisted that self-determination for the Saharawis of the Western Sahara was inconceivable without self-determination for the black population of southern Mauritania.⁷ Senghor also claimed that Polisario had been responsible for the massacre of thousands of Mauritanian blacks and that a Polisario government would be racist and anti-black. And again at the O.A.U. summit in Freetown, in July 1980, he maintained that 2-3,000 blacks had been killed by Polisario.⁸

Senghor's tactics were directed at the black African leaders with a view to mobilising them against acceptance and recognition of a 'Western Sahara State'. The intention was clearly to strengthen Hassan's position where it was weakest : inside the OAU. Polisario sought to counter such propaganda by using Algerian television to show South African weapons captured from Moroccan troops.⁹ Morocco's diplomatic weakness among the African states was clear from the general lack of enthusiasm in

the OAU for the Moroccan position in the decade and a half since the Western Sahara question was first raised. Her principal allies have been Senegal, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Zaire. Hence Morocco's preference for the Arab League rather than the OAU as the relevant body to arbitrate in the conflict - which goes counter to Algeria's support for the OAU. Hassan has also sought to enlist additional support by presenting the Western Sahara within the wider framework of the east-West conflict.

Dancing for the West

Morocco has insisted that the supply of Soviet weapons to Polisario, via Algiers and Tripoli, represents a new, more aggressive Soviet strategy in Africa. And when Morocco twice sent troops to the assistance of President Mobutu of Zaire, during the Shaba conflict of 1977-78, Rabat hoped to convince the West and Washington in particular that she was defending the values of the 'free world' both here as well as in North Africa and in black Africa as a whole. In fact Morocco's action was the result of a concerted strategy with France designed to break out of its diplomatic isolation; to threaten and, if possible, destabilise the radical regimes of Angola and Algeria; and, most important, to secure Western support and aid for Morocco to finance the costs of her military occupation of the Sahara. The despatch of Moroccan troops to Zaire was an attempt to define Morocco's role and place within the international power game. And in an Africa increasingly polarised once again between moderate and radical groupings, Hassan's preference was clearly

for alignment with forces that were conspicuously anti-revolutionary. Morocco's intervention in Zaire had been prompted, in Hassan's view, by fear that a revolution in Zaire, provoked by intervention from Angola and supported by Cuban and Russian advisers, might bring Marxist rule to a country whose size and situation made it a key strategic target.

Algeria, on the other hand, was confronting Morocco, indirectly, through its support for the MPLA in Angola. There were even reports from Zaire that Algerian pilots had fought with the MPLA in its post-independence contest with the FNLA and UNITA - although this was never confirmed. The Algerians did, however, allow Soviet equipment to pass through their territory on its way to Angola.¹⁰ And as if to underline the Algerian stand, an Algerian medical mission was despatched to Luanda, Angola, in February 1977, while the Angolan Prime Minister visited Algiers the following March.¹¹ Logically, Morocco's support for the central government in Zaire was coupled with its backing for the pro-Western rebels in Angola. Morocco has been a main source of weapons for UNITA along with South Africa which likewise supports UNITA in an effort to de-stabilise the MPLA government in Angola and to contain the SWAPO guerrillas operating out of Angola and into Namibia.¹² Polisario has alleged that South Africa also cooperates in training Moroccan military personnel inside Morocco itself. In support of the allegation they claim to have captured from the Moroccans some thirty brand new South African Panhard armoured cars.¹³ It is because of Morocco's far-flung military

interventions inside Africa that she has appeared to the rest of Africa as "the *gendarme* of the West".

When the Angolan President, Agostino Neto, sent the Moroccan king a message warning him of the consequences of despatching troops to Zaire, the Moroccans hastened to point out that they, at least, were acting within an African framework and had not had recourse to military personnel from the Caribbean.¹⁴ In the first Shaba war, March-May 1977, France and Morocco had rushed an expeditionary corps and the necessary arms and equipment to Zaire where Mobutu's troops were apparently besieged by forces infiltrating from across the border with Angola. The Moroccan troops helped turn the tide in favour of the central government - to the relief of moderate African leaders who feared the consequences elsewhere of a successful invasion of Zaire. There were few states in Africa that were not threatened in some way by dissident forces who had taken refuge across the border. Such dissidents required only arms, training and encouragement to turn them into a credible military threat to governments whose own armies were weakened by corruption, indiscipline, personal jealousies, and ethnic and other divisions.

The Moroccan Foreign Minister was quick to defend his country's decision to send troops to Zaire in 1977. He issued the following statement to the Foreign Minister of Togo, who was presiding at the twenty-eighth session of the OAU Council of Ministers :

The government of the Kingdom of Morocco is convinced that peace in Africa is one and indivisible. It responded to the appeal by the President of the Republic of Zaire by placing a contingent of the Moroccan armed forces at his disposal with the object of defending the national unity and territorial integrity of the country. In so doing it sought to deal with the problem within a strictly African framework.¹⁵

In the second Shaba war, May-June 1978, Hassan II sent some 1,500 Moroccan troops to replace the Belgian and French paratroopers who had been flown in earlier to maintain peace in the region of Kolwezi and around Lumumbashi. A dozen American C141 aircraft were used to transport the Moroccan soldiers who were joined by contingents from Togo, Ivory Coast, Senegal and the Central African Empire (now once again a Republic), all operating in the guise of an African intervention force.¹⁶ The new Moroccan Foreign Minister, Mohammed Boucetta, maintained that Morocco, despite sending troops to Zaire, was still non-aligned in the fullest sense of the word, which was why Morocco had also signed important agreements with the Soviet Union with a bearing on the country's future development. Hassan, himself, was unrepentant at the end of the operation in June 1978. Morocco would undertake similar operations whenever and wherever they were required.

Morocco does not intervene in the internal affairs of Zaire and it does not support a regime as such. But it will, with all the means at its disposal, oppose destabilisation attempts monitored from outside.¹⁷

Which presumably explains Hassan's meetings with President Mobutu, at the end of the first Shaba war, in 1977, and again in May 1978, while the second Shaba war was still under way.

It appears that today Zaire is Morocco's one remaining ally in Africa. It was the only country to walk out of the OAU summit in Addis Ababa in November 1984, in support of Morocco and in protest at the decision to seat the delegation from the SADR. And in July 1985 Zaire indicated that it would not participate in the forthcoming summit of the OAU because the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic remained a member. On this occasion the Foreign Minister of Zaire, Mokolo Wampombo, recalled that Morocco had supported President Mobutu in 1977-78 and that her gestures then were "actions that Zaire cannot forget".¹⁸

CHAPTER FOURTEEN : TUNISIA AND AFRICA

LINKING AFRICA TO THE WEST

The link between Europe and Africa

Foreign policy in Tunisia has always remained the preserve of President Habib Bourguiba, and all Foreign Ministers, with the exception, perhaps, of Mohamed Masmoudi, being simple executants. What Bourguiba wants from Africa is stability and moderation, adherence to the principles of the OAU Charter, and continuing and close links with the Western powers, notably the United States and France, which alone in his view can provide the investment required for the economic development of his and other African states. From his vantage point the problems of other African states are similar to those of his own country, and lie mainly in the need for economic and social development within the continent. Such development can only come, however, from the 'free world', which is the source of the most advanced technology. Tunisia's small size and population and its limited resources are both a consequence of its relative weakness and lack of influence as well as contributing to that weakness. At best Tunisian foreign policy, in Africa as elsewhere, leads a shadowy existence, as the country's leaders manoeuvre within extremely narrow limits fixed largely by geography, colonial history, and the absence of substantial mineral resources.

The country's comparatively high levels of social development and educational attainment have guaranteed high and responsible

posts in international organisations to its many and distinguished graduates. The very disadvantages of the country, in terms of conventional power politics, have also brought compensations in so far as Tunis serves as the location for a number of prestigious international bodies. But assets of this nature are dependent on international good-will and therefore presuppose a low rather than a high profile in terms of foreign policy, and a conciliatory rather than an aggressive or abrasive approach. If Tunisia has always adhered closely to the western camp it has tried to avoid being directly identified with confrontational policies and has also been active in the non-aligned movement. Only in the context of the Middle East have Tunisia's policies ever seemed 'radical' - because there, too, Bourguiba pursued the goal of a political rather than a military settlement. Some of his early difficulties with the independent Algerian government also stemmed from his support, in the last years of the war with France, for political negotiation between France and the FLN instead of prolonged armed conflict. But then Tunisia suffered heavily from the Algerian war and its large commitment to the FLN - as well as from French reprisals and other kinds of sanctions imposed by Paris.

While the economic ties between Tunisia and Algeria have grown since independence, Bourguiba has had no close or obvious ally in North Africa, other than Morocco. By the same token, however, Bourguiba has been reluctant to allow his state to be associated with the expansionist policies of Rabat. Although the

rivalry between Algeria and Morocco, that has continued since 1963, does create a role for Tunisian diplomacy, it also detracts from the prospects of Maghrebin cooperation which should otherwise be the basis of Tunisian policy in North Africa.

Bourguiba sees Tunisia as the link between Europe, with its advanced technology and administrative competence, and black Africa with its under-development and inadequate social structures. In 1960 Tunisia did not hesitate to reproach Guinea for having rejected the French Community in favour of an uneasy independence requiring the search for new (and in Bourguiba's view often unsatisfactory) allies with little understanding of Africa's real requirements and even less to contribute to its economic growth and social development. A year later, however, at the time of Tunisia's brief confrontation with France over the evacuation of the French base at Bizerta, it was the turn of Bourguiba to complain of the "drama" of those countries whose fate it was to be linked with France¹ - while the member countries of the French community demonstrated their solidarity with the former 'motherland'.

In these trying circumstances Tunisia's participation in the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade, a few months later, suggested that it might be seeking to diversify its partners - in ideological terms. That did not happen, however, as during the Bizerta conflict Tunisia turned instead towards the United States waiting in vain for military aid from Washington

that failed to arrive. Thereafter Tunisia has aligned in political and military terms with America and France, very occasionally trying to play one off against the other, but generally dependent on both to ensure the country's economic growth and to secure its survival vulnerable as it is sandwiched between Algeria on the one hand and Libya on the other. The scope for manoeuvre, never large, became even more constricted after the overthrow of the conservative monarchy in Libya in 1969 and its replacement by the revolutionary and Islamic republic of Colonel Kadhafi. There were compensations, however. At the height of its economic confrontation with Algeria, at the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s, France could not afford to fail Tunisia - her own economic problems notwithstanding. And the arrival of Kadhafi did give Tunisia a new strategic importance both to the Americans and to Algeria.

Francophonie : the path to Africa

But Tunisia's links with black Africa are largely through the francophone states and are the product of their close and mutual relationship with France, reflecting Tunisia's image of itself as the 'link' or 'hinge' between Europe and Africa - an image it shared with Senegal under Senghor. The relationship began during the Algerian war with Tunisia's whole-hearted identification with the rebellion. After 1958 and the arrival in power of General de Gaulle Bourguiba did, however, grasp the change that had taken place in France and in French sentiment towards the war.

Thereafter he worked, increasingly in conjunction with France's other moderate allies in Africa, notably Senghor, towards a negotiated political settlement between the F.L.N. and the French. That would be the basis of future difficulties with Algeria (and of more immediate problems with France), but it did serve to draw Tunisia closer to the francophone states of West Africa which would acquire their own independence even before Algeria.

Tunisia was also associated in 1960 with the same francophone leaders of West Africa, particularly Senghor, as they sought to influence the French in favour of independence for Mauritania. Thus Tunisia recognised Mauritania's independence, in 1960, and fought for its admission to the United Nations - against the wishes of the Moroccans who were then associated, briefly, with the more radical African states. In October 1964 an attempt at mediation by Tunisia and Senegal - between President Ould Daddah of Mauritania and King Hassan II of Morocco - was a failure. Bourguiba nevertheless continued to work with the moderate francophone leaders of West and Central Africa, perhaps recognising the central importance that the French attached to their former African colonies. His incursions into Middle Eastern politics had not been auspicious, particularly after his speech at Jericho in 1965 where he implicitly advocated recognition of Israel. Bourguiba may have hoped to recover from this diplomatic setback by embarking from mid-November until mid-

December on a tour of francophone African states that included Mauritania, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger and Senegal.

Another, perhaps more important reason for the African tour, was Bourguiba's anxiety to improve his country's relations with France and with President de Gaulle in particular - after the earlier difficulties over the nationalisation of French estates in Tunisia and the evacuation of the Bizerta naval base. Algeria under President Ben Bella had enjoyed good (and profitable) relations with France after its independence - whereas relations were strained between France and the two more moderate Maghrebini states, Tunisia and Morocco. In 1965 General de Gaulle was still smarting from the Ben Barka scandal which threatened to complicate his re-election as President at the end of the year. With Franco-Moroccan relations almost non-existent, the time may have seemed propitious in Tunis to attempt to re-launch the old friendship between de Gaulle and Bourguiba. At the end of his African tour Bourguiba took the opportunity in Senegal to join with Senghor in proposing the creation of an international francophone community - a project presumably calculated to flatter de Gaulle, to produce a thaw in Franco-Tunisian relations, and to give Tunisian diplomacy once again some margin for manoeuvre.

The francophone states of Africa, with the exception of Guinea, had retained close ties with the metropole long after independence - and for the most part the relationship continues,

albeit in an attenuated form, today. Economic, cultural, commercial and military agreements have been a feature of France's relations with her former colonies. As an Arab state that had demanded and received independence as early as 1956, Tunisia could hardly entertain such notions of strict dependence. Indeed, as a Maghrebin state aware of the views of its large neighbour, Tunisia was careful to emphasise the economic rather than the cultural or political basis of francophonie - whereas Senghor placed greater weight on the last two factors. Tunisia meanwhile was cultivating the recent Canadian interest in Africa and may have seen Tunis and Dakar as the twin poles of a new French commonwealth. Bourguiba was also a very pragmatic politician and may among other things have been exploring the prospects for economic support from all possible quarters.

In his speech in Dakar in November 1965 Bourguiba had given voice to his own moderate, democratic socialist views while criticising the 'progressive' African leaders and, by implication, President Nasser of Egypt.

We do not favour closer relations among African states by encouraging acts of subversion. We cannot serve peace and at the same time indulge our appetite for hegemony. It is no kindness to the oppressed to hold out prospects of a liberation that is not within their reach. It is our manner, as Tunisians, to face up to realities...Does this mean that we lack revolutionary spirit? But our

objectives are revolutionary...development, the raising of living standards...those are the goals we want to achieve and without a revolution. What kind of a revolution is it that only destroys without ever building? But to reach our objectives we need time and planning.²

There seems little doubt that Bourguiba also sought refuge in francophonie out of a sense of frustration with his fellow Arab leaders, giving rise to the conviction that the Arab League was incapable of taking realistic decisions about the problems confronting it. In any case the cultural divide between the Arab core and the Maghrebin fringe would not easily be bridged. Geographical groupings, like francophonie, based on 'cultural affinities' and grouping leaders with shared backgrounds were more likely to lead to fruitful cooperation and to have a positive effect in terms of promoting peace, stability and development. In Africa at least Bourguiba was convinced that the francophone community was already a reality. It was not only the presence of a common tongue, French, but the fact that the African elites also "spoke the same language" : i.e., shared a community of discourse, of symbols, ideals, goals, a readiness to accept the independence of other states and a willingness to work with them.

Francophonie did not, however, appeal greatly to Tunisia's Maghrebin partners. President Boumedienne of Algeria dismissed with something approaching contempt any suggestion of his country's participation in the new grouping with its preference for the European over the Middle Eastern connection and the low priority it attached to economic independence. Morocco was still smarting from a series of rebuffs administered by France, beginning with the independence of Mauritania and, more recently, the backlash from the murder in Paris in 1965 of the Moroccan socialist leader, Mehdi Ben Barka. In any case Morocco did not suffer from the same cultural inhibitions that made it so difficult for Bourguiba to come to terms with his Middle Eastern counterparts. Nor did Morocco enjoy the confidence of the black African states to the South to anything like the same extent as Tunisia. Bourguiba's democratic socialist views had an echo in the liberal attitude of Senghor, while his *realpolitik* corresponded closely to that of Houphouet-Boigny. Tunisia threatened no one but did offer a model of development with some relevance to other states poor in natural resources and forced to trade on unequal terms in a world dominated by the industrial powers.

From the Tunisian point of view the most tangible outcome of francophonie - besides the gatherings that took place each year from the end of the 1960s - was the establishment of close and enduring links between Tunisia and Senegal. In 1966 Tunisia succeeded in its request that French should be accepted by the

United Nations as an official language for all proceedings. Interestingly, Algeria approved the initiative while Morocco insisted that proceedings in UNESCO should be conducted in Arabic as well. President Pompidou, perhaps because of his special interest in education (his father had been a *lycee* teacher) showed rather more interest than de Gaulle in establishing a permanent francophone grouping.

But it was under his successor, in June 1974, that a chair of Francophone Studies was created at the Sorbonne, to be entrusted to a Tunisian, Ahmed Abdesselam. Meanwhile Senghor's success in getting his party (later the *Parti Socialiste Senegalais*, or PSS) affiliated with the Socialist International, in 1976, encouraged Bourguiba to seek the same status for his own *Parti Socialiste Destourien* (PSD). Although supported by Senghor the application was finally rejected as a result of the opposition of the rival *Mouvement d'Unité Populaire* (MUP), led by Bourguiba's former Economics Minister and old antagonist, Ahmed Ben Salah, whose own movement, formed in 1973, had already received observer status within the Socialist International. Which did not stop Bourguiba and Senghor from promoting an African branch of the Socialist International, which did not include the MUP.

In the struggle for African independence Tunisia had always backed moderate leaders and movements who would preserve and encourage western ties after independence. As early as 1960 Tunisian troops had participated in the United Nations force

deployed to keep order in the former Belgian Congo (later Zaire). Their intervention had helped to establish a pro-western government in Léopoldville (now Kinshasa) under President Joseph Kasavubu, who had meanwhile dismissed his radical Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba - later to be assassinated by troops loyal to General Mobutu, then Army Chief of Staff. On this as on other issues the Tunisian position coincided fairly closely with that of the United States and France, although France was then more inclined than Tunisia (and a majority of the francophone African states) to support Katangan secession.

Distaste for Communism and Apartheid

In the 1970s there were further opportunities for cooperation between Tunisia and Senegal with American and/or French encouragement. In the Angolan civil war of 1975 both states supported Roberto Holden and the FNLA which had been the only Angolan movement accorded an office in Tunis in 1970. Both Tunisia and Senegal also approved French intervention in Shaba (former Katanga) province of Zaire in 1977. At the height of the Shaba affair the Tunisian press not only condemned the Cuban military presence in southern Africa and the use of Soviet arms, but also underlined the need for an American presence as a counterweight to the Soviet intervention.³ And when Senegal accorded facilities to the French for air attacks against Polisario, in 1977, Tunisia made no protest. Indeed, Bourguiba refused to condemn French actions against the Saharawis despite

requests from Boumedienne, which did not improve Algerian-Tunisian relations. These, as we have seen, were already poor following Bourguiba's active encouragement in 1974-5 of a rapprochement between Morocco and Mauritania with a view to partitioning the Western Sahara.

Bourguiba's distaste for communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular made him suspicious of radical governments in Africa fearing that the Soviets would use them to extend their influence in the continent. A serious rift developed in 1975 with the Marxist regime in Ethiopia over Tunisia's support for the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). Ethiopia even broke off relations after Tunisia tried to have an Eritrean admitted as an observer at the OAU summit in July 1975.⁴ And at the 1976 OAU summit in Mauritius the Tunisian Foreign Minister, Habib Chatti, implicitly attacked Angola by insisting

Africa must preserve its distinctive personality and pursue its own path to ensure that it remains master of its destinies. We must resist those outside powers who continue to assail us.⁵

He would return to the same issue a year later at the Libreville (Gabon) summit :

Africa presents the unfortunate image of a continent subject to rivalries and divisions...at a time when the

major powers are working hard to maintain and develop detente and cooperation. It is sad therefore to see Africa going in the opposite direction - one which can only lead to confrontation and de-stabilisation.⁶

Tunisia's rejection of a Soviet presence in Africa goes back at least to 1965 when it claimed the Mediterranean as a "lake of peace", thereby implicitly calling for the withdrawal of the Soviet fleet. Its opposition to Communist penetration and its warm support for Western involvement is consistent only in so far as Bourguiba clearly views the West as a force for order and development and sees Africa as in some sense bound to the West through its ties first with France (and Britain) and later through the United States. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is seen as an interloper, whether in historical or cultural terms, whose only interest in Africa (as in the Middle East) is military and not economic, and is therefore linked with violence and de-stabilisation. If that was also the view of francophone leaders like Houphouet-Boigny, Senghor and Mobutu, it was certainly not a view that was universally held in Africa, even among the more moderate, conservative leaders. But it does explain why Tunisia was unable to project a more favourable image inside the Non-Aligned Movement - particularly with Fidel Castro as Chairman in 1979-80, and why Tunis, despite its favourable location for international meetings and organisations, is yet to

become the Geneva of North Africa. And this despite Bourguiba's pre-occupation with persuasion and moderation.

Where other Arab states, notably Libya and Saudi Arabia, have sought to exploit the presence of Islam in Africa, to further their own influence, such channels are closed to Tunisia, particularly under Bourguiba. Since independence Tunisia has been conspicuous in the Moslem world in the government's pursuit of, and encouragement for secularisation in every sphere of life. It is the most notable example of the policy since Mostafa Kemal's Turkey. Although a member of the Islamic Conference Organisation - more for political and ideological rather than for religious reasons - Tunisia has never sought to encourage Islamic militancy in Africa, least of all in Tunisia itself. Hence the recent concern at the alleged activities of Iranian fundamentalists in Tunis, although the main opposition to the government continues to come not from Islamic organisations but from the unions in the capital and the left of centre political movements.

While Bourguiba's approach may not recommend Tunisia to the Iranian fundamentalists or the Saudi *Wahabbi*, it does help remove an important cultural barrier between the political elites in North Africa on the one hand and : those governing in Africa South of the Sahara on the other : religion remains an obstacle for the other Maghrebin leaders who seek support in black Africa among Christian as well as Moslem leaders and among their

constituents. It has been a problem for the Moroccans, and for Houari Boumedienne despite the secular nature of the Algerian administration and its preoccupation with economic rather than religious questions. It is not such a problem for Kadhafi because his appeal is directed largely at Moslem leaders in predominantly Moslem countries, mainly within the Sahel. Some three decades after independence the western values of the Tunisian leadership are still for the most part those of the black African governments. Tunisia also appointed the first woman to serve as ambassador in Africa : Faika Farouk, who represented her country in Senegal. This was seen as an appeal by Bourguiba for the emancipation of African women, at a time when the feminist movement was having a noticeable impact within Africa.

Tunisia, in its approach to the black African states also has the advantage that it has no obvious "axe to grind". With the exception of the Bizerta episode in 1961, and possibly the more recent threats from across the border in Libya, Tunisia is involved in no dispute of its own for which it wants African support. It is also distinguished from its Maghrebin neighbours in lacking the military means by which to intervene elsewhere in Africa. Tunisia also had little to contribute to the Afro-Arab dialogue that followed the October 1973 war in the Middle East, lacking the means. In that sense, however, her position is closer to the great majority of African states, dependent mainly on cash crops and minerals. Where the black African states are

largely integrated into West European markets, Bourguiba has always insisted that economic development can only come in close cooperation with the West and not in opposition to it. As a pragmatist Bourguiba had little patience, in any case, with the rhetoric that characterised much that passed in the 1970s for "North-South Dialogue".

Having come late to oil production, and even then only in a small way, Tunisia had no large surplus with which to purchase allies in Africa. Whereas Senghor sought to broaden his concept of Eur-Afrique to include the Middle East, and Mauritania sought and was given admission to the Arab League as a result of Algerian sponsorship, Bourguiba concentrated instead on the one resource for which Tunisia is really distinguished - its administrators and technocrats. The President of the most important Arab/African institution, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) is the Tunisian economist, Chadli Ayari, formerly Minister for the Economy.⁷ Even with its very limited means Tunisia manages to make its presence felt in Africa by contributing skilled and experienced personnel to various bi- and multi-lateral organisations. According to one source, by 1973 Tunisia had 1052 *coopérants* working, mainly as teachers, in black Africa.⁸ Addressing the OAU summit, in 1977, Habib Chatty, then the Foreign Minister, was able to point to

Afro-Arab cooperation as an important step realised by Third World countries in their effort to contribute to

the installation of a new international order. It makes for a more diversified and at the same time for a much closer form of South/South cooperation.²

Tunisia, like its neighbours, Algeria and Libya, views Afro-Arab solidarity as a means of expressing common interests and engaging in a common struggle. For Tunisia, however, the struggle is one against poverty and illiteracy and against those outside powers who seek to exploit the backwardness and weakness of the African states to further their own global ambitions. The fact that Algeria and Libya were, for much of the seventies, the two largest African purchasers of Soviet arms, helps to explain Tunisia's determination to maintain and develop its own contacts with Western Europe and America, as well as with the 'moderate' African states to the South. The tight constraints under which Tunisian policy operates abroad, especially in Africa, require diplomatic language of an exceptional subtlety - quite unlike Bourguiba's attempts to confront the key issues of the Middle East : head on! The ambiguous flavour of much Tunisian policy in Africa is to some extent conveyed by the following extract from the Tunisian press.

Africa and the Arab world use the language of reason and firmness and not the language of violence and hatred. Both have worked to bar the path to colonialism and racism by having recourse to appropriate methods of

struggle against essentially anachronistic systems of domination and supremacy. This new strength points inexorably to the end of a certain type of domination destined sooner or later to disappear.¹⁰

Indeed, on two questions of central concern to Africans, i.e., apartheid in South Africa and Israel's attitude to the Palestinians, Tunisia has always adopted a radical attitude. Tunisia condemned the South African raid on the African National Congress (ANC) offices in Maputo, in October 1983, and declared its complete solidarity with Mozambique. Tunisia's Foreign Minister called the raid a "barbaric act committed in defiance of international law".¹¹ And when President Mobutu of Zaire approved the resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel, in May 1982, Tunisia, like Algeria, recalled its ambassador from Kinshasa - as a first step. Morocco and Iraq, on the other hand, resolved only to try to persuade President Mobutu to change his mind. The presence in Tunis of the headquarters of the Arab League as well as those of the PLO does impose a particular responsibility on the Tunisian government - certainly on issues affecting the future of the Middle East and especially the plight of the Palestinians.

On the other hand Tunisia continues to adhere to a moderate position on most other issues of interest to Africa. Unlike Morocco, Tunisia regularly attends the Franco-African summits -

although admittedly only as an observer. Algeria, however, has consistently refused to participate in meetings that it insists are orchestrated by France. Tunisia also maintains its close contacts with Senegal and Ivory Coast and it was in conjunction with the former that the Inter-African Socialist Organisation (IAS) was set up in Tunis in 1981 and held its first ordinary congress in Morocco in May of that year. Its president is the former Senegalese leader, Léopold Sedar Senghor. In this as in other matters of common interest Tunisia has always worked closely with moderate African states in the search for practical solutions. Thus President Abdou Diouf of Senegal, on an official visit to Tunisia in May 1984 stressed the need for both countries to consult more often to try to find African solutions for African problems, particularly in the related areas of peace and security.¹²

CHAPTER FIFTEEN : LIBYA AND AFRICA

ADVENTURES FOR THE ARAB CAUSE

Kadhafi : the rejected suitor

Libya's interest in sub-Saharan Africa goes back to the nineteenth century when the *Senoussiya*, a religious confraternity founded by Mohammed Al Senoussi, sought to extend its implantation across the Sahara and into the Sahel. Al Senoussi despatched missionaries towards Lake Chad, and the regions of Queddei and Dafour. After his death the work was continued by his two sons, Al Mahdi and Sharif who formed *zawias* (lodges) in all these regions. The Senoussi resisted French colonial penetration in the Sahara and West Africa and were responsible for the massacre . of the Flatters' Mission and the assassination of *Père de Foucauld*.¹ It is this Senoussi heritage which Muammar Kadhafi later sought to appropriate after the revolution of 1969 in Libya and the overthrow of the monarchy. And there are a number of parallels with present-day Libyan foreign policy - as well as some obvious differences. The religious and political legacy of the Senoussi provides an enduring symbol of unity in a country otherwise sparsely populated and divided into at least three main regions. There is the tendency too to subordinate everything to the realisation of a single over-riding goal, that of unity, which does not permit of any compromise. Where before it was the French who were the outsiders and the principal obstacle to Arab unity, now it is

Israel, supported of course by the West and international Zionism.

Arab unity and the vision of a pan-African Islamic confederation are the twin goals of Kadhafi's foreign policy. Disappointed in the first by 1973 Kadhafi turned increasingly to the second. Hence Libya's growing involvement in Africa, particularly in Chad, which began in the early seventies and culminated in a full-scale military invasion in 1980, followed by another in 1983. The aim was not only to compensate for setbacks elsewhere, notably his bid for unity with Egypt 1970-3, but also to put an end to 'Zionist' penetration of Africa, to exclude Israeli influence, to strengthen the cause of Islam, and eventually to outflank the secular and conservative Egyptian state. By confronting Israel directly, wherever her influence is to be found, and by challenging her allies in the West, Kadhafi believes that he will re-create the Arab nation and revive the flourishing culture of the past.

More immediate factors were also at work in the case of Chad. There had been civil war and an extensive French military presence in that state almost from its inception in the sixties. And the Arab groupings of the North had problems in uniting to confront the Christian and animist minority of the South that nevertheless dominated government, the administration and the economy - with the backing of the French. There was also the determination to resist the West and, in particular, the French

wherever there was a chance of popular support. Finally, on a more mundane, material level, Northern Chad and neighbouring Niger were known (or in the case of Chad were believed) to possess extensive deposits of uranium. With his aspirations to lead a nuclear power, Kadhafi needed access to large quantities of uranium; if at the same time he could deny uranium to the West and France, so much the better.

Despite its small population, Libya's oil wealth, particularly after 1973, meant that Kadhafi, unlike Bourguiba, had a range of foreign policy options to choose from. He could try to purchase political allies and ideological support in Africa by means of lavish economic aid and assistance. Alternatively, he could provide negative 'aid', by arming and financing dissident groups who could be induced to participate in his grand design for the Sahel and for the Arab world as a whole. Or again, Libya could expend its wealth acquiring a vast armoury and building an army capable of intervention elsewhere in Africa and the Middle East. Here the small size of the Libyan population would seem to dictate the employment of large numbers of 'mercenaries' recruited from elsewhere in Africa. The Islamic character of most of the Sahel would greatly assist in the process of recruitment as well as in the attainment of Kadhafi's objective : a "Greater Islamic State".² Kadhafi's message, however, was unlikely to appeal to the existing political class whose attachment was, for the most part, to the former colonial

power and who, in any case, were likely to resist Kadhafi's attempts to by-pass them and appeal directly to the masses.

We have seen that the death of Nasser in 1970 was followed by a divorce between Sadat and Kadhafi, as the plan for Libyan-Egyptian union was scrapped while Libya was isolated during the war of October 1973. Libyan policy then changed its direction if not its object as Kadhafi pursued the theme of Arab and Islamic unity in the Maghreb and the Sahel rather than the ~~Machrek~~Libyan foreign policy had then to adjust to this about-face without, however, disclaiming its Arab convictions and its goal which was confrontation with Israel, not in Africa but in the Middle East. In the words of the Libyan Foreign Minister, in an interview with *Jeune Afrique* in 1973 :

In essence the Arab nation has become African...70% of the Arab people lives in Africa; 60% of Arab land is in Africa; the seven Arab countries in Africa also have the largest populations; and the most important of the Arab economic and cultural centres are also in Africa; moreover the Arab language, which is one of the rare African languages that can be written down, is spoken by some 90 million Arabs in Africa.³

The battleground is Africa

Libya, like Tunisia before it, came to Africa on the rebound - after the collapse of the unity negotiations with Egypt in 1973. If Arab unity remained the goal the young officers who had seized power with Kadhafi in 1969 would have to make a detour of several thousand kilometres through the Sahel before they could outflank Egypt and confront both Sadat and Israel. Africa moved from a very low to a very high priority in 1973. Where the regime of King Idris had only had seven embassies south of the Sahara, under Kadhafi that number was increased in a matter of months to over thirty, to say nothing of the forty joint government companies, the ten Libyan financed banks, and the seventeen Islamic centres that were all inaugurated before the end of 1974.⁴ But the diplomatic and commercial offensives would have to be supplemented by other, military pressures, as in Uganda and Chad, or even by promoting popular insurgency against the most reactionary and intransigent of the African regimes.

Religion was also a formidable weapon in Kadhafi's well-stocked armoury. Islam was presented by Kadhafi as an ideological bulwark against imperialism and its own brand of militant Christianity. By contesting Christianity in Africa one was also undermining Western influence throughout the continent. Meanwhile the presence of Islam in Africa and its considerable popular appeal would prove the strongest link in Afro-Arab solidarity, guaranteeing victory over even the combined forces of

Judaism and Christianity. At the seventh pan-African Youth Conference in Benghazi (Libya), in March 1974, Kadhafi strongly denounced Christianity and its subservience to imperialism. He also attacked the Pope and the Catholic priests who wanted to impose their domination upon the African people. In South Africa Christianity had even been used as a weapon to destroy the black man in Africa.⁵

In a speech in Bangui (Central African Republic), where he was the guest of President (later Emperor) Jean-Bedel Bokassa, in October 1976, Kadhafi spoke once more about the association of Christianity with imperialism in Africa and the need for a cultural revolution to impose the values of Islam which was more in tune with African goals.⁶ A year earlier Bokassa, until then a Catholic, had been converted to Islam changing his name to Salah Ed Din Ahmed Bokassa and urging all Africans at the same time to become Moslems. His own conversion, one of several in the course of his life, owed not a little to the prospect of Arab money. In September 1976 Bokassa decorated Kadhafi with the Grand Order of Bokassa referring to him - with considerable self-effacement - as "Africa's leading hero and soldier".⁷ And in an interview with the Lebanese newspaper, *Al Safir*, in August 1980, Kadhafi insisted that the Arab Christians must also convert to Islam, for they concealed "a European spirit in an Arab body...[and] one cannot be a Christian and an Arab at the same time."⁸

Islam, for Kadhafi, is a progressive religion which encourages science, social justice and respect for all peoples. In a speech on December 1, 1978, Kadhafi took it on himself to modify the Moslem calendar so that in Libya, days, months and years would in future be calculated from the date of the Prophet's death and no longer from the date of the Hajire , commemorating his departure from Mecca to Medina.²⁹ Kadhafi has sponsored the construction of mosques and Islamic centres in Africa, including the Grand Mosque of Niamey (Niger). And Islam was also a central element in Libya's intervention in Uganda throughout the seventies, in support of President Idi Amin. But as well as support for Islam and opposition to Christianity the major object of Kadhafi's African policy, as indeed of all his policies, has been confrontation with Israel and, in the African context, the expulsion of Israeli influence from the continent.

Accordingly, when the government of Ngarta (François) Tombalbaye in Chad broke off diplomatic relations with Israel, in November 1972, the way was opened for strengthening relations with Libya and the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which the two leaders approved a month later, in December. As other African states followed suit Kadhafi was able to conclude similar treaties with Niger, the Central African Republic, Uganda and the Congo. Guinea had severed its relations in 1967, before Kadhafi's *coup*. There was considerable resentment in the Israeli press at the scale and success of the Libyan campaign. According to *Haaretz* of December 8, 1972 :

Not only has Libya succeeded in severing relations between Israel and a number of African capitals, but it has also undermined the prevailing view in Africa that Jerusalem can find a solution to every crisis. The Africans are not accustomed to seeing Israel suffer reverses.¹⁰

Indeed, Kadhafi regarded Israel's growing isolation in Africa, and the desertion of many of its former friends, as his greatest contribution so far to the Palestinian cause. Thanks to Libyan efforts he maintained that "the Zionist state" had been "reduced to the level of Taiwan".¹¹ He even called for a boycott of the forthcoming OAU summit in Addis Ababa - a celebration in 1973 of ten years of African unity - on the grounds that Israel was permitted to maintain an embassy in the Ethiopian capital. Only the immediate transfer of the OAU headquarters and the adoption of a common approach to Israel could ensure a Libyan presence on the occasion of the anniversary. Cairo, it was suggested, as the largest city in Africa would be a more appropriate site for the OAU headquarters.

It was Kadhafi's determination to remove all trace of Israeli influence that led to confrontation with Fidel Castro of Cuba, at the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers, in September 1973. As Cuba (like the Soviet Union) still maintained diplomatic relations with Israel, Kadhafi denounced Castro at the

conference as being neither socialist nor non-aligned, but a communist (i.e., a puppet of the Soviet Union). However, at the end of the conference, when Castro announced his decision to sever ties with Israel, the two leaders embraced publicly. Pressure on African states to cut their ties with Israel, coming from Kadhafi and other Arab leaders, has not always been welcomed - particularly in view of the substantial economic aid that Israel had previously supplied to the African continent. They were unlikely to identify with sentiments such as the following expressed by the Libyan leader in a speech to the General People's Congress in Tripoli in January 1982.

Those in Palestine who now constitute the armed state of Israel are not the kind of Jews we can describe as Arab cousins, the Oriental Jews who have lived in the Arab East since time immemorial. Not at all! Those [in power in Israel] are Europeans, criminals, foreigners, mercenaries and warriors, who came and set up a criminal society that poses a grave threat to peace here and in the world as a whole. Those countries that have agreed to arm and support such people will one day pay a heavy price - after the Israelis have provoked a Third World War.¹²

Meanwhile Libya's diplomatic influence in Africa certainly owes much to the financial aid it is able to provide to

prospective allies. Libya is the only African country with a large financial surplus - thanks to its small population, its inability to utilise more than a fraction of its wealth at home, and oil revenues that remained high until the mid-eighties. States like Nigeria and Algeria also have a regular income from oil but this (and more) is soon absorbed by development programmes and by rising expectations on the part of a growing population. Libya has sought to employ economic incentives to ensure support for her programme across a wide range of African states and governments, usually through bi- rather than multi-lateral arrangements.

Leaving aside the states that belong to the Arab League, the main beneficiaries of Libyan aid, from 1973 until 1977, have been : Chad (\$19m); Uganda (\$18m), Guinea (\$11m), Gabon (\$10m), and Mali (\$5m)¹³. Contrary to a widely held view - and contrary to Saudi Arabian and OAPEC practice - Libyan assistance is not primarily directed towards predominantly Islamic states. The presence of an important Moslem community is obviously one criterion for Libyan aid. But Libya has also worked towards a rapprochement with 'progressive' African states with a Christian majority. With the collapse of Portuguese rule in Africa in 1974 and the emergence the following year of a number of Marxist regimes, Libyan aid has increasingly gone to governments whose outlook is similar, from a political and ideological point of view, to that of Kadhafi, and which are anti-Western and anti-imperialist. Thus Angola and Uganda, despite their Christian

majorities, benefited from Libyan financial assistance - to the tune of \$150m and \$180m respectively, during the 1970s¹⁴.

Other countries are viewed by Libya as being within its 'natural' sphere of influence, notably Chad and Niger who each received \$70m and \$100m respectively from Libya in the 1970s.¹⁵ Libya also subsidises some of the main agencies of Afro-Arab cooperation, including the Arab bank for Economic Development (BADEA). In the case of BADEA, Libya subscribed \$40m of a total paid-up capital of \$231m. This did not quite match Saudi Arabia's \$50m, but it exceeded Iraq's \$30m, and was double Algeria's \$20m.¹⁶ Kadhafi, however, absented himself from the Afro-Arab summit in Cairo in March 1977, while the Libyan press criticised the decision to hold the summit in the Egyptian capital.¹⁷ His opponents accused him of playing the game of the Israelis and the South Africans who (unlike Kadhafi) had condemned the idea of the summit. Kadhafi's absence doubtless reflected his conviction that the summit would be dominated by the conservative Arab coalition headed by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states on the one hand, and by Egypt and Sadat on the other. His fears were confirmed. The summit did, however, attract delegates from some sixty Arab and African countries; important decisions were taken and a fund of over \$1.5b was subscribed to meet African developmental needs.

Libyan oil policy was directed first towards securing the highest price and the maximum profit on a commodity that is in

limited supply whose reserves are finite, and where mounting demand from the industrial nations threatened in the seventies to exceed available supplies. The second question involved the use of the oil as a 'weapon' by which producing countries might by coordinated action effect changes in the behaviour and policies of the consuming states - notably with regard to the Middle East and the problem of Israel and the Palestinians. On the question of pricing policy Kadhafi in 1974 had proposed, at the Islamic Conference meeting in Lahore, to agree a preferential oil price for the oil-dependent African states. Although rejected by the other OPEC members, Kadhafi's suggestion did correspond to the wishes of many African states for whom Afro-Arab solidarity meant concessionary oil prices.¹² Had the Libyan proposal been adopted it is possible that Afro-Arab cooperation might not have provoked the kind of mutual recrimination so much in evidence at the latest meeting of the Islamic Conference Organisation, in Kuwait, early in 1987. It was clear to the African states, however, that Libyan influence within OPEC and among the key oil producing states was very limited. Regarding the oil weapon we have seen that the embargo on oil supplies to certain western countries, as a result of the October 1973 war, was lifted after a brief experiment and despite the objections of the Libyans.

There is little doubt that ideology rather than philanthropy was the motive behind Libyan development aid to Africa. There had been some aid offered before 1973, but the bulk of Libyan commitments were entered into after 1973 as Kadhafi turned his

attention from Egypt and the Middle East towards the sub-Saharan states. The failure of Arab solidarity had much to do with Libya's new interest in Afro-Arab solidarity. Tripoli has certainly sponsored a number of development projects in Africa, but the main emphasis has been on social investments such as the construction of hospitals, and cultural cooperation including the building of mosques and Islamic centres. Yet another aspect of Libya's policy in Africa relates to military involvement (in Chad and Uganda) and support for insurgency.

Vision of an Islamic state in the Sahel

Kadhafi has issued repeated appeals to the Touareg to 'return' to Libya and 'rejoin' their 'motherland'. The intention has been to embarrass the governments of Mali, Niger and Algeria whose territorial integrity would be threatened should the Touareg comply with Kadhafi's directive.¹⁹ Kadhafi's aim was to secure recruits for his 'Islamic Legion' by insisting that the Touareg were Libyan 'Arabs' exploited and oppressed by their present political masters. In September 1979, on the tenth anniversary of Kadhafi's accession to power, the Islamic Legion paraded in Tripoli, its troops being acclaimed as the future "Liberators" of the Third World. Nor did Kadhafi hesitate to attack the authorities in Mali and Niger, accusing them of persecuting elements of their population. The nomads were reminded that the borders of Libya remained open to them as "free

sons of the Arab nation who suffer repression and extermination in the camps set up in Mali and Niger".²⁰

As the Touareg are of Berber stock and have nothing in common with the Arabs, neither race nor language.²¹ Kadhafi's appeals therefore aroused derision rather than anger in Niamey and Bamako. Nevertheless, in November 1980 the President of Niger, Colonel Seyni Kountché, warned that

Every country has its domestic quarrels and its ethnic particularisms. A certain Libyan called Kadhafi wants to exploit such particularisms to foment subversion in our country.²²

Kountché's predecessor, Hamani Diori, had been overthrown by Kountché, in 1974, after Diori was suspected (by the army and the French) of conspiring to sell his country's uranium to Libya at prices well above those sanctioned by the French government and the mining consortium.

At the end of 1980 the press in Niger, controlled by the government, was quick to reject any designs Kadhafi might have on Niger's vast uranium deposits.

Where Niger has always been ready to cooperate in a loyal and sincere way with Libya, we are not another Chad.²³

Which prompted Kadhafi's retort to the effect that :

The Touareg are Libyans because originally they came from Libya. We do not encourage them to revolt against the authorities in the countries where they live, but we do invite them to return to their country because we have the means to receive and assimilate them.²⁴

Tripoli has sought to extend its 'protection' to the so-called 'white' minorities in those Sahel states with black governments. These include the Touareg of Mali and Niger and the Toubous of Niger and Chad. Libya can easily acquire influence over such peoples thanks to the economic incentives it can offer and which other governments in the region cannot hope to match. By the eighties it was reported that Libya was recruiting for its Islamic Legion from as far afield as Mauritania, Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria (disputed by the Nigerian authorities), Mali, Upper Volta, Niger and Chad. There were also volunteers from the Maghreb, particularly Tunisians. In one way or another Libya has also been involved, more or less directly, in the politics of many of the West African states, including Nigeria, with its large and highly politicised Moslem population, and even Ghana which is predominantly Christian. For a time Libya sponsored a leading opponent of the government of Abdou Diouf in Senegal as well as financing opposition to the regime in Mali - following its reintegration into the francophone community in the late seventies.

At about the same time the Libyan government began to encourage a new, younger and more militant generation of military leaders, who took advantage of the deteriorating economic conditions and an ageing and increasingly corrupt leadership to seize power for themselves. They included Master-Sergeant Samuel KanyonDoe, in Liberia (1980), Flight-Lieutenant 'Jerry' Rawlings in Ghana (1979 and again in 1981). and the late Colonel Thomas Sankara in Upper Volta (i.e., Burkina Faso - in 1983). As the interventions were clearly subversive of the old order and initially failed to secure the support of the relevant European power - America in the case of Liberia, Britain in Ghana, and France in Upper Volta) - the usual pattern was for the coup leader to seek Libyan political and financial support and then to use that as a lever to extract a more favourable settlement from the Western governments.

Liberia is now more closely and tightly integrated than ever with the IMF, the World Bank, and the American government. Ghana under Rawlings is regarded by the IMF, if not by its own people, as a showpiece for Western fiscal orthodoxy. Sankara has been overthrown and killed in Burkina Faso and it is too soon to be able to comment on his successor. It is difficult, however, to avoid the conclusion that outside Chad and possibly Niger, and despite the resources that Libya has squandered in West Africa and the Sahel, the political returns have been minimal. In Niger incipient Libyan involvement was quickly blocked by the French who had the backing of the local military. And in Chad the

outcome of nearly a decade of direct Libyan military intervention has been division, defeat and a humiliation in Africa not long after the American attack on the Libyan capital and Kadhafi's own official residence. Elsewhere in Africa the picture has been much the same : as African states have come to terms with the international monetary organisations, in an effort to meet interest payments on a mounting debt, they have shown less interest in the millenary visions of a Libyan ruler whose fortunes, both literally and metaphorically, appear to be on the decline, and who has himself drawn closer in recent months to leaders and states that are well connected in Washington.

Relations with Niger

Relations between Libya and Niger under Hamani Diori were exceptionally cordial and seem to have been a kind of 'model' for relations between Tripoli and other states within the region. Although a disciple at first of Houphouet-Boigny, leader of the Ivory Coast and founder of the Entente group of states which included Niger, Diori had registered his independence as early as the civil war in Nigeria when he maintained cordial relations with the Federal Government and criticised the French Government and Houphouet-Boigny for their support for Biafra. He later sought to develop good relations with the Canadian Federal Government in Ottawa at a time when French policy inclined instead towards Quebec. As early as 1966 Libya had established an embassy in Niger but it was 1971 before Diori visited Libya,

looking for Libyan support for Niger's development. That same year saw the commencement of extensive uranium mining in Niger, near Arlit, as well as the opening in Tripoli of an embassy representing Niger.

On January 2, 1973 Niger severed diplomatic ties with Israel, a gesture quickly approved by the Libyans. Libya and Niger drew even closer with Kadhafi's visit to Niamey in March 1974. A mutual defence agreement seems to have been signed while Kadhafi pledged to provide educational and cultural aid to Niger and to build a radio station, the "Voice of Islam", which would propagate Islam in Africa.²⁵ Diori's resolutely pro-Arab policy identified Niger as an obvious candidate for Libyan assistance, coupled with its Islamic population, its vast uranium deposits and growing antagonism with the French government whose determination to exercise complete control over uranium extraction and marketing ensured a lower price than could otherwise be obtained, e.g., from Libya. Diori's overthrow following a military coup in April 1974 has been attributed at least partially to the new and closer relationship with Libya, although there were mounting domestic problems as well after several years of severe drought throughout the Sahel.

The military in Niger might also have seen the defence agreement with Libya as indicating a lack of confidence in the army on the part of the civilian leadership. But it seems significant that the new military government maintained its ties

with Libya, and sought as quickly as possible to restore cordial relations with Nigeria and its other partners in the West African Economic Community (ECOWAS). Even more to the point, in May 1974 Kadhafi paid an official visit to Niger, where he was welcomed by the local press in the name of "Islamic fraternity".¹²⁶ There was reference, too, to the "similar and even identical positions of the two countries", vis-a-vis the international situation in general and the "two dominant global ideologies" in particular. Nevertheless relations between Niger and Libya did deteriorate rapidly after 1974, perhaps reflecting the growing differences between Paris and Tripoli, over Chad and the Western Sahara, and above all the question of access to Niger's uranium deposits, as Libya began making large territorial claims in Niger - after its claims in Chad.

Several cooperation agreements between Niger and Libya were shelved between 1974 and 1976 and in March 1976 there was a further coup attempt in Niamey, against the military government of President Seyni Kountché. This time the government in Niger made no secret of its suspicion of Libyan complicity : instead of breaking off relations with Tripoli, however, Kountché sought to pursue the country's earlier line of independence from France by seeking a rapprochement with Algeria. Algeria was militantly nationalist and anti-colonialist, was powerful enough to contain any Libyan threat to Niger, and, just as important, could be trusted to respect the frontiers of the existing states. Coupled

with Nigerian support Kountché was convinced he could contain the spread of Libyan influence.

President Boumedienne invited Niger and Libya to a mini-summit at Wargla in southern Algeria, in April 1976, to discuss and hopefully resolve outstanding differences. Far from complying the Libyans produced new official maps of the region, in September 1976, laying claim to an additional 52,000 square miles of territory in Algeria, Chad and Niger.²⁷ Kadhafi was also thought to be supporting a rebellion of the Touareg in northern Mali, where uranium deposits had likewise been uncovered. Official figures from Niger revealed that in the first half of 1981 Libya bought 1,212 tons of locally mined uranium, three times the quantity purchased in 1980. Even the 1980 figure was large for a country whose normal requirements were much more limited. Indeed, Niger's deliveries to Libya in the first six months of 1981 were half the quantity sold to France. But they established Libya as Niger's second customer, ahead of Japan (816 tons) and Spain (300 tons).²⁸

Libya's territorial claims in Niger remained dormant until 1981, thanks largely to Algerian efforts in support of existing frontiers. There is, however, a parallel with the situation that later turned to Libyan intervention and conflict in Chad. On January 13, 1981 the Niger government expelled Libya's diplomatic staff.²⁹ This followed the attempted 'fusion' between Libya and Chad and the conversion of the Libyan embassy in Niamey into a

"people's bureau" without first consulting the Niger government. Libyan intervention in N'Djamina in 1981 was seen as a threat to Niger which was then producing ten per cent. of the world's uranium. Meanwhile Algeria was distancing itself from Libya at this time, and moving closer to Niger in the process. Confronted by Libyan demands, Algeria and Niger quickly reached agreement on their joint boundaries. While Kountché was attending the Franco-African summit in Vittel, France, in October 1983, there was an attempted *coup* mounted in Niamey - apparently involving security forces close to the President. The *coup* was soon put down amidst allegations of further Libyan involvement.³⁰

Involvement in Chad

Chad, like Uganda before it, was a major setback for Libyan foreign policy in Africa. A large, landlocked country, with nearly two hundred different ethnic groups, Chad was predominantly Moslem although, for the first fifteen years after independence, government was in the hands of the largely Christian Sara tribe, in the South, and the President, François Tombalbaye. Rebellion erupted in the centre of the country, in 1965 and the following year the Chadian National Liberation Front (FROLINAT) was set up in Sudan, formed by Ibrahim Abatcha, with assistance from Algeria, Sudan and Libya. The Libyan connection thus preceded Kadhafi's arrival in power. When Numeiri of Sudan opted out of the conflict, in a bid to appease his Christian minority, Kadhafi stepped up his own intervention. 1968 saw the

insurrection of the Toubou in the north based on the Borkou Ennedi Tebesti (BET). Tombalbaye rejected Libyan offers of mediation, calling instead for French intervention. The region was 'pacified' by General Edouard Cortadellas and his paratroopers in 1970-2.

Libya was less concerned about French intervention at this stage than with the more sensitive question of Chadian-Israeli cooperation, which went beyond economic matters to encompass military cooperation - and bases that were at the disposal of the rebellion in southern Sudan. In August 1971 the government of Chad accused Libya of interfering in its domestic affairs and severed diplomatic relations with Tripoli. In September the Libyan government reacted, according recognition to Frolinat which then opened an office in Tripoli.³¹ Chad broke off its diplomatic relations with Israel in November 1972, just as Tombalbaye was taking a more critical and independent line with the French - together with the neighbouring francophone governments of Cameroon and Niger. There was a thaw in relations between Chad and Libya as diplomatic staff were exchanged once again. Relations likewise improved between Chad and Sudan.

In the summer of 1973, however, Libya occupied the Aouzou strip in northern Chad, basing its claim on the French-Italian treaty of June 1935, which the French had never ratified. Libya's assertion of its rights in northern Chad seem to have gone uncontested in Chad itself, perhaps another indication of

the southern bias in N'Djamina (and the French preference for the Sara and the comparatively prosperous agriculture of the south).³² The only opposition to the Libyans came from the *Forces Armees du Nord* (FAN) led by Hissene Habre. Until 1975 politics in Chad remained polarised around the North/South or Christian/Moslem axis. The state itself continued to be monopolised by the Sara with the systematic exclusion of northerners from political as well as military and economic power. While this greatly strengthened the unity and determination of the Sara, it also contributed to the fragmentation that was such a feature of FROLINAT and its interventions. There were at least three rebel armies - the true figure was closer to twelve - claiming revolutionary legitimacy in Chad by 1975.

The Second Army of Hissène Habre and Goukouni Oueddei had been created in 1972; in addition there were the *Forces Populaires de Libération* (FPL) of Abba Siddick, and the Eastern Army (AE) of Mohammed Baghlan. The Libyan occupation of the Aouzou Strip, in 1973, antagonised Frolinat and turned Habre into an opponent of the regime in Tripoli. Kadhafi then sought to exploit the divisions within the front as well as the ambivalence of French policy concerning the Strip and French hostility to Habre after several French had been captured and held by forces loyal to him. Kadhafi sought to exploit the rivalries within Frolinat, supporting Oueddei who was closer to Libya, in opposition to Habre who preferred to keep his distance. There

was a major schism between the two in 1976 which split the Second Army. Habre defected to organise the *Forces Armées du Nord* (FAN) while Oueddei emerged as leader of the *Forces Armées Populaires* (FAP).

With the help of the French, Habre then approached President Félix Maloum who had earlier staged a successful coup against Tombalbaye. Habre then became Prime Minister while Maloum remained as President. But at the beginning of 1979 these two leaders quarrelled. Nigeria intervened to try and effect a reconciliation in Chad that would help exclude Libyan influence. Oueddei agreed to distance himself from Libya in August 1979 and to enter a Government of National Unity (GUNT) in N'Djamena. Oueddei was able to take advantage of the rivalry between Habre and Maloum to impose himself as president and to arbitrate among all the contending factions. He detached himself from Libya and denounced its occupation of the Aouzou Strip. Libya then accused Goukouni of receiving arms from Jerusalem and Cairo, while Kadhafi turned to other factional leaders including Abba Siddick, Mohammed Abba of the *Front de Libération Populaire*, Ahmat Acyl from the *Armée Volcan*, and even Lieutenant-Colonel Wadel Abdelkader Kamougué, effective master of the south.

The Libyan objective was doubtless to bar the route to national reconciliation, as favoured by Nigeria and the majority of African states, members of the OAU. Tripoli hoped instead to take advantage of the continuing confusion within Chad to

multiply its own interventions and extend and deepen its penetration. Perceiving that the antagonists in Chad were lukewarm about implementing the Kano resolutions, under which Nigeria and Libya would act jointly to underwrite the reconciliation in Chad. Oueddei accused Lagos of trying to ignore and stifle the government in N'Djamena. Frolinat was then confronted in the capital by the *Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération de Tchad* (MPLT), financed, according to some sources, by the Nigerian government.³⁴ This apparently latent confrontation was the Nigerian response to Oueddei's renewed flirtation with Libya. In November 1980 it was even reported that Nigeria was considering an announcement declaring the Libyan ambassador in Lagos *persona non grata*.³⁵ He was said to be recruiting mercenaries from Nigeria to fight for Goukouni in the civil war now raging inside Chad. Though Nigeria refrained from breaking diplomatic relations with Libya, it nevertheless expelled the personnel of the "people's bureau" that had been set up inside the Libyan embassy in Lagos.

When fighting erupted in March 1980 among the various factions of the GUNT, the contest was essentially between Habré's *FAN* and the forces loyal to the GUNT, which included Goukouni's *FAP*, Kamougue's *Fores Armées Tchadiennes* (FAT), and Aycl Ahmat's *Front d'Action Commune* (FAC). The intensity of Habre's campaign coupled with the French decision to withdraw their forces from Chad, left Goukouni with little option but to request Libyan intervention. Kadhafi's seized the opportunity

that his opponents had afforded him. In December 1980 he / despatched a large military force to Chad, comprising the Islamic Legion with over 5,000 infantry supported by sophisticated Soviet weapons.³⁶ Unable to resist Habre then fled to Cameroon. A month after Libyan troops had entered Chad, Kadhafi announced that Libya would merge with its southern neighbour. Many states in Africa were critical of the Libyan gesture, seeing the Libyan presence more as an annexation than as a merger. In November 1981 Libya made the surprise announcement that she was withdrawing her forces from Chad - after strong pressure from African capitals and a campaign that seemed to be concerted between Lagos and Paris.

In December an OAU peacekeeping force was hastily improvised under Nigerian leadership but with contributions from only three of the six African states that had originally agreed to participate in the venture. The force had no clear instructions beforehand, with the Nigerians determined to avoid a military confrontation with any of the contending factions. Before long they found themselves under fire while Lagos failed to receive the financial backing it had been promised for the force - either from the OAU or from the French. Zaire and Senegal who also contributed to the OAU force of 3,500 troops had rather different conceptions from Nigeria about their role and referred all decisions about their deployment for the advice of their respective governments.³⁷ Oueddei interpreted 'peacekeeping' to

mean that the inter-African force would assist him to defeat Habre's *FAN*.

However, General Ejiga, Nigerian commander of the force, saw it as occupying a neutral position, creating a buffer zone between the opposing forces. Habre was able to put together a successful military coalition which, in view of the Nigerian attitude, resulted in Goukouni's downfall. There followed yet another Libyan intervention from the north in support of Goukouni, accompanied by a new French intervention, this time on behalf of Hissène Habre and his victorious coalition. Where the French had long considered Chad to be an integral part of their African domain, and the Libyans, under Kadhafi, had just as strongly rejected any French presence in Africa, the campaign in Chad, in 1982-3, threatened for a time to turn to all-out war.

François Mitterrand, the new Socialist president of France was anxious, however, to dissociate his administration from the earlier image of France - under the Fifth Republic - as the *gendarme* of Africa. A politician, with considerable previous experience of black Africa, Mitterrand was wary of those in Washington and elsewhere who sought to draw France into a direct confrontation with Libya. This time French intervention was designed not to support one or other faction, but instead to separate the warring leaders, providing a respite during which a peaceful settlement might be negotiated. Fighting a rear-guard action on the economic front in France itself, Mitterrand's

government had no wish to become embroiled in what threatened to become a long and expensive war with the risk of super-power involvement. Already Washington had supplied Habre with arms while he had been regrouping his forces in Sudan, in preparation for his return to power, and while France was still courting Oueddei's government in N'Djamena and working behind the scenes to secure the withdrawal of the Libyan forces.³⁸ The French politely warned the Americans that France could not accept the view of the Chadian conflict as one between East and West. Claude Cheysson, then French Foreign Minister, spoke of it as primarily a "war of chiefs".³⁹

Chad offered Kadhafi an obvious base from which to pursue his vision of an "Islamic Empire in the Sahara", stretching from Mauritania to Sudan. Being desperately poor, most of the countries in the region were also politically vulnerable. Which may be why Kadhafi appeared to accept Mitterrand's offer for a joint but phased withdrawal of French and Libyan troops from Chad, only to renege on the agreement, if such was indeed the agreement, after the French had hastened to comply. French withdrawal did, however, encourage those in Chad who wished to seize this, perhaps the last opportunity for a settlement excluding all direct foreign intervention. In Tripoli there appears to have been a strong difference of opinion between Goukouni and Kadhafi, reflected in Chad by the defection of much of Goukouni's support to the government forces now led by Habre.

The outcome, in March 1987, was the unexpected defeat of the Libyan army at Oudi Doum, with 2,500-3,000 soldiers killed and hundreds of prisoners taken captive.⁴⁰ For the first time Goukouni's followers had fought alongside the government forces. Kadhafi's prestige in Africa has suffered a severe blow from which it may not recover. The remnants of the Libyan army, back in Libya, may be a de-stabilising factor. The war itself is reported to have been unpopular with the Libyan officers and men. Kadhafi for his part is likely to take the opportunity to try to strengthen his control over the military, by changes of personnel at all levels, as well as by measures of de-centralisation, designed to give additional protection against any possible military intervention.

'Islamic' solidarity - with Uganda!

Elsewhere the experience of Libyan intervention has been scarcely more succesful although the motive has usually been similar : to eliminate Israeli and Zionist influence from Africa and to encourage the spread of Islam. Since independence Israel has sought to improve relations with black Africa, not only to secure diplomatic support but, more important, to position itself for intervention in the Arab states - to exploit any sign of weakness or division in the other camp. In Sudan, for example, Israel helped train the southern African dissidents, gathered together in the 1960s in the *Anyar Nya* movement. Further south Israel has also shown a continuing interest in Uganda which, to

some extent, also controls the Nile waters, vital for Egypt and its economy. When President Milton Obote was overthrown as President of Uganda, in 1971, there were 150-200 Israeli experts - half of them military - inside Uganda. Israel was also undertaking construction of six air bases and the training of Ugandan paratroopers.⁴¹ There were those who suspected the Israelis of complicity in the *coup* that enabled Idi Amin to replace Obote while the latter was attending the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore.

It came as something of a shock, therefore, when, on March 30, 1972, Amin announced his country's break with Israel. Already Libya's influence was being felt in Uganda. In September there appeared the first signs that Kampala was moving towards the Arab viewpoint. In the United Nations Uganda voted a motion calling on Israel to withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967. That same month some 400 Libyan troops landed at Entebbe airport near Kampala. Intended to provide a loyal, private bodyguard for Amin, the troops were met and welcomed by the President himself.⁴² In January 1973 Amin made the pilgrimage to the holy land and, on his return from Mecca, Amin stopped off in Tripoli where he conferred with Kadhafi. A joint communique proclaimed Islam as "the language of revolution". Libya undertook to build and finance a programme of educational and religious building in Uganda as well as signing agreements for economic cooperation. Bilateral relations were further strengthened the following month as Libya offered to provide a

\$10 million loan which had first been promised and then refused by Great Britain.⁴³

Uganda was the first African state eligible for Libyan aid, for the simple reason that it was also the first sub-Saharan state to have severed diplomatic ties with Israel. It was also the first to have expelled Israeli military staff, in March 1973. Successes of that order won considerable respect for Kadhafi and his policies among many of his Arab partners. Amin, on the other hand, was able to exploit the situation to win considerable leverage over his patron. To get Libyan support for his scheme to invade Tanzania, Amin had only to cite the presence in Dar-es-Salaam of Milton Obote, plotting his return to power with Tanzanian complicity - and Israeli support! The Libyans were convinced that the removal of Amin would mean the return in force to Kampala of their Israeli foes. In February 1977, when there were "threats" of an invasion from Tanzania, Kampala was able to announce that Libya had placed all its armed forces at the disposal of the Ugandan government.

Two months before the Ugandan attack on Tanzania, in November 1978, Idi Amin and his Defence Minister were both in Tripoli. After the outbreak of hostilities Libya called for moderation on the part of Tanzania and Uganda. Uganda, part of whose army was trained by the Palestinians, claimed to be ready to comply with the Libyan appeal : Tanzania, understandably, refused.⁴⁴ In March 1979 Amin called for a war against the Tanzanian

"aggressor" and his entourage of mercenaries and Ugandan traitors, supported by a coalition of imperialists, zionists and racists. He also confirmed that Palestinians were actively engaged in the conflict, fighting alongside his own troops.⁴⁵ By then the Ugandan army was being driven back across the frontier by the Tanzanian military offensive. Shortly afterwards the Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere, rejected an ultimatum from the Libyans to withdraw his troops from Ugandan territory, notwithstanding a Libyan threat to commit forces of its own to the defence of the Ugandan regime. More than 3,000 Libyan troops do, indeed, seem to have been seconded to the defence of the government in Kampala, while the Libyan media deplored the "terrible massacre of Ugandan Moslems by invading forces from Tanzania".

Despite Libyan intervention, the Ugandan opposition, which comprised some eighteen different movements, organised into the *National Front for the Liberation of Uganda* (NFLU), entered and occupied Kampala with the help of the Tanzanians on April 11, 1979. Amin fled the country, finally seeking sanctuary in Saudi Arabia. Libya had suffered 400 troops killed and another 200 taken captive in the course of the brief campaign.⁴⁶ They had gone to Kampala on a mission of "Islamic solidarity", despite the large Christian majority in Uganda where the Moslem population had never exceeded ten per cent. at most, and despite Amin's fearsome reputation both at home and abroad.

Libya and the Horn of Africa

The conflict in the Horn of Africa has traditionally involved long-standing Somali claims to the Ogaden province of Ethiopia, as well as claims, later withdrawn, to much of Kenya's most northerly province. It has also involved the parallel struggle for autonomy or independence from Ethiopia on the part of various factions, Christian and Marxist in Eritrea. From the outset there was a strong East-West dimension, with American support for the Emperor Haile Selassie in Addis Ababa, and Chinese, later Soviet support for the regimes, civilian and military, in Mogadishiu. The Somalis had failed in their first military confrontation with Ethiopia in 1964, when they had received little encouragement from the Soviets and had incurred the united wrath of the African states for trying to change existing frontiers by force.

They would try a second time, in 1977-78, following the revolution in Ethiopia in 1974 which saw the overthrow of Haile Selassie and the installation of the military *dergue*. Under attack over civil rights from President Carter, and, much more serious, facing an invasion from Somalia, the new regime in Addis Ababa moved further to the left, removing the Americans and inviting Soviet and Cuban intervention to defend what by now was describing itself as a Marxist, rather than a socialist regime. The Russians, for their part, were happy to exchange their influence in Somalia for a much larger, potentially stronger

ally, occupying a strategic location in North-East Africa with access to the Red Sea.

Libya's rapprochement with the Soviet Union after 1973 coincided with Egypt's integration after 1972 in the Western camp and Sadat's expulsion of the Soviet technicians and military advisers. Prior to the revolution in Ethiopia, in 1974, Libya under Kadhafi had supported the territorial claims of Somalia and her rejection of the inherited colonial frontiers. Somalia's Moslem majority and her membership of the Arab League - although she was not an Arab country - qualified her for Libyan support. Like Algeria, however, Libya moved into the other camp following the revolution in Ethiopia and the arrival in power of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam. The change in Tripoli was influenced by the new Soviet preference for Ethiopia, coupled, above all, with the fact that 'moderate' Arab states, led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and the Sudan. were now providing support for Somalia. The fact that Somalia belonged to the Arab League while the leadership in Ethiopia was neither Arab nor Moslem does not seem to have troubled Kadhafi (or Algeria).

And by 1977 Kadhafi had made yet another switch - from supporting the mainly Moslem guerrilla movement in Eritrea against Haile Selassie, to supporting the Marxist regime of Haile Mariam against the Eritrean Marxists. Once again the readiness of 'moderate' Arab states like Saudi Arabia to back the Eritrean movements was apparently sufficient cause for Libya to support

the anti-imperialist regime now entrenched in Addis Ababa. In July 1977 Egypt, Sudan and Saudi Arabia had concluded a 'holy alliance' with the aim of containing communist 'subversion' - whether from South Yemen, Ethiopia or from Libya. They planned to transform the Red Sea into an "Arab lake of peace". The fear of Soviet penetration of Africa and the Middle East and the desire for American support were also factors in the Arab equation. In Tripoli, however, the threat came from outside, directed by the United States and its European and Arab accomplices. The aim was to de-stabilise all 'progressive' African regimes. Hence Libya's support for Ethiopia against Somalia after 1974; it was even reported that Libya had given Moscow \$300 million to supply Mengistu's regime with MIG 21 fighter aircraft and some 110 T34 and T54 tanks.⁴⁷

Having defeated the Somali invasion with Cuban and Soviet assistance, the regime in Ethiopia then invoked Russian aid in a major offensive against the Eritrean liberation movements around Asmara. The Cubans seem to have declined their support for a war against a genuinely Marxist movement, while even the Libyans were uncertain whether to condone the destruction of a movement that was not only Marxist but also included a commitment to pan-Arabism among its objectives. Military failure in Eritrea might, however, provoke the downfall of the government in Addis Ababa. Unable or unwilling to choose Tripoli finally opted for a negotiated, political solution to the conflict - not unlike the Cuban position. Yet its repeated calls for negotiation did not

halt the Soviet military engagement in Eritrea; nor did it lead to a re-consideration of the Libyan-Ethiopian alliance. In the interests of anti-imperialist solidarity, Libya supports 'revolutionary' Ethiopia against the claims of Somalia, after having earlier supported Marxist Somalia against pro-Western Ethiopia. However, in the interests of Arab-Islamic solidarity, it called for a negotiated settlement of the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict (1976-78) after having supported the Eritrean guerrillas against Addis Ababa (1969-75).

Support for Soviet strategy and Soviet interests was never the over-riding or even the principal preoccupation on the part of Kadhafi. Instead it was the defence of 'progressive' regimes in Africa that would then become reliable partners in the struggle against Israel, and to defeat zionism and its imperialist allies. The Libyans have never stopped criticising Soviet opposition to religion and communist support for secular atheism among the peoples of the Soviet Union who include a very substantial Moslem component. Nor can the Libyans ignore the fact that the Soviet Union voted for the creation of Israel in the United Nations - alongside the United States. Indeed the continuing emigration of Soviet jews to Israel is one of the ambitions of the present Israeli leaders. The Soviets have also refused to accept the more extreme Palestinian position, which would entail the disappearance of the Jewish state in the Middle East. That certainly was not the tenor of the Brezhnev proposals

advanced in 1973. Moreover, Moscow supported Arafat against Assad and Kadhafi in 1983.

Nevertheless, it is a major objective of Kadhafi's African policy to exclude western as well as Israeli influence from Africa - and, most notably, the tenacious grip of the French over their former territories in West and Central Africa. It was in Chad that the Libyans hoped first to confront and then defeat the French, repeating their success among the adjacent states of the Sahel. In his Africa Day address on May 25, 1981 Kadhafi denounced those African states that were French-speaking and "completely subservient to France". It would make more sense in such cases to transfer Libya's diplomatic missions to France itself.⁴⁸ Accordingly, in June 1980 the Libyan government announced the closure of its embassy in Senegal, while its diplomatic staff were recalled from Gabon in August 1981. Senegal responded by breaking off diplomatic relations with Libya on July 1, 1980. Two weeks later President Senghor accused Kadhafi of training and arming mercenaries in an attempt to destabilise the Sahelian region. There were even allegations that Kadhafi was mobilising Senegalese dissidents under Ahmed Khalifa Niasse - who had taken refuge in Libya and had called for the installation of an Islamic republic in Senegal.⁴⁹

The same year Kadhafi was suspected of playing a part in the so-called Maitatsine riots that rocked the northern Nigerian city of Kano shortly after the return of civilian government and the

withdrawal of the military. The Nigerian Foreign Minister warned
:

I sincerely hope that they- the Libyans - will keep out of this country...But if they continue [to intervene] we will have to consider taking drastic measures.⁵⁰

Several other African states followed Senegal's example in severing diplomatic ties with Libya in 1980-81, including Gambia, Gabon and Ghana - all alleging that Libya had interfered in their domestic affairs. Indeed, repeated intervention by Libya in the states of the Sahel, and its exploitation of their persistent social and economic problems, has had the effect of uniting their governments - the majority at least - in efforts to isolate and contain Kadhafi.

At the 1981 OAU summit, in Nairobi, several African states were reluctant to have Tripoli as the venue for the next OAU summit. In fact the 1982 summit had to be abandoned after two successive attempts to convene in Tripoli. On the first occasion various states refused to attend because the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) had been admitted to full membership of the organisation. At the second attempt they again refused to attend because Kadhafi refused to receive Hissène Habre as the legitimate representative of Chad. Many African states saw Chad as the springboard for Libyan attempts at de-stabilisation elsewhere in the Sahel and, beyond that, in West, Central and

Eastern Africa. Fears such as these have led the Ivorian President, Houphouet-Boigny, to attribute a prolonged teachers' strike in April 1983 to the machinations of an unnamed foreign power - presumably Libya. At that time Kadhafi was visiting Benin, a francophone state and a member of the Ivorian Entente - but with a 'Marxist' military government. In Benin he succeeded in infuriating Houphouet-Boigny by declaring : "we must continue to incite the African peoples to revolution and to encourage the army to seize power." In Abidjan he was described by the media as an "Arab-African Hitler".⁵¹ The pro-Libyan *coup* that took place in Upper Volta four months later, in August 1983, clearly served to confirm African fears about Kadhafi.

Conclusions

Libya's foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa has a symbolic character that is inspired by Kadhafi's dream of a united Arab nation that would one day assume the leadership of the Third World. Libya's interest in Africa south of the Sahara grew after the failure of Libya's foreign policy both in the Middle East and in the Maghreb. Substantial oil revenues have given credibility to Libya's ambitions in Africa which are backed up by generous offers of financial assistance on the one hand as well as by threats of military involvement and de-stabilisation on the other. But visions of Arab unity in Africa have proved as difficult to realise as earlier dreams of unity with Egypt and the other Arab states of the Middle East. Another dimension of

Libyan policy in sub-Saharan Africa is its support for Islam and its efforts to replace Western values with Moslem ones. In line with much earlier policies of Senoussiya expansionism it seeks to dominate the Sahara in ideological terms. Accordingly, Kadhafi's Libya follows the 'natural' line of expansion which was that of the *Senoussiya*, towards Chad, southern Algeria and northern Niger. Again the symbolic nature of Libyan policy is obvious, although mixed, as always with a measure of pragmatism and more than a suspicion of opportunism.

But it is Kadhafi's Middle Eastern designs and his desire to acquire a nuclear capability, on behalf of the Arab world, that have pushed him in the direction of territorial expansion and into neighbouring states with large known (or reputed) reserves of uranium - just as the desire to acquire nuclear technology has pushed him into even closer alliance with the Soviet Union. But again it is the symbolic character of Libyan policy that is most striking. Libya has little to recommend it as a credible nuclear power - unlike Israel it does not have the technological base or the necessary levels of scientific skill or military organisation. For Kadhafi the possession of a nuclear capability would serve largely symbolic purposes - as a token of Arab renewal and a force for Arab unity. As well as being an instrument of coercion and blackmail, a nuclear device also helps define the extent of a state's 'power' as well as its prestige in the modern world. To Kadhafi there is no question but that the

restoration of Arab 'greatness' requires the acquisition of nuclear capability.

After 1973 the Maghrebin states pursued more active foreign policies in Africa. The reason was the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, which provided motives and incentives for Arabs and Africans to come together to harmonise their foreign policies with regard to the external world and in the context of Middle Eastern issues and the North-South debate. In the Maghreb, Algeria and Libya made considerable efforts to convince African states of the necessity for a united Arab-African front so as to make common cause against the "common" enemy : represented by apartheid on the one hand and by zionism on the other. It was argued that by combining their efforts the Arab and African states could help defeat injustice and regain their sense of dignity. These efforts resulted in the so-called Afro-Arab Dialogue where Arab finance and African diplomacy were supposed to complement one another and to contribute to the success of their respective causes.

The conservative Arab states of the Gulf, led by Saudi Arabia, were determined, however, to show themselves as the effective masters of the new situation. It was their financial contributions rather than those of the Maghrebin states that would determine the success or otherwise of Afro-Arab dialogue - at least so far as the African recipients of aid were concerned. The radical Arab states like Algeria and Libya were excluded from

any major role in the Arab-African rapprochement, which was to the advantage of the moderate Maghrebin states, namely Morocco and Tunisia, who lacked the income of their "oil-rich" neighbours but had no wish to be overtaken either in the Maghreb itself, or anywhere else in Africa.

In the medium and longer term, however, the divisions within the Arab world have served only to weaken Arab-African cooperation as African states have resisted attempts to enlist their support in inter-Arab conflicts that are remote from their immediate concerns. It is argued that such disputes have served only to threaten and undermine the fragile consensus on which African unity and the OAU are based. Meanwhile the conflict over the Western Sahara split the Maghreb into two distinct camps with Algeria "supported" by Libya on the one hand, and Morocco receiving "moral" backing from Tunisia on the other. Morocco's military successes on the battlefield were matched by Algeria's diplomatic efforts on the African scene. These regional rivalries then spilt over into other areas of Africa where conflict was increasingly assuming an ideological character, beginning with Angolan independence and the civil war that accompanied it in 1975 and soon spreading to the Western Sahara, then to the Horn of Africa and, after the troubles in Shaba province of Zaire, finally focussing on the civil war in Chad. From the outset, Algeria's covert support for the MPLA and the central government in Angola was countered by Morocco's more direct and explicit support for Zaire and the Angolan opposition.

The Maghrebin states, with the exception of Libya, have approached their potential African allies from the vantage point of a limited coincidence of interests rather than that of an all-embracing sense of community and shared values. But the crucial factor dictating Maghrebin involvement in Africa has been the struggle for regional leadership within the Maghreb itself and the attempt to enlist African support on behalf of the two leading North African states, Algeria and Morocco. The Algerian approach has been largely secular focussing mainly on economic issues with the emphasis on national control of resources, on overcoming dependency and cooperating in the creation of a new international economic order. At the same time Algeria views Africa as a large and convenient market - once existing barriers to trade are overcome - for the country's expanding industrial production, as well as an obvious source of raw materials. The Moroccan interest in Africa is political and strategic rather than economic. Radical states like Algeria and Libya are perceived as a serious threat to the established social and political order. The Moroccan role in Africa is therefore to strengthen and defend the moderate African regimes - although occasionally (and briefly) Morocco has made common cause with radical states, notably Ghana in the sixties and Libya in the 1980s, in pursuit of territorial claims dictated by the logic of Maghrebin politics.

Tunisia, which has few means with which to influence events in Africa, prefers to see the continent tied to the western world

whose continuing support and cooperation, both military and economic, is felt to be a condition for African emancipation, and for the independence and development of the new states. Libya, on the other hand, has pursued long term symbolic goals as well as short term territorial gains in Africa. The attachment to Arab unity and Islamic hegemony has been accompanied by wide-ranging interventions in African and Arab states alike. usually involving financial or military support or, conversely, destabilisation culminating sometimes in physical intervention. African ends are subordinated to (radical) Arab goals and leadership, although the targets of Libyan policy are often the "corrupt", conservative regimes in Africa and the Middle East, which have made common cause with imperialism and zionism at the expense of the masses and Arab-African unity. In that context Islam is presented as a revolutionary doctrine that is alone capable of mobilising those same masses against foreign penetration and economic exploitation.

Libyan policy under Kadhafi has, however, been perceived as ambitious, subversive and, indeed, counter-productive by most other African states, conservative and radical alike, as well as by states and powers outside Africa. While North African interest in the sub-Saharan states has largely been dictated by rivalries within the Maghreb itself, the divisions among the Arab states have been just as pronounced as the divisions among the old colonial powers. As a result Afro-Arab dialogue had already lost much of its attractiveness for both sides even before the

end of the 1970s and the start of the next decade that would witness a sharp drop in oil prices and the emergence of the debt crisis.

PART FIVE

THE MAGHREB-WESTERN EUROPE AND THE
SUPER POWERS

THE MAGHREB, WESTERN EUROPE AND THE SUPER-POWERS

Introduction

The year 1973 marked a watershed in Arab-European relations generally and in Maghrebin-European relations in particular. It was the year of Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) following the Arab-Israeli war of October. But for the war, the oil boycott, and the new pricing arrangements for oil, there would not have been a dialogue. Because of their geographical proximity to Europe and their historical ties, particularly with France, the Maghreb countries played a prominent role in the Dialogue. Even before the October war, at the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers, in September 1973, Houari Boumedienne had raised the question of a rapprochement with Europe "to put an end to the bipolarisation of the world".¹ Afro-Arab cooperation and a joint dialogue with Europe were seen as useful steps towards that goal. European technology, Arab oil and finance, and African raw materials formed the basis for an alliance that even the super-powers would have to reckon with.

From the vantage point of Western Europe and the member-countries of the European Community (EC) the oil boycott, imposed by OAPEC in the context of the 1973 war, raised a number of vital issues : the formation of an oil-producers cartel was no longer a remote and unlikely prospect; Europe was particularly vulnerable to such a boycott given its high consumption of imported oil and its heavy dependence on Middle Eastern producers; and globally

the European states were unable to speak with a single voice and were, in any case, overshadowed by the super-powers, particularly the United States. The 'Nine' therefore issued a declaration on November 6, 1973, which proclaimed the support of the EC for Security Council resolutions 242 and 336, calling for Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967 and acknowledging the right of all Middle Eastern states to secure existence within recognised and approved frontiers. There was recognition, too, of the need for a "just peace" based on acceptance of the "legitimate rights of the Palestinians".

This important statement, now regarded as Western Europe's first original contribution to the Middle Eastern debate, was followed a few days later by the Arab League summit in Algiers which issued an appeal for the development of trust and mutually beneficial cooperation across the Mediterranean and between European and Arab states - states which shared a long history as well as cultural affinities and a number of vital interests that remained common to both. Such were the origins of Euro-Arab Dialogue in 1973. In December discussions were held in Copenhagen between European representatives and four Arab ministers (from Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan and the UAE) mandated by the Algiers Arab summit. The European states had to balance off their heavy dependence on Arab oil, which accounted for well over half their total imports, against American warnings that any Dialogue at this level should not extend to questions of politics or oil. The dialogue nevertheless became institutionalised with

the creation of a General Commission that met for the first time in Luxembourg, in May 1974. There were further meetings in Tunis (1977), Brussels (end of 1977), Copenhagen (March 1978) and Damascus (December 1978). Meanwhile EC exports to the Arab world more than doubled, rising from 6.6% of all exports in 1972 to 15% in 1979.²

The European reaction to Camp David in 1978 was supportive, at least in public, although there was considerable scepticism regarding the possibility of a Palestinian settlement emerging within such a restricted diplomatic framework. The Foreign Ministers of the EC, in a statement of September 19, congratulated President Carter on his efforts and achievements to date, but insisted that peace would be achieved only when the various parties concerned had taken account of a "Palestinian homeland".³ In 1979 there was increased pressure on Europe both from the French government inside the EC and from the Arab states outside, who called for a European diplomatic posture on the Middle East that would be independent of the United States and would better protect European interests in the Arab World. The outcome was the Venice declaration in June 1980 which launched a European initiative for a settlement of the outstanding issues in the Middle East. The declaration did not go so far as to recognise the PLO but did ask that the PLO should be associated with any future negotiations. It also rejected any unilateral initiative aimed at a change in the status of Jerusalem. Otherwise the West European states confirmed the right of all

states within the Middle East to a secure and peaceful existence within recognised frontiers, and repeated its earlier appeal for a just settlement in the Middle East recognising, among other things, the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.⁴

Caution rather than imagination were the hallmarks of the Venice declaration, whose overriding concern it was to reassure Washington while seeking to placate the Arab states with a number of pious statements that, in the context of European-American relations, carried little or no weight with the super-powers. This evident lack of resolve on the part of the Europeans, coupled with the new Republican administration in Washington, doubtless encouraged Israel to invade the Lebanon in 1982. There was an attempt to revive the European peace initiative in March 1984 - long after the failure of the Brezhnev Plan in 1978, the Reagan Plan of September 1981 and the Fahd Plan of 1981/1982. There was a declaration by EC members calling on Israel to end its occupation of Arab territories and to halt the creation of new settlements in the West Bank, the Golan, and Gaza. Without American backing, however, the member-states of the EC had little leverage over Israel even had they been agreed - which they were not - about measures to give effect to their resolutions.

The Maghrebin states were well placed, geographically and otherwise, to play a key role in any Euro-Arab Dialogue. Long and close association with France and other EC countries had made

them familiar with the problems arising from transfer of technology and unequal exchange. Where, in the past, Algeria had been ready to play the American card against the French in order to achieve independence, they now sought to strengthen Euro-Arab Dialogue in the hope of distancing Western Europe (or individual European states) from the United States, emphasising their different and often conflicting interests, while underlining the underlying sympathies and the interdependence that marked Europe's relations with the Arab states. Algeria was already looking for improved relations with France, under President Giscard d'Estaing after 1974, in the context of the North-South Dialogue, and after 1981 under the socialist President, François Mitterrand, who held out promise of a new era of Franco-Algerian solidarity and cooperation, beginning with a long-term contract for imported Algerian gas on terms that were highly favourable to Algeria.

For the Algerians, cooperation with France and Europe would help reduce American influence in the Middle East, and within the Arab world would strengthen the states of the Maghreb (notably Algeria) at the expense of those in the Gulf who claimed to have the confidence of Washington. The oil embargo imposed by OAPEC on October 17, 1973, was designed to gain leverage over the West and thereby to increase the pressure on Israel to negotiate. For Algeria, however, it also served other purposes. Primarily it was a means of boosting oil revenues to finance domestic development and a series of major economic projects. If Algeria

called for tougher measures against the United States, the Netherlands, Portugal and South Africa, and was "softer" on the other EC countries, this largely reflected her own trading patterns. Oil supplies to America were then only 5% of total oil exports from Algeria. Nor could America retaliate diplomatically or otherwise against Algeria as all relations had been severed after 1967.

Oil is not, however, the only commodity traded across the Mediterranean. The countries of the EC, particularly France, also provide a valuable outlet for surplus Maghrebin labour, especially unskilled labour from Algeria and Morocco. They are also an important source of manufactured goods as well as providing technical and financial assistance. The Maghreb, for its part, supplies much of the EC's energy and commodity requirements, creating a large degree of complementarity between the North and South "banks" of the Mediterranean. Indeed, Maghrebin trade with the EC far exceeds the levels of trade within North Africa itself - one of the major problems confronting more ambitious plans for Maghrebin unity and cooperation. Dialogue with the EC is also favoured by the North African states in so far as it is a trading community rather than a military alliance and does not therefore threaten their independent, non-aligned status. In that respect it is preferable to alliance with either of the super-powers and integration in their respective military blocs.

Under the terms of the EC's Mediterranean policy, the community began in 1973 to negotiate an agreement of association with Algeria as well as renewal of existing agreements of association with Tunisia and Morocco. The negotiations broke down, however, over the problems posed by Tunisia's tinned sardines, by Morocco's citrus fruits, and by Algerian wine. Agreement on the new trading arrangements, and provisions for aid and cooperation, was not reached, therefore, until 1976. In April of that year Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia all signed association agreements with the EC (then the EEC)- which emphasised the growing inter-dependence of the nations on both sides of the Mediterranean, and twenty years after Tunisian and Moroccan independence. North Africa serves increasingly as a convenient market for West European manufactured goods and as a recipient of European technology, while Western Europe absorbs much of North Africa's agricultural surplus, her unskilled labour and her raw materials.

In the case of Tunisia and Morocco the new agreements of association gave preferential access for Tunisian products like olive oil and wine which would now be admitted to the Community markets at special low tariffs. Industrial products would have free access with quotas for more sensitive items whose import would threaten established local manufactures. Tariffs on Moroccan citrus fruits and wine were set 80% below the fixed Community rate, while concessions were also available for tinned sardines and olive oil and, in the industrial sector, there is

exemption for all Moroccan products derived from cork. Algeria had no previous agreement with the EC and, conscious of its leading position in the Third World and its reputation as a radical state, the Algerians made the negotiations both difficult and protracted. The agreements concluded by Tunisia and Morocco were strongly attacked by Algiers who claimed they had obtained only "derisory" advantages and were simply bolstering European protectionism. The agreement of association finally reached between the EC and Algeria was broadly similar, however, to those already signed with her two North African neighbours. There was complete exemption from tariffs for Algeria's industrial products with partial exceptions for cork and for products derived from refined petroleum.⁵

Tunisia and Morocco protested nevertheless at what seemed to them unfair discrimination in favour of Algeria and against their own established economic interests. Algeria, they maintained, had negotiated easier access for its oranges and quality wines than they had received for the same products. To which the EC replied that other concessions had been made to the Tunisians and Moroccans, achieving an overall balance between the three Maghrebin states.⁶ The 1976 agreements were of unlimited duration and, unlike previous agreements, did not entail the granting of "reverse preference" to the states of the EC. In fact the concession dates back to 1973/4 and the re-negotiation in Brussels of the Lomé Agreements. Under Nigerian leadership the African, Caribbean and Pacific states had pressed strongly for

concessions on "reverse preferences" as well as on a number of other issues including fixed 'floor' prices for a specified number of commodities essential to the economic survival of many of the poorest Third World states. As in other areas of policy the African and other Third World states were beginning to look within themselves for leadership in international negotiations - and away from the Arab states.

Nevertheless, Algeria attached particular importance to the principle of "non-reciprocity", for which it had campaigned actively through the seventies in the context of the North-South dialogue. Along with lower tariffs on industrial products and guaranteed quotas and minimum prices for raw material exports, it had long been seen by Third World states as an important step towards a New International Economic Order. The 1976 agreement of association was renewed by Algeria in June 1987. There was a matching financial protocol with a renewable five-year duration for which the EC has allocated the sum of FF 1.7 billion. Europe is Algeria's major market for hydro-carbons as well as being the leading supplier of goods to Algeria, while the balance of trade in 1986 was \$2 billion in Algeria's favour.⁷

Algerian policy in the period under review was largely based on extracting from Brussels and the European capitals the best possible terms for Algerian trade while pursuing its goal of rapid industrialisation in an attempt to transform the country's status within the international capitalist system. The approach

can best be described - to adopt the language of I.W. Zartman - as that of "licking them". Tunisia and Morocco are similarly concerned with their domestic development and securing better terms of trade with the EC. Their elites, however, are more conservative and more closely integrated with the ruling circles in Western Europe. The main goal of association with the EC is therefore to foster the preservation of existing economic (and therefore political) structures : the approach is one of "joining them".⁶

The Mediteranean basin forms a single ecological unit and patterns of agricultural production are therefore similar everywhere. The Maghreb states, being on the other side of the Mediterranean are not, however, eligible for membership of the European Community. Their status is governed by a special Declaration of Intent, part of the Annexe to the Rome Treaty, which only permits them to conclude "conventions for economic association" with the EC. The prospect therefore of Spanish and Portuguese entry to the EC as full members seemed to threaten the interests of Tunisia and Morocco in particular, which produced a range of similar agricultural products and whose status within the Community would remain inferior to that of the newcomers.

The impact would be proportionately greater in the case of Morocco where agriculture plays a predominant role in the economy and where some three-fifths of the population are engaged in farming. Aware of this challenge Morocco announced its

intention, in 1984, to apply for full membership of the Community. King Hassan II repeated the request while visiting Britain in July 1987. As the statutes of the EC preclude non-European states from full membership it is probable that the request was a symbolic affirmation of Morocco's desire to retain a close relationship with the EC despite its new composition. Today Morocco and Tunisia face something of a dilemma in their relations with the European Community. Unless they diversify their economies quickly, and re-structure production to ensure greater efficiency and even lower costs, they are likely to suffer considerably in the near future from competition from Greece, Spain and Portugal. Algeria and Libya, on the other hand, are mainly exporters of hydro-carbons for which there is a fairly buoyant market in western Europe (albeit at lower prices since 1981). Even the new members of the Community are importers of oil and gas.

Another issue helping to shape relations between the Maghreb and the EEC has been the presence of a considerable number of Maghrebin migrant workers within the Community, particularly in France. The number is now estimated at around 1,200,000 and their accommodation and treatment in the host country has long been a source of continuing complaint on the part of their home government. In 1983 the French Socialist government recognised their right to equal status with domestic workers - which itself marked a considerable advance. The Community has itself acknowledged the existence of the problem. Apart from numerous

cases of racism, particularly in France, the Maghrebin governments are also concerned about the opportunities for migrant workers to acquire skills that are in short supply back home and would contribute substantially to economic development in North Africa. As unskilled labour they are seen to be in competition with French workers and are highly vulnerable in an economy experiencing high and rising levels of unemployment. Their remittances are valuable to the Maghrebin economies while their presence abroad helps to keep unemployment down in Algeria and Morocco. Nevertheless the North African governments acknowledge that this is at best a short-term expedient - although it has been continuing now since before the last war. Re-training within the Community would be a valuable contribution to Maghrebin development as well as a form of indirect educational subsidy.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN : ALGERIA AND EUROPE

'NATURAL' PARTNERS

France : Algeria's road to Europe

Algeria has long been aware of the relevance of Western Europe for her economic development as well as for her security. It was this that prompted the government to try to win observer status at the 1975 Helsinki Conference on European Cooperation and Security. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, Algeria was permitted to submit its views to the conference and, in its submissions, Algeria took the opportunity to underline the connection between European and Mediterranean security.

Algeria's original association with the European Community was indirect, based on its special relationship with France. When the special relationship ended Algeria immediately began negotiating a direct association with the EC whose members, particularly France, continue to account for a significant proportion of Algeria's trade. Because of the long colonial experience and the resulting historical and cultural ties, Franco-Algerian relations are more prominent than relations with other European countries. Since the time of General de Gaulle, France has seen Algeria as its "window" on the Third World; Algeria for its part has looked to France to defend its interests inside Western Europe. Boumedienne was not the first to have acknowledged that "Paris and Algiers are condemned to live together", despite their political differences over a wide range

of issues, including the Western Sahara and the status of migrant workers in France. Meanwhile the French have attempted to maintain a presence within the Algerian economy and to retain their influence with a country that was once regarded as part and parcel of the metropole.

Conflicts and reconciliations have been a feature of Franco-Algerian relations since independence in 1962. There has been some convergence in foreign policy as a result of de Gaulle's insistence on French independence vis-a-vis the global powers, his withdrawal from NATO in 1966, and his determination to pursue a policy oriented towards Africa, the Arab states and the Third World. Successive French presidents after de Gaulle have likewise adhered to an independent line of foreign policy, sympathetic to Third World aspirations. President Pompidou registered his opposition to Henry Kissinger's scheme for the creation of an International Agency for Energy; Giscard d'Estaing cooperated with the African and Arab states to organise a global debate on North/South issues in 1974-76 and to encourage three-way cooperation between Europe, Africa and the Arab world; at the Cancun talks in Mexico in 1981, Francois Mitterrand supported Algeria's proposal for global negotiations notwithstanding the hostility of the American President; Mitterrand also worked to increase French support for the Third World, trying to extend aid to states outside the traditional 'inner circle' in West Africa. All such initiatives were well received in Algiers.

By 1973 Algeria's relations with France seemed to have survived the nationalisations of 1971 and to be on the mend. In the summer Abdelaziz Bouteflika became the first Algerian Foreign Minister to visit France since independence in 1962. The visit succeeded for a time in healing the rift that had developed as a result of the earlier expropriation of French companies and investments - without compensation. The treatment of Algerian migrant workers in France did, however, introduce a discordant note - and eleven Algerians were killed during September 1973 as a result of racial violence. That month the Algerian government suspended further immigration to France while the presence in France of over 800,000 Algerians raises questions of security that have weighed heavily on policy-makers in both capitals. In his two visits to France in January 1974 Bouteflika received assurances from President Georges Pompidou about the security of Algerian workers living in France. The French Foreign Minister, Michel Jobert, then travelled to Algiers in March. Other visits followed in rapid succession culminating in the first visit by a French president to independent Algeria in April 1975.⁹

President Giscard d'Estaing came to office in 1974 determined to improve relations with Algeria, to set aside the quarrels of the past, and to secure France's energy requirements by promoting mutually profitable trade and investment. In Algiers the French and Algerian presidents discussed the Paris energy conference and the need to widen its scope.¹⁰ Giscard promised to improve the condition of Algerian workers resident in

France and to try to meet Algeria's need for a wider range of skills. There was agreement to proceed with a \$2 billion gas pipeline that would supply Algerian gas to the French and European markets.¹¹ It was not long, however, before many of the old problems re-emerged : racism, clashes over the pricing of Algerian commodities, notably oil and gas, and, by 1975, the Western Sahara issue began to cast a long shadow over Franco-Algerian relations.

Algeria's will for de-colonisation of relations

Initially France maintained a neutral posture over the Western Sahara conflict. Early in 1976, however, French policy tilted towards Morocco as France agreed, in January, to sell 21 Mirage F1 fighter aircraft to Morocco - at a time when Morocco and Algeria were engaging in open confrontation. The Algerians regarded the French initiative as a hostile gesture. Giscard maintained that good relations with Morocco should not imply any deterioration in relations with Algeria.¹² He did, however, indicate his support for the partition of the Western Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania, which he justified on the grounds that the small population of Saharawis could not support the large, complex apparatus of a modern state. To allay Algerian fears he was prepared, however, to sell arms to Algeria as well as to Morocco. He also offered French mediation should both sides request it. But relations between Paris and Algiers suffered a further eclipse, in May 1976, when Polisario guerrillas

kidnapped six French nationals working in Mauritania, seizing two others in October.

The French held Algeria responsible and threatened military intervention to free the hostages. At the request of the Mauritanian government French Jaguar aircraft were sent to strafe and attack Polisario bases. The hostage affair still rankled in December 1977 when the French legislature vetoed an important agreement between Algeria and the European Community. Still denying any responsibility, Algeria then arranged for negotiations between the French and Polisario, and these talks and the intercession of the U.N. Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, led to the release of the hostages that same month. French-Algerian disagreements over the Western Sahara did offer Algiers the opportunity to seek out alternative trading partners, thereby asserting her independence while strengthening her bargaining power. By 1976 the United States had superseded France as Algeria's major trading partner. In 1977 the important division of the Algerian Foreign Ministry with responsibility for 'France' was absorbed into the division dealing with 'North America' and 'Europe of the Nine'. The advent of President Carter in Washington and his policies favouring civil rights and a 'regional' rather than a 'global' response to Third World problems, undoubtedly contributed to the new Algerian orientation. Henceforth American penetration of Algeria began to seem irreversible. In 1976 the French Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Algeria had warned that "France is about to lose

once and for all its economic and cultural predominance within Algeria".¹³

Algeria's determination to promote trade with America rather than with France was underlined by the appointment, in June 1977, of Abdelaziz Maoui, as Ambassador to Washington - a post left vacant although diplomatic relations with the United States, broken off in 1967, had been resumed as long ago as 1974. The appointment of a new ambassador to Washington coincided with a re-shuffle of Boumedienne's government and the deliberate choice of technocrats with a view to "gaining the battle of production and management". The interests being reflected in Algiers were those of the large state industries created in the late 60s and early 70s, companies like SONATRACH with responsibility for the extraction and marketing of oil and gas. The new generation of Algerian officials and management, like their counterparts in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa at this time, were impressed by the advances of American technology and the efficiency of American management - to say nothing of the respect and prestige that they enjoyed with government and administration alike.

Meanwhile the economic downturn in France, following the energy crisis, had aggravated racial tensions to the point where the government was considering the phased repatriation of Algerian migrant workers. In December 1978 Paris rejected a request from Algiers that expiring visas for migrant workers should be renewed for an additional ten year period. Instead the

French proposed a one year extension and further talks between the two governments. Under pressure the Algerian authorities agreed to the repatriation of some 30,000 workers annually but a thaw in relations led to a new agreement in Paris, in September 1980, effectively ruling out repatriation as a solution to the outstanding difficulties.¹⁴ Relations continued to improve across the Mediterranean, particularly after the election of Francois Mitterrand in 1981, the first socialist and left-wing President of the Fifth Republic. While France's rather ambivalent attitude to the Western Sahara dispute remained a stumbling block, the new government in Paris was obviously keen to dissociate itself from earlier right-wing policies in Africa including support for conservative-oriented regimes and a predilection for military intervention.

There had been a new government in Algeria, too, since 1979, and the president, Benjedid Chadli, was anxious from the start to work for better relations with his French counterpart.

We have never been against the French people. Today we have turned the corner after one hundred and thirty years of colonialism and eight years of war. Now is the time to re-examine relations between our two countries.¹⁵

Trade between Algeria and France flourished once more in the eighties. thanks in no small measure to a very favourable agreement with the French for the export of Algerian gas at

prices well above the going rate in Europe and the rest of the world. Other agreements followed covering different sectors of the economy.

Algeria's gas policy and Europe

By 1982 France had recovered its position as Algeria's major trading partner to the relief of those in Paris for whom Algeria could never be anything but French. In November 1981 Mitterrand had already visited Algeria and in December 1982 it was the turn of President Chadli to repay the courtesy, stopping over for four hours in Paris after an official visit to Belgium. His choice of Belgium in preference to France was taken by French officials as an indication of the delicate state of Franco-Algerian relations. The French recovery in Algeria also owed much to a bitter dispute with the El Paso company of Houston, Texas, after Algeria had demanded a new contract and a sharp price increase for its liquified natural gas - \$6 per million BTUs instead of \$1.95.¹⁶ In 1980 both El Paso and the American government rejected the Algerian request, fearing that it would set a precedent and encourage other larger suppliers, notably Mexico and Canada, to follow suit. Negotiations were broken off in February 1981, but not before Algeria claimed to have lost \$1 billion in revenue as a result of its decision to suspend sales of its gas to the United States.

Algeria had then to seek new customers in Europe where its gas would have to compete with cheaper Soviet supplies reaching the West via a new overland pipe-line. Where Algeria was receiving \$3.75 per million BTUs from the French, the Belgians in April 1981 agreed a price of \$4.80 for long term supplies from Algeria.¹⁷ This was a significant break-through for the Algerians in their long wrangle to secure higher prices for natural gas and to index gas prices to those for crude oil. It helps explain Chadli's first visit to Belgium in 1982, in preference to Paris. By 1982 Algeria had finally succeeded in extracting from Belgium, France and Italy an additional premium of around 20% above market rates for its natural gas. The Algerian authorities were anxious to diversify their exports in view of the low reserves of oil; by way of contrast Algeria holds the fourth largest reserves of natural gas in the world. Moreover, a considerable amount of capital had been invested in new plant designed to liquify the natural gas which could then be transported anywhere in the world.

At the beginning of February 1982 France signed one of the largest ever contracts for the supply of natural gas from Algeria. The deal came only a few days after the French had agreed to take a similar quantity of gas each year from the Soviet Union and the price to be paid Algeria was 20% above market rates. Following protests by *Gaz de France* the government agreed to pay thirteen per cent. of the price direct to the Algerian suppliers.¹⁸ The decision effectively to subsidise the

purchase of Algerian LNG was then complemented by three sectoral agreements covering French participation in Algerian projects covering housing, transport, infrastructure and agriculture, which brought substantial orders for French companies by way of compensation.

In September 1982 there was yet another agreement, this time between Algeria and Italy, covering the supply of natural gas through the Trans-Mediterranean pipe-line - over a year after the completion of the pipe-line. The deep differences between the two governments over the price to be paid for the gas go some way to explain why a \$1.3 billion facility had remained unused for those twelve months. Algeria, for its part, was determined to extract everything it could for what amounted to a wasting asset. The main Italian customer, the state oil company, ENI, had agreed to review the original contract, signed in 1977, but refused to pay more than \$3.90 per million BTUs until the Italian government, following the French example, offered a subsidy raising the price to \$4.41. The price was indexed to a basket of crude oil prices and the agreement, though covering the supply of gas for twenty-five years, was subject to review every three years.¹⁹ France and Italy had, in effect, paid a political price to ensure supplies of the gas on which they were relying to meet future energy demands and to achieve a desired balance among different types of fuel.

Algeria, for its part, rewarded French, Belgian and Italian companies with contracts enabling them to participate in the execution of Algerian development projects. Thus, in September 1982, the Belgian company, Cobelgaz, won a turnkey contract, worth \$100 million, to construct a pipe-line from Hassi R'Mel oil field to the port of Arzew, Algeria's major oil and gas base.²⁰ In November 1982 the Algerian and French governments signed a major transport agreement that was expected to bring French companies contracts worth \$1.3 billion. French companies had, in particular, been retained to build an underground transport system for Algiers. Another agreement by Italy for the purchase of Algerian gas opened the door to an estimated \$1.5 billion worth of Italian exports to Algeria.²¹

By way of contrast, Spain's position as a supplier to the Algerian market was weakened by a protracted dispute between the Algerian state-owned oil company, SONATRACH, and the Spanish state gas company, ENGAS. It was alleged that ENGAS had failed to honour the terms of a contract to import LNG from Algeria. Deliveries were suspended in 1981 after the twenty-five year contract had run only six years and after ENGAS had taken, on average, only one-third of the agreed quantity of gas. In retaliation Algeria had suspended several key contracts awarded to Spanish companies. In 1985 the Spanish share of Algerian imports fell to 1.4% compared with 7.5% in 1982. This dispute was, however, settled as a result of an agreement concluded in Algiers, in February 1985, in the presence of the foreign

ministers of the two states. ENGAS agreed to pay \$500 million in compensation and to accept a price increase on the resumption of deliveries. SONATRACH agreed for its part to permit ENGAS to vary the quantities of LNG to be taken pending the extension of the Spanish domestic grid and, as a result, an increase in domestic demand. The prospects of further economic cooperation were enhanced by the visit of the Spanish Prime Minister, Felipe Gonzalez, to Algeria in March 1985, followed by that of Chadli to Spain the following July.

Algeria has generally favoured relations with European states but relations with Spain deteriorated sharply in 1975 after the government in Madrid had signed a tripartite agreement with Morocco and Mauritania allowing them to partition and occupy the Western (former Spanish) Sahara. Algeria had responded by offering material and moral support to the Saharawi nationalist movement, represented by the Polisario Front. Furthermore, Algeria extended its support to the Canary Islands' Independence Movement (MPAIAC).²² The Spanish government recalled its ambassador from Algiers, in December 1977 after a statement in the Algerian press describing the Canary Islands as the "last Spanish colony in Africa" and implicitly criticising Spain for allowing the French to use a base in the islands from which aircraft could then proceed to Dakar and carry out attacks against Polisario.

The Spanish protested at Algerian interference in what they described as their "domestic affairs", namely the Canary Islands. A visit to Algiers by the Spanish socialist leader, Felipe Gonzalez, seems to have improved relations. Algeria ceased to allow broadcasts by the MPAIAC directed at the Canary Islands, while the Spanish ambassador returned to Algeria in February 1978.²³ Algiers then took the opportunity to protest about the freedom that the Spanish authorities accorded to Algerian opposition leaders, including the former President, Ahmed Ben Bella, and his supporters. Algeria then offered sanctuary to the Basque leader, Txoimin. A tense situation developed between the two countries until a meeting in December 1986 in Algeria between prominent officials of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) and the FLN. This led to a deal whereby both governments seem to have agreed to discourage dissident leaders from one country operating inside the other.

Algerian relations with West Germany became close during 1974, largely as a result of the sympathy of the West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, with the plight of Third World countries, and his support for Boumedienne's appeal to the United Nations, in April 1974, for a New International Economic Order. Brandt, leader of the West German Social Democratic Party, was received by Boumedienne in Algiers shortly after the Algerian leader had addressed the UN Special Session. Boumedienne was reported to have told Brandt :

It is true that it is hard to change the present system but first we must recognise that it is unjust. It was created without our consent or participation and we would like to have the opportunity to examine it with you and, if necessary, re-negotiate everything, the means, the methods, the system itself.²⁴

Expanding economic relations between Algeria and West Germany were reflected in the visit to Germany by the Algerian Industry Minister, Abdesslam Belaid, in May/June 1974. The Algerian delegation was a large one and included the directors of the major state enterprises. In the eighties West Germany has retained its position as the second largest supplier of the Algerian market, although its share of that market slipped from 13,9% in 1982 to 11.2% in 1985.²⁵

Sweden, particularly under the socialist leader, Olof Palme, was likewise viewed by Algeria as a country that values its independence and in its foreign policy accords a high priority to Third World issues. Palme visited Algeria in November 1974 where he signed a comprehensive agreement on economic, scientific and technical cooperation. In 1981 Scania of Sweden won a £25 million order for 457 inter-city buses from the state bus company, SNTV. Deliveries of the vehicles would begin in June 1981 and be completed by February 1982.²⁶ In March 1983 the Swedish construction group, Shanska Cementgjuteriet, won a turnkey order valued at £73 million for the construction of

twelve pre-fabricated boarding schools, to be completed by the end of 1984.²⁷

Relations with non-socialist governments in Europe have usually been cordial but not as close as with socialist-led administrations. Algerian relations with Switzerland were long overshadowed by a conflict over moneys said to have been deposited in a Swiss-based bank by the late Mohammed Khider, former FLN Treasurer during the Algerian war. In 1973 the Civil Court in Geneva had ruled that the sum of fifty million Swiss Francs that once belonged to the FLN and was then transferred to an Arab bank in Geneva, should be handed over to the Algerian government. After six years of litigation the Swiss Supreme Court ruled unanimously, in July 1974, that Algeria had no claim to the money which, according to the Arab Bank, had been paid into Khider's personal account.²⁸ A lawyer retained by the Arab bank maintained that Khider and not the FLN was the rightful owner of the money - which had been collected for the most part from Algerian workers in France and other supporters of the war for independence. Insult was added to injury when the Supreme Court further ruled that the Algerian government was liable for costs.²⁹

Anglo-Algerian relations have remained luke-warm and British companies have been slow to move into the Algerian market. This may have reflected advice from British diplomats in the seventies who warned investors to stay away from Algeria on the grounds

that its economy was heading for disaster. In the eighties relations began to improve somewhat as Algeria began to examine alternative sources of arms in an attempt to diversify its purchases away from the Soviet Union and later America. In 1982 Tarmac International won a £46 million contract to build four hospitals in the Mascara region of Algeria, while in 1983 British companies received contracts totalling £26 million.³⁰ By 1986, however, the United Kingdom's share of Algerian imports was only some 3%, and the commodities supplied were mostly foodstuffs, chemicals, and iron and steel products.

During 1981 Algeria had sought a barter deal with Japan to supply goods in return for oil. The object was to resist Saudi pressure on OPEC members, including Algeria, to drop their crude oil prices. In 1982 Japan became the fourth largest source of Algerian imports, providing cars and heavy equipment in return for quantities of oil and copper. Japanese companies were also the recipients of two major contracts to be financed by soft loans from Japan. One contract worth \$54.4 million involved the Mitsubishi Corporation and concerned the construction of gas extraction and treatment facilities. The other, valued at \$250 million, was awarded to Koble Steel for building a recovery and processing plant for Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) at Hassi R'mel in southern Algeria.³¹ In addition there was the sale of some \$50 million of Honda cars which were paid for by shipments of crude oil. Because of the drop in oil prices in the eighties, however, imports from Japan were down from 7.3% in 1982 to 6% in 1985.

Algeria's relations with Western Europe have been dominated largely by questions of trade as Algeria has sought to secure its economic independence by policies of industrialisation and product diversification. The Algerian authorities have also taken effective steps to try to improve the terms of trade in line with their support for a revision of existing North/South relations and the elimination of dependency and "unequal exchange". With a large and rapidly expanding domestic population, Algeria, although an important oil producer, does not have a large surplus income to invest. It is far more vulnerable to market and price fluctuations for its oil and gas exports than Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, for example, or even Libya. Nor does it have large reserves of oil on which it can draw for its future development needs. Under Boumedienne Algeria therefore embarked on an ambitious programme of industrialisation, financed by exports of hydrocarbons, and to the neglect of her agriculture. It was essential, therefore, that Algeria should extract the best possible price for her limited exports, whether crude oil or natural gas.

Hence the paradox that Algeria, with its socialist principles, has been heavily involved in commercial-type negotiations with capitalist states and large western corporations. Its adoption of capitalist tactics to enhance its own revenues has enabled it to survive some major international setbacks, including the relative drop in real oil prices for much of the 1970s, and the steep decline in the price first of oil,

then of natural gas, after 1981. In that sense the Algerian tactic of trying to link the price of natural gas to that of a basket of crude oils proved singularly counter-productive in the mid-1980s. Algeria had then to try to re-negotiate all the earlier agreements with a view to maintaining the price of gas.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN : MOROCCO AND EUROPE

IN SEARCH OF MARKETS AND SYMPATHY

Morocco and Spain : unreliable alliance

The conservative orientation of the regime in Morocco makes it an obvious and privileged partner of the West, including both the European Community and the United States. Its rivalry with 'radical' Algeria has been used to enlist western sympathies and to present Morocco as a loyal and an indispensable ally in the defence of western interests within the region and in Africa as a whole. Over the Western Sahara issue Morocco was thus well placed to be able to canvass western as well as moderate Arab and African support for its own position. It earned that sympathy and support by its military intervention in 1977-78 in the Shaba conflict when it contrived to save the moderate regime of Mobutu Sese Seko against what it labelled a 'communist' conspiracy from neighbouring Angola.

Over the years the European Community has, however, proved an unreliable partner for Morocco. At the first hint of recession the EC has imposed quotas which in 1977 resulted in a trade deficit with Europe of \$1 billion. In 1979 the Moroccan Commerce and Industry Minister attacked the Common Agricultural Policy which was subsidising high cost European producers of fruits and vegetables that could be grown more cheaply and naturally in Morocco. He warned that Morocco would be forced to seek other

markets, perhaps by expanding trade with the Soviet Union and the member-states of COMECON.

Morocco has also had problems with Spain which, in 1975, had signed a tri-partite agreement with Morocco and Mauritania, relinquishing its own rule over the former Spanish Sahara - rather than risk a prolonged confrontation with Moroccan forces at a time of political transition in Spain itself. In May 1979, however, the Spanish Prime Minister, Adolfo Suarez, agreed to meet Polisario leaders during a visit to Algiers after which he told the Algerian government that the inhabitants of Western Sahara had the right to self-determination while the international community had the obligation to see they were able to exercise it.' It would appear that, since 1975, the Spanish authorities had come under increasing pressure from the left, Socialists and Communists, over their earlier support for Morocco. This change of policy in Madrid, coupled with a dispute between Morocco and Spain over fisheries, aggravated relations between the two.

In February 1978 when the Cortes had ratified an earlier fishing agreement with Morocco there had been considerable opposition in Spain from the left which supported Polisario. Polisario guerrillas retaliated by attacking Spanish fishing fleets operating in waters adjacent to Western Sahara and by capturing some of the fishermen. The ruling Spanish party, the Central Democratic Union, then attempted to secure their release

by sending a delegate to the Fourth Congress of Polisario, in 1979, thereby implicitly recognising the movement. Morocco then seized several Spanish boats on the pretext they were fishing in Moroccan waters. Relations improved for a time when King Juan Carlos visited Morocco in June. In November 1980, however, relations deteriorated once again after the Spanish Prime Minister, Adolfo Suarez, visited the Spanish enclaves of Morocco-Ceuta and Mellila which Morocco claimed as part of her national territory.

In December Spain then concluded an agreement with Polisario for the release of some thirty-six Spanish fishermen captured the previous September. The agreement included a promise of Spanish support for the principle of self-determination for the peoples of Western Sahara. Polisario claimed that this new agreement superseded that of 1975 between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania.² Morocco reacted the following day by claiming a maritime zone extending two hundred miles into the Atlantic as well as sections of the Mediterranean. A new Spanish Prime Minister, Leopold Calvo Sotelo, was appointed in February 1981 and at once tried to improve relations with Morocco, starting with a new one-year agreement on fisheries signed in April.³

The election of a Socialist government in Spain under Felipe Gonzales was not well received in Rabat, following as it did the election of a socialist government in France in 1981. In opposition the French and Spanish socialists had both shown

support for Polisario. In government the Spanish socialists worked instead to try to improve relations with all the Maghreb states. Both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister paid separate visits to Morocco in 1983 and a four-year agreement on fisheries was concluded in August - the first real sign of better relations between Madrid and Rabat. Spain also pledged loans amounting to \$550 million, tied partly to the purchase of Spanish goods and services, and partly to the development of port facilities in Agadir.⁴ The agreement was very favourable to Morocco, being in line with its policy of developing a national fishing industry to take advantage of the extremely rich fishing grounds off its Atlantic coast which had been mainly exploited by other countries, including the Soviet Union, Spain and France.

Prudence with France and the EC

Morocco enjoyed exceptionally good relations with France during the conservative presidency of Giscard d'Estaing. The French President was received in Rabat in May 1975, while Hassan visited France in November 1976. The timing of Hassan's visit coincided with mounting confrontation in the Western Sahara between Morocco and the Polisario forces, supported by Algeria. Hassan doubtless hoped to secure a strengthening of the Rabat-Paris-Madrid axis. France remained Morocco's Principal trading partner as well as its chief source of aid which was estimated in 1978 at \$300 million - increasing to \$329 million in 1979.⁵ To express his satisfaction at the state of French-Moroccan

relations King Hassan broke with his previous practice and attended the Fifth Franco-African summit in Paris in May 1978, which also debated the French proposal to set up a permanent "intervention force". A week earlier Zaire had requested military assistance from Morocco, suggesting the coordination of French-Moroccan policies on the African scene. The main justification offered for an intervention force was its potential as a counterweight to the Cuban presence in Africa.

After a successful attack by Polisario against the southern Moroccan town of Tan Tan, early in 1979, Hassan II paid an unscheduled visit to France. Later that year details emerged about the extent of French military aid to Morocco.⁶ By 1980 relations were so close that Giscard and Hassan had three meetings and the issues discussed ranged from the Western Sahara to the recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Morocco also sought to enlist French support to try to convince Algeria of the futility of prolonging the Saharan conflict. Given such close ties between France and Morocco in the seventies - a considerable improvement over the Gaullist period when relations had been extremely frosty - it was not surprising that Giscard's defeat in 1981 was badly received in Rabat. The victorious socialists had supported Polisario when in opposition and Mitterrand was known to favour better relations with Algeria : he hoped to succeed in Algiers where Giscard, before him, had failed after 1974.

Mitterrand visited Algiers as early as November 1981 while his trip to Rabat was delayed until January 1983. The new French president was careful, however, to avoid any serious breach with Morocco, no doubt fearing that the Americans would take advantage of any strains in Franco-Moroccan relations to strengthen their own influence with Rabat. Given its location Morocco retained considerable significance for the French even if the value of trade with Morocco was smaller than that with Algeria. Accordingly the French supply of arms to Morocco continued under the socialists. In January 1982 Hassan was received by Mitterrand following two visits by the French Foreign Minister to Morocco. The King's unofficial visit to Paris cleared the way for Mitterrand's official visit of three days to Morocco in late January 1983. After recalling the "special ties...forged by history and geography" Mitterrand expressed his support for those African states that wished to exclude the great powers from their conflicts. Which was one reason why he favoured self-determination for the population of the Western Sahara and therefore a referendum.⁷

Mitterrand's visit did nothing to alleviate Moroccan fears that the French socialists would inevitably side with Algeria in the latent conflict opposing the two Maghrebin states in the Western Sahara. Algeria, on the other hand, seems to have suspected the French government of a change of policy leaning more towards Morocco. On the eve of the Libya-Moroccan 'union' agreement Mitterrand was in Morocco on a 'private' visit. The

Moroccan-Libyan 'union' did provide a useful channel of communication with the Libyans at a time when Paris was working for the removal of outside forces from Chad and in favour of a reconciliation among the various factions still in contention. Like the Spanish, the French have tried since the eighties to adopt a balanced approach to the Maghreb as a whole. Predictably, however, where Mitterrand had visited Algiers before Rabat, the new Gaullist Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, gave priority to Morocco while despatching his Foreign Minister to Algiers.

Hassan has always looked to Western Europe as his country's most obvious partner, describing his country as "Europe's backyard". The Foreign Minister, Abdellatif Fillali, declared in 1987 that Morocco was a "part of the West".⁹ The logical culmination of centuries of shared history and civilisation would, from the Moroccan point of view, be full membership for Morocco within the European community. There are a million Moroccans living within the Community, mainly in France and Belgium, while tourism is responsible for a large annual migration from both sides of the Mediterranean. Aware that full membership is unlikely for the present, the Moroccans have pressed their claim for special treatment, above and beyond the concessions granted to other countries in the Mediterranean basin. Given the accession to the EC of Spain and Portugal, after Greece, the question of special consideration for Morocco has taken on a new urgency.

The accession to the Community of Greece, Spain and Portugal may seem necessary for a Community trying to strengthen its position in the Mediterranean and, to some extent, competing with an American presence inside a region that is, however, of vital concern to Western Europe. But the expansion of the Community is bound to damage the trading interests of countries like Tunisia and Morocco, and particularly the latter because of its heavy dependence on agriculture. Morocco wants to keep its competitive advantage especially over its principal competitor in Western Europe, namely Spain. Morocco insists that the matter is of the highest national importance, pointing out that in citrus production alone the livelihood of some three million people is at stake. Two-thirds of Morocco's citrus production is sold inside the Common Market.⁹ To secure its previous competitive advantage, even after Spanish entry to the EC, Morocco resorts to political and strategic rather than economic arguments. The appeal is directed to the European Heads of State rather than to the bureaucrats in Brussels. The case rests mainly on the Kingdom's pro-western orientation, its military capability and its political reliability. There is also its invaluable strategic situation, linking the Mediterranean and the Atlantic and commanding the entrance to the former. Factors such as these are the basis of the Moroccan case for special treatment by the EC. The viewpoint of Rabat was well expressed by a senior Moroccan official who complained :

We do not understand why no distinction is made between friends like us, who share the same values as Europe, and more distant countries...The fundamental problem is that the European Community treats us as if we were Syrians."¹⁰

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN : TUNISIA AND EUROPE

COMMITMENT TO THE WEST

Europe : the hope and shelter

Tunisia has always been seen as a liberal, pro-western country whose foreign policy is based on cooperation with the western world which alone, it is held, can supply the technology and investment needed for the country's economic development and social emancipation. There is also the conviction that the industrial states of the West, with their long history of political and economic intervention in the Third World, and the experience and profits derived therefrom, have a special responsibility to assist in the development efforts of the poorer states, through the provision of guaranteed markets and prices for Third World produce. Closing the gap between rich and poor nations would contribute to security at the global level as well as to regional political stability. Tunisian security is seen to be connected closely with that of Western Europe and particularly those states bordering the Mediterranean. The Tunisians have proposed an ingenious solution to the problem of North African migrant labour inside Europe. The establishment of light industries in the Maghreb states, which have abundant labour and energy sources, would assist states like Tunisia to diversify while relieving countries like France of the problems posed by large scale immigration at a time of economic uncertainty and growing unemployment.

Tunisia, like its Maghrebin neighbours, also looks to France to represent and defend its interests within the EC. While relations with France were strained during the Algerian war and a diplomatic chill persisted until de Gaulle's defeat and departure in 1969, Bourguiba enjoyed a personal triumph in 1972 when he visited France for the first time in his official capacity as President of Tunisia. Giscard paid an official visit to Tunisia in November 1975, after first going to Algeria and Morocco. Giscard praised Bourguiba's leadership and moderation and underlined the continuing friendship between their two countries. "Tunisia and France had concluded a contract, a compact for development, that was valid for today, for tomorrow and, as far as anyone could envisage, for ever."

In June 1978 it was Giscard's turn to receive the Tunisian Prime Minister, Hedi Nouira, and both received the report of the *Grande Commission de Coopération* which pointed to the steady improvement in economic and financial cooperation between the two countries. Meanwhile France's commitment to the security of Tunisia was demonstrated in 1980 when it hastened to secure the Bourguiba government after the Commando attack from across the frontier at Gafsa. It was not clear whether the French feared Libyan or possible American intervention most. Ministerial visits followed and, in their wake, the French agreed to make available FF.210 million to help alleviate the country's economic problems and to promote development. This was the largest allocation of French aid, per capita, to any country. Paris

undertook to correct the imbalance in bilateral trade between France and Tunisia while Tunis agreed to solve the problem of French accounts frozen in that country since independence.² This problem, outstanding since 1956, was in fact largely resolved by February 1981.

A visit by the Tunisian Prime Minister to France, in February 1982, ended in an agreement whereby Peugeot would establish a factory in Tunisia to manufacture spare parts for the home market and for export. France also undertook to intercede on behalf of Tunisian interests in the EC. Bourguiba, who had earlier approached the Socialist International with a view to affiliating his own party, took the opportunity of a socialist government in Paris in 1981 to advance his country's special relationship with France. Tunisia was the first Arab country to be visited by the new Foreign Minister, Claude Cheysson, in July 1981. And it was held out as "an example of democracy for...the Third World". On this occasion France undertook to expand and intensify its relations with Tunisia on the basis of a true policy of association" with the object of reaching the stage of "integration and complementarity".

France also reaffirmed its "natural undertaking" to maintain "military security in a region which included Tunisia".³ The following March Charles Hernu, the French Defence Minister, visited Tunisia. Since January 1980, when Tunisia had increased its defence budget following the Gafsa attack, France had

furnished Tunisia with the necessary radar equipment to safeguard its airspace. And, along with the United States France was the country's principal supplier of arms. In January 1982 the Tunisian Prime Minister paid a visit to Paris, which was returned in February by the French Prime Minister, Pierre Mauroy, on his first visit to a Third World country. Mitterrand himself visited Tunisia officially in October 1983, confirming France's place as Tunisia's major trading partner - despite the obstacles erected by the EC on Tunisian exports to Europe. Mitterrand also spoke of the 220,000 Tunisians resident in France and their rights to security and well-being. The question of French assets frozen in Tunisia for the past twenty-seven years was also finally resolved.

The deterioration of the Tunisian economy during the eighties and mounting debts brought pressure from the IMF for cuts in public spending as well as for the abolition of subsidies on basic commodities like grain. The subsequent 'bread riots' of January 1984, which had their counterpart in Morocco as well, threatened a regime whose leader was clearly approaching the end of his political life. In February the French provided aid worth FF.560 million in cereals as well as a grant for the purchase of agricultural products and loans to cover the deficit in the country's balance of payments. The agreement signed on that occasion, which provided for the gradual re-possession by Tunisians of French colonial estates in the countryside, was eventually ratified by the Tunisian government in early March 1985. Relations have steadily improved, particularly since

agreement was reached in September 1986 allowing the transfer to France of the assets of 11,000 French citizens who had resided in Tunisia prior to independence, and whose assets had subsequently been impounded.⁴ France continued to support Bourguiba until his removal by a palace coup late in 1987. While the French did not intervene directly to effect a smooth succession, the new Tunisian leader, Ben Ali, has long and close relations with France as well as enjoying the confidence of the United States and the Algerian government - all of whom clearly had an interest in the outcome of the power struggle in Tunis.

Tunisia's relations with other West European countries have generally been good. Political relations with Portugal, severed in 1963 because of that country's colonial policy, were restored in 1974 when the Portuguese recognised the independence first of Guinea-Bissau and later of Mozambique and Angola. There have also been some problems with Italy and Spain. In the case of Spain the matter at issue was an adverse trade balance, while the difficulties with Italy - a former colonial power - were more complex. Relations between Italy and Tunisia deteriorated during 1974-77 after disputes over fishing rights, assaults on the Tunisian community in Sicily, and the low level of Italian imports of Tunisian oil. All of which was complicated by Italy's membership of the EC. In May 1977 there arose a new disagreement, again over fishing rights, but in July the two Mediterranean countries joined Algeria in an agreement for the construction of

a natural gas pipe-line that would link Algeria with Italy via Tunisia.

Even then tensions persisted over fishing rights and trading patterns. However, at the time of the grain riots, in February 1984, Italy donated 2,500 tons of wheat.⁵ And when the Italian Premier , Bettino Craxi, visited Tunisia in December 1984, he promised to try to ensure that Spanish and Portuguese entry to the EC would not be allowed to damage Tunisian interests. Tunisia has also been one of the principal recipients of West German aid and an agreement assigning DM 150 million in credits for development projects in Tunisia was signed in October 1978.⁶ Delivery of the loan was later suspended, however, on account of violations of human rights in Tunisia, in the case of the detained Tunisian trade unionists.

CHAPTER NINETEEN : LIBYA AND THE WEST

THE POLICY OF CONFRONTATION

Europe : source of Arab mishaps

Libyan foreign policy since 1969 has been inseparable from the issues of Arab unity and opposition to imperialism and zionism. Europeans have been held responsible for most of the ills of the Third World and, in particular, for the destruction of Arab and African cultures and the exploitation of those who had the misfortune to be subjects of one or other European empire. Libya has adopted an aggressive posture towards the West and to Western Europe. Just as Kadhafi mobilised the Libyan armed forces for the overthrow of the Libyan monarchy, he now seeks to mobilise the African and Arab masses for the conquest and overthrow of imperialism.

In 1973 Kadhafi published his *Green Book*, containing his "Third International Theory" which aims in the first instance at mobilising and raising the revolutionary awareness of the Libyan people as well as imparting a more radical bias to Libyan foreign policy.¹ The policy of oil nationalisation in September 1973 was a calculated step in this direction, provoking, as expected, a hostile reaction particularly in America. When the large oil companies threatened to embargo Libyan oil, Kadhafi asked : "How can you boycott something which everybody needs".² It is Kadhafi's purpose to provoke : whether he is calling for the exclusion of foreign vessels from the Mediterranean so that it

may become a "lake of peace"; or whether he is demanding reparations from Italy, Germany and Great Britain for the damage inflicted on Libya, after 1939, by the warring European powers.

Libya had no use for Euro-Arab Dialogue after 1973 unless the European states were prepared to subordinate their other interests to the Arab and anti-imperialist cause. The subjects proposed for dialogue by the Libyan ambassador to Bonn, in 1975, included the exclusion of foreign fleets from the Mediterranean; the de-militarization of bases in southern Europe that could be used for offensive action in the Middle East; the participation of East European countries in any Dialogue; and a particular emphasis on the Palestinian question. No one was surprised when Libya withdrew from the preparatory talks on Dialogue after the European Community had concluded an economic agreement with Israel in May 1975.

It is Western support for Israel that has dictated Libyan attitudes to the member-states of the EC. Support for Israel is seen in Tripoli as part of a deliberate conspiracy aimed at dividing and ultimately destroying the Arab world. There is a state of continuing war between Libya and the West that may permit certain opportunist alliances - there are, after all, divisions in the western camp that can be exploited by Arab states, just as the West has fomented Arab divisions to serve its own purposes. It does not, however, permit of any lasting compromise or negotiated settlement. The lines are clearly

drawn. Dialogue, in that context, could be tantamount to betrayal of the Arab cause.

Within Europe, Britain has been singled out as bearing a particular responsibility for the creation of the state of Israel within the Arab heartland. And in retaliation Kadhafi has apparently been prepared to support the Irish Republican Army (IRA - Provisionals) in their campaign of violence in Northern Ireland. The connection between the IRA and Kadhafi seems to go back to 1973 when a small ship, the Claudia, was intercepted off the Irish coast and was found to be carrying weapons from Libya destined for use by the IRA.³ For Kadhafi, the struggle of the IRA against British (and Protestant) rule in Northern Ireland is that of a genuine liberation movement reacting against an imperialist power. Britain was largely responsible for the dispersion throughout the world of the Irish people in the nineteenth century; Britain, too, was responsible for the dispersion after 1948 of the Palestinians, having long connived at Jewish immigration and the forcible re-settlement of the original Arab inhabitants.

By supporting the IRA Kadhafi claimed to be demonstrating : his support for all liberation movements; the capacity of the Arab revolution to strike back at its opponents; and the fact that injustice generates its own remedies. There were reports, too, during the Falklands War, beginning in June 1982, of Libyan support for the junta in Buenos Aires. Libya and Israel were

both suspected of selling arms to Argentina.⁴ More serious was the crisis with Britain in 1984 after shots were fired from inside the Libyan People's Bureau at anti-Kadhafi demonstrators, leading to the death of a policewoman. That and the subsequent siege of the People's Bureau lent credence to the American view of Libya as a prime source of international terrorism. But it also led to a break in diplomatic relations with Britain which, until then, had been Libya's most important commercial and financial outlet in Western Europe.

The United States has nevertheless had great difficulty trying to persuade European states to join in a campaign to isolate Libya economically and politically. Europe, with a good appreciation of its own interests, and a more realistic assessment of the real significance of Kadhafi and Libya's rather limited potential for disruption, has preferred to take advantage of Libya's dependence on western oil markets, particularly in a time of glut. The availability of alternative supplies of oil, similar to Libya's but from more reliable sources, has given the European states some leverage as oil prices themselves have fallen sharply. As Libya's revenues have declined her potential for mischief may also have decreased. After Libya's confrontation with the United States, in April 1986, the EC removed Libya from the list of North African countries eligible for food and other subsidies under the EC export tender system. The country no longer qualified therefore for the 461,000 tonnes of grain, 54,000 tonnes of skimmed milk, 14,000 tonnes of beef, and 7,000

tonnes of butter it had received, at subsidised prices, during the previous year.⁵

France : a friend and a foe

In the case of France, Libya initially approved the government independent foreign policy, especially its attitude after 1967 to the Arab cause.⁶ Finding itself heavily dependent after 1973 on imported oil, France worked to improve relations with producing states like Iraq and Libya (and Algeria for a time) in order to guarantee future oil supplies, preferably at concessionary rates. To help meet the increased bill the French also pursued an aggressive policy of arms marketing, which involved large sales of Mirage jet fighters to Libya as well as quantities of these and other arms to other states in the Middle East. In 1974, following a month-long tour of Europe, East and West, by Major Abdul Salam Jallud, an official Libyan statement singled out France as a key country in the matter of winning West European support for Arab rights. Tripoli announced that it wished to see France leading other West European nations to "independence" from American influence, on the Palestinian question as well as on that of a global oil strategy.⁷ Following Prime Minister Chirac's visit to Libya in March 1976, France was able in 1978 to ratify a maritime agreement providing "most favoured nation" treatment for French and Libyan merchant shipping in the ports of either state.

In Africa, however, Libya disapproved of the French presence and France's neo-imperial pretensions. The two countries were brought into latent conflict between 1978 and the mid-eighties, first over the Western Sahara and then, more seriously, over Chad. And when France, like Algeria, offered to send troops to Lebanon in May 1976, at the height of the civil war in that state, Libya strongly opposed the suggestion which Kadhafi described as tantamount to French "aggression" against the Lebanon.²⁴ For Kadhafi the French intention was all too transparent : to support the Christian Maronites against the Lebanese National Movement backed by a majority of the Moslems. But the major clash with France was over Libyan involvement in Chad. By 1980 that involvement was already large and obvious. The presence and success of Libyan troops inside Chad was seen in Paris as a defeat for French policy, not only in Chad but in Africa as a whole. Moreover, West African leaders who had long supported France were now critical of French "weakness" and her reluctance to resume her military responsibilities in this former French state.

Libyan resentment of the West as well as geographical circumstances also explains Libya's constant attempts to exert pressure on Malta, with the primary object of preventing the Maltese government from establishing close ties with NATO countries or harbouring NATO bases. The two countries were in dispute over their rival claims to the continental shelf. Malta had, moreover, declined to sever diplomatic ties with Israel.

Nevertheless, the Maltese Minister of Education was able to visit Libya in June 1978 where he confirmed that Arabic would now be taught in all Maltese schools and would be available as part of a more advanced curriculum in other institutions. Kadhafi himself visited Malta in July 1978 to discuss political and military questions, as well as the financial consequences of Britain's withdrawal from the Island in 1979.²

On that occasion he pledged economic and financial support for Malta's neutrality threatened by the NATO powers. He was personally present in Malta, on March 30, 1979, for the ceremonies marking the British military evacuation and renewed his earlier promise of economic aid. He announced that Libya would establish several joint economic ventures that would provide work for thousands of Maltese, while his country would also continue to provide oil at prices below world market levels. He then stressed that Malta's real interest lay in maintaining the neutrality of the Mediterranean and excluding any foreign military presence. Relations, however, deteriorated in the eighties, given the Maltese resentment of their new 'subordinate' status and the continuing dispute about oil exploitation rights in the continental shelf. In 1980 Kadhafi ended the supply of oil to Malta at concessionary prices and Malta had then to seek other suppliers and pay a higher price. The Maltese Prime Minister, the Labour leader, Dom Mintoff, then shut down the Libyan radio station - Radio Friendship and Solidarity - while, in July 1980, the right-wing National Front party in Malta

denounced Kadhafi's "expansionist and annexationist" plans. They claimed responsibility for the bombs that damaged the Libyan Cultural Centre and the office of Libyan Airlines in Valletta. And in August Malta expelled more than fifty Libyan military advisors.¹⁰

Italy, the former colonial power, was also of considerable importance in terms of Libya's European policy. Libya had looked to Italy to defend its interests within the European Community. Many Italians found lucrative jobs in Libya, while Libyan investment helped finance a number of leading Italian companies. In 1976 the Libyans were encouraged to invest in FIAT, the Italian car company, when that company was experiencing financial difficulties and Italy was itself prospecting for foreign loans. In November 1978 the Italian Prime Minister visited Libya where he and Kadhafi expressed satisfaction at present relations between their two countries while both agreed on the desirability of maintaining Malta's neutrality. The previous month the Italian state oil company, *ENI*, had negotiated a \$ 250 million loan over a period of five years with the Libyan Arab foreign Bank, which had important investments in Italy - including the recent investment in FIAT in December 1976.¹¹

After a wave of killings of Libyan exiles in Europe, particularly in Italy and Britain in 1980, the Italian government decided on new measures to protect Libyan expatriates. It was at this time of mounting tension that Libya informed Italy, Britain

and West Germany that she intended to seek reparations for the damage inflicted on Libya by those states responsible for the Second World War.¹² Meanwhile the Maltese government was anxious to secure Italian diplomatic and economic assistance to facilitate their own impending break with Libya. The Italians themselves were not, however, ready or prepared for such a break. The 20,000 Italians in Libya constitute the largest group of Western residents inside the country while Libya remains an important source of oil imports. Italian governments have therefore had to balance off interests of that kind against strong American and NATO pressures for tougher measures against Kadhafi.

THE MAGHREB AND THE SUPER-POWERS

Introduction

Where the coastal states of the Mediterranean are seen by the super-powers as strategically very important, the Maghrebin governments have shown, in varying degrees, their reluctance to be involved in big power rivalry within the region.¹ The two major powers have themselves held back from direct involvement in the conflict over the Western Sahara, while the Soviet Union has shown its reluctance to be drawn into a confrontation with the United States over Libyan initiatives in Africa and elsewhere.

Algeria is still too concerned with its hard-won independence to accept a subordinate status in any international alliance. As early as 1972 Algeria revived the idea of 'the Mediterranean for Mediterraneans'. In July the Foreign Minister had suggested a conference to try to work, among other things, for the withdrawal of foreign fleets and the dismantling of foreign bases.² Such a conference was not feasible, however, since countries like Italy, Greece and Turkey were members of the NATO alliance. Like Algeria Libya, too, claimed to be non-aligned - even criticising the Cubans in the early 1970s for their alliance with the Soviet Union. In 1979 Kadhafi recalled the departure of American, British and Italian forces from Libya and the elimination of their bases. Libyans would not accept the return of foreign forces but would remain non-aligned "and friend and foe alike would have to accept that fact".³ Meanwhile Egypt's growing

alignment with the United States in the seventies and the emergence of President Reagan in the eighties would seem to have pushed Kadhafi closer to the Soviet Union and the friendship treaty of 1982 between their two states. While the Soviets may have acquired the use of Libyan bases and facilities the impression is that Moscow has tried to avoid closer military ties with the charismatic but unpredictable Kadhafi.

The Sixth Fleet has long had access to Tunisian ports, but the Americans, like the French before them, are aware that no Tunisian government, whether under Bourguiba or his successor, would readily give permission for the establishment of American bases. After the eviction of French forces from Bizerta, in 1961, and the repatriation of the FLN to Algeria at the time of independence in 1962, the issue remained a sensitive one and Tunisians were determined to retain control of their national territory. The same pressures were not, however, at work in Morocco. In return for American support in the Western Sahara conflict, Hassan did agree transit rights for American military forces in February 1982 while authorising a joint military commission with representatives of both states. By May there was also permission for American military aircraft to operate from Moroccan airfields, which was mainly significant in view of American efforts to set up a Rapid Deployment Force principally for the Gulf area.

There is now a proposal from Morocco to allow the United states to transfer air force bases from Spain to Morocco, which reflects American as well as Moroccan difficulties with the Spanish government. In talks at the White house, in May 1982, President Reagan described King Hassan II, without exaggeration, as a firm friend of the United States.⁴ Moroccan officials maintained, however, that the agreement on base facilities would in no way affect their country's sovereignty and independence, or its territorial integrity; nor would it endanger any other state in the region. Libya nevertheless insisted in November that joint military manoeuvres between Morocco and America threatened peace and security in other parts of the globe.⁵

In the Maghreb, as elsewhere, states do not always observe the letter or the spirit of their declarations. Morocco, which is armed by France and the United States, maintains close political ties with the latter. In economic terms, however, its trade with the United States is small in relation to the \$2 billion phosphate agreement with the Soviet Union in 1978 and the \$300 million fishing agreement with the same state. Algeria, which was ideologically closer to the socialist bloc and the Soviet Union, bought most of its arms from Moscow but trades mainly with France and, increasingly, the United States. Its trade with the Soviet Union, other than arms, is insignificant. The Soviet Union has more need of Moroccan fish and phosphates than of Algerian or Libyan oil. What Libya and Algeria can provide, however, is foreign exchange to help maintain an

equilibrium in the Soviet balance of payments. Whereas, in 1976, America became Algeria's major trading partner, Morocco was two years later concluding the "contract of the century" with the Soviet Union for a large phosphate complex in the southern part of the country. This was one of the largest Soviet investments at that time in the Third World!

The United States, on the other hand, had an abundance of phosphates but her industries continued to depend on imported oil and, more particularly, on natural gas. Relations with her traditional supplier, Mexico, were strained in the late seventies, and President Carter was anxious to show that America could cooperate even with 'radical' Third World states, provided, like Algeria, they kept their distance from the Soviet Union. Libyan military supplies have come largely from the Soviet Union, despite the supply of French Mirage fighter aircraft in the early seventies. But again most Libyan trade is western- not Soviet-oriented. Economic inter-dependence, geographical location and political necessity have therefore produced some strange bedfellows in North Africa. In the Maghreb in the eighties foreign relations were even more tortuous than usual.

Morocco is an obvious ally for the United States because of its key strategic situation and the supportive policies of its conservative, pro-western regime. The loss of Morocco to the Soviets would be a calamity for American foreign policy. Where the Soviets have dominated Moroccan trade and investment

patterns, the United States has given substantial aid and assistance supplemented by the generosity of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Coinciding with the outbreak of the conflict in Western Sahara, in 1975, the United States Defence Department announced its decision to sell Morocco \$154 million of military equipment.⁶ American interest in Tunisia, as a bulwark against Libyan designs in North Africa, has had similar consequences in terms of political and military support. In a visit to Tunisia, in April 1976, the American Vice-President, Nelson Rockefeller, expressed concern about the future intentions of Libya and Algeria - particularly Algeria which had received large quantities of weapons from the Soviet Union and had been visited by General Giap of Vietnam and by Fidel Castro of Cuba. After the Gafsa raid of January 1980, in which Libya was implicated, the American representative in the United Nations, Donald McHenry, visited Tunisia where he stressed :

We wish to re-emphasise at this time our deep interest in the independence and integrity of Tunisia...We would view with concern any outside interference in Tunisia's affairs.⁷

It can be argued that non-alignment as an option is becoming increasingly difficult, if not impossible, in North Africa. The resignation of General de Gaulle, as President of France, in 1969 and the accession of non-Gaullist presidents after 1974, removed a major factor contributing to the credibility of a non-aligned

policy in the Mediterranean. Even more important, the defection of Egypt from the Soviet camp after 1972 and its subsequent integration into the western alliance removed another essential support for non-alignment elsewhere in North Africa. The fall of oil prices in the eighties and economic hardship and indebtedness almost everywhere in Africa have forced states to re-examine not only their economic policies but also to explore the political conditions for debt relief and further credits and investment.

The Western Sahara conflict, emerging after 1975 against this changing political background, acted as a catalyst. The American determination to reinforce Hassan in Morocco, the reluctance of the Soviet Union to become directly involved or even to recognise the provisional Saharawi state, the SADR, and the sympathy exhibited by most of the Arab states for Morocco, left Algeria little option but a diplomatic initiative to try to isolate Morocco first within Africa, then within North Africa, and finally to try to secure a return to a more even-handed approach on the part of the United States. The American Ambassador to the United Nations under President Carter warned that, by favouring Morocco on the Western Sahara issue, the United States risked losing a very promising trading relationship with Algeria.⁸ Rather than tackling Washington directly, in the manner of Kadhafi, the new Algerian administration of President Chadli, sought not confrontation but rapprochement - offering Algerian mediation with Teheran to secure the release of the American

Embassy hostages. Algeria remained non-aligned, but her non-alignment now inclined towards the West in an attempt to correct the American tilt towards Morocco over the Western Sahara.

CHAPTER TWENTY : ALGERIA AND THE SUPER-POWERS

PRAGMATISM WINS OVER IDEOLOGY

Algeria leads the battle for the Third World

Algeria was understandably hesitant at first to seek any accommodation with the United States. On ideological as well as other issues Algeria saw America as a formidable opponent. The American intervention in Vietnam and its consistent support for Israel were viewed in the 1960s and 1970s as examples of imperialist aggression. Diplomatic relations were severed in 1967, following the Six-Day War, and American firms were among those nationalised by the Algerian government. After the 1973 war Algeria strongly supported the oil embargo by OAPEC against certain Western nations, notably the United States, in view of American support for Israel during the war. Algeria was also opposed to the lifting of the embargo against America when that was proposed by the Gulf states. The Algerian authorities then resisted Secretary of State Kissinger's attempts to enlist the support of consumer states in a bid to reduce the power of OPEC. The growing dependence of the United States on imported oil from the Middle East offered the Arab states some leverage over American policy and a possible means of prising the United States away from Israel.

After the 1973 war the United States nevertheless included Algiers on the Middle Eastern itinerary of its visiting statesmen. Kissinger visited Algiers several times in 1973-4 in

the pursuit of his shuttle diplomacy. In December 1973 he was supposed to have enquired of President Boumedienne whether Algeria should be classified with the 'moderate' camp of Arab states, or with hard-liners such as Iraq and Libya. Boumedienne's reply was to the effect that Algeria was not trying to outbid anyone. "It can only support the decisions of the Palestinians themselves. To demand more than they do is demagoguery, to demand less is treason."⁹ Boumedienne also saw President Nixon while in the United States in April 1974, on a visit to the United Nations. That same month Kissinger was again in Algiers to discuss the disengagement of Syrian and Israeli forces in the Golan Heights. Kissinger reported that Algeria "showed support and understanding" for the American initiative. He also added, significantly, that "relations between Algeria and the United States were undergoing extensive review. [They] are improving constantly and will continue to improve in the future".¹⁰

While Algeria was ready to go alone with the diplomatic process in the context of the policies agreed by the Arab states, it rose to the defence of OPEC against criticisms from the United States that "in raising the price of oil the producing countries have purely and simply torpedoed the chance of development of the Third World". Boumedienne was the first of the OPEC Arab leaders to refute such criticisms. At the Second Islamic Conference in Lahore, in February 1974, he declared :

Today we hear voices explaining to the third World that the increase in oil prices is directed against them. Since when has the exploiter become defence counsel for the exploited? The industrial countries must learn to get their hands off our riches. We pay excessive prices for imported industrial goods and technology. The contest over oil is part of a wider struggle involving all raw materials : and underlying that struggle is the question of relations between the industrialised and the developing countries.''

A few days before the Lahore statement, and in his capacity as President of the Non-Aligned Movement, Boumedienne had sent a message to the U.N. Secretary General calling for a Special Session of the U.N. to deal with "all questions relating to every aspect of raw materials".¹²

For Algeria the Arab states and OPEC were doing battle with the industrial nations on behalf of the entire Third World and in an effort to bring about a new and more equitable international order. Theirs was not an Arab struggle but one on behalf of the Third World as a whole. The issue was not only oil but all commodities and raw materials. It was necessary therefore to organise other commodity producers into bodies like OPEC so that the battle for a New International Economic Order could commence. However powerful the OPEC states alone could not take on the consumer nations without the support of other producer states.

Fearing American plans to weaken and undermine OPEC, Boumedienne summoned a first OPEC summit in Algiers in 1975 to ensure a united front by its members. He also took the opportunity of the conference to mediate in the dispute between Iran and Iraq over their common frontier on the Shatt-al-Arab.

That same month there was a meeting in France of some ten nations whose object was to prepare for an international conference of producer and consuming nations. On behalf of the developed states, America pressed for an agenda that would emphasise energy problems; the Third World nations, led by Algeria, demanded a much wider, more comprehensive agenda, to focus on problems of development. Despite the stalemate between the two sides, the ability of the Third World states to present and maintain a united front was regarded as a diplomatic victory for Algeria. The stalemate was finally broken in May 1975 when Kissinger agreed to broaden the discussion to include more general questions about the relations between developed and developing nations. Concessions by America were answered by concessions on the part of some of the more 'moderate' (i.e., conservative) Third World states. As the united front among the producer countries gave way before the show of 'reasonableness' on the part of the consuming nations, Algerian influence also began to wane. Meanwhile the emergence of the Western Sahara issue on its own frontiers served to distract Algerian attention away from the long and complex proceedings in Paris.

Algeria's interests first

Just as political relations between Algeria and the United States were becoming increasingly problematic, their economic relations were improving and expanding. In 1973 Algerian exports to America were worth \$ 215 million, or 11% of her total exports. Her imports from America amounted to \$ 161 million, or 7% of total imports. Two years later, in 1975, Algerian exports to America had risen to \$ 2.209 billion, which was nearly 40% of the total. Imports from America were \$ 487 million or 9% of all imports. Algeria thus had a favourable trade surplus with the United States in 1975 of \$ 1.722 billion, compared with a surplus of only \$ 54 million in 1973.¹³ By 1976 Algeria had ceased to be economically dependent on France as the United States came to replace France as Algeria's principal trading partner. This economic rapprochement with America was accompanied by some deviations in foreign policy, as Algeria switched to a more moderate line in both domestic and foreign policies, breaking with her earlier, more intransigent line. The year 1977 witnessed a big increase in Algeria's trade surplus with the United States which leapt to \$ 2.538 billion. The value of Algerian exports to the United States was \$ 3.065 billion while Algerian imports from the United States did not exceed \$ 527 million - a mere 8% of her total import bill. By 1978 Algeria had a favourable trade surplus with America of \$ 3.200 billion.¹⁴

Rapid industrialisation and technological "dependence" were the main factors behind this increasing reliance on the American connection. By 1977 Algeria was the leading recipient of loans and loan-guarantees from the U.S. Export-Import Bank. In other respects, too, Algeria was looking to the United States rather than to France. From 1973-1977 the number of Algerian students studying in America increased from 50 to 2,000.¹⁵ In 1977 the Algerian government was itself composed mainly of technocrats for whom America, rather than France or the Soviet Union, served as the model of industrial and scientific advance. Ideology would seem to have been relegated to second place as the 'circulation of elites' within Algeria produced a new generation of senior administrators. Having grown to maturity since the war of independence, these were likely to be more critical of orthodox socialist prescriptions and more inclined to pragmatism in foreign as in domestic policy.

American foreign policy had moved sharply to the right in the late seventies, away from the earlier 'regional' perspective of the State Department and towards a more 'global' view, represented by the National Security Council and White house advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski's presence at the twentieth anniversary celebrations of the Algerian Revolution, on November 1, 1979, was all the more surprising. It recalled the earlier support that American leaders had given, in the late fifties and early sixties, to the cause of Algerian independence during the long war with France. It also suggested that the

Carter administration was hoping to expand its influence on the southern shores of the Mediterranean at the expense both of France and the Soviets. While Algeria remained, with Libya, the largest African purchaser of Soviet arms, Washington was ready to accept the fact of Algerian independence. Algeria would not, however, replace Morocco as America's most trusted ally in North Africa : 1979 also saw the American decision to sell arms to Morocco, at the height of her confrontation with Algeria and Polisario over the Western Sahara.

Until 1979 American neutrality in the Saharan conflict was clear from its reluctance to sell offensive weapons to Morocco - so as not to upset its economic relations with Algeria. Washington saw the conflict as a local one that did not invite an East-West confrontation. When Polisario began to intensify its attacks on Morocco, in late 1979, the Americans came under strong pressure to register their support for King Hassan II. President Carter summoned a meeting with the Secretary of state, the Secretary of Defence and his National Security Advisor, to consider possible overt military aid for Morocco.¹⁶ After Hassan's visit to Washington, in March 1980, Morocco received \$ 235 million of American military aid.¹⁷ Algeria, for her part, did not react negatively, but sought instead to use its influence with the new, revolutionary regime in Teheran, to try to secure the release of the American Embassy hostages - if possible, in advance of the presidential election. Algeria had initially criticised the Iranian action as a violation of international

norms and as a political mistake that had isolated Iran from the rest of the world.

As one of the few countries that had retained close ties with Iran in the early stages of the revolution, Algeria was well placed to be able to mediate in the dispute.¹⁸ By helping to secure the release of the hostages, in 1981, and by serving as Iran's representative in Washington, Algeria hoped to convince the Americans that Algeria was, in fact, non-aligned, despite the purchase of arms from the Soviet Union. The new administration of Benjedid Chadli also hoped to establish its international credentials and to publicise and promote Algeria's style of conflict resolution - as demonstrated earlier by Boumedienne's mediation in the Iran-Iraq border dispute. In return Algeria may have expected a more sympathetic response by Washington to the Algerian position on the Western Sahara - and some support in her long and costly dispute with the EL PASO oil company. Disappointed with the results, on both counts, Algeria concluded that Washington would continue its support for Morocco rather than adopt a more 'balanced' or neutral approach to Maghreb affairs.

The new Reagan administration soon made its position clear. Following the American clash with Libya in the Gulf of Sirta in December 1981, the decision to sell advanced AWACs aircraft to Saudi Arabia, and the creation of American bases in Kenya and Somalia as well as Egypt, the Algerians became alarmed at the

prospect of concerted action against so-called 'revolutionary' regimes in Africa. In 1982 the Moroccan government granted military facilities to the Americans, including the use of bases inside Morocco, shortly after the creation by America and Tunisia of a joint military commission. At the same time American imports from Algeria were halved as oil companies stopped lifting Algerian oil complaining of its high cost. Imports from the United States increased, however, by some 20% to reach \$1 billion. They included Hercules transport aircraft and army trucks as well as equipment for oil and gas extraction.¹⁹

More liberal economic policies on the part of the Chadli administration in 1983 - and moves for detente with Morocco - did, however, bring a return to closer economic ties with the United States. By 1984 Algeria exported \$3.8 billion in hydrocarbons to the United States, importing \$500 million of American goods in exchange. A pro-American group emerged within the Algerian political elite, led by the Prime Minister, Abdelhamid Brahimi, backed by the Foreign Minister, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi.²⁰ But the main impetus for a new U.S.-Algerian rapprochement came in August 1984 as a result of the Oudja Treaty of Union between Morocco and Libya. Washington was not slow in registering its disapproval - as the flow of arms to Morocco slowed to a trickle. In April 1985 Chadli became the first Algerian president to pay an official visit to Washington. The United States responded by approving Algerian purchases of sophisticated American military hardware.

Thereafter Algeria has looked increasingly to the United States rather than the Soviet Union for its major defence purchases. It did not, however, succeed in its more immediate aim of isolating Morocco from its principal source of military and financial assistance. The Libyan-Moroccan 'union' did not bring America's "special relationship" with Morocco to an end and the Americans, in any case, had no wish to drive Morocco into the arms of the French. After the American attack on Libya in 1986 the Moroccans determined to bring the 'union' to an end and set about ingratiating themselves once more with Washington. By 1985 America was Algeria's second largest trading partner after France. While America's trade with Algeria is second only to Saudi Arabia in the Arab and African worlds.

Algeria and the Eastern bloc

For Algerian and other Arab leaders the war of October 1973 offered conclusive evidence that, as in 1967, the Soviet Union was more concerned with safeguarding détente and securing parity with the United States, than with promoting Arab and other 'local' interests. Even in the fifties and sixties Soviet support for Algerian liberation had been lukewarm - and had fluctuated depending on the state of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Paris. Like most other Arab states Algeria had expected the Soviet Union to come to the rescue of the Arabs during the war of June 1967. To the dismay of Algeria and other Arab states, however, the Soviet Union was not only surprised by

the scale of the Arab defeat, but counselled the Arab leaders to negotiate an unconditional cease-fire. Algeria could not accept the Soviet interpretation of détente which would effectively perpetuate the status quo in much of the Third World. It was unreasonable and unjust that the masses should have to accept poverty and exploitation for the indefinite future so that those in the industrial nations could enjoy both security and higher standards of living. Peace and security on a global level depend on a satisfactory outcome to the North-South Dialogue and a New International Economic Order. As the Algerian National Charter of 1976 states :

It is increasingly in Africa, Asia and Latin America that wars, plots and *coups d'état* take place, instigated from outside. It is there, too, that the real struggle continues...For Algeria, therefore, peace is one and indivisible.²¹

Under President Boumedienne Algeria seems to have rejected the Soviet thesis of a world divided into socialist and imperialist powers, preferring the Chinese version which sees the split as one between rich and poor. On the eve of the Algiers summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, in September 1973, Boumedienne had reacted angrily to an attempt by Leonid Brezhnev to ensure that the Soviet view was accepted by the conference. Instead Algeria has preferred to stress the economic rather than

the political content of non-alignment, where the Soviets have sought to emphasise the second at the expense of the first. For Algeria, ideological considerations are secondary to the overriding need for development and the pursuit of a more equitable distribution of wealth on a global basis. Détente is valuable in so far as it contributes to that goal. The banners in Algiers at the time of the Non-Aligned conference carried the slogan "poor of the world unite" which suggested once again a preference for the Chinese rather than the Russian position.

Initially, however, Algeria had appeared to be linked to the Soviet Union - although it refused to take sides in the Sino-Soviet schism. Ben Bella who was accorded an elaborate reception in the Soviet Union, in May 1964, did not take up an invitation to visit Peking. Moscow reacted coldly, however, to the *coup* in 1965 and the substitution of Boumedienne for Ben Bella, and this, as well as the Soviet reaction to the Arab defeat in 1967, may have pushed Boumedienne towards a more independent line. Nevertheless it was February 1974 before the Algerian president made his first official visit to China where he found much sympathy for the view that all foreign fleets should be withdrawn from the Mediterranean.

Algeria and Libya were the main African purchasers of Soviet arms for much of the 1970s although neither would concede military bases on their territory. While they are closer to the Soviet Union than any other North African state, Moscow has been

wary of any diplomatic involvement in the Western Sahara dispute. The Polisario forces are equipped largely with Soviet arms, and the Soviet Union did warn the French against intervention in the conflict. But, as well as ideological affinities with Polisario and Algeria, Moscow had also to consider questions of trade and the benefits the Soviet Union could derive from the purchase of Moroccan phosphates and the negotiation of fishing rights in the off-shore waters of the Atlantic. The fact that the Moroccans were soon in effective occupation of most of the Western Sahara as well as patrolling the adjacent waters, clearly influenced the Soviet attitude. Anticipating the disappearance, one day, of the Moroccan monarch, the Soviets also wish to maintain a presence in a state whose strategic position in the Mediterranean is of considerable importance.

The Soviet Union also resented the appointment of Benjedid Chadli to succeed the late Houari Boumedienne in 1979. Aware of Chadli's reputation as a 'liberal' Moscow would have preferred the candidate of the left, Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui. On taking office Chadli had promised to adhere to the country's policy of non-alignment - keeping both super-powers at an equal distance. It is doubtful, however, if that was quite the interpretation of non-alignment that the Soviet leaders wished to hear. Algerian demands for the withdrawal of American, Soviet and NATO fleets from the Mediterranean are not regarded with much sympathy by the Soviets who would find themselves effectively confined within the Black Sea or compelled to roam the more distant oceans. Trade

between Algeria and the Soviet Union did increase significantly in the seventies, mainly as a result of large Algerian purchases of Soviet arms. But trade with the East does not begin to match the level of trade with the Western countries. Moreover, Algeria since 1973 has shown a distinct preference for Western, particularly American technology in its pursuit of diversification and rapid industrialisation.

Yet, despite Chadli's new interpretation of non-alignment, he was cautious not to offend the Soviet Union. Algeria had not condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. And, during Chadli's visit to the Soviet Union, in June 1981, he reviewed Algeria-Soviet relations and important aspects of international relations, but failed to mention Afghanistan.²² While the Soviet Union continues to provide most of Algeria's military equipment, Britain, France and the United States are also playing an increasingly active and prominent role. Moscow's only close ally in North Africa now is Libya - which some would see more as a liability than an asset. The United States, on the other hand, can count on Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, while its relations with Algeria continue to improve - even under Reagan - and are likely to improve still more should an accommodation be reached between Algeria and Morocco in the Western Sahara.

Algerian relations with Eastern Europe have generally been positive although, again, trade is much smaller than with the Western countries. Algeria continues to receive military and

technical assistance from countries like Hungary, which in the late seventies provided large numbers of teachers, including academics, as well as doctors and other medical personnel. There was much support in Algeria for an East German programme offering systematic vocational training for Algerian workers who were later repatriated home where they could assist in national development. Problems arose, however, in 1976 when several thousand Algerian workers struck over low pay - many were then deported. The most cordial relations were those between Algeria and Yugoslavia, also a prominent member of the Non-Aligned Movement whose relations with the Soviet Union have shown a will to independence much appreciated by Algiers if not by Moscow. Yugoslavia gave unconditional support to Algeria during the war with France and many of the leaders and officials of the GPRA were guests of Marshal Tito in Belgrade. After independence Algerian leaders and intellectuals also drew on Yugoslav experience with "self-management" and industrial relations in the establishment of the new state enterprises created after independence in 1962.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE : MOROCCO AND THE SUPER-POWERS

THE ART OF PLAYING THE GAME

Morocco : a reliable friend of America

Since the 1960s Morocco has been classified as a pro-Western state enjoying a very close and sympathetic relationship with the United States. Under Hassan II Morocco was for a time the largest African recipient of American aid. For the Moroccan state, however, there were risks as well as advantages in this policy. American support for Israel remains a highly contentious issue among Arab leaders and has been an even more sensitive question with Arab opinion generally in the Middle East. American support for the Moroccan regime did, however, bring important diplomatic and, on occasion, military support particularly when, as in the Western Sahara in the late 1970s, the government in Rabat was under considerable pressure. In return Hassan agreed to despatch troops to the troubled province of Shaba in Zaire, in 1977 and again in 1978, to bolster the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko. And it was in Morocco that preparations were made for the subsequent meeting between Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin. On a visit to Washington, in November 1978, Hassan had offered to help recruit and staff a pan-African force, some 20,000 strong, to replace Cuban troops stationed in Africa.¹

As we have seen the Americans were nevertheless reluctant to be drawn into the contest in the Western Sahara, and were under

some economic pressure to adopt an even-handed approach : in the second half of the seventies the value of American trade with Algeria was ten times the figure for trade with Morocco. While the United States has remained ideologically attached to Morocco, it also has a clear interest in maintaining and expanding its commercial relations with 'socialist' Algeria. By way of contrast the Soviet Union is ideologically closer to Algeria, but values its commercial exchanges with Morocco. Neither power therefore wants to see the Western Sahara erupt into a major East-West conflict. On a visit to Moscow, in January 1976, Henry Kissinger had warned Brezhnev that Washington would not tolerate an Angolan-type intervention in the Western Sahara.² Nor did the Americans view Algeria as a Soviet satellite.

It remains the case that the United States wants to secure the Moroccan regime and that the occupation of the Western Sahara is the essential condition for that security. There is no enthusiasm in Washington for an Algerian or Libyan-influenced Polisario government in the SADR. Hence Morocco in 1976 was still one of the largest recipients - although no longer the largest - of American aid and military assistance in Africa. In 1979, however, Polisario guerrillas took the initiative and embarked on a series of offensive operations that found the Moroccans unprepared and forced to withdraw to prepared defensive positions. Rabat increased its pressure on the United States to furnish more effective "defensive" weaponry. Washington responded favourably and American policy tilted noticeably in the

direction of its old ally. Egypt and Saudi Arabia also seem to have intervened with Washington on behalf of the Moroccan government. The African states were themselves more divided on the Western Sahara, at this time, than they had previously been over earlier Moroccan claims to Mauritania. And in Washington the availability of Mexican natural gas after 1979 - with lower transportation costs and less hassle about the price - weakened the position of the Algerian government.

With Mauritania's withdrawal from the conflict in the Western sahara, Polisario inflicted further humiliations on the besieged and increasingly demoralised Moroccan forces. The rising cost of imported oil coupled with the economic haemorrhage of the war in the Sahara, falling world prices for phosphates, and the ever-present threat of open confrontation with Algeria - all threatened to engulf the Moroccan regime, despite the undoubted popularity of the war among all sectors of the Moroccan population. The only solution seemed to lie in the construction of an elaborate network of sand walls to exclude Polisario guerrillas while maintaining maximum security within the occupied territory at a minimum cost in political as well as military terms. Once the territory was pacified Morocco could then afford the luxury of a plebiscite to confirm (if not legitimise) its presence. But defences on that scale would require substantial investment that, in the circumstances could only come from abroad. In 1980 the American government asked Congress to authorise a 100% increase in the arms vote for Morocco - despite

evidence that such arms, whatever the conditions governing their future use, would be deployed against Polisario.³

Where Morocco's relations with France suffered strain after the socialist victory in 1981, relations with the new American president were closer and more cordial than before. In contrast to President Carter, Ronald Reagan was determined from the outset to confirm his administration's unwavering support for its loyal allies and partners in other parts of the world. Washington would tolerate no more Irans in the Middle East and no more Cubas in Central America. Hassan had condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979; was prepared to allow American warships to use its ports and to negotiate the use of its airfields; Moroccan policies in the Middle East were highly flexible and pragmatic and inspired by an acute awareness of the 'realities' of the situation, while Morocco also shared Washington's concern at the Soviet and Cuban presence in various parts of Africa, and at Libyan involvement in the affairs of many African states. In March 1981, therefore, the Pentagon announced the sale of 108 M60 tanks to Morocco with a value of \$182 million. Washington also undertook to deliver fighter aircraft already promised Morocco by the previous Carter administration.⁴

An official visit to Washington by King Hassan, in May 1982, resulted in an agreement whereby the United States would acquire military transit facilities from Morocco for a period of six years. In return Morocco would receive military credits to

expand its purchases of American arms and military equipment. Moreover, these would now include sophisticated electronic devices for monitoring Polisario movements in the Western Sahara. The two countries held joint military manoeuvres in the autumn of 1982 confirming their new more intimate partnership. Algeria and Libya were critical but could do little to influence American policy. There was some indication, however, of dissent inside Morocco, directed against the American connection rather than against the war itself. The incidents were minor but pointed to growing anti-American sentiment elsewhere in the society - in the aftermath of Israel's invasion of Lebanon and the failure of the Americans to condemn the Israeli action. A meeting sponsored by the official Moroccan Association of Support for the Palestinian Struggle ended in confusion when a junior minister was prevented from speaking by cries of "long live popular regimes and down with reactionary Arab regimes". And in July 1982 a member of the American consular staff in Casablanca was killed, apparently in a car accident although a fundamentalist group claimed to have been responsible for his death.⁵ Even greater mystery surrounded the death, in January 1983, of General Ahmed Dlimi, the most senior officer in the Moroccan Army. This, too, was said to have been the result of a car accident, while he was on an inspection tour of the defences in the Sahara. There were rumours, however, linking Dlimi with a plot to overthrow Hassan apparently in opposition to the latter's pro-American views.

The administration in Washington was clearly upset and disappointed by the Libyan-Moroccan rapprochement of August 1984. While relations continued they did not exhibit the same warmth or sense of mutual trust. The 'Moroccan lobby' was busy trying to play down the significance of Hassan's new alliance with America's leading opponent in North Africa.⁶ And the lobby had some support from the Jewish community and the Zionist organisations. Nevertheless there were increasing 'difficulties' with the agreed supply of arms to Morocco. Trade with Algeria was thriving and Hassan was soon looking for excuses to withdraw from the 'union'. The American attack on Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986 was particularly embarrassing from the Moroccan point of view since their treaty with Libya did involve a mutual defence undertaking. The Moroccan decision later that year to receive the Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, for confidential talks had the required effect on the Libyans, who tore up their treaty with Morocco. Relations between Rabat and Washington improved at once.

In October 1986 there was a meeting between the Moroccan Minister for commerce and the American Deputy-Secretary which ended with an agreement that Morocco would, in future, undertake to supply fresh fruits and other produce to American troops stationed in Western Europe. Morocco would also accommodate the most powerful Voice of America transmitting station outside the American mainland. And in December 1986 it was the turn of the American Secretary of State for Defence, Casper Weinberger, to

pay an official call on Morocco. Washington apparently was ready to resume military aid and even to sell advanced F16 fighter aircraft to Rabat.

We particularly appreciate the moderate, pro-Western policy being pursued by Morocco. We will do everything in our power to help provide whatever might be useful to the Kingdom...We will give Morocco any assistance that may be necessary to maintain security in Western Sahara.⁷

There would also be measures to reduce the debt burden and reflate the economy. Prior to the visit some 10,000 American and Moroccan troops had been involved in joint manoeuvres conducted in southern Morocco as part of an exercise labelled "African Eagle".

Morocco and the Soviet Union : economic opportunism

In the case of Algeria's long struggle against the French the Soviet Union had already shown that, in its view, the right to "self-determination", however praiseworthy, does not automatically involve a right to "independence". Much depends on the state of Moscow's relations with the colonial or occupying power, to say nothing of the risks of confrontation with the United States. While Polisario and Algeria might view the issue in the Western Sahara as one of self-determination, Moscow was more concerned with balancing arms sales to Algeria off against

purchases of Moroccan (and Saharan) phosphates, to say nothing of securing access for commercial Soviet trawling fleets to the rich Atlantic waters adjoining Western Sahara. In 1976 Moscow went so far as to warn Algeria about allowing Polisario to use Soviet-supplied arms in its attacks on Moroccan outposts and other military targets.⁹ The Soviet Union did not support the Moroccan position on the Saharan issue, but neither did it support Polisario or Algeria. The Soviet Union has yet to recognise the SADR or to establish close relations with Polisario. Nor does the Soviet Union supply arms directly to the Polisario guerrillas. Where the United States has rationed its support for UNITA in Angola it has been argued that the Soviet Union has shown a similar restraint in its support for Polisario.

Although sympathetic with Algeria on the political plane, the Soviet Union has developed a very profitable economic relationship with Morocco which it has no wish to sacrifice. In the seventies Morocco was the Soviet's major trading partner in Africa. There was a \$2 billion agreement for the construction of phosphates mines, which Hassan, using a somewhat familiar phrase, described as the 'Deal of the Century' (*marché du siècle*), signed in March 1978. Which was followed by a fisheries agreement, signed the following April in Moscow, which provided access to the Atlantic coast for Soviet fleets, as well as credits for the establishment of a canning industry in Morocco and investment in the expansion of the Moroccan fishing fleet. The 'deal' encountered certain 'teething' troubles at the outset

since the Moroccans were evidently trying to manoeuvre the Soviet Union into recognising, at least implicitly, Moroccan sovereignty over the Saharan waters. The Soviet ambassador in Algiers had to confirm to the Algerian authorities that the agreement did not cover the territorial waters in dispute off the coast of Western Sahara.⁹

Problems between Morocco and Cuba in 1980 also had implications for Moroccan relations with the Soviet Union. Morocco broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba in April 1980, following Cuban recognition of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) the previous January. In July 1980 the official Moroccan Press Agency insisted that Cuba was conniving with Algeria and the Polisario 'pirates' in kidnapping fishermen operating inside Moroccan territorial waters.¹⁰ The Soviet Union continued to maintain a low profile on the Saharan question. It has also sought to develop the mutually beneficial commercial exchanges between the two countries. In October 1984 there were two further agreements, covering phosphates and agricultural produce, while the two states envisaged exchanges worth \$2.2 billion by the year 1990.¹¹

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO : TUNISIA AND THE SUPER-POWERS

A TILT TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES

Tunisian foreign policy, as we have seen, has been largely shaped by Habib Bourguiba, himself a product of Western liberal thinking. He has consistently taken moderate, pro-Western positions on international issues, being one of the very few leaders in the Third World to have openly supported American policy in Vietnam.¹ The same factors explain Bourguiba's distaste for radical policies, his distrust of the communist bloc, particularly Maoist China, and his suspicion of Third World leaders who seek communist support. Tunisia has never accepted the radical Third World view of the United States as an imperialist or neo-colonial state. When the French stopped aid to Tunisia, in 1964, after Tunisia had nationalised the European estates, the American government intervened to provide assistance for Tunisia. Since then the United States has remained an important source of foreign aid. During 1957-76 American bilateral assistance to Tunisia amounted to \$850 million.² And while there are no security treaties between the two countries America has undertaken to supply Tunisia with considerable military aid and to assist with military training.

Henry Kissinger took the opportunity to confer with Bourguiba and other Tunisian officials, in November 1974, in the course of his 'shuttle' diplomacy, to sound out their views, and those of other Middle Eastern leaders, on a Middle Eastern settlement. It

was the view of the Tunisian officials that, without American pressure, the Israelis were unlikely to enter into substantive negotiations. Tunisia has therefore been disappointed by continuing American support for Israel and the refusal of Washington to enter into direct talks with the leaders of the Palestinian resistance. A joint communiqué, issued in 1976 by the Tunisian-American joint commission, pointed to the 'healthy state of bilateral relations. Kissinger once again stressed the importance Washington attached to Tunisia's independence, and the role it was playing, as a moderate state and as a force for stability in the Mediterranean region.³

As in the case of Morocco, however, there is considerable suspicion inside Tunisia about American policy in the Middle East generally and more specifically about the close ties that exist between the two states. In Tunisia, as in Morocco, there were anti-American demonstrations in 1982 - the first directed against America since Tunisia became independent in 1956. Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 a thousand demonstrators gathered at a rally sponsored by the official Tunisian Trade Union Confederation (UGTT) at which the American flag was burnt. In July the Tunisian Foreign Minister, Beji Caid Essebsi, appeared on television and was sharply critical of American Middle Eastern policy, calling on the United States to abandon its unwavering support for Israel. Meanwhile hundreds of Tunisians volunteered to fight for the PLO in Lebanon.⁴ Although Tunisian ties with the United States remained close, her

continuing close association with Israel was highly embarrassing for the Tunisian leaders in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. When the American Secretary of State, George Schultz, visited Tunisia, in December 1983, there was strong criticism of the American position from President Bourguiba and from Prime Minister M'Zali.

Apart from such momentary fluctuations, American-Tunisian relations have remained relatively straight-forward. The United States sees Tunisia as a bulwark against Libya and was therefore ready to exert itself to ensure an orderly succession in Tunis. Bourguiba's eventual successor, General Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali, was himself trained in the United States and was formerly responsible for national security in Tunisia. His appointment as Interior Minister in 1984, after the bread riots in the capital, was a clear indication of American as well as Tunisian concern to maintain order and political stability at all costs. The first joint Tunisian-U.S. military exercises to take place on Tunisian soil were held in early May 1985. A month later, President Bourguiba visited the United States where, among other issues, he discussed the possibility of Tunisia receiving American military aid in the form of grants rather than loans. The President claimed that the loan system was placing an "intolerable burden on the economy".⁵

In November 1987 Ben Ali would finally take power in a palace coup, replacing Bourguiba as president. Since Libya's military

escapade at the town of Gafsa, in January 1980, and the bread riots of January 1984, Tunisia has acquired F5 fighter aircraft and M60 tanks from the United States, as well as anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles. By the end of 1984, Tunisia's military debt to the United States was estimated at \$400 million. The commercial balance between Tunisia and the United States amounted to \$403 million - in favour of America.⁶ After Bourguiba's visit to the United States in 1985 there were tentative plans for America to supply sophisticated air defence systems to Tunisia in exchange for the right to use certain military facilities in that country.⁷ Washington and Tunis were agreed that any threat was likely to emanate from Tripoli and Kadhafi.

Tunisia's western orientation has not precluded positive relations with the East Communist states, although these for the most part have been more recent and are usually on a more temporary, ad hoc basis. In 1973 two Soviet diplomats and a Soviet news agency correspondent were accused of espionage : the Soviet citizens were expelled - after the Soviet Union had apologised for the incident - while four Tunisians also involved in the affair were convicted of treason in May 1974.⁸ Receiving the Soviet Prime Minister, Anatoly Kosygin, on an official visit to Tunisia in April 1975, Bourguiba remarked that "in this time of détente we cannot be more American than the Americans".⁹ And just as Tunisia has from time to time expressed disappointment at Washington's unconditional support for Israel, so too there have

been differences between Tunis and Moscow over possible future boundaries for the state of Israel.

Bourguiba favours frontiers based on the 1947 UN Partition Plan while the Soviet Union prefers - perhaps more realistically - a return to the frontiers that existed before the June 1967 war. On other issues, Tunisia has become increasingly alarmed at the Soviet military presence in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere in Africa as well as its involvement in Afghanistan. Bourguiba did not share Boumedienne's interest in Chairman Mao's China or its dispute with the Soviet Union and its distinctive Third World policies. Relations were fairly minimal and were confined to a number of official visits and an Y80 million loan, negotiated by the Tunisian Prime Minister, Hedi Nouira, in April 1975.¹⁰

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE : LIBYA AND THE SUPER-POWERS

MUTUAL SUSPICIONS

Libya and the Soviet Union : superficial alliance

Kadhafi's attitude to the super-powers has changed over the period under consideration. At first he was hostile to both the Soviet Union and the United States - but his hostility to the Soviet Union was more pronounced. Prior to 1973 he was even seen by Arab leftists and communists as an American agent because of his anti-communist utterances. In 1971 he denounced the Soviet role in the Indo-Pakistan war, as "confirming Soviet imperialist designs in the area".¹ Briefly, Kadhafi supported Sultan Qaboos of Oman, a close ally of Britain and the United States, against the Dhofar guerrilla movement being supported by the pro-Soviet marxists of Southern Yemen. The leaders of the abortive, pro-communist *coup* in Sudan, in 1971, were intercepted by Kadhafi and returned to Sudan where they were executed by the government of Jaafar Numeiry.² Some have even claimed that Kadhafi was protected by the Americans, and even by the CIA, in his initial bid for power - in the conviction that he was a religious fanatic and an anti-communist nationalist who would resist communist penetration of the region.³

At the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers, in September 1973, Kadhafi even challenged the right of Cuba to be represented because of its close alignment with Moscow. As we have seen the two leaders embraced on the final day - after Cuba

had agreed to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. But at the very time that Egypt was turning to the United States, Libya was starting to lean towards the Soviet Union. This had little to do with communism but a great deal to do with the rebuff that Kadhafi had suffered at the hands of Sadat in his attempts to cement a union between their two states. In 1973 Kadhafi first visited the Soviet Union and relations between the two have since demonstrated the contradictions inherent in Libya's attitudes towards the wider world. The Soviet Union, together with the United States, had voted for Israel's entry to the United Nations. The Soviet Union has pursued a vigorous policy of secularisation among the Moslem populations that inhabit the republics of Central Asia. In 1979 the Soviet Union took advantage of internal divisions to invade Afghanistan. For Kadhafi, however, it is the United States and its Western allies who must bear most of the responsibility for the creation of Israel and its subsequent expansion - to the exclusion of the native Palestinians.

A large arms deal was concluded in 1975 between the Soviet Union and Libya, along with reports that the Soviets had offered some assistance in the development of nuclear power - albeit for peaceful purposes.⁴ Moscow was reacting to its expulsion from Egypt by the Americans in 1972, as well as to the chronic shortage of foreign exchange that could be alleviated by the sale of arms to the oil-rich Libyans (and Algerians). It appears that the Soviets had little faith in Kadhafi and saw the alliance

rather in terms of a short-term 'marriage of convenience'. Political circumstances since 1973 had thrown them together : Libya, however, was no substitute for Egypt. The Green Book of 1973 demonstrated not only Kadhafi's nationalist fervour, but also his determined rejection of communist as well as of capitalist ideas. From the outset Moscow seems to have been aware of the risks posed by Kadhafi with his well deserved reputation for volatility. The communist leaders were wary lest "the tail wag the dog".

Although Kadhafi threatened in 1978 to join the Warsaw Pact, no invitation was issued and no acceptance of Libyan membership was recorded. Kadhafi was to make similar requests, notably after the American attack on Tripoli in 1986, but the door remained shut fast and bolted.⁵ In 1979 Kadhafi hinted that he might reverse his previous non-aligned policy and permit Soviet bases in Libya so as to counteract the flourishing alliance between America and Egypt. Following the investiture of President Ronald Reagan, in 1981, Kadhafi threatened first to sign a friendship pact with the Soviets and then to join the Warsaw Pact on the grounds that Washington was pushing Tripoli into the arms of Moscow. Under this mounting American pressure Kadhafi, together with the Presidents of Ethiopia and South Yemen, signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on August 19, 1981. This provided for closer political and economic cooperation.

In protest at the build-up of American military facilities in the Indian Ocean - which in 1979 was declared a zone of peace by the UN General Assembly - the three leaders referred in particular to U.S. bases in Somalia, Oman, Egypt, and on the island of Diego Garcia. The treaty was condemned by Oman and Egypt, who both considered the Soviet Union to have instigated the alliance with a view to spreading Soviet influence throughout the Arab region. On the same day there was a clash between Libya and the United States, resulting in the shooting down of two Libyan aircraft by American F14 jets over the Gulf of Sirte. In March 1983 the Soviet Union and Libya did agree, in principle, to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship - reflecting their joint concern of mounting American influence in the Middle East, particularly after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon the previous year. At the same time Soviet-Libyan trade rose from £504 million in 1981 to £1.2 billion in 1982 - following large purchases of Soviet arms paid for mainly by shipments of Libyan oil.⁶

The Soviet Union remains to the present Libya's most important military ally. Diplomatic relations with China were not established until August 1978 and relations were temporarily frozen in 1982 on account of the continuing supply of Chinese arms to Egypt. Despite the friendship treaty, however, neither side has quite matched the more optimistic expectations of the other. Until recently Libya, together with Syria, has been supportive of Iran against Iraq in the protracted Gulf war. And

this despite growing Soviet support for Iraq since 1982 and attempts by the Soviets to effect a cease-fire between the rival governments. Libya, moreover, still looks to the west as its major export market and as the source of most of its non-military imports. Kadhafi has been largely unpredictable in his behaviour towards the Soviet-backed PLO, frequently acting in defiance of Soviet wishes, most notably in his long opposition to Yasser Arafat, chairman of the PLO. Kadhafi had often had cause to condemn Arafat : on account of his support for the peace process in the mid seventies, his long reluctance to support the revolution in Lebanon until the Christian militias had forced his hand, and his unexpected decision to visit President Mubarak of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan, shortly after his expulsion from Tripoli (Lebanon) in 1983 - by the Syrians who had mobilised PLO and Fatah dissidents against him.

Because of the erratic behaviour of the Libyan leader the Soviets have always preferred to keep their distance. Libya is seen as yet another unreliable Arab state - with independent means and therefore more likely to promote its own rather than Soviet interests in the region. Kadhafi's close supervision of the army and his control over the 'people's committees' leaves little room in which the Soviets can manoeuvre. From Kadhafi's point of view it is a matter of regret, too, that the Soviet Union cannot or will not provide the kind of military and diplomatic support for the Arab states that America so readily dispenses to Israel. That is a cause of some resentment vis-a-

vis the Soviet Union, but is also at the origin of the Libyan-American conflict. In the words of the Libyan Minister of State for Information, Mohammed Belkacem Zwai :

Israel was a foreign body within the Arab nation; every one who went there after 1945 should go back where they came from...The Americans not only arm Israel but have built it into a strong power that can threaten any other country.'

Libya and the United States : continual confrontation

In October 1980, following the delivery of American AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia, Kadhafi urged the Arab states to strike back at Israel and American imperialism.

We urge the Arab people, from the Ocean to the Gulf, to strike back at United States bases, the United States presence and its main base in Israel. Should the Arab regimes obstruct the vengeance of the Arab people they must pay the price for their obstruction; they will be treated like the United States and the Israelis.²³

Ironically, Kadhafi had welcomed the election of Ronald Reagan as American president in November 1980, arguing that Republicans were closer to the Arab cause than Democrats.

We firmly welcome the election of President Reagan, firstly because it was Carter who signed the accords which were a plot against the Arab and Palestinian peoples...But also we feel the Republicans have always been closer to the Arab cause than the Democrats. Proof of this is seen by the reaction of Sadat before this election. He detested Reagan."

Since Reagan's election, however, relations between the two states have sunk to their lowest level. In July 1981 there were rumours that the CIA was planning Kadhafi's assassination. A month later F14 aircraft from the American Sixth Fleet shot down two Libyan SU22 aircraft over the Gulf of Sirte, as part of a long-standing dispute over the extent of Libya's territorial waters. It also followed a long war of words over American allegations that a Libyan assassination squad had been sent to Washington with orders to kill President Reagan and other senior American officials. Ever since Camp David Libya has seen itself as a likely target for hostile action by Egypt, Israel and the United States. In 1982 America and conservative Arab states had pressured members of the OAU to boycott the summit due to be held in Tripoli - thereby preventing Kadhafi becoming chairman of the organisation during 1982-3.

Reagan wished to remove Kadhafi to eliminate what he considers to be a potential Soviet foothold in the Mediterranean region. In March 1982 the United States banned imports of oil from Libya and that same month token measures were announced to stop the 'illegal' export of \$1.7 billion of 'high technology' goods to Libya. The intention was clearly to squeeze Kadhafi in every way possible. Kadhafi has gauged his responses with a view to eliciting the greatest reaction in the United States. Aware of Reagan's crusade against communism, Kadhafi declared in January 1986 that American policy was forcing Libya into the hands of the Soviet Union and that his country might become the "Cuba of the Mediterranean".¹⁰ One might argue equally that the Libyan leader should be grateful to the United States for distracting the attention of Libyans away from the urgent domestic problems now facing them.

Oil revenues have fallen steeply while the national debt has soared. Much of the budget has been spent on an army that, following its crushing defeat in Chad, in March 1987, may now pose a serious threat to Kadhafi himself. The attempted coup of 1984 was primarily the result of mounting dissatisfaction with Kadhafi among Libyan officers. Kadhafi's reaction has been to re-shuffle the army command and to reinforce the surveillance of the revolutionary people's guards. Arguably, the American attack on Libya in April 1986, far from weakening the regime, served largely to discredit the military - which was always the most

likely focus of opposition to Kadhafi - while strengthening public (civilian) support for the Libyan leader.

Meanwhile there was mounting frustration in the United States following Libyan involvement in terrorist actions, particularly those directed against American targets. President Reagan has been urging European support for economic sanctions and possible military action against Libya. Since 1981, however, America's European allies have been anxious to keep some distance between themselves and the increasingly bitter dispute involving Reagan and Kadhafi. Given the reasonably good relations between Libya and the West European states, it is not surprising that the latter have responded with a marked lack of enthusiasm to discreet soundings from Washington about comprehensive and collective economic sanctions against Libya.

The United States did not take kindly to the failure of her European partners to follow her lead in imposing economic sanctions against Libya, following attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports in which Libya was said to be implicated. If the European states have hesitated it has been because they believe the Reagan administration has been over-reacting while the effect of American retaliation has not been that intended : one does not isolate Kadhafi by making a martyr of him. In any case European interests in Libya and the Arab world are far from negligible - nor is Europe, particularly southern Europe, immune from possible Libyan retaliation. So long as the United States continues to

support Israeli policy in the Middle East and refuses recognition to the PLO, there will be support for Kadhafi in Libya and other Arab states. Where American (and Western) policy towards South Africa has cost Washington the support of much African opinion, her unflinching support for Israel has helped alienate Arab opinion in most of the Middle East.

Conclusions

Algeria is the obvious point of reference for any examination of the Maghreb on account of its greater size, manpower and availability of natural resources. Compared with its immediate neighbours, Morocco and Tunisia, its foreign policy has been more 'radical' - and more consistently 'radical' than the unpredictable Libya. The principal object of Algerian policy, particularly under Houari Boumedienne, has been to free itself from the economic constraints and the consequent sense of dependency imposed by colonial conquest and the reorganisation and later evolution of its productive structures. Undertaken by the French throughout North Africa this has led to the creation of economies that relate to France rather than to one another or to the other states around them. Today, long after independence, such economies are still engaged in harmful competition with one another for access to French and, more recently, European markets.

Greater economic independence and a measure of self-sustaining growth have been the guiding principles of the Algerian development programme in its formative years and throughout the Boumedienne period. This was a period when priority went to industry and large-scale, state-owned and state-directed organisations were the norm in business as well as in agriculture. Self-reliance and socialist planning were the ideals in economics just as self-determination and independence were the goals of state-craft and foreign policy. After 1973 the Algerian leadership launched itself into the struggle for a New International Economic Order and the campaign for North-South Dialogue. During 1973-76 President Boumedienne was in the forefront of the Third World political offensive to win a radical improvement in terms of trade with the industrial nations. He was also chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, favouring an interpretation of non-alignment which matched the economic concerns of the Third World rather than the strategic priorities of the super-powers and their European allies.

Algeria's concern with international trading patterns reflects her own experience as a Third World producer and the struggle in the 1960s and early 1970s to secure a larger share of oil royalties for re-investment in the country's development. Together with Iraq, Algeria had experimented with a variety of methods for ensuring more effective control not only over oil extraction but also over refining and marketing. By the mid-seventies Algeria was again active in pressing forward with

similar policies for her other major export, natural gas, looking for investment in the necessary infrastructure and technology, and then adopting an aggressive marketing policy towards the industrial states. It was this radical policy and aggressive approach to marketing and pricing that characterised Algeria's relations with the European Community in particular, and the industrialised world in general.

Other Maghrebin states, notably Tunisia and Morocco, have not sought to follow the Algerian lead. Morocco has sought to protect its largely agricultural economy by integrating itself more closely with the European Community and seeking to adjust to the economic needs and priorities of the West rather than collaborating with other Third World states to try to influence or change those priorities. Tunisia, although it enjoys higher levels of social formation, has followed policies similar to those of Morocco, although its own economy is more closely integrated with that of Eastern Algeria. The main concern of Algeria's neighbours has been to secure and maintain preferential access to the European Community and, especially, to the French market. The alternative, closer integration with the Algerian economy and a coordinated pattern of development in the industrial and agricultural spheres has not proved sufficiently attractive, although it would appear to offer substantial advantages over the existing system. The principal objection appears to be political although, in economic terms, it could be argued that to pursue Maghrebin cooperation would be to replace

one form of dependency - on the European Community - with another, even less acceptable form - namely dependency on Algeria. It remains to be seen, however, whether the entry into the EC of Greece, Spain and Portugal will stimulate a new interest in regional cooperation inside North Africa.

On the broad level of principle there is little to choose between the foreign policies of the Maghrebin states. All, though in differing degrees, emphasise national independence, development, solidarity with the Third World, close association with Africa, the Middle East and the Mediterranean, the need for linkage with Europe, identification with the Arab 'nation' and the Moslem world and the cause of the Palestinians. It is at the level of action, on a day-to-day basis, that the policies begin to diverge. Morocco, Algeria and Libya denounce imperialism but, for Morocco, the threat comes from Eastern Europe and the Soviets, as well as from Algeria; for Libya it emanates from Israel, the United States and the West, notably France; and for Algeria it comes mainly from the North - at least until the arrival in power of President Chadli - and, of course, from Moroccan 'expansionism'.

Where the Maghrebin states are agreed that American support for Israel has been a critical factor in maintaining Israel's dominant position within the Middle East, this has produced very different reactions. Where Bourguiba has tried to bring Washington and the Arab states within hailing, if not speaking

distance, Morocco has been active on Washington's behalf in precisely those areas and on those questions, like Camp David, that continue to separate the United States from even the most moderate Arab leaders. The Americans can, on the other hand, point to the Libyan position on Middle Eastern questions to justify their continuing support for Israel, notwithstanding the invasion of Lebanon and subsequent events on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. And if Algerian policy under President Benjedid Chadli has drawn closer to Washington it reflects an ability on the part of each to differentiate between mutual economic interest and conflicting political goals. But that is one of the purposes of a foreign policy and is a requirement that every state must submit to.

There is a suspicion that the Maghrebin states have marketed their foreign policies with the same energy and conviction that they try to market their industrial and agricultural produce and, of course, their oil and gas when they have it. Barter has never been confined to commodities but extends to investment, contracts, military bases, and innumerable 'deals' of one kind or another, involving political 'favours' and 'services' as much as economic transactions. Foreign policies compete in a political market just as commodities are subject to competition in the economic market. Foreign policies also have to be 'sold', markets created and political rivals 'bought off'. And it is here that the Maghrebin states, whatever their political complexion,

have shown considerable ingenuity, not to be outdone, despite their diminutive resources, by even the Saudis and the Kuwaitis.

It is as political as well as economic entrepreneurs that one should perhaps view the Maghrebin leaders. Here President Kadhafi is at a clear disadvantage since he is largely debarred from the one market where he wants to play an effective role - the Middle East - and is forced to compete in other markets where the Libyan role is even more peripheral. The problem of centre-periphery relations has been a problem of alliance-building since time-immemorial, and long before it was appropriated by dependency writers and those concerned with 'internal colonialism'. And there are some goods that just cannot be sold at any price, e.g., Kadhafi's efforts to integrate Libya with the Warsaw Pact. In marketing the North-South debate, President Boumedienne also contrived - without detracting from the principles involved - to sell Algerian oil and gas. For the Arab states even the oil embargo of 1973 was a political instrument heavily circumscribed by calculations of economic profit and loss. For some Arab leaders the Palestinians, too, have been a 'commodity' although here again the leadership has found itself constrained by the favourable image that 'commodity' enjoys in the political marketplace.

The fact remains that, with Egypt's switch after 1972, from the Soviet to the Western camp, the pressures on the Maghrebin states for closer integration with the West in the political as

well as the economic sense became overwhelming. President Reagan's bombing of Libya in April 1986 and the evident reluctance of the Soviet Union to become involved merely underline what had long been obvious in any case. Egypt stands between Kadhafi and the Middle East. France, America, Nigeria and Algeria bar the path to Libyan expansion southwards as well as westwards. In Western Sahara Algeria and Morocco are competing for American attention : here as elsewhere the Soviet response has been disappointing. The economic shake-up in Algeria under Chadli and the experiment in liberalisation anticipated - rather than followed - the more timid 'reforms' of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. This is the real context in which one has to re-consider more traditional policies like non-alignment, *francophonie*, and Third World solidarity.

CONCLUSIONS

The period 1973-87 was a particularly significant one for the Maghrebin states and for their foreign policies. The year 1973 was a watershed in terms of inter-state relations in the global context as well as in the Middle East, Africa and within the Maghreb. In the international sphere attention became focussed on the October 1973 war between Egypt and Syria on the one hand and Israel on the other. The war saw a pronounced shift in the Soviet-American 'balance' within the Middle East. Soviet influence began to wane as American involvement in the area increased. Already in 1968 the Rogers' Plan for a cease-fire between Israel and her Arab neighbours was an indication of growing American influence with the Arab leaders. The accession of Sadat after the death of Nasser in 1970 saw the recognition by Egypt and its conservative allies of the Gulf that no satisfactory or lasting solution could be found in the Middle East without the active participation and support of the United States which was the only power with some leverage over Israel. The Soviets were deliberately excluded over a year before the October war when Sadat expelled the Soviet advisers from Egypt in 1972. American support for a cease-fire and for the "peace process" that followed the war was to have a considerable impact on the Arab states in their relations with Egypt and with one another. The new and enlarged American role and the more

conservative bias within the Arab League could not fail to influence the Maghrebin states who had identified closely with the Arab cause in 1973, to the extent of despatching arms and men - although they arrived too late to have any very direct role in the conflict.

The quadrupling of oil prices in the course of 1973 was the outcome of a growing imbalance between the demand of the industrial countries for oil and the capacity of the Middle Eastern producers to meet that demand. It was also triggered by closer collaboration than in the past among the producing states represented in OPEC and a determination to exploit market forces to secure the best possible return for existing reserves in the knowledge that these were large but not inexhaustible. The dramatic, if short-lived oil embargo imposed by the Arab Oil-Producing and Exporting Countries (OAPEC) as their contribution to the 1973 war effort also emphasised the dependency of many West European states on oil from the Middle East and the political as well as the economic significance of the oil weapon. The impact on oil-importing Third World states proved even more far-reaching as they confronted higher charges for fuel and energy as well as higher prices for European imports. Struggling to maintain commodity prices at a level that would finance existing commitments, many Third World producers were unable to apply the same collective pressure as OPEC for a time maintained. Nor were they able to absorb or pass on to others the more damaging inflationary effects of higher costs.

Many European states began to differentiate between their own oil dependency and the more secure position of the United States with its large oil reserves and its substantial, if declining, domestic production. Accordingly, the beginnings of the Euro-Arab Dialogue date back therefore to 1973 and the last months of the Presidency of Georges Pompidou. Arab-African Dialogue was also launched in 1973 as Algeria, Libya and other Arab states called on their OAU colleagues to sever ties with Israel in a display of African solidarity. Meanwhile the North-South debate was effectively joined in 1973, following the meeting of the UNCTAD group earlier in the year, in Santiago, Chile. Where the Group of 77 had previously failed to interest the major West European powers in any negotiation of their collective demands, the French in particular, as well as the Italians and some of the smaller European states were now prepared to break ranks and organise joint discussions with Third World states, in the initial stages of which the OPEC members and Algeria played a very prominent role.

And in North Africa itself 1973 witnessed two events that would play an increasing role in the evolution of inter-state relations over the next decade and a half. There was the formation of the Polisario Front in the Spanish Sahara with its demand for the independence of the Saquiet Al Hamra and Rio de Oro, which was at the origin of the continuing dispute between Algeria and Morocco over the future of the small but wealthy territory. And it was in 1973 that Libya occupied the Aouzou

Strip in Northern Chad, announcing Kadhafi's shift of interest from the Mackrek to the Maghreb, with Libya's new ambitions in the Sahel, coinciding with large uranium discoveries in Niger and a temporary weakening in French influence within the region, in a context of prolonged drought and mounting economic tensions.

In relative contrast with the position in much of sub-Saharan Africa, 1973 and the years immediately following saw some improvement in the economic position of the Maghrebin states, particularly for the surplus oil and gas producers, like Libya and Algeria, but also for states like Morocco where phosphate prices improved. There was also a transformation in the domestic situation in the direction of what Zartman has called the "national consolidation process". Where the 1960s had been rather optimistically described as the decade of nation-building,

emphasis of the 1970s was rather on state-consolidation. The same process was evident elsewhere in the Middle East as Syria and Iraq acquired more stable regimes in the 1970s following the turmoil of the previous three decades. The Maghrebin states continued through the 1970s and 1980s with the regimes already in place at the end of the 1960s. The civilian regimes remained civilian, the military governments continued to be military.

The last attempted coup in Algeria was in 1967, following the overthrow of Ben Bella by the military two years earlier. Its failure marked the eclipse of 'wilayism' inside Algeria and the strengthening of the new state with the fusion of the earlier

'military' and 'guerrilla' traditions and the incorporation of more technocratic, administrative elements. The revolution of 1969 in Libya inaugurated a political and administrative transformation in that otherwise traditional monarchy. An attempted coup in 1975 was unsuccessful, as was a later barracks revolt in 1984. In Morocco, King Hassan survived the coup attempts of 1971 and 1972 and promptly set about consolidating his position, purging the senior ranks and despatching less reliable officers and contingents to the Golan Heights well in advance of the October war. The military in Tunisia had been politicised from an early stage and posed no serious threat to President Bourguiba until General Ben Ali intervened in 1987 putting an end to the constitutional 'crisis' that began with Bourguiba's sudden 'illness' (and subsequent recovery) in 1974.

By 1973 the earlier legitimising formulas were no longer adequate or even effective. Nationalism, differentiation and the sabre-rattling of the 1960s were beginning to wear thin by the 1970s. The Maghrebini elites had now to seek legitimacy and consolidation through institutionalisation and through new policies, domestic and foreign, that sought to associate key constituencies, military, administrative, economic and 'popular' with the conduct of government. Anti-colonialism was no longer sufficient rationale or justification for the 'new' state. In Tunisia, where the institutions were already firmly based and well entrenched, it was sufficient for Bourguiba to be elected President for Life in 1974 to dissipate the uncertainties arising

from his 'illness' of that year and the political challenges mounted from inside the government, first by the Planning Minister, Ahmed Ben Sahal in 1969, and, more threatening, by the Foreign Minister, Mohamed Masmoudi in 1974.

In Morocco where the military threat had been serious Hassan announced a number of domestic as well as constitutional reforms designed to enlarge the base of the regime while adopting a more 'militant' policy of Arab solidarity in the Middle East that helped meet some of the demands from within the army while providing a motive for removing other disgruntled elements to the distant Syrian 'front'. A new constitution had been presented in 1972 while in July 1975 general elections were announced (within eighteen months) for a re-convened session of parliament. Meanwhile sweeping agrarian reforms in 1973 saw the expropriation of all foreign-owned estates and measures of liberalisation and land reform designed to renew and strengthen the bond between the throne and the producers in the countryside. Morocco's much publicised participation in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war also helped to strengthen the throne but it was the Green March into the Western Sahara at the end of 1975 that confirmed the popularity of the regime with the people and with all the major parties, from *Istiqlal* on the Right, to the Socialists and Communists on the left.

In Libya the failed coup of 1975 also suggested the need for state consolidation to confirm Kadhafi's grip on a revolution

whose military base had always been decentralised. Hence the General People's Congress summoned in March 1977 to proclaim officially the installation of "people's power" under a new constitution whereby the country was to be designated the "Popular Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" or "state of the masses". Kadhafi would be assisted in the administration of the country by networks of control described as 'popular committees' who appropriated much of the machinery of government including the country's embassies abroad. The 'programme' of the revamped state was the well-known Green Book, published as early as 1973. Meanwhile the occupation of the Auouzou Strip in 1973 marked the beginnings of a shift in policy away from pan-Arabist designs in the East and towards a rather more pragmatic, state-based policy directed at securing control of strategic territories and resources in the Sahel and, if possible, the Maghreb.

Consolidation in Algeria was a more leisurely process given the military's monopoly of power and President Boumedienne's tight and effective control of the military. Nevertheless, there too there was a new emphasis on state-building and on securing state-control of resources and a foreign policy addressed more directly to the country's economic interests, at home, in Western Europe, and in the Middle East. Measures of nationalisation of petroleum resources in the early 1970s were followed by the National Debate of 1975, giving birth to the National Charter in 1976 and concluding with Presidential elections in 1977 and the appointment of a new team of ministers, mostly technocrats

inspired more by economic liberalism and the American model than by the East European experience of state ownership and socialism. Beginning the decade with a new emphasis on socialism and nationalisation, Boumedienne had given ground to the 'liberals' shortly before his death in 1978 - foreshadowing the liberal policies and technocratic inspiration of President Chadli Benjedid after 1979.

The new emphasis on the state in the 1970s has been accompanied by profound social transformation over the last two decades, with greater access to education at all levels, higher levels of literacy and greater awareness of developments both at home and abroad. Policy-making can no longer be the self-contained, self-perpetuating process that it was in the first decade after independence. It is no longer the preserve of the King or the President as it so often was when Zartman first described the process in the mid-1960s. Signs that foreign policy-making has been becoming more widely diffused have been apparent since the early 1970s when foreign ministers began to pursue initiatives of their own - albeit with the support of their leaders. Abdelaziz Bouteflika as Foreign Minister seemed to have had a very wide discretion indeed in his handling of Algeria's relations with France from the beginning of the decade until Boumedienne's death in 1978. His successor, Mohamed Sedik Benyahia, played a pivotal role in the negotiations that culminated in the release of the American hostages in Teheran in 1981, a year before his death while on a mission of mediation in

the Iran-Iraq war. In Tunisia the radical initiatives of the Foreign Minister, Mohamed Masmoudi (1970-1974) including the attempted fusion of Tunisia with Libya, were policies fundamentally opposed to the convictions and the inclinations of the President, Habib Bourguiba. And there were conflicting views about Sadat's unilateral peace initiative contained in statements issued by King Hassan on the one hand, and his Foreign Minister, Mohamed Boucetta, on the other.

The contest for leadership in North Africa has been the crucial factor dictating Maghrebin policies in the Middle East and Africa, as well as in Europe, East and West. The earlier checkerboard conflicts of the 1960s had given way to the power struggles of the 1970s which focussed on the independence of the Western Sahara after Spanish withdrawal and future control over the territory. Ideology was much less important here than in previous quarrels of the 1960s. Personalities were still important but there was also a new emphasis on the state and the perception and defence of national interest accompanied by a more pragmatic less ideological style. Again one could point to parallels in other Arab states where pan-Arab rhetoric gave way after 1967 (and especially after 1973) to a new emphasis on the state and state/national interests. A change of leadership in Algeria in 1979 brought a change of style and, in the handling of the domestic economy, a change of policy. There was greater flexibility over the Western Sahara and a search for reconciliation in the Maghreb as a whole. But the conflict

nevertheless continues, albeit in a more contained and muted form (perhaps because of the sand walls).

What has changed, of course, since 1973 has been the pattern of alliances within the Maghreb. The checkerboard that was the dominant mode in the 1960s has been frequently challenged in the 1970s and 1980s. In the early 1970s inter-state relations were still based on the "bad-neighbour" principle identified by Zartman. Algerian-Tunisian ties were close and intimate while Morocco and Tunisia shared the same 'moderate' outlook as well as a common suspicion of Algeria. In 1975, however, Morocco and Mauritania broke away from the pattern, setting aside their previous hostility in the pursuit of common 'national' interest, namely the partition of the Western Sahara under the tripartite agreement with Madrid. Tunisia acted the role of 'honest broker' in setting up this cosy arrangement which effectively isolated Algeria. The checkerboard pattern then re-asserted itself, but in a different guise, when Algeria signed the agreement of Hassi Messaoud with Libya, effectively coopting a new actor into the Maghrebin sub-system, providing additional military as well as diplomatic backing for Polisario which was active against Mauritania, while effectively encircling Tunisia.

Mauritania abandoned its claim to the southern part of Western Sahara after the July 1978 coup that removed President Mokhtar Ould Daddah and signed an agreement with Polisario the following year. Tunisia also hastened to distance itself from its

earlier allies, taking advantage of Chadli's accession in Algeria in 1979. Chadli clearly wanted to have done with the checkerboard pattern once and for all within the Maghreb substituting a policy of "good neighbourliness" which implied cooperation rather than confrontation. And for a time relations between Algeria and Morocco were more relaxed and the Maghreb seemed to be heading towards a 'concert' rather than a 'balance of power' system. After 1979 Kadhafi distanced himself from President Chadli whom he regarded as too 'moderate' and whom he accused of failing to support Tripoli as the venue for the OAU summit in 1982. Tunisia, however, responded positively to the new Algerian approach and a Treaty of Friendship was signed in 1983, soon to be joined by Mauritania. The object of Algerian policy was to constitute the nucleus of a Maghrebin community based on economic cooperation, respect for existing frontiers, and non-interference by one state in the affairs of its neighbours. It was argued that Morocco and Libya would remain outside the terms of the treaty for as long as Western Sahara and the people of Chad were denied independence and self-determination and for as long as Morocco and Libya failed to respect the Charter of the OAU.

The outcome was an attempt by Morocco and Libya to outflank the more central states by a new checkerboard alliance - at one remove - signed and sealed in 1984. This new and surprising 'union', which resembled 'leap-frog' rather than the checkerboard, was nevertheless directed essentially against

Algeria and in an attempt by the two states to overcome their mutual isolation and to win time to consolidate their position in Western Sahara and Chad. It was an example of the *politique du pire*. Like other alliances of the 1960s, including the Casablanca bloc, and like the earlier alliance of Morocco and Mauritania in 1975, it was based on opportunism and on a short-term appreciation of national interest. It collapsed in 1986 after Morocco had consolidated its position in the Western Sahara while Libya had suffered a humiliating defeat in Chad. American intervention against Libya and the timely diplomatic decision by Hassan to receive the Israeli Prime Minister effectively put paid to the unholy alliance. Indications now are that the checkerboard may give way before long to a new 'concert' pattern within the Maghreb based on cooperation rather than confrontation - but the probability is that periods of cooperation will alternate with periods of confrontation unless and until Algeria or Morocco secures a distinct military and/or economic advantage over the other. Zartman's original model was based on an evolutionary or developmental perspective that may be more appropriate in the European than in the African context - or may not be appropriate in either.

While Maghrebin foreign policies are closely related to events in the Maghreb itself and, above all, to the continuing rivalry between Algeria and Morocco, this is not in any way meant to imply that those policies have been static. The style and content of the policies has changed considerable since 1973. The

change has been most marked in Libya where the whole focus of policy has shifted from the East and Egypt/Sudan, to the West : the Maghreb and the Sahel. Arab union and anti-imperialism continue to provide the rationale but territorial aggrandisement and acquisition of resources (uranium) seem to play a more prominent role while Kadhafi's strategy seems to be aligned more closely with that of the *Senoussiya* and their twin goals of resisting western (French) penetration and upholding Islamic orthodoxy. Moroccan policy has shown greater consistency over time although the claims to the Western Sahara - and the way they were prosecuted - displayed greater realism than the earlier campaign to annexe Mauritania. This time Mauritania was to be associated, in a small way, with the conquest. The Moroccans could also count on the support of the conservative Arab states and on backing from the United States.

Tunisian policy continues to focus on survival in a North African environment that has been none too hospitable for a state with a small territory and comparatively few natural resources. As before Tunisia looks to America, France and conservative African states like Senegal and Ivory Coast. But Egypt's suspension from the Arab League in 1979 brought new opportunities and also new responsibilities, namely the acquisition of the Arab League Secretariat as well as the PLO headquarters. Another new factor is the continuing improvement in relations between Tunisia and Algeria and Tunisia's association with the 1983 Friendship Treaty as a privileged partner in the latest attempt at Maghrebin

cooperation. The recent change of leadership in Tunisia is likely to strengthen those links.

The trend in Algerian foreign policy has been the move away from Arab and African solidarity and the linkage between the two and towards a policy based more closely on national interest particularly as it affects Algeria's present and future economic prospects. Where domestic policy in the last year of Boumedienne's rule and under Chadli has begun to stress economic liberalisation at the expense of socialism and state control, foreign policy has been increasingly involved since 1973 in the pursuit of economic advantage, particularly as it affects the sale of oil and natural gas. This involves bargaining not only within OPEC but also with western industrial nations who provide the main market for Algeria's surplus energy production, but who also provide the most obvious source of new technology and capital investment.

The rivalry between Algeria and Morocco continues, however, to provide the dynamic for their relations not only with one another but also with other states in the Maghreb and elsewhere. But it is a real dynamic rather than the kind of static situation that Zartman seems to be describing in his more recent works. Foreign policies may not be 'developing' but they are certainly changing. And one can identify patterns here that are themselves evolving. In the 1960s, for example, the quarrel between Algeria and Morocco almost invariably suggested a conscious and

deliberate choice of different partners. In the Middle East Algeria chose the more 'radical', secular Arab states while Morocco was closer to the moderate Arab states and, above all, to the monarchies. After 1965, however, Algeria under Boumedienne was already distancing itself from President Nasser and, by 1973, Boumedienne had drawn close to President Sadat. While Algeria, like most other Arab states, severed formal diplomatic ties with Egypt in 1979, President Chadli nevertheless contrived to remain on good terms with Sadat and his successor, Mubarak, while moving even closer to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Competition between Algeria and Morocco in the 1960s had dictated a choice of rival Arab partners and rival 'ideological' alliances within the Arab League. The competition in the 1970s between the Maghreb rivals, this time over the Western Sahara, was just as intense as before, but this time both states were competing for the attention and support of the leading conservative states who comprised the core group within the Arab community, notably Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

In Africa, too, after the dissolution of the Casablanca bloc, Algeria aligned consistently with the 'progressive' states while Morocco deserted its former radical allies to join the other 'moderate' groupings. Those rival alignments intensified in the mid-1970s with the appearance of marxist regimes in the former Portuguese territories and, in particular, with the civil war in Angola in 1975-6 and the later conflicts in Shaba province of Zaire in 1977 and 1978. The occupation of the Western Sahara by

Morocco and Mauritania, in 1975, and the readiness of the French to intervene in their defence against Polisario and against Algerian interests, even pushed Algeria into an alliance with Libya, threatening a major confrontation in the North-West of Africa. However, Algeria's diplomatic success in persuading a majority of OAU members to recognise and admit the SADR, including leading moderate states like Nigeria, and Algeria's defence of an 'African' solution to the problems of Chad, effectively isolated both Morocco and Libya inside the OAU, with the consensus here, as in much of the Third World, favouring the Algerian theses.

In their relations with Western Europe and the super-powers the Algerian and Moroccan policies have likewise evolved considerably - and in a paradoxical sense have even converged. In the 1960s the rivalry between the main Maghrebin states pushed each into opposing international camps. Morocco (like Tunisia) was pro-American and looked to Western Europe and especially to France. Algeria favoured the socialist countries and the Soviet Union while playing a prominent role in the Non-Aligned Movement. Her relations with France were strained, particularly after 1965. In the 1970s, as the Soviet Union lost ground in the Middle East, Boumedienne shifted Algerian policy closer to the American position. He cooperated with Kissinger in the early stages of the "peace process", while later in the 1970s Algeria pursued a more aggressive marketing policy in the direction of the United States and Western Europe with a view to disposing profitably of

its large oil and gas surplus. By the 1980s the process had assumed a political as well as an economic dimension as Algeria tried to obtain some leverage over Washington through offering its services to secure the release of the American hostages held in Teheran during 1979-1981.

In order to compete more effectively with Morocco over the Western Sahara Algeria was drawing closer to the Western camp and the United States in particular. Most of Algeria's armaments continued to come from the Soviet Union but there, too, Algeria is now increasingly looking to the United States . In Western Europe there is a similar pattern. Before 1973 and, indeed, as late as 1978, Morocco was closely involved, politically and militarily with France. Increasingly, however, Algerian governments have held out the prospect of a political rapprochement with France in order to strike favourable commercial deals over the supply of natural gas. More recently they have mediated effectively in Lebanon to secure the release of French hostages. Their reward was a highly favourable gas contract negotiated over the opposition of the French gas industry and at the insistence of the Prime Minister. While Algeria has moved closer to the West in the 1970s and, more particularly, the 1980s, and has enjoyed a certain economic success as a result, it has yet to displace Morocco as the privileged strategic ally of the United States (and France) in North Africa.

Meanwhile there is the paradoxical situation that the United States which is strategically close to Morocco and which was, at least until recently, ideologically opposed to Algeria, has since the late 1970s conducted far more trade with Algeria than with Morocco. And as a privileged trading partner Washington was compelled to revise its earlier unfavourable image of Algeria. The Western Sahara conflict had therefore to be viewed in local terms rather than as part of the East-West conflict - which was no small concession to President Chadli at the time of the "Reagan watch". Washington nevertheless maintained the supply of arms and equipment to the Moroccans as they constructed their defensive perimeter in the Western Sahara. Meanwhile the Soviets, although ideologically close, until recently, to Algeria does most of its North African trade with *Morocco*, with the purchase of phosphates and investments in light industry, infrastructure and off-shore fisheries. Which is one important reason why the Soviet Union (like the United States) does not wish to view the Saharan conflict in global terms and prefers not to become directly involved. And why Moscow, unlike Cuba, has yet to recognise the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. Policy-making in the North African context is less obviously ideological while 'national interest' and statecraft would seem to have largely replaced the earlier emphasis on differentiation, national identity and inter-personal relations.

The year 1987 seemed an appropriate as well as a convenient place to end our analysis of the Maghreb foreign policies.

Under pressure of the Iran-Iraq war and under the leadership of Saudi Arabia the Arab states seem to be preparing for the return of Egypt to the Arab League, particularly with the decision of 1987 that Arab states were now free to resume normal diplomatic relations with Cairo. The aim seems to be a resumption of the "peace process" in the near future and the pursuit this time of the "comprehensive" settlement that failed to emerge from the negotiations of the 1970s. Oil prices have been falling sharply through the 1980s as the divisions within OPEC become more pronounced. There is no question now of an OAPEC embargo, while the Arab-African Dialogue is now more or less defunct. The threat by Zaire to re-constitute the OAU without the North African states was empty bombast but does reflect the extent of black African disillusionment with the interminable quarrels of the Arab states, their attempts to enlist black African support, their failure often to match their earlier promises of financial and other support, and the fact that Arab aid, too, comes with strings attached. In any case the African predicament of the 1980s, which centres largely on the question of debt and the need for 'structural adjustment', would seem to have driven most African states into the arms of the IMF and the World Bank which alone can provide debt relief, credits and new investment on the massive scale that is now required.

In North Africa, too, Tunisia and Morocco have had to seek assistance from the IMF during the 1980s while Algeria has maintained its economic 'independence' but only by cultivating

American and European markets and by playing the 'capitalist' game with much the same determination (one hesitates to say enthusiasm) as its erstwhile ideological opponents in Washington, Paris and the other european capitals. Soviet influence has receded to such an extent that Libyan appeals to be more closely associated with the Warsaw Pact are no longer even acknowledged. In the Maghreb the rivalry and competition remain but the nature and direction of the alliances have changed. Meanwhile the foreign policies of the North African states are better defined, show a greater degree of realism and consistency, are less involved with ideological concerns, and are more independent of 'personal' considerations. They also relate more closely to perceptions of national interest as distinct from a pre-occupation with differentiation. The 1980s have, however, seen a determined attempt by the Algerian government, in conjunction with neighbouring Tunisia, to break out of the checkerboard pattern once and for all by substituting a more cooperative, 'concert of states' pattern for the previous confrontational model.

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26. In January 1983, The Libyan Capital, Tripoli, was a venue for a meeting gathering the Palestinian radical factions - FPLP, FDPLP, FFLP General Command, and the pro-Syrian Saiga (Thunderbolt). Their resolution firmly rejected the Fés Summit decisions and the PLO Jordanian rapprochement. However, a month later, Algeria succeeded in bringing the Palestinian factions together.
27. The National Charter (Algeria), 1976, pp. 144-45.
28. Chadhi's Report to the FLN Fifth Congress (Dec. 19-22, 1983) in a special paper for the Congress, p.4.

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2. Elisabeth Stemer, "Le Maghreb et la Guerre d'octobre", Maghreb Machrek No. 60, November-December 1973, p.15.
3. Le Monde, March 21, 1982.
4. Africa Research Bulletin 10(5) May 1973, p. 2871.
5. Le Monde, June 30, 1973.
6. Ibid.
7. Africa Research Bulletin 10(7) July 1973, p. 2933.
8. Ibid.
9. Elisabeth Stemer, Op. Cit. p. 16.
10. Le Monde, November 30, 1973.
11. Elisabeth Stemer, Op. Cit. p.15.
12. Le Monde, June 20, 1973.
13. Africa Research Bulletin 10(7) July 1973, p. 2933.
14. Le Monde, September 8-9, 1974.
15. Le Monde, January 17, 1975.
16. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 24, August 25, 1978, pp. 29161-62.
17. Maghreb Machrek, No. 85, July-September 1979, p.11.

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2. Jean Paul Chagnollaud, Maghreb et Palestine, Editions Sindbad, Paris, 1977, p. 236.
3. John Damis, "Morocco's part in the October War", Middle East International, No. 30, December 1973, p. 14.
4. John Damis, "Morocco, political and economic prospects", The World Today, Vol. 31, January 1975, p. 40.
5. Elbaki Hermassi, "The Maghreb and The Middle East Conflict", Middle East Review 10(4) 1978, p. 37.
6. Le Monde, May 6, 1973.
7. Le Monde, February 24, 1973.
8. Le Monde, November 30, 1973.
9. John Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful, The Moroccan Political Elite, A Study in Segmented Politics, Weinfeld and Nicolson, London, 1970, p. 128.
10. The Times, November 11, 1976.
11. El Moudjahid, July 13, 1984.
12. International Saudi Report 6(17) May 28, 1984, p.3.
13. Le Monde, June 1, 1978.
14. Le Monde, June 4, 1977.
15. Ibid.
16. A full story of these contacts, which were at the origin of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, was revealed by Mr. Moshe Dayan in the Observer of June 21, 1981, under the title "The Breakthrough".
17. The Observer, June 21, 1981, p. 29.
18. Keesing's Contemporary Archives Vol. 24, August 28, 1978, p. 29162.
19. Le Monde, June 28, 1978.

20. The New York Times, February 5, 1978.
21. Le Monde, March 18, 1978.
22. Jeune Afrique (promotion series) Nos. 994 and 1012, of January 23 and May 28, 1980, p. VII.
23. Le Monde, September 4, 1979.
24. Jeune Afrique No. 1363, February 18, 1987, p. 33.
25. Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord (AAN) Vol. 19, 1980, pp. 777-78.
26. Ahmed Al Fadihi, "Le Maroc et le Conflict Irako-Iranien", Remarques Arabo-Africaines, Vol. 22, 1980/81, pp. 7-8.
27. The Financial Times, February 11, 1981, p.3.
28. The New York Times, April 18, 1982, p. 16.
29. L'Express, June 4, 1985.
30. King Hassan's speech on October 26, 1982. Before the UN General Assembly, Embassy of The Kingdom of Morocco, London.

NOTES: Chapter Eleven

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2. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 19, Ap. 2-8, 1973, p. 25807.
3. Marius K. Deeb and Mary Jane Deeb, Libya Since the Revolution, Aspects of Social and Political Development, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1982, p. 131.
4. Anwar Al Sadat, Those I Have Known, Janathan Cape Ltd. London, 1985, pp. 48-49.
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7. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 7, 1974/75, p. B.59.
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9. William H. Lewis, "North Africa, The Eye of The Storm", Current History, December 1977, p. 177.
10. John Wright, Libya, A Modern History, Croom Helm, London, 1982, p. 206.
11. Ibid.
12. Le Monde, September 4, 1979.
13. Maghreb Machrek, Vol. 93, July-September, 1981, p. 104.
14. Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, Vol. 19, 1980, p. 780.
15. Le Monde, July 1, 1981.
16. Anwar Al Sadat, Op. Cit. pp. 110-11.
17. Africa Research Bulletin 10(11) 1973, p. 3061.
18. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 8, 1975/76, p. B.68.
19. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 9, 1976/77, p. B.72.
20. The Times, January 4, 1974, p.1.

21. Maghreb Machrek, Vol. 85, July-September, 1979, p.26.
22. Ibid.
23. Karen Dawisha, "The USSR in The Middle East: Superpower in Eclipse", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, Winter 1982/83, p. 438.
24. Le Monde, October 30-31, 1983.
25. The Times, June 12, 1975, p. 6.
26. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 26, March 21, 1980, p. 30148.
27. Jassim M. Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran, The Years of Crisis, Croom Helm, London, 1984, p. 193.
28. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 27, August 7, 1981, p. 31011.
29. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 28, June 4, 1982, p.31521.
30. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 29, September 1983, p. 32414.
31. Africa Confidential, 25(5), February 29, 1984, p. 3.
32. International Saudi Report, 6(23) July 16, 1984, p. 8.

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2. I.C. Tcheho, "L'Unité Maghrebine dans ses Rapports Avec l'Unité Africaine", The Maghreb Review, 8(1-2) January-April 1983, pp. 18-23.
3. Nicole Grimaud, La Politique Étrangère de l'Algérie 1962-78, Essai d'Interpretation, Ph.D. Thesis, Institut d'Études Politiques, Paris, 1982, p. 337.
4. G. Aforka Nweke, Harmonization of African Foreign Policies 1955-1975, The Political Economy of African Diplomacy, African Studies Centre, Boston University, 1980, p. 227.
5. Discours du Président Houari Boumediène, Vol. 4, May 1972-June 1973, Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture, Alger, 1975, p. 259.
6. Jeune Afrique, No. 673, December 1, 1973, p. 29.
7. Le Monde, November 30, 1973.
8. Djamel Ould Khaoua, La Politique Africaine de l'Algérie, Mémoire pour le Diplôme d'Études Approfondies (DEA) Université de Droit, d'Économie et de Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1982, p. 138.
9. Jeune Afrique, May 3, 1978, pp. 45-47.
10. Slimane Chikh, "La Politique Africaine de l'Algérie", in Slimane Chikh et al, Le Maghreb et l'Afrique Sub-Saharienne, Editions CNRS, Paris 1980, pp. 9-11.
11. Le Monde Diplomatique, November 1982, p. 31.
12. Franz Fanon, Pour La Revolution Africaine, Francois Maspéro, Paris, 1964, p. 206.
13. Le Monde, March 7, 1973.
14. Ahmed Baba Miské, "Front Polisario l'Âme d'un Peuple" Editions Repture, Paris, 1978, p. 14.
15. Le Monde, November 28, 1973.
16. L'Algérie et l'Actualité Internationale, No. 31, May-June 1981, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Algiers, Algeria, pp. 17-19.
17. Le Monde, December 6, 1985, p. 12.

18. The Guardian, June 30, 1984.
19. Robert Taton, "L'Algerie du Président Chadli Bendjedid, Un Monde Très Complexe", Europe Autremer, No. 619, December 1981. p. 13.

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2. Ibid, p. 90.
3. Ibid, p. 95.
4. Ibid, p. 106.
5. Ibid, p. 108.
6. Revue Francaise d'Études politiques et Économiques Africaines, Nos. 152-153, August-September 1978, p.91.
7. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, The Western Sahara, Croom Helm, London, 1980, p. 282.
8. David Lynn Price, "Conflict in the Maghreb: The Western Sahara", Conflict Studies, No. 127, February 1981, p. 5.
9. Le Monde, April 7, 1980.
10. Harold D. Nelson (ed), Algeria, A Country Study, Foreign Area Studies, The American University, Washington D.C. 1979, pp. 245-46.
11. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 9, 1976/77, p. 14.
12. The Observer, April 22, 1984, p. 15.
13. Africa Confidential, 22(14), July 1, 1981, p.3.
14. Africa Confidential, 18(9) April 29, 1977, p. 1.
15. Le Monde, April 10, 1977.
16. Le Monde, June 6, 1978.
17. Le Monde, June 18, 1978.
18. West Africa, July 8, 1985, p. 1391.

NOTES: Chapter Fourteen

1. Mohsen Toumi, "La Politique Africaine de la Tunisie", in Slimane Chikh et al, Le Maghreb et l'Afrique Sub-Saharienne, Editions CNRS, Paris, 1980. p. 119.
2. Ibid.
3. Le Monde, April 13, 1977.
4. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 8, 1975/76, p. B. 144.
5. Mohsen Toumi, Op. Cit., p. 143.
6. Ibid.
7. At the Arab level, The Secretary General of the Arab League is the Tunisian Chadli Klibi; and at the Islamic level, The Secretary General of the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) is also the Tunisian diplomat, Mr. Habib Chatti.
8. Le Monde, February 22, 1973.
9. Mohsen Toumi, Op. Cit., p. 140.
10. Africa Research Bulletin 10(11) November 1973, p. 3042.
11. Africa Research Bulletin 20(10) October 1983, p. 6399.
12. Africa Research Bulletin 21(5) May 1984, p. 7238.

NOTES: Chapter Fifteen

1. René Otayek, "La Libye Revolutionnaire au Sud du Sahara", Maghreb Machrek, No. 94, October-December 1981, p.6.
2. The Muslim population in the region has been estimated as follows: Mauritania 96%, Gambia 90%; Niger 85%; Senegal 85%, Sudan 60%; Mali 50%; and Chad 50%.
3. Jeune Afrique, No. 637, March 24, 1973, pp. 16-18.
4. René Otayek, Op. Cit. p.7.
5. Le Monde, March 26, 1974.
6. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 9, 1976/77, p. B. 75.
7. The New York Times, September 5, 1976, p. 39.
8. Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, Vol. 19, 1980, p. 84.
9. Harvé Bleuchot, "La politique Africaine de la Libye", in Slimane Chikh et al, Le Maghreb et l'Afrique Sub-Saharienne, CNRS, Paris, 1980, p. 84.
10. Ibid, p. 63.
11. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 6, 1973/74, p. B. 63.
12. Africa Report, March-April 1982, p. 14.
13. René Otayek, Op. Cit. p. 9.
14. Harvé Bleuchot, Op. Cit., pp. 69-70.
15. René Otayek, Op. Cit., p. 11.
16. Africa, No. 115. March 1981. pp. 12-17.
17. At this stage relations between Egypt and Libya were at their lowest. The result was a border clash between the two countries which occurred shortly thereafter, in July 1977.
18. OPEC is not an exclusively Arab organisation. Moreover, a concessionary price for Africa - Two tier pricing system - should include all the Third World with its majority supporting the Arab cause. Some Third World Countries, like India had supported the Arab cause years before the majority of Black African States were converted to the Arab side.
19. The Touareq are living mainly in Niger (250,000); Mali (200,000) and Algeria (20,000).

20. Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, Vol. 19, 1980. p. 781.
21. Niger has made a very significant gesture by recognising the Touareq language - Tamachagh - as a second national language. While none of the North African countries, where the proportion of the Berbers exceeds 30 or 40% of the population, recognises their identity or their right to difference.
22. Le Monde, January 9, 1981.
23. Ibid.
24. Le Monde, December 31, 1980.
25. Jean Marc Bellot, "La Politique Africaine de la Libye: Le Cas du Niger", Revue d'Etudes Politiques et Economiques Africaines, 15(8-9), 1980, pp. 20-36.
26. René Otayek, Op. Cit. p. 24.
27. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 9, 1976/77, p. B. 75.
28. The Times, August 29, 1981, p. 4.
29. Le Monde, January 14, 1981.
30. It was reported that fourteen Touareqs had been arrested in April 1982, in the Northern town of Arlit in Niger, where they were allegedly intending to sabotage the uranium mines. (Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Vol. 29, December 1983, p. 32541).
31. Le Monde, Dossiers et Documents, No. 105. November 1983.
32. According to some sources, in 1973 Kadhafi bought the Aouzou Strip from President Tombalbaye in a secret deal whose details remain obscure. (Africa, No. 115, March 1981, p. 16).
33. René Otayek, Op. Cit. p. 28.
34. Ibid, p. 29.
35. Abdulkadim Sharafeddin was born of a Nigerian mother in Nigeria and was a wealthy businessman in Lagos until his surprising appointment as Libya's Ambassador in July 1975.
36. Oye Ogumbadejo, "Kadhaki's North African Design", International Security, 8(1), 1983, p. 163.
37. While Benin, Togo and Gambia bowed out of the programme.
38. Le Monde, Dossiers et Documents, No. 105, November 1983.

39. The World Today, Vol. 39, October 1983, pp. 362-63.
40. Francois Soudan, "Tchad, Une Mediation Dévenue Impossible", Jeune Afrique, No. 1369, April 1, 1987, pp. 28-30.
41. Jeune Afrique, No. 613, October 7, 1972, p. 12.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Le Monde, March 6, 1979.
45. Le Monde, March 15, 1979.
46. New Africa, No. 179, August 1982, p. 22.
47. René Otayek, Op. Cit., p. 21.
48. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 28, April 9, 1982, p. 31427.
49. Le Monde, July 16, 1980.
50. The Times, November 27, 1980.
51. The Christian Science Monitor, August 22, 1983.

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2. Mohsen Toumi, Le Maghreb, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1982, pp. 100-101.
3. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 15, November 23, 1979, p. 29951.
4. Saadallah A. S. Hallaba, Euro-Arab Dialogue, Amana Books, Brattleboro, U.S.A., 1984, p. 12.
5. Avi Shlaim "The Maghreb and the EEC", The Maghreb Review, 1 (2) August 1976, pp. 10-13.
6. Ibid.
7. Le Monde, January 12, 1988, p. 4.
8. I. William Zartman, "Maghrebi Politics and Mediterranean Implications" in Giacomo Luciani (ed) The Mediterranean Region, Economic Interdependence and the Future of Society, Croom Helm, London, 1984, p. 165.
9. The previous visits included that of the Algerian Industry Minister, Mr. Abdesslam Belaid that lasted for ten days.. and whose purpose was to improve French-Algerian economic relations. This was followed by a visit to Algeria by the French Interior Minister, Mr. Michel Poniatowsky, in December 1974.
10. The International Energy Conference met in Paris in October 1975 and lasted until June 1977. The Industrialised nations were represented by eight countries, while the Third World was represented by nineteen countries - Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia. The conference set up four commissions (Energy, Raw Materials, Development and Finance).
11. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 8, 1975/76, pp. B 9-10.
12. Harold Nelson (ed), Algeria, A Country Study, Foreign Area Studies, The American University, Washington DC, 1979, pp. 249-50.
13. Samir Gharbi, "Algerie États Unis: Un Mariage de Raison", Jenne Afrique, No: 869, September2, 1977, pp. 14-17.
14. Belkaçem Iratni, Foreign Policy and Nation State Building in Algeria 1962-1985, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Warwick, 1986, pp. 195-96.

15. Studia Diplomatica, Vols. 1-2, 1980, pp. 165-77.
16. The Financial Times, February 21, 1981, p. 26.
17. The Financial Times, April 13, 1981, p. 8.
18. The Financial Times, February 25, 1982, p. 7.
19. The Financial Times, February 28, 1982, p. 1.
20. The Financial Times, September 14, 1982, p. 6.
21. The Financial Times, February 28, 1983, p. 3.
22. The Movement for the Independence of the Canary Archipelago.
23. M. Salah Tahi, The Western Sahara Conflict and its repercussions on the Algerian-Moroccan Relationship, M.A. Dissertation, Politics Department, Warwick University, 1982, pp. 58-59.
24. Ania Francos and J. P. Sereni, Un Algerien Nomé Bourmedienne, Editions Stock, Paris, 1976, p. 272.
25. The Financial Times, December 10, 1986, pp. 1-8.
26. The Financial Times, May 8, 1981, p. 4.
27. The Financial Times, March 7, 1983, p. 3.
28. The Times, July 2, 1974, p. 4.
29. Harold Nelson, Op. Cit., p. 251.
30. The Financial Times, February 28, 1983, p. 11.
31. Belkacem Iratni, Op. Cit., p. 461.

NOTES: Chapter Seventeen

1. The Economist, May 12, 1979, p. 76.
2. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 13, 1980/81, pp. B88-89.
3. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 14, 1981/82, p. B87.
4. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 16, 1983/84, p. B53.
5. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol 11, 1978/79, pp. B100-101.
6. The aid included more than 200 military advisors who were teaching in the military academies; help to maintain the 20 Mirage F. 1s sold to Morocco earlier in the year; and help to train young staff officers.
7. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 15, 1982/83, pp. B64-65.
8. The Financial Times, July 13, 1987, pp. 1-8.
9. Ibid., p. 4.
10. Ibid., p. 4.

NOTES: Chapter Eighteen

1. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 8, 1975/76, p. B145.
2. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 13, 1980/81, p. B127.
3. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 28, December 1982, p. 31868.
4. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 33, October 1987, p. 35478.
5. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 17, 1984/85, p. B99.
6. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 11, 1978/79, p. B146.

NOTES: Chapter Nineteen

1. The Green Book contains three parts:
 - Part one: The solution of the problem of democracy (The Authority of the People) pp. 4-40.
 - Part two: The solution of the economic problem (Socialism) pp. 41-69.
 - Part three: The social basis of the third universal theory, pp. 71-120.
2. Mirella Bianco, Kadhefi Messenger du Desert, Editions Stock, Paris, 1974, p. 273.
3. The Sunday Times, April 20, 1986, p.1.
4. The Financial Times, June 10 1982, p. 48.
5. The Times, April 24, 1986, p. 7.
6. Since the end of the Algerian War in 1962, De Gaulle's policy has been to modify France's unqualified support for Israel in order to rebuild French relations with the Arab World. The June 1967 Arab/Israeli War provided the opportunity to exchange the Israeli market for the potentially far more lucrative Arab one and to take advantage of Arab disenchantment with British and Middle East policies, coupled with their uneasiness about turning to the Soviet Union.
7. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 7, 1974/75, p. B. 66.
8. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 9, 1976/77, p. B. 77.
9. Differences in policies, however, were apparent when, in October 1978, Don Mintoff, walked out of a Basic Popular Congress in Tripoli. He felt he was being pressed too far about the extent to which he would adopt Libyan policies and adopt Arabic as a teaching language.
10. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 13, 1980/81. p. B. 70.
11. By 1986, Libya's holding in FIAT, was estimated at 15.19% (The Times, April 24, 1986, p. 7.)
12. John K. Cooley, Libyan Sandstorm, Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1983, p. 26.

NOTES: Chapter Twenty

1. Up until mid-1960's Western navies, particularly the US Sixth Fleet, sailed the Mediterranean unchallenged. Yet, the 1967 Arab/Israeli War and the 1974 Cyprus Crisis, brought an increasing penetration of the Soviet Fifth Escadra in the Mediterranean. By 1950, there were over 50 US Warships. And by 1981 the Soviet Fifth Escadra was over 50 vessels strong, half of which were Warships and Submarines.
2. For the subject of superpowers' competition in the Mediterranean see Charles Zorgbibe, La Méditerranée sans les Grands, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1980; and Glenda G. Jackson, The Mediterranean Basin, its Political Economy and Changing International Relations, Butterworth and Co. Publishers, London, 1982.
3. John Wright, Libya, A Modern History, Croom Helm, London, 1982, p. 202.
4. The Times, May 21, 1982, p. 10.
5. The New York Times, November 11, 1982, p. 14.
6. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 8, 1975/76, pp. B76-79.
7. The New York Times, February 22, 1980, p. 5.
8. In an article in 1980, Stephen J. Solarz, a US congressman, argued that Algeria is now so moderate that its officials privately acknowledge the state of Israel as a "Historical Reality", whose existence must be taken into account. The article appeared against Carter Administration's decision, in late 1979, to sell arms to Morocco. (Stephen J. Solarz, "Arms to Morocco?" Foreign Affairs, Winter 1979/80, p. 298).
9. Ania Francos and J. P. Sereni, Un Algerien Nomé Boumedienne, Editions Stock, Paris, 1976, p. 273.
10. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 7, 1974/75, pp. B8-9.
11. Ania Francos, Op. Cit., p. 269.
12. Earlier in January 1974, George Pompidou's Foreign Affairs Minister, Michel Jobert, had already proposed such a meeting, but in limiting it to the sole problem of energy.

13. Samir Gharbi, "Algerie États Unis, Un Mariage de Raison"
Jenne Afrique, No. 869, September 22, 1977, pp. 14-17.
14. Al Ahram Al Iqtisadi (Al Ahram Economist), Cairo, No: 585,
January 1. 1980, p. 40.
15. Samir Gharbi, Op. Cit., pp. 14-17.
16. The New York Times, October 9, 1979.
17. Afrique Asie, August 3, 1981, p. 15.
18. In December 1979, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Algiers, French
born Duval, flew to Tehran to celebrate Christmas Mass with the
US hostages at the request of the Iranian Government.
19. The Financial Times, January 13, 1983, p. 4.
20. Ahdelhamid Brahimi had been the US representative for the Algerian
state owned oil company, SONATRACH. He was appointed Prime
Minister in 1983.
21. The National Charter, (in Arabic), Algiers, 1976, p. 142.
22. See Chadli's speech in L'Algerie et l'Actualité Internationale
No: 31, May-June 1981. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
(Algeria), pp. 33-35.

NOTES: Chapter Twenty One

1. Africa Report, January - February 1979, pp. 52.54.
2. Revue Francaise d'Etudes Politiques et Economiques Africaines, Nos. 172-173, April-May 1980, p. 67.
3. Initially the US arms supplied to Morocco were under the 1960 US-Moroccan Agreement which prohibited Morocco from using them for non-defence purposes.
4. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 14, 1981/82, p. B. 88.
5. Africa Confidential, 23 (14) July 7, 1982, p.8.
6. Leading this lobby is the Moroccan-American Foundation whose Council of Advisors' Chairman is David Rockefeller. Henry Kissinger and the US Ambassador to the UN, General Vernon Walters, are fellow advisors.
7. Le Monde, December 9, 1986, p. 14.
8. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 9, 1976/77, p. B. 146.
9. Le Monde, May 10, 1978.
10. The Guardian, July 15, 1980.
11. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 17, 1984/85, p. B. 71.

NOTES: Chapter Twenty Two

1. Tunisia reversed this policy in 1969, and established diplomatic relations with North Vietnam in August 1972.
2. Harold Nelson (ed), Tunisia, A Country Study, Area Handbook, Washington DC, 1979, p. 218.
3. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 11, 1978/79, p. B. 133.
4. Africa Confidential, 23 (14), July 7, 1982, p. 8.
5. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 32, September 1986, p. 34646.
6. Africa Confidential, 26(12) June 5, 1985, pp. 5-6.
7. Ibid.
8. Harold Nelson, Op. Cit., p. 219.
9. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 8, 1975/76, p. B. 145.
10. Ibid.

NOTES: Chapter Twenty Three

1. John K. Cooley, Libyan Sandstorm, Sidgwick and Jackson, London 1983, p. 83.
2. Kadhafi also criticised the 1972 Soviet Iraqi Treaty; as there were reports that he had approved Sadat's expulsion of The Soviet military advisors from Egypt in 1972.
3. John K. Cooley, Op. Cit., pp. 80-100.
4. Middle East Review, Vol. 7, 1980, p. 266.
5. This attitude which was to express Kadhafi's isolation, is similar to King Hussan's request to join the EC in 1984; and again in 1987. in an attempt to compensate for his isolation at the regional level.
6. The Financial Times, March 21, 1983, p.2.
7. The New York Times, September 28, 1976, p.4.
8. I William Zartman and A.G. Kluge, "Heroic Politics: The Foreign Policy of Libya", in Bahgat Korany and Ali Hillal Dessouki (eds), Foreign policies of the Arab States, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1984, pp. 175-95.
9. The New York Times, November 30, 1980, p.6.
10. The Sunday Times, January 12, 1986, p. 21.

Economic weight of the Maghreb countries

	Population (million)			GNP per capita US \$	Average Annual growth rate		Average Annual rate of inflation		GDP bn US \$				
	1980	1984	1987		1979	1984	1965-84	1985	1986	1970-79	1985	1986	1985
Algeria	18.3	21.2	23.4	1590	2410	3.6	3.2	2.9	13.3	10.8	10	58.6	69.1
Morocco	19.0	21.4	23.3	740	670	2.8	4.3	6.2	7.3	1	1	12.12	15.1
Tunisia	6.0	7.0	7.1	1120	1270	4.4	2.6	-2.1	7.5	8	5.8	8.7	9.4
Libya	2.6	3.5	3.8	8170	8520	-1.1	-11	-12	18.7	13	16	22.6	18.8

Source: The statistics in this table are derived from aggregate figures in Mohsen, Toumi, Le Maghreb, Presses

Universitaires De France, Paris, 1982, p. 85; The World Bank Report 1986, Washington DC, pp. 180-81; and

The Military Balance (International Institute for Strategic Studies - IISS) London, 1987-88.

Table II

Population and GNP (bn US \$)

	1978		1981		1985	
	GNP	Population	GNP	Population	GNP	Population
Algeria	15.9	18.420.000	36.8	20.580.000	46.2	22.000.000
Morocco	9.5	18.590.000	14.9	20.700.000	11.9	22.000.000
Tunisia	5.3	6.250.000	8.0	6.670.000	8.0	7.150.000
Libya	19.0	2.760.000	33	3.125.000	22.6	3.550.000

Source: On Military Balance. International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS) London, from 1976-86.

Table III

The Maghreb: Structure of Production

GDP (million US \$)			Distribution of GDP (%)							
			Agriculture		Industry		Manufacturing		Services	
	1965	1984	1965	1984	1965	1984	1965	1984	1965	1984
Algeria	3.170	50.690	15	6	34	53	11	-	51	41
Morocco	2.950	13.300	23	17	28	32	16	17	49	51
Tunisia	880	6.940	22	15	24	35	9	14	54	50
Libya	1.500	30.570	5	2	63	64	3	4	33	38

Source: World Development Report 1986. Oxford University Press London and New York, pp. 184-85.

External Public Debt and Debt Service Ratios

	External Public Debt Outstanding and disbursed (million US \$)		Interest Payments on External Public Debt (million US \$)		Debt Service as percentage of		Exports of goods and services		External Debt (bn US \$)	
	1970	1984	As percentage of GNP 1970	1984	1970	1984	1970	1984	1985	1986
Algeria	937	12.bn	19.3	24.3	10	12.19	0.9	9.2	33.6	18.7
Morocco	711	10.bn	18.0	82.9	23	49.4	1.5	9.2	37.6	16.0
Tunisia	541	3.7bn	38.6	46.1	18	22.2	4.5	8.5	24.4	5.6
Libya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.0	5.0

The statistics in this table are derived from aggregate figures in World Development Report 1986, Oxford University Press, London and New York, pp. 214-15 and The Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, 1987-88.

Table V

The Military Balance in the Maghreb

Arms Imports (million US \$)		Defence Expenditure (million US \$)					
		% of the Total Imports Third World	Rank in the Third World	% of the Third World	Source of		
		1977-80	1977-80	1979-81	Arms	1981	1985 1986 1987
Algeria	882 m	2.2	16	12	2.6	Mainly USSR	914 m 1160 m 1240 m
Morocco	1122 m	2.9	11	10	2.8	Mainly France	1200 m 756 m 848 m
Tunisia	Not figured in the Top 25 largest Third World Importers						262 m 522 m 547 m 525 m
Libya	2107 m	5.4	6	1	9	Mainly USSR	557 m 709 m 1410 m 1290 m

Source: The statistic of this table is derived for the SIPRI Year Book (Stockholm International Peace Research

Institute) London, 1981-82, and The Military Balance, (The International Institute for Strategic

Studies - IISS), London, from 1976 to 1988.

Table VI

The Maghreb Position in the World Phosphate Market (1978)

Country	Production (million tons)	Export (million tons)
United States	50.037	13.684
Soviet Union	24.000	4.992
<u>Morocco</u>	19.278	17.307
P. R. of China	4.300	-
<u>Tunisia</u>	3.712	1.667
Togo	2.849	2.827
South Africa	2.699	-
Senegal	1.843	1.686
Israel	1.759	1.367
<u>Algeria</u>	1.136	0.619
Brazil	1.049	-

Source: Al Ahram Al Iqtisadi (Al Ahram Economist-Cairo) N. 589

March 1, 1980, p. 31.

Table VII

Intra-Maghrebin Commercial Exchanges %

	Exports			Imports		
	1964	1970	1977	1964	1970	1977
Algeria	1.16	1.5	0.01	2.40	2.0	0.3
Morocco	2.46	4.0	0.0	2.07	1.7	0.0
Tunisia	7.89	14.2	1.2	2.06	0.9	0.01

Source: Mohsen Toumi, Le Maghreb, Presses Universitaires de France,
Paris, 1982, p. 75.

Table VIII

France-Maghrebi Exchanges in 1977 %

	Exports	Imports
Algeria	12.7	24.1
Morocco	24.7	27.3
Tunisia	16.6	33.1 (1978)

Source: Mohsen Toumi, Le Maghreb, Presses Universitaires de France,
Paris, 1982, p. 76.

Table IX

French Trade with Algeria 1982-85 (F F million)

	1982	1983	1984	1985
Imports	14.022	18.591	23.633	21.832
Exports	25.000	23.447	24.809	20.737
Balance	-11.892	-4.856	-1.176	+1.095

Source: Middle East Economic Digest, (MEED), Vol. 30, N. 18, May 3-9
1986, p. 6.

Table X

Algeria's Trading Partners (Figures in Percentage)

	Imports 1983	Exports 1983	Imports 1984	Exports 1984	Imports 1985	Exports 1985
EEC	84.5	59.8	86.1	65.2	87.9	64.4
N. America	9.7	23.7	9.5	22.4	10.6	17.6
Japan	6.0	3.5	8.1	0.7	5.8	1.0
Eastern Bloc	6.3	0.9	5.2	2.6	4.5	5.0

Source: The Financial Times, December 10 1986, Survey on Algeria,
pp. 1-8.

Table XI

Morocco's Major Trading Partners (1985)

	% of Total Imports	% of Total Exports
France	25	24
Spain	14	7
West Germany	8	7
Italy	6	6
U.K.	3	3
Others	44	53

Source: The Financial Times, July 13, 1987, p. 4.

Table XII

African Students in Algerian Universities Supported by Algerian Grants

Country	Academic Year		
	1975-76	1976-77	1977-78
Benin	-	7	16
Burundi	-	8	17
Cameroon	16	21	17
Cape Verde	-	12	9
Chad	-	-	5
Congo (P.R.)	59	97	99
Eritrea	2	2	1
Gabon	6	6	5
Gambia	-	-	1
Guinea Bissau	8	8	6
Guinea	17	19	30
Upper Volta	25	27	20
Comoro Islands	-	-	16
Mauritius	7	13	18
Madagascar	21	28	48
Mali	27	38	51
Mauritania	57	-	-
Niger	18	40	33
Senegal	17	16	21
Sudan	-	3	8
Togo	6	29	38

Source: Slimane Chikh "La Politique Africaine de L'Algerie", in
 Slimane Chikh et al, Le Maghreb et L'Afrique Subsaharienne,
 Editions du CNRS, Paris, 1980, p. 28.

APPENDICES

	ALGERIA			MOROCCO				TUNISIA			LIBYA		
	Prime Minister	Foreign Minister	Defence Minister	Prime Minister	Foreign Minister	Defence Minister	Prime Minister	Foreign Minister	Defence Minister	Prime Minister	Foreign Minister	Defence Minister	
1970	ABDELHAMID BRAHIMI AHMED BEN AHMED ABDELGHANI	AHMED TALEB IBRAHIMI MOHAMED SEDIK BENYAHYA	PRESIDENT CHADLI BENJEDID	MOHAMED KARIM LAMRANI	ABDELQWIED BELKZIZ	KING HASSAN II	MOHAMED MZALI	BEJI CAID ESSEBSI	SALAHEDDINE BALI	ABDUL SALAM JALLOUD	ALI ABDUL SALAM TREIKI ABDUL ATI OBEIDI	COLONEL MUAMMAR KADHAFI	
1971				MOHAMED KARIM LAMRANI	YOUSSEF BEL ABBES		MOHAMED MEZIANE	BAHI LADGHAM					BEJI CAID ESSEBSI
1972				MOHAMED KARIM LAMRANI	YOUSSEF BEL ABBES		MOHAMED MEZIANE	BAHI LADGHAM					BEJI CAID ESSEBSI
1973				MOHAMED KARIM LAMRANI	YOUSSEF BEL ABBES		MOHAMED MEZIANE	BAHI LADGHAM					BEJI CAID ESSEBSI
1974	NO PRIME MINISTER	ABDELAZIZ FOUTEFILKA	PRESIDENT HOUARI BOUMEDIENNE	ARMED OSMAN	ARMED TAIB BENIHA	ARMED OSMAN	HEDI NOUIRA	MOHAMED MASMOUDI	HEDI KHEFACHIA	ABDUL MONEIM HUNI	VACANT	HANSOUR RASHID KIKIYA	
1975				ARMED OSMAN	ARMED TAIB BENIHA	ARMED OSMAN	HEDI NOUIRA	MOHAMED MASMOUDI					
1976				ARMED OSMAN	ARMED TAIB BENIHA	ARMED OSMAN	HEDI NOUIRA	MOHAMED MASMOUDI					
1977				ARMED OSMAN	ARMED TAIB BENIHA	ARMED OSMAN	HEDI NOUIRA	MOHAMED MASMOUDI					
1978	AHMED BEN AHMED ABDELGHANI	MOHAMED SEDIK BENYAHYA	PRESIDENT CHADLI BENJEDID	MAATI BOUABID	MOHAMED BOUCETTA	KING HASSAN II	MOHAMED MZALI	BEJI CAID ESSEBSI	SALAHEDDINE BALI	ABDUL SALAM JALLOUD	ALI ABDUL SALAM TREIKI ABDUL ATI OBEIDI	COLONEL MUAMMAR KADHAFI	
1979				MAATI BOUABID	MOHAMED BOUCETTA		MOHAMED MZALI	BEJI CAID ESSEBSI					
1980				MAATI BOUABID	MOHAMED BOUCETTA		MOHAMED MZALI	BEJI CAID ESSEBSI					
1981				MAATI BOUABID	MOHAMED BOUCETTA		MOHAMED MZALI	BEJI CAID ESSEBSI					
1982	AHMED BEN AHMED ABDELGHANI	MOHAMED SEDIK BENYAHYA	PRESIDENT CHADLI BENJEDID	MAATI BOUABID	MOHAMED BOUCETTA	KING HASSAN II	MOHAMED MZALI	BEJI CAID ESSEBSI	SALAHEDDINE BALI	ABDUL SALAM JALLOUD	ALI ABDUL SALAM TREIKI ABDUL ATI OBEIDI	COLONEL MUAMMAR KADHAFI	
1983				MAATI BOUABID	MOHAMED BOUCETTA		MOHAMED MZALI	BEJI CAID ESSEBSI					
1984				MAATI BOUABID	MOHAMED BOUCETTA		MOHAMED MZALI	BEJI CAID ESSEBSI					
1985				MAATI BOUABID	MOHAMED BOUCETTA		MOHAMED MZALI	BEJI CAID ESSEBSI					
1986	AHMED BEN AHMED ABDELGHANI	MOHAMED SEDIK BENYAHYA	PRESIDENT CHADLI BENJEDID	MAATI BOUABID	MOHAMED BOUCETTA	KING HASSAN II	MOHAMED MZALI	BEJI CAID ESSEBSI	SALAHEDDINE BALI	ABDUL SALAM JALLOUD	ALI ABDUL SALAM TREIKI ABDUL ATI OBEIDI	COLONEL MUAMMAR KADHAFI	
1987				MAATI BOUABID	MOHAMED BOUCETTA		MOHAMED MZALI	BEJI CAID ESSEBSI					

APPENDIX IIThe Founding Countries of the OAU

- | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Algeria | 17. Mali |
| 2. Burundi | 18. Mauritania |
| 3. Cameroun | 19. Morocco |
| 4. Central African Republic | 20. Niger |
| 5. Chad | 21. Nigeria |
| 6. Congo (Brazzaville) | 22. Rwanda |
| 7. Congo (Leopoldville) | 23. Senegal |
| 8. Dahomey | 24. Sierra Leone |
| 9. Ethiopia | 25. Somalia |
| 10. Gabon | 26. Sudan |
| 11. Ghana | 27. Tanganyika |
| 12. Guinea | 28. Togo |
| 13. Ivory Coast | 29. Tunisia |
| 14. Liberia | 30. Uganda |
| 15. Libya | 31. United Arab Republic |
| 16. Madagascar | 32. Upper Volta |

APPENDIX IIIArab Oil Embargo in 1973

Operation BADR, October 1973

Algeria	October 20	10% cut, US ban
Bahrein	October 20	10% cut
Bahrein	October 21	US ban
Bahrein	October 30	Netherlands ban
Kuwait	October 19	10% cut, US ban
Kuwait	October 23	Netherlands ban
Libya	October 19	5% cut, US ban
Libya	October 30	Netherlands ban
Oman	October 25	US and Netherlands ban
Qatar	October 19	10% cut
Qatar	October 21	US ban
Qatar	October 24	Netherlands ban
Saudi Arabia	October 18	10% cut
Saudi Arabia	October 20	US ban
UAE/Abu Dhabi	October 18	US ban
UAE/Abu Dhabi	October 21	Netherlands ban
Dubay	October 21	US ban

Source: John W Amos II, Arab-Israeli Military Political Relations, Pergamen Press, New York, Oxford, 1979, p.201.

APPENDIX IVMembership of the Arab League

<u>Member</u>	<u>Date of Admission</u>
1. Egypt	March 22, 1945
2. Saudi Arabia	March 22, 1945
3. Iraq	March 22, 1945
4. Transjordan	March 22, 1945
5. Syria	March 22, 1945
6. Lebanon ^{1/}	March 22, 1945
7. North Yemen	May 5, 1945
8. Sudan	January 19, 1945
9. Libya	March 28, 1956
10. Morocco	October 1, 1958
11. Tunisia	October 1, 1958
12. Kuwait	July 20, 1961
13. Algeria	August 16, 1962
14. South Yemen	December 12, 1967
15. Bahrain	September 11, 1971
16. Qatar	September 11, 1971
17. Oman	September 29, 1971
18. United Arab Emirates	December 6, 1971
19. Mauritania	November 26, 1973
20. Somalia	February 14, 1974
21. PLO	September 9, 1976
22. Djibouti	September 4, 1977

^{1/} The first six were the founding members of the League.

APPENDIX VOAU Summit Meetings^{1/}

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>
-May 1963	The Founding Summit in Addis Ababa
1st 1964	Cairo (Egypt)
2nd 1965	Accra (Ghana)
3rd 1966	Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
4th 1967	Kinshassa (Congo Kinshassa)
5th 1968	Algiers (Algeria)
6th 1969	Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
7th 1970	Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
8th 1971	Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
9th 1972	Rabat (Morocco)
10th 1973	Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
11th 1974	Mogadishu (Somalia)
12th 1975	Kampala (Uganda)
13th 1976	Port Louis (Mauritius)
14th 1977	Libreville (Gabon)
15th 1978	Khartoum (Sudan)
16th 1979	Monrovia (Liberia)
17th 1980	Freetown (Sierra Leone)
18th 1981	Nairobi (Kenya)
19th 1983 ^{2/}	Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
20th 1984	Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
21st 1985	Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
22nd 1986	Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
23rd 1987	Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)

^{1/} OAU Headquarters in Addis Ababa

^{2/} The 19th OAU Summit failed to take place in Tripoli (Libya) in 1982 because of disagreement over the seating of the SADR as well as the representation of Chad.

APPENDIX VI

Diplomatic Break of African States with Israel*

<u>Country</u>	<u>Date</u>
1. Guinea	June 12, 1967
2. Uganda	March 30, 1972
3. CHAD	November 28, 1972
4. Congo (B)	December 31, 1972
5. Niger	January 4, 1973
6. Mali	January 5, 1973
7. Burundi	May 16, 1973
8. Togo	September 11, 1973
9. Zaire	October 4, 1973
10. Dahomey	October 6, 1973
11. Rwanda	October 9, 1973
12. Cameroun	October 15, 1973
13. Equatorial Guinea	October 15, 1973
14. Upper Volta	October 18, 1973
15. Tanzania	October 18, 1973
16. Malagash Republic	October 20, 1973
17. Central African Republic	October 21, 1973
18. Sierra Leone	October 22, 1973
19. Ethiopia	October 23, 1973
20. Nigeria	October 25, 1973
21. Zambia	October 25, 1973
22. Gambia	October 25, 1973
23. Ghana	October 27, 1973
24. Senegal	October 27, 1973
25. Gabon	October 29, 1973
26. Kenya	November 1, 1973
27. Libya	November 2, 1973
28. Ivory Coast	November 8, 1973
29. Botswana	November 13, 1973

Source: G Aforke Nweke, Harmonization of African foreign policies 1955-1975, The Political Economy of African Diplomacy, African Studies Centre, Boston University, 1980, p.230.

* / Three African States - Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland. Did not break diplomatic relations with Israel. By June 1987, five other African states resumed diplomatic relations with the state of Israel. These are: Zaire, on May 14, 1982; Liberia, on August 13, 1983; Ivory Coast, February 12, 1986; Cameroun, August 26, 1986; and Togo, June 1987.

APPENDIX VIIChronology of the States Recognising the Saharawi Arab
Democratic Republic (SADR)

1. Madagascar	February 28, 1976
2. Burundi	February 29, 1976
3. Algeria	March 6, 1976
4. Benin	March 9, 1976
5. Angola	March 9, 1976
6. Mozambique	March 11, 1976
7. Guinea Bissau	March 13, 1976
8. North Korea	March 15, 1976
9. Togo	March 15, 1976
10. Rwanda	March 30, 1976
11. Seychelles	October 25, 1977
12. South Yemen	February 12, 1978
13. Congo	June 3, 1978
14. Sao-Tomé and Principe	June 20, 1978
15. Panama	June 22, 1978
16. Tanzania	November 9, 1978
17. Ethiopia	February 24, 1979
18. Vietnam	March 12, 1979
19. Kampuchea	April 10, 1979
20. Laos	May 9, 1979
21. Afghanistan	May 23, 1979
22. Cap Verde	July 4, 1979
23. Granada	August 24, 1979
24. Ghana	August 24, 1979
25. Guyana	September 1, 1979
26. Martinique	September 1, 1979
27. Saint Lucia	September 1, 1979
28. Jamaica	September 4, 1979
29. Uganda	September 6, 1979
30. Nicaragua	September 6, 1979
31. Mexico	September 8, 1979
32. Lesotho	October 9, 1979
33. Zambia	October 12, 1979
34. Cuba	January 20, 1980
35. Iran	February 27, 1980
36. Sierra Leone	March 27, 1980
37. Syria	April 15, 1980
38. Libya	April 15, 1980
39. Swaziland	April 28, 1980
40. Botswana	May 14, 1980
41. Zimbabwe	July 3, 1980
42. Chad	July 4, 1980
43. Mali	July 4, 1980
44. Costa Rica	October 30, 1980
45. Vanuatu	November 26, 1980
46. Kiribati	August 12, 1981
47. Nauru	August 12, 1981
48. Papua New Guinea	August 12, 1981
49. Solomon Islands	August 12, 1981
50. Tuvalu	August 12, 1981
51. Venezuela	August 5, 1982
52. Surinam	August 5, 1982
53. Bolivia	August 5, 1982
54. Mauritius	August 5, 1982

55. Ecuador	November 15, 1983
56. Mauritania	February 27, 1984
57. Upper Volta	March 4, 1984
58. Chad	August 21, 1984
59. Nigeria	November 11, 1984
60. Yugoslavia	November 24, 1984
61. Colombia	February 27, 1985
62. Liberia	July 31, 1985
63. India	October 1, 1985
64. Guatemala	April, 1986
65. The Dominican Republic	July, 1986
66. Belize	September, 1986
67. St Kitts and Nevis	February, 1987
68. Antigua and Barbuda	February, 1987

APPENDIX VIIIONU: Résolution No. 3458 A du 10 Décembre 1975 sur le Sahara Occidental, adoptée par 88 voix contre 57 et 41 abstentions

L'Assemblée générale,

1. Réaffirme le droit inaliénable du peuple sahraoui à l'autodétermination, conformément à la résolution 1514 (XV) de l'Assemblée générale.
2. Réaffirme son attachement au principe de l'autodétermination des peuples et son souci de voir appliquer ce principe aux habitants du territoire du Sahara Occidental dans un cadre qui leur garantisse et permette l'expression libre et authentique de leur volonté, conformément aux résolutions pertinentes de l'Organisation des Nations unies.
3. Réaffirme la responsabilité de la puissance administrante et celle de l'Organisation des Nations unies en ce qui concerne la décolonisation du territoire et la garantie de la libre expression des vœux du peuple du Sahara Occidental.
4. Prend note avec satisfaction de l'avis consultatif de la cour internationale de justice au sujet du Sahara Occidental.
5. Prend note avec satisfaction du rapport de la mission de visite des Nations unies au Sahara occidental en 1975, et fait sienne sa conclusion selon laquelle des mesures devraient être prises pour permettre à tous les sahraouis originaires du territoire de décider de leur avenir en toute liberté et dans une atmosphère de paix et de sécurité conformément à la résolution 1514.
6. Exprime ses remerciements au gouvernement espagnol et aux gouvernements marocain, algérien et mauritanien pour la coopération et l'assistance qu'ils ont apportées à la mission de visite.
7. Demande au gouvernement espagnol, en tant que puissance administrante, conformément aux observations et conclusions de la Cour internationale de justice, de prendre immédiatement toutes les mesures nécessaires, en consultation avec toutes les parties concernées et intéressées, pour faire en sorte que tous les sahraouis originaires du territoire exercent pleinement et librement sous la supervision de l'Organisation des Nations unies leur droit inaliénable à l'autodétermination.
8. Prie le secrétaire général, en consultation avec le gouvernement espagnol, en tant que puissance administrante, et le comité spécial chargé d'étudier la situation en ce qui concerne l'application de la déclaration sur l'octroi de l'indépendance aux pays et aux peuples coloniaux de prendre les dispositions nécessaires à la supervision de l'acte d'autodétermination visé au paragraphe 7 ci-dessus.
9. Prie instamment toutes les parties concernées et intéressées de faire preuve de modération et de mettre fin à toute action unilatérale ou autre qui outrepasserait les décisions de l'Assemblée générale relatives au territoire.

10. Prie le comité spécial de suivre l'application de la présente résolution et de faire rapport sur la question à l'Assemblée générale à sa trente et unième session.

Source: Annuaire de L'Afrique du Nord, Vol.14, CNRS, Paris, 1975, p.974.

APPENDIX IXONU: Résolution 3458 B du 10 Décembre 1975 adoptée par 56 voix
contre 42 et 88 abstentions

L'Assemblée générale,

Réaffirmant sa résolution 1514 (XV) du 14 Décembre 1960,
Réaffirmant ses résolutions 1541 (XV) du 15 Décembre 1960, 2072 (XX)
du 16 Décembre 1965, et toutes les autres résolutions pertinentes des
Nations-Unies, notamment sa résolution 3292 (XXIX) du 13 Décembre
1974.

Prenant acte du rapport de la Mission de visite des Nations Unies
envoyée dans le territoire en 1975.

Prenant acte de l'avis consultatif de la Cour internationale de
Justice du 16 Octobre 1975, au sujet du Sahara occidental.

Considérant les résolutions du conseil de sécurité 377 (1975) du 22
Octobre 1975, 379 (1975) du 2 Novembre 1975 et 380 (1975) du 6
Novembre 1975.

1. Prend acte de l'accord tripartite intervenu a Madrid, le 14
Novembre 1975, entre les Gouvernements espagnol, marocain et
mauritanien, dont le texte a été transmis au Secrétaire général de
l'Organisation des Nations Unies le 18 Novembre 1975.

2. Réaffirme le droit inaliénable a l'autodétermination de
toutes les populations sahraouies originaires du territoire,
conformément a la résolution 1514 (XV) de l'Assemblée générale;

3. Demande aux parties a l'accord de Madrid du 14 Novembre 1975
de veiller au respect des aspirations librement exprimées des
populations sahraouies;

4. Demande a l'administration intérimaire de prendre toutes les
mesures nécessaires pour faire en sorte que toutes les populations
sahraouies originaires du territoire puissent exercer leur droit
inaliénable a l'autodétermination au moyen d'une consultation libre
organisée avec le concours d'un représentant des Nations Unies désigné
par le secrétaire général.

Source: Annuaire De l'Afrique du Nord (AAN), Vol.14, CNRS, Paris,
1975, pp.974-75.

APPENDIX XAnnouncement of The Birth of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic
(SADR) February 27, 1976Text of the Official Communiqué

"Le peuple Arabe Saharaoui, en rappelant aux peuples du monde qui'ils ont annoncé dans la Charte des Nations Unis et dans la proclamation Universelle des droits de L'homme, ainsi que par le biais de la décision de l'Assemblée Générale No.1514 prise lors de sa quinzième session, ce qui suit:

"Les peuples du monde se déclarent résolus à proclamer à nouveau leur foi dans les droits fondamentaux de l'homme, dans la dignité et la valeur de la personne humaine, dans l'égalité des droits des hommes et des femmes, ainsi que des nations grandes et petites, et à favoriser le progrès social et instaurer de meilleures conditions de vie dans une liberté plus grande"... "Conscient des répercussions des conflits accrus découlant du refus de la liberté à ces peuples des entraves mises dans leur voie constituant ainsi une menace dangereuse pour la paix mondiale.

"Convaincu que tous les peuples jouissent du droit inalienable de disposer d'une liberté totale, d'exercer leur souveraineté et du droit à l'intégrité de leur territoires.

"Conformément au principe dictant de mettre fin rapidement sans préalable ou condition, au colonialisme sous toutes ses formes afin de réaliser le développement économique, socio-culturel de tous les peuples en lutte;

"Announce au monde entier, sur la base de la libre volonté populaire fondée sur les principes de l'option démocratique, la naissance d'un état libre, indépendant, souverain, régi par un système national démocratique Arabe d'orientation, Unioniste, progressiste et de religion Islamique.

"En harmonie avec sa doctrine son orientation et la voie qu'il s'est tracée, cet état Arabe Africain non aligné proclame son respect pour les chartes et les traités internationaux ainsi que son attachement à la charte des Nations Unis, à celle de la Ligue Arabe, à celle de l'organisation de l'unité Africaine, tout en réaffirmant son engagement à la proclamation Universelle de droits de l'homme.

"Le peuple Arabe en République Arabe Saharaouie Démocratique, tout en étant résolu à défendre son indépendance, son intégrité territoriale, et à prendre en main ses ressources et les richesses naturelles, lutte aux côtés de tous les peuples épris de paix pour le renforcement de la paix et la consolidation de la sécurité dans le monde entier. Il soutient tous les mouvements de libération en lutte pour se soustraire à la domination colonialiste.

"En ces moments historiques, où se proclame la naissance de le nouvel état, la République Arabe sahraouie Démocratique lance un appel à tous les pays frères et aux états du monde entier pour la reconnaître, et exprime, en même temps, son désir sincère d'établir des relations avec eux sur la base de l'amitié de la coopération et de la non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures.

"La Republique Arabe Saharaouie Democratique lance également un appel a la communauté internationale qui a pour objectif l'instauration du droit et de la justice et qui oeuvre pour le renforcement des fondements de la paix et de la securité, afin qu'elle participe a l'edification et au developpement du nouvel état."

Source: Le Monde, February 29, March 1, 1976, p.3.

APPENDIX XIProclamation du gouvernement de la République Arabe Sahraouie
Démocratique du 4 Mars 1976

Au nom du peuple sahraoui et en exécution de sa volonté, le drapeau de la RASD s'est élevé sur la terre de Saguia El Hamra et Rio de Oro. Il annonçait ainsi la naissance d'un Etat africain dont l'authenticité plonge des racines profondes dans l'histoire de notre peuple, et de sa civilisation qui a rayonné sur tout le Maghreb. Un Etat dont la force vient de la foi des fils de ce peuple dans leur droit à une vie digne, à la liberté vraie, et dont la principale arme est la détermination et l'opiniâtreté dans la lutte.

Aussi une nouvelle page est ouverte ou s'inscrit la lutte de notre peuple qui défie aujourd'hui le colonialisme des "frères" voisins après avoir fermé par sa lutte héroïque la page du colonialisme de l'ennemi étranger.

Aujourd'hui, notre peuple a décidé de rendre publique une étape importante de la mise en place de nos institutions fondamentales, base indispensable pour franchir cette étape de notre lutte permanente pour la liberté, et pour permettre à notre peuple d'exercer un pouvoir réellement démocratique ayant sa source dans la légalité révolutionnaire.

En exécution de la volonté de notre peuple, la direction du F. Polisario, en accord avec le Conseil national Sahraoui provisoire unanime, a décidé la constitution d'un gouvernement qui assume ses responsabilités dans la continuité de la lutte en levant toujours plus haut le drapeau du combat libérateur jusqu'à la victoire et la garantie pour notre peuple de vivre en paix et en sécurité, et pour ouvrir devant lui et les autres peuples frères arabes et africains la voie de l'unité et de la libération.

Nous renouvelons à cette occasion notre attachement à tous les principes des chartes des Nations Unies et de l'OUA. Nous mentionnons tous spécialement les principes relatifs à la protection des droits de l'homme, à l'intégrité territoriale, et à l'intangibilité des frontières établies, comme garantie de la paix et de la sécurité africaine et internationale.

Nous attirons l'attention de l'ONU, de l'OUA et de la Ligue Arabe sur la responsabilité historique qui leur incombe vis-à-vis d'un peuple pacifique victime d'une tentative d'extermination et d'une véritable action de génocide.

Nous mettons également tous les peuples du monde devant leurs responsabilités, leur devoir étant d'aider ce peuple agressé à faire échouer le complot impérialiste dont il est victime.

En cet instant historique où le gouvernement de la RASD est proclamé en même temps à Alger, Tripoli, Tananarive, Conakry et Bujumbura après avoir été constitué sur le sol national, nous tendons une main fraternelle aux peuples frères du Maroc et de la Mauritanie, pour leur demander de soutenir notre lutte de libération et de comprendre que l'avenir est aux peuples. Nous les adjurons d'épargner le sang innocent en exigeant l'arrêt de la guerre qui nous est imposée par leurs régimes pour servir des intérêts étrangers et des ambitions personnelles.

Nous tendons la main de l'amitié a tous les peuples et Etats du monde en leur demandant de soutenir notre juste lutte et de reconnaître la RASD. Nous affirmons a cette occasion notre désir sincère d'établir des relations d'amitié et de coopération avec tous les Etats sur la base du respect mutuel de la souveraineté nationale.

Nous sommes décidés a poursuivre la lutte jusqu'a la victoire, quels que soient les sacrifices. Cette région ne connaîtra ni paix ni stabilité tant que durera l'agression et tant que notre peuple n'aura pas achevé la libération de son territoire national.

Angala, le 4, Mars 1976
Conseil National Provisoire Sahraoui

Source: Annuaire de L'Afrique du Nord (AAN), NRS, Paris, 1976, 917-918.

APPENDIX XIIWestern Sahara

Recommendation of the Ad-Hoc Committee of OAU Heads of State
fifth session, Freetown, Sierra Leone (9-11 September 1980)
AHG/103 (XVIII) B

The Ad-Hoc Committee of OAU Heads of States having heard all the concerned and interested parties to the conflict of Western Sahara; noting with regret that the positions of the concerned and interested parties on the question of Western Sahara are widely divergent; satisfied, however, at the fact that all the concerned and interested parties are willing to establish peace in the region; convinced that there is need for a fair and general referendum in the Western Sahara; decides:

1. That there is a clear need for a fair referendum in Western Sahara in accordance with Decision AHG/Dec. 114 (XVI) Rev.1;
2. To call upon all parties concerned to observe a cease-fire which should come into force by December 1980;
3. To request the concerned parties, during the cease-fire, to confine their forces to their respective bases and barracks;
4. That a UN peacekeeping force should be entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring an effective cease-fire;
5. That the OAU, with the assistance of the UN, should proceed with the organisation and conduct of the referendum in Western Sahara;
6. To charge the Secretary-General of the OAU with the responsibility of bringing this decision to the attention of the concerned parties.

Source: Africa Contemporary Record, Holmes and Meier publishers, New York and London, Vol.14, 1981-82, pp.C36-C37.

APPENDIX XIIIText of the Decision of the OAU Implementation Committee on
Western Sahara at its First Meeting, Nairobi, Kenya
(24-26 August 1981)

The OAU implementation committee on Western Sahara... conscious of the need for all the parties concerned to cooperate for the successful implementation of Resolution AHG/Res. 103 (XVIII), of the eighteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of OAU Heads of State and Government, held in Nairobi, so as to attain the objectives laid down in the resolution and make the parties concerned agree on the steps to be taken in the context of that resolution; taking into consideration the need for the UN to participate in the referendum and ceasefire, by virtue of resolution AHG/Res. 103 (XVIII), adopted by the eighteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of OAU Heads of State and Government, held in Nairobi, in June 1981:

Decides to organise and conduct a general and free referendum in the Western Sahara, establish and maintain the ceasefire, as follows:

(a) Referendum

1. The referendum shall be one of self-determination which will enable the people of the Western Sahara to express themselves freely and democratically on the future of their territory.
2. The referendum shall be held in the Western Sahara (ex-Spanish Sahara) the maps of which were deposited with the UN.
3. All Saharawis listed in the census conducted in 1974 by the Spanish authorities who have attained the age of 18 or above, shall be eligible to vote in the referendum. In determining the Saharawi refugee population in the neighbouring countries, reference should be made to the records of the UNHCR. In establishing the population of the Western Sahara, account shall be taken of the internationally-recognised rate of population growth.
4. The voting shall be by secret ballot on the basis of one person, one vote.

5. The people of Western Sahara shall be given the following choice:

- (a) Independence, or
- (b) Integration with Morocco.

(b) Structural Requirements

1. The referendum shall be organised and conducted by the implementation committee in collaboration with the UN.
2. For a fair and impartial organisation of the referendum, an impartial interim administration, supported by civilian, military and police components, shall be set up.
3. The interim administration shall also be assisted by an adequate number of UN peacekeeping force.

(c) Ceasefire

1. The committee urges the parties concerned to agree on a ceasefire through negotiations under the auspices of the implementation committee.
2. All the parties concerned shall undertake to respect the ceasefire and maintain it after the proclamation of the date fixed by the implementation committee.
3. For the fair conduct of the referendum and the strict observance of the ceasefire, troops of the parties to the conflict should be effectively confined to their bases in conformity with the recommendations of the fifth session of the Ad hoc Committee of Heads of State on Western Sahara held in Freetown, Sierra Leone, from 9 to 11 September 1980.
4. The peacekeeping forces shall be stationed in the area so as to guarantee the ceasefire.

(d) Financing of the Implementation of the Decision

The OAU current chairman shall consult the UN in order to determine involvement in the implementation of this decision including its financing.

(e) General Principles

1. All the parties undertake to respect the results of the referendum.
2. Neighbouring countries undertake to respect the results of the referendum and to abstain from interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. The implementation committee shall announce the results of the referendum.
Implementation Committee members: Kenya, Tanzania, Mali, Sudan, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Guinea.

Source: Africa Contemporary Record, Holmes and Meier publishers, New York and London, Vol.14, 1981-82, pp.C37-C38.

APPENDIX XIVResolution on Western Sahara adopted by the UN General Assembly
76 in favour, nine against and 57 abstaining (24 November 1981)

The General Assembly, having considered in depth the question of Western Sahara: recalling the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the UN and in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial countries and Peoples; recalling its resolution 35/19 of 11 November 1980 on the question of Western Sahara; having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; having heard the statements made on the question of Western Sahara, in particular the statements of the representative of Polisario; recalling its resolution 35/117 of 10 December 1980 on cooperation between the UN and the OAU; taking note of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU at its eighteenth ordinary session held at Nairobi from 24 to 27 June 1981, to organise throughout the Territory of Western Sahara a general and free referendum of the people of Western Sahara on self-determination: Taking note of the decision adopted by the Implementation Committee on Western Sahara of the OAU at its first ordinary session, held at Nairobi from 24 to 26 August 1981, concerning the establishment of appropriate machinery to enable the people of Western Sahara to express themselves freely and democratically on their future:

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the UN, the Charter of the OAU and the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), as well as the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the OAU;
2. Welcomes the efforts made by the OAU and its Implementation Committee on Western Sahara, with a view to promoting a just and definitive solution to the question of Western Sahara...
4. Welcomes the steps taken by the Implementation Committee with a view to organising and conducting the referendum;
5. Appeals to the two parties to the conflict, Morocco and Polisario Liberación de Sanguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro, to observe a cease-fire in accordance with the decisions of the Organization of African Unity and its Implementation Committee;
6. Urges to that end, Morocco and Polisario to enter into negotiations with a view to establishing an immediate ceasefire and concluding a peace agreement permitting the fair conduct of a general, free and regular referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara;
7. Reaffirms the determination of the UN to cooperate fully with the OAU in the fair and impartial organisation of the referendum;
8. Requests, to that end, the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to ensure that the UN participates in the organisation and conduct of the referendum, and to report to the General Assembly

and the Security Council on this subject, and on the measures requiring a decision by the Council;

9. Urgently requests the Secretary-General to cooperate closely with the Secretary-General of the OAU with a view to the implementation of the decisions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU and of its Implementation Committee, and of the present resolution;

10. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation, with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a matter of priority and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

Source: Africa Contemporary Record, Holmes and Meier publishers, New York and London, Vol.14, 1981-82, pp. C38-C39.

APPENDIX XVTripoli Declaration of the African Heads of State and Government
present in Tripoli, Libya for the first attempted OAU Assembly
(5 August 1982)(a) Western Sahara

The spirit of understanding and cooperation shown by the Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic and its efforts to ensure the success of the scheduled 39th session of the Ministerial Council of the Organisation and the 19th ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government is an indication of its political maturity and devotion to the African cause;

The Heads of State and Government participating in this meeting reaffirm their support to and solidarity with the Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic in its struggle and acclaim the heroic struggle led by the Sahraoui people to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity;

We are still convinced that the admission of the Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic to OAU constitutes an important step towards the reestablishment of peace in the Western Sahara, in the region and in Africa at large;

The Heads of State and Government appeal to both the Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic and the Kingdom of Morocco to explore ways and means to put an end to the conflict between them;

(b) Chad

We express our deep concern for the deteriorating situation in Chad and the renewal of civil strife since the voluntary departure of the troops of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, whose efforts and sacrifices had significantly contributed to restore peace, security and to safeguard the unity of that troubled sister-country and to safeguard the unity of the people and territorial integrity of Chad;

Faced with the danger of destruction of the territorial integrity of that country, we solemnly invite all African states to exert all possible efforts to put an end to the blood-shed and strife in Chad, and to find a lasting solution to the problem of Chad in order to achieve the unity and stability of the people of Chad;

We affirm our support to the Lagos Accord on national reconciliation in Chad and condemn any faction signatory to this agreement which may seize power in a way that would disturb the peace and security of the country.

Source: Africa Contemporary Record, Holmes and Neier publishers, New York and London, Vol.15, 1982-83, pp.C3-C6.

APPENDIX XVIOAU Tripoli Meetings: Record of Member-States

Algeria	Supported seating SADR.
Angola	Supported seating SADR; appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt.
Benin	Supported seating SADR
Botswana	Supported seating SADR
Burundi	Supported seating SADR.
Cameroon	Opposed seating SADR, attended Tripoli II, walked out after compromise.
Cape Verde	Supported seating SADR.
Central African Rep.	Supported seating SADR, did not attend final session of Tripoli 1, attended Tripoli 2; walked out after compromise.
Chad	Both supported seating SADR; both delegations arrived for summit; Habré did not accept the compromise, was not seated.
Comoros	Opposed seating SADR; declined to join Tripoli 2 after compromise.
Congo	Supported seating SADR; member of liaison committee for Tripoli 2; appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt.
Djibouti	Opposed seating SADR, attended Tripoli 1 until 5 August; attended Tripoli 2; walked out after compromise.
Egypt	Refused to attend summit in Tripoli.
Eq Guinea	Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2, walked out after compromise.
Ethiopia	Supported seating SADR; appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt.
Gabon	Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2, walked out after compromise.
Gambia	Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2, walked out after compromise.
Ghana	Supported seating SADR.
Guinea	Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2, walked out after compromise.
Guinea-Bissau	Supported seating SADR.
Ivory Coast	Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2, walked out after compromise.
Kenya	Opposed seating SADR, did not attend final session of Tripoli 1; Daniel arap Moi, the outgoing chairman, opposed the Chad compromise, but called upon all African states to attend the summit; member of liaison committee for Tripoli 2; appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt.
Lesotho	Supported seating SADR, did not attend final session of Tripoli 1; appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt.
Liberia	Opposed seating SADR
Libya	President Qadhafi, slated to become the new OAU chairman, insisted upon Chad compromise, supported Goukouni Weddeye's GUNT regime; member of liaison committee for Tripoli 2, appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt.

Madagascar	Supported seating SADR.
Malawi	Supported seating SADR.
Mali	Supported seating SADR; member of liaison committee for Tripoli 2, appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt.
Mauritania	Supported seating SADR.
Mauritius	Supported seating SADR.
Morocco	Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2, walked out after compromise.
Mozambique	Supported seating SADR; member of liaison committee for Tripoli 2, appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt.
Niger	Attended Tripoli 1 through July, opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2, walked out after compromise.
Nigeria	Opposed seating SADR, did not attend final session of Tripoli 1; appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt.
Rwanda	Supported seating SADR.
Sao Tomé et Príncipe	Supported seating SADR.
Senegal	Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2, walked out after compromise.
Seychelles	Supported seating SADR.
Sierre Leone	Opposed seating SADR.
Somalia	Refused to attend summit in Tripoli.
Sudan	Opposed seating SADR; on October 24, President Numeiry stated that Sudan and Egypt would welcome an African summit provided it was not held in Tripoli.
Swaziland	Supported seating SADR, did not attend final session of Tripoli 1
Tanzania	Supported seating SADR; appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt.
Togo	Supported seating SADR, did not attend final session of Tripoli 1; attended Tripoli 2, walked out after compromise.
Tunisia	Opposed seating SADR
Uganda	Arrived in Tripoli in August, attended final session of Tripoli 1; appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt.
Upper Volta	Opposed seating SADR; unable to send delegation to Tripoli 2 because of coup in October.
Western Sahara	Seated as member of OAU at Tripoli 1; agreed to pull out of OAU temporarily 30 October.
Zaire	Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2, walked out after compromise.
Zambia	Supported seating SADR; appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt.
Zimbabwe	Supported seating SADR.

Source: Africa Contemporary Record, Holmes and Meier publishers, New York and London, Vol.15, 1982/83, pp.C10-C11.

APPENDIX XVII (A)The Organisation of African UnitySelected resolutions adopted by the Nineteenth Assembly of
Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
(6-12 June 1983)(a) Western Sahara

The OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government... Having examined the Report of the Implementation Committee of Heads of State on Western Sahara; recalling the solemn commitment made by His Majesty King Hassan II during the 18th Summit to accept the holding of a referendum in the Western Sahara to enable the people of that territory to exercise their right to self-determination; recalling with appreciation, His Majesty King Hassan's acceptance of the Recommendation of the Sixth Session of the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State on Western Sahara contained in Document AHG/103 (XVIII) B Annex 1, as well as his pledge to cooperate with the Ad Hoc Committee in the search for a just, peaceful and lasting solution; reaffirming its previous Resolutions and Decisions on the Question of Western Sahara, and in particular AHG/Res. 103 (XVIII) of 27 June 1981:

1. Takes note of the Reports of the Implementation Committee of Heads of State on Western Sahara;
2. Urges the parties to the conflict, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front, to undertake direct negotiations with a view to bringing about a ceasefire to create the necessary condition for a peaceful and fair referendum for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, a referendum without any administrative or military constraints, under the auspices of the OAU and the UN and calls on the Implementation Committee to ensure the observance of the ceasefire;
3. Directs the Implementation Committee to meet as soon as possible, and in collaboration with the parties to the conflict should continue to work out the modalities and all other details relevant to the implementation of the ceasefire and the conduct of the referendum in December 1983;
4. Requests the UN, in conjunction with the OAU, to provide a Peacekeeping Force to be stationed in Western Sahara to ensure peace and security during the organisation and conduct of the referendum;
5. Mandates the Implementation Committee, with the participation of the UN, to take all necessary measures to ensure the proper implementation of this resolution;
6. Requests the Implementation Committee to report to the 20th Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the result of the Referendum with a view to enabling the 20th Summit to reach a final decision on all aspects of the question of the Western Sahara;
9. Welcomes the constructive attitude of the Sahrawi leaders in making it possible for the 19th Summit to meet by withdrawing from it voluntarily and temporarily.

Source: Africa Contemporary Record, Holmes and Meier publishers, New York and London, Vol.16, 1983-84, PC3.

APPENDIX XVII (B)The Organisation of African Unity

Selected resolutions adopted by the Nineteenth Assembly
of Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
(6-12 June 1983)

(b) On Chad/Libya Dispute AHG/Res.106 (XIX)

The OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government... having heard the statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Chad on the worsening situation between his country and the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya regarding the Tibesti Region; recalling decision AHG/Dec.109 (XIX) relating to the settlement of intra-African disputes; reaffirming decision AHG/Dec.108 (XIV) on the setting up of an Ad Hoc Mediation Committee on Chad/Libya dispute; noting that the Security Council, which had been seized with Chad's complaint regarding this dispute, has referred the matter to the OAU, requesting it to find ways and means of resolving it through its appropriate machineries; gravely concerned by the serious tension characterising the relations between the two sister-states of Chad and the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya:

1. Takes note of the statement made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Chad;
2. Urgently requests the two parties to refrain from any action likely to further worsen the present situation;
3. Calls upon the Ad Hoc Mediation Committee to pursue its activities with a view to finding, as early as possible, ways and means of settling this dispute;
4. Appeals to the two parties to cooperate sincerely and faithfully with the Ad Hoc Committee in a manner as to enable it to accomplish its mission;
5. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to report to the next session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU.

Source: Africa Contemporary Record, Holmes and Meier publishers, New York and London, Vol.16, 1983-84, p.C4.

APPENDIX XVIIIThe December 1975 Hassi Massaoud Joint Communiqué Between Presidents,
Houari Boumedienne of Algeria and Muammar Kadhafi of Libya

"L'escalade des défis auxquels se trouve confrontée la nation Arabe au Machrek et au Maghreb impose plus que jamais aux deux directions révolutionnaires la nécessité d'assumer pleinement et en commun leurs responsabilités à l'échelle de la nation Arabe dans sa vocation unitaire et pour le progrès... Les deux directions sont convenues, par ailleurs, de faire front tous les défis, quelle qu'en soit la nature et où qu'ils se situent... "Toute atteinte portée à l'une des deux révolutions sera considérée par l'autre comme une atteinte contre elle"... "La communauté inéluctable de destin des peuples frères d'Algérie et de Libye, l'identité de leurs options révolutionnaires ainsi que les facteurs évidents de complémentarité entre les deux pays ont déterminé les directions révolutionnaires respectives à intensifier leurs efforts dans une action persévérante en vue d'établir, d'une manière rigoureuse, des liens organiques adéquats entre les deux pays. Ces liens seront renforcés de telle sorte qu'ils se situent au niveau des aspirations légitimes des deux pays frères et de toute la nation Arabe dans la voie de l'unité et de la libération."

Source: Le Monde, Paris, December 31, 1975, p.2.

APPENDIX XIXFusion tuniso-libyenneThe Djerba Declaration of January 12, 1974, Read by M Mohammed Masmoudi (Tunisia's Foreign Minister)

Au nom de Dieu Clément et Miséricordieux,
A une heure décisive, a un moment ou les défis se multiplient, en un jour dont le souvenir sera impérissable, conscient du poids des responsabilités historiques qui lui incombent,

Le Combattant Supreme, répondant a l'appel en faveur de l'unité arabe, appel aussi pressant que celui en faveur de la lutte pour la libération des territoires arabes et musulmans, a signé avec le Colonel Muammar Quaddhafi la proclamation de l'Union de la Tunisie et de la Libye Arabes sur la base des principes constitutionnels en vigueur dans chacun des deux pays.

Les deux pays constitueront une seule République qui prendra le nom de "République Arabe Islamique". Elle aura une seule constitution, un seul drapeau, un seul président, une seule armée, les memes pouvoirs législatif, exécutif et judiciaire.

Un référendum sur l'union aura lieu le 18 Janvier 1974.

Signé: Habib Bourguiba - Muammar Quaddhafi

Source: Annuaire de L'Afrique du Nord (AAN), Vol.13, CNRS, Paris, 1974, p.742.

APPENDIX XXTraité de Fraternité et de Concorde

La République algérienne démocratique et populaire et
La République tunisienne,

Ayant foi en leur communauté de destin dans la cadre du
Grand Maghreb Arabe conscientes de leur appartenance au Monde Arabe et
Islamique, au continent africain et de la nécessité de renforcer les
liens de rapprochement et de solidarité entre les deux Peuples
Freres,

Désireuses de renforcer la stabilité et la sécurité dans la
région du Grand Maghreb Arabe et dans le monde.

Convaincues de contribuer ainsi a la consolidation des
relations de voisinage positives et de coopération fraternelle
existantes entre les pays du Grand Maghreb Arabe,

Résolues a oeuvrer, en commun, pour un développement
complémentaire et global de leurs deux sociétés répondant ainsi aux
aspirations de leurs deux peuples vers la progres et la prospérité,

Se fondant sur le traité de fraternité, de bon voisinage et
de coopération, signé a Tunis le 6 Janvier 1970,

Déterminées a conjuguer leurs efforts pour le renforcement
de la justice, de la paix de la sécurité et de la coexistence
pacifique dans le monde et a poursuivre leur action pour le respect de
l'application des principes des Nations Unies, de l'OUA et de la Ligue
Arabe,

Convaincues qu'un traité de fraternité et de concorde
implique nécessairement le reglement de tout différend pouvant surgir
entre elles par des moyens pacifiques, conformément aux principes de
la Charte des Nations unies,

Sont convenues des dispositions suivantes:

Article 1^{er}

En vue de renforcer entre le deux pays les relations
pacifiques, fraternelles et de bon voisinage, fondées sur leur
appartenance au Grand Maghreb Arabe et sur leur communauté de destin
ainsi que sur le respect des principes de la souveraineté nationale,
de l'égalité des droits des peuples et de leur droit a disposer
d'eux-memes, les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent a oeuvrer
continuellement pour le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité entre
elles et, d'une facon générale, entre tous les pays du Grand Maghreb
Arabe.

Article 2

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent a s'abstenir de
recourir a la menace ou a l'emploi de la force pour régler les
différends qui pourraient surgir entre elles, compte tenu de
l'authenticité des liens historiques qui unissent les deux peuples, en
vue du préserver une coopération fraternelle et fructueuses et de
maintenir entre elles une paix permanente basée sur le respect mutuel

de l'intégrité territoriale, de l'intangibilité de leurs frontières nationales, de la souveraineté et de l'indépendance politique de chacune d'elles.

Elles s'engagent également à résoudre les différends qui pourraient surgir entre elles par la voie de la concertation, de la négociation ou par tout autre voie pacifique.

Article 3

Chacune des hautes parties contractantes s'engage à n'adhérer à aucune alliance ou coalition de caractère militaire ou politique avec un ou plusieurs États tiers dirigée contre l'indépendance politique, l'intégrité territoriale ou la sécurité de l'autre partie contractante.

Chacune des hautes parties s'engage à ne tolérer, sur son territoire, aucune initiative ou acte découlant d'une attitude hostile adoptée par un ou plusieurs autres États tiers contre l'une d'entre elles.

Article 4

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à ne pas tolérer, sur leur territoire, l'organisation et l'activité de groupements qui attenteraient à la sécurité et à l'intégrité territoriale de l'autre partie ou tenteraient par la violence de changer son régime.

Article 5

Chacune des hautes parties contractantes conserve sa pleine liberté d'action pour conclure avec des États tiers tout accord qui ne serait pas contraire aux dispositions du présent traité.

Article 6

Le présent traité demeurera ouvert à l'adhésion, avec l'accord des hautes parties contractantes, aux autres États du Grand Maghreb Arabe qui en accepteraient les dispositions.

Article 7

Le présent traité sera valable pour une durée de vingt ans. Il sera ratifié conformément aux procédures constitutionnelles en vigueur dans chacune des hautes parties contractantes. Il entrera en vigueur à la date de l'échange des instruments de ratification.

À l'expiration de la période de vingt ans, le présent traité sera renouvelé, par tacite reconduction et pour une même durée, à moins que l'une des hautes parties contractantes ne le dénonce, par écrit, un an au moins, avant la date d'expiration de la période en cours.

Le présent traité est établi en deux exemplaires originaux, en langue arabe, le deux textes faisant également foi.

Fait a Tunis, le 4 jourmada II 1403 correspondant au 19 Mars
1983.

P la République
Algérienne démocratique
et populaire
Chadli BENDJEDID

P la République
tunisienne
Habib BOURGUIBA

Source: ANNUAIRE DE L'Afrique Du Nord (AAN), CNRS, Vol.22, Paris,
1983, pp.694-95.

APPENDIX XXILibya-Morocco

Text of the Libyan-Moroccan federation agreement signed at
a meeting between King Hassan of Morocco and Col. Qadhafi of
Libya at Oujda, Morocco (13 August 1984)

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. The Kingdom of Morocco and the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, out of their realisation of the dangers threatening the Arab nation and the Islamic world in general and usurped Palestine and Jerusalem in particular as a result of the policy of violence and aggression which the Zionists have been practising, flouting the sanctions of Islam and violating the rights of Muslims and Arabs, after coming to cherish wrongdoing and have been blinded by arrogance, so that they no longer paid any attention to the principles and high ideas on which the international order is founded, nor to the resolutions adopted by international organisations and conferences at every level;

And out of their feeling that the checking of these threatening dangers against the Arab nation and the Islamic world headed by Palestine and Jerusalem requires a unification of outlook and determination and the pooling of efforts to check aggression, establish the rights and safeguard the interests of Arabs and Muslims and defend their right to existence and dignity;

And out of their belief that the adoption of this course will act as a decisive factor in giving the Arab nation and the Islamic world the opportunity to regain their past glory and secure the appropriate position compatible with their glorious religion;

And devoting their efforts to lifting their peoples and prepare them to enter the 21st century equipped with all the things that would enable them to occupy a prominent position among those who are advanced in the fields of science, technology and all other fields of human culture and civilisation;

And in consideration of the obstacles standing in the way of Arab unity, as has been revealed by past experience, and in consideration also of what wisdom dictates on the need to learn lessons from setbacks which were actually the result of disregarding obstacles, and what wisdom demands in the way of persistent and continued work to achieve the desired goal gradually and without haste, improvisation in implementation;

And out of their feeling in particular of the strong bonds that bind the peoples of the Arab Maghrib together - bonds based on their common geography, history, religion, language knowledge and cultural aspects;

And in consideration of the aspiration of these peoples and their leaders, since long ago, to establish unity that would bolster the bonds among them, based on the unity of destiny and dialogue, and which would lead them towards a complementary unit of considerable weight politically and economically among the advanced peoples of the world, particularly in the community of the Mediterranean basin countries, who - irrespective of their individual characteristics - share a cultural heritage which has its roots in common spiritual and intellectual values;

And out of their wish to respond to these aspirations and to contribute towards the realisation of these aspirations in a manner characterised with realism, moving them from the sphere of theorising to the sphere of precise implementation, and out of their realisation that the best way to achieve this lies in the creation of a federation between them which would act as a springboard for the establishment of wider institutions aimed at serving the unity of the Arab and Islamic peoples and realising the dignity and strength they aspire to, since this federation would constitute a cornerstone of Arab Maghrib unity and, consequently, an historic step towards achieving the unity of the Arab nation, have agreed on the following:

Article 1: In accordance with this pact a federation that will consist of the Kingdom of Morocco and the SPLAJ will be founded and will be known as the Arab-African Federation.

Article 2: The Presidency will be the supreme body of the federation. HM the King of Morocco and HE the Leader of the 1st September revolution [Qadhafi] will exercise the presidency jointly, and in it will be vested the authority to issue decisions.

Article 3: A general secretariat will be created under the authority of the Presidency, the headquarters of which will alternate between the two countries, the secretariat will have a permanent representative in each of them. The federation's Secretary General must be a citizen of the country where the headquarters of the general secretariat is not situated, and the Assistant Secretary General must belong to the other country. The term of office will be two years.

Article 4: The federation will have the following councils: (a) political council; (b) defence council; (c) economic council; (d) educational and technological activities council. These councils will be composed, in accordance with the decision of the presidency, of delegates from each of the two countries, and the number of representatives from each country will be equal. The councils will have a consultative role, and their tasks within their specialist fields will be to study issues referred to them by the presidency, propose solutions and prepare plans at the request of the presidency.

Article 5: The federation will have a federal body which will be composed of members of the House of Representatives of the Kingdom of Morocco and members of the General People's Congress of the SPLAJ. The task of this body will be to put forward proposals to the presidency regarding the strengthening of the federation and the achievement of its objectives.

Article 6: The federation will have an executive committee composed of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of Morocco and the General People's Committee of the SPLAJ, whose task will be to execute and follow up the presidency's decisions. The executive committee will hold regular meetings in each country alternately.

Article 7: The federation will have a federal court to be formed by a decision of the presidency. In the event of a dispute between the two sides regarding the implementation or realisation of this pact, they will have the right to submit their complaint to the court for settlement. The rulings and opinions of the court will be final and binding.

Article 8: The federation will seek to strengthen ties of fraternity between the two countries and their peoples, to work for the advancement of the Arab nation and the defence of its rights, to contribute to the maintenance of peace on the basis of the principles of justice and harmony and characterised by continuity and stability, pursuing a joint political policy in all spheres, to contribute to uniting the Arab Maghrib and subsequently to achieving the unity of the Arab nation.

Article 9: The joint policy referred to in the previous article is aimed at achieving the following objectives: (a) In the international field: to strengthen ties of fraternal amity between the two countries and establish firm diplomatic cooperation between them; (b) In the defence field: to maintain the independence of both countries; (c) in the economic field; to work for the achievement of technical, industrial, agricultural, commercial and social development in both countries, and take all necessary steps to achieve that objective, especially by creating joint institutions and preparing general or specific economic programmes; (d) In the educational field: to establish cooperation aimed at developing education at its various levels, maintaining spiritual and moral values which adhere to Islamic teachings, and preserving Arab national identity, and to adopt the necessary measures to reach all those objectives, particularly by exchanging lecturers and students and creating joint university, educational and research institutions.

Article 10: The federation will have an administrative and a development budget.

Article 11: Each country will accord absolute respect to the sovereignty of the other country and will undertake not to interfere in the other's internal affairs.

Article 12: Any aggression directed against one of the countries will be regarded as aggression against the other country.

Article 13: The federation will not prevent either of the participating countries from signing agreements which are alike or similar to the pact which it is based on; on the contrary, each of them is permitted to sign such (? an agreement) with other countries. Other countries belonging to the Arab nation or the African community are permitted to join this pact and become members of the federation, provided that the two sides consent to this.

Article 14: A special committee, whose members will be appointed by the presidency [of the federation], will be responsible for presenting the regional draft agreements aimed at explaining the aforementioned clauses. The aforementioned proposals will be submitted to the presidency for consideration.

Article 15: A resident minister or secretary will represent the interests of his country in the other country.

Article 16: The pact will come into force as soon as it is approved by the people of the Kingdom of Morocco and the people of the SPLAJ, through a referendum that will be held in accordance with the measures in operation in each country.

Issued at Oujda on August 13, 1984, signed by Hassan II, the King of Morocco, Colonel Muammer Al Kadhah, Leader of the September 1st Revolution.

Source: Africa Contemporary Record, Holmes and Meier publishers, New York and London, Vol.17, 1984/85, pp.C20-22.

APPENDIX XXIISommet des Chefs d'Etats arabes révolutionnaires
et progressistes (Tripoli, 2 au 5 décembre 1977)(a) Communiqué Final

Au nom de Dieu, clément et miséricordieux,

A l'initiative du Colonel Moammar Quaddhafi, un sommet arabe s'est tenu a Tripoli, capitale de la Jamahiriya arabe libyenne populaire et socialiste, entre les 22 et 25 Dhou El Hejja 1398 de l'hégire, correspondant aux 2 et 5 décembre 1977 de l'ère chrétienne.

Ce sommet a regroupé:

1. M. Houari Boumediene, Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire;
2. M. Hafedh Al Assad, Président de la République Arabe Syrienne.
3. M. le Colonel Moammar Quaddhafi, Secrétaire Général du Congrès du Peuple de la Jamahiriya Arabe Libyenne Populaire et Socialiste;
4. M. Abdelfattah Ismael, Secrétaire Général du Front National de la République Démocratique du Yemen;
5. M Taha Yassine Ramadan, représentant du Président de la République Irakienne;
6. M Yasser Arafat, Chef du Comité exécutif de l'OLP et commandant en chef des forces armées de la révolution palestinienne.

Avec un sens développé des responsabilités nationales, et un haut degré de conscience, les participants au sommet ont examiné les divers aspects de la situation qui prévaut actuellement dans la région arabe, et les circonstances que traverse la cause prévaut actuellement dans la région arabe, et les circonstances que traverse la cause palestinienne en particulier.

Les responsables arabes ont également analysé les conspirations tramées par les impérialistes et les sionistes contre la Nation Arabe.

Ces conspirations ont pour but d'imposer aux masses palestiniennes et arabes des solutions défaitistes qui font fi des droits nationaux du peuple palestinien, qui liquident les acquis révolutionnaires dans la patrie arabe et dévoient les mouvements arabes de libération nationale. Ces solutions ne seraient évidemment qu'un prélude permettant aux ennemis de la Nation arabe de soumettre toute la région et de la laisser à la traîne de l'imperialism.

Le sommet de Tripoli a également étudié la signification et la portée de la visite effectuée par le Président Sadate en Palestine occupée. Cette visite, pour les chefs des Etats arabes progressistes, n'était que l'un des volets du vaste complot tramé par les ennemis de la Nation arabe. Les conséquences de ce pas accompli par Sadate sont certes graves. Cette visite est en effet, une atteinte grave aux

aspirations des masses arabes, et une trahison envers le Mouvement de Libération Nationale qui mène une lutte ardue contre le sionisme. C'est également une braderie des droits nationaux du peuple palestinien, et une exclusion de l'Egypte du front de la lutte arabe anti-impérialiste et anti-sioniste. En conséquence, les participants au sommet de Tripoli accusent le Président Egyptien de haute trahison. Son initiative a été un service inappréciable rendu à ses maîtres impérialistes et à ses nouveaux maîtres sionistes. Sadate a torpillé dangereusement la solidarité arabe, en voulant cyniquement la chartre de la ligue arabe, ainsi que les décisions des précédents sommets arabes, pardessus tout. La visite effectuée par Sadate en Palestine occupée a été une reconnaissance de fait de l'entité sioniste, et une consolidation de l'existence de cette citadelle de l'impérialisme dans la région.

Tirant les conclusions de l'analyse à laquelle ils ont procédé, les participants au sommet ont ainsi classé les buts de la conspiration tramée actuellement contre la Nation arabe.

1. Rendre impossible toute paix qui pourrait être juste et honorable, en sauvegardant les droits légitimes de la Nation arabe et du peuple palestinien, et permettre la libération des territoires arabes occupés par les sionistes, en premier lieu Al Quds.
2. Couper la Nation arabe des Pays africains qui ont adopté une attitude juste et courageuse en faveur de la cause arabe, et dévoilé parallèlement, les liens organiques qui lient l'entité sioniste aux régimes racistes implantés au sud du continent africain.
3. Couper la Nation arabe des pays non-alignés et des pays musulmans qui ont toujours appuyé la cause arabe et soutenu la juste lutte du peuple palestinien.
4. Causer du tort aux liens de coopération et d'amitié qui unissent les pays arabes à l'Union Soviétique et à l'ensemble des pays du bloc socialiste, parce que l'URSS et les pays du Pacte de Varsovie ont accordé un soutien inestimable à la Nation arabe dans sa lutte contre l'ennemi impérialo-sioniste.
5. Permettre aux ennemis de la Nation arabe, et à leur tête, les Etats-Unis, de s'assurer des acquis considérables qui les rendraient à même de renverser l'équilibre des forces en faveur des impérialo-sionistes et de mettre en danger l'indépendance nationale des pays d'Afrique, d'Asie et d'Amérique latine.
6. Instaurer un système d'alliance entre les sionistes et le régime égyptien en place actuellement. Le but de cette alliance est la liquidation de la cause palestinienne et de la cause arabe en général. L'atomisation des efforts déployés par la Nation arabe, et la braderie des intérêts nationaux.

Conscients du grave danger que représentent les conspirations impérialo-sionistes qui visent à affaiblir le mouvement de libération arabe, et à semer le découragement et le défaitisme.

Sachant parfaitement que ces conspirations n'ont pour autre but que de liquider les droits nationaux du peuple palestinien, et surtout son droit à retourner dans sa patrie et à y élever un Etat indépendant comprenant tout le territoire national, sous direction de l'OLP, seul représentant légitime de ce peuple.

Sachant que les droits du peuple palestinien ont été reconnus comme légitimes et inaliénables par l'ensemble de la communauté internationale.

Les participants au sommet, mus par la grande responsabilité historique qui leur incombe dans ces circonstances critiques, décident ce qui suit:

1. La condamnation de la visite effectuée par le Président Egyptien en Palestine occupée; les participants au sommet, tout en estimant a sa juste valeur le role important joué par le peuple égyptien frere dans la lutte arabe pour la libération nationale, savent que l'Egypte n'est tout de meme pas la clef de toute solution dans la région, et que, si la Nation arabe est renforcée par le poids de l'Egypte, le pays ne peut etre fort que s'il reste dans le cadre de la Nation arabe, sinon son role et son poids ne peuvent qu'etre affaiblis.
2. Le déploiement des efforts nécessaires pour éliminer les conséquences dangereuses engendrées par la visite du traître Sadate en Palestine occupée et des pourparlers que le Président Egyptien a eus avec le dirigeants sionistes, ainsi que toutes les initiatives décidées au lendemain de cette visite et de ces pourparlers. Les participants au sommet mettent en garde tous ceux qui seraient tentés d'emprunter la meme voie que le Président Egyptien et de se laisser entrainer par ses démarches, car leur responsabilité devant l'histoire et devant la Nation arabe sera grande.
3. Le gel des relations politiques et diplomatiques avec le gouvernement égyptien et l'arret de toute forme d'échange avec ce gouvernement, sur le plan arabe et international, ainsi que l'application des mesures de boycott arabe contre toute personne, toute société ou toute institution égyptienne qui traiterait avec l'ennemi sioniste.
4. Le boycott de tout réunion de la Ligue arabe qui se tiendrait en Egypte. Les participants au sommet décident également de prendre les contacts nécessaires avec les pays de la Ligue arabe pour étudier avec eux le probleme du siege de la Ligue, des organisations qui dépendent de la Ligue et le probleme posé par l'appartenance de l'Egypte Sadatienne a cette organisation.
5. Les participants au sommet saluent fraternellement le peuple arabe palestinien qui lutte avec courage et détermination dans le territoires occupés, guidé par ses organisations patriotiques et populaires qui ont unanimement condamné la visite du traître Sadate en Palestine occupée.

Les participants au sommet resteront toujours vigilants pour dénoncer énergiquement toute tentative visant a remettre en cause la légitimité de l'OLP en tant que seul représentant du peuple palestinien.

6. Les participants au sommet enregistrent avec satisfaction les premieres réactions de certains pays arabes qui se sont élevés contre la visite-trahison. Ils demandent a ces pays de prendre les mesures pratiques nécessaires pour faire face aux dangers de la politique défaitiste et capitularde menée dans la région. Une des premieres mesures a prendre est la suspension de toute aid financiere et de toute assistance politique a l'Egypte sadatienne. Les

participants au sommet dénoncent, par contre, les attitudes de ceux qui ont osé magnifier la visite du Président Sadate, ou la soutenir. Ils les mettent en garde contre les conséquences désastreuses qu'une telle politique pourrait leur valoir.

7. Les participants au sommet demandent aux organisations officielles et populaires arabes d'accorder leur soutien économique, politique, militaire et financier à la République Arabe Syrienne, étant donné que la Syrie est devenue le principal pays du front et la principale citadelle d'où la Nation arabe pourra continuer à résister face à l'ennemi. La même aide doit être fournie au peuple palestinien représenté par l'OLP.

8. Les participants au sommet saluent le peuple arabe égyptien frère, et surtout ses forces patriotiques et progressistes qui refusent la politique défaitiste et capitulaire de Sadate. Cette politique qui est une véritable injure à la mémoire des martyrs du peuple égyptien est une atteinte grave aux vaillantes forces armées égyptiennes.

9. Conscients de l'importance des liens militants entre les forces syriennes et les forces palestiniennes, la République Arabe Syrienne et l'OLP ont décidé d'instaurer un front de lutte unissant les deux parties pour rendre plus efficace la lutte contre l'ennemi sioniste et pour déjouer les complots tramés par l'impérialisme. La République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, le Jamahiriya et le Yémen démocratique ont décidé de se joindre à ce front qui peut être considéré comme le noyau d'un large front arabe pour la résistance et la lutte. Ce front reste ouvert à tous les autres pays arabes qui peuvent décider de s'y joindre à tout moment.

10. Les membres de ce front national considéreront toute agression dont serait victime l'un d'eux comme une agression contre l'ensemble du front.

Les participants au Congrès, tout en s'engageant solennellement auprès de la Nation arabe à continuer la lutte et à rester toujours fidèles aux aspirations des masses arabes, affirment que la Nation arabe - cette Nation qui déclenché maintes révolutions victorieuses, qui a su vaincre les obstacles les plus difficiles, tout au long d'une longue histoire jalonnée par des actes militants en héroïques qui suscitent l'admiration - est aujourd'hui capable de répondre énergiquement à tous ses ennemis et de libérer définitivement des impérialistes et des renégats qui ont trahi ses valeurs et sa cause sacrée. Les chefs des États arabes progressistes sont absolument convaincus que, grâce à Dieu, cette Nation est capable d'aller de l'avant dans le chemin du progrès, jusqu'à la victoire finale.

Enfin, les participants au Congrès apprennent avec satisfaction que les combattants palestiniens ont décidé de s'unifier dans le cadre et sous l'égide de l'OLP.

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